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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
RENAIRE LEWIS
Appellant No. 1606 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 20, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0007008-2014
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED MARCH 11, 2016
Appellant, Renaire Lewis, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, following his
conviction of driving under the influence (“DUI”)—high rate of alcohol.1 We
affirm.
The trial court sets forth the relevant facts of this case as follows:
On July 19, 2014 at approximately 3:00 a.m., Lower
Pottsgrove Police Sergeant Robert Greenwood (“Sgt.
Greenwood”), a thirty year veteran of the force, was
investigating a vehicle (“Vehicle 1”) stopped on Buchert
Road which was blocking the westbound travel lane.
During his investigation, Sgt. Greenwood heard a second
vehicle driven by Appellant, accelerating towards him in
the westbound lane. Sgt. Greenwood attempted to alert
____________________________________________
1
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(b).
_____________________________
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Appellant of the danger by waving his flashlight, but
Appellant continued to accelerate toward the obstruction
caused by Vehicle 1. Eventually, Appellant slammed on his
brakes causing his tires to screech. As Appellant
decelerated, he swerved into the eastbound lane of
Buchert Road in order to avoid colliding with Sgt.
Greenwood or Vehicle 1.
After Appellant came to a complete stop, Sgt. Greenwood
approached Appellant’s vehicle and immediately observed
an unusual number of air fresheners throughout the
interior of Appellant’s vehicle. Sgt. Greenwood then
ordered Appellant to back up and park behind [Sgt.
Greenwood’s] unmarked patrol car.
Upon speaking with Appellant, Sgt. Greenwood noticed
that Appellant had glassy, blood-shot eyes and slurred
speech. Sgt. Greenwood then noted a strong odor of
alcohol emanating from Appellant’s person. Sgt.
Greenwood requested that Appellant perform field sobriety
tests. Appellant’s poor performance on the field sobriety
tests confirmed Sgt. Greenwood’s suspicion that Appellant
was [DUI]. Appellant was then placed under arrest.
(Trial Court Opinion, filed 7/29/15, at 1-2).
Procedurally, on October 21, 2014, the Commonwealth charged
Appellant with DUI—general impairment, DUI—high rate of alcohol, failure to
drive vehicle at safe speed, and failure to drive on roadways laned for traffic.
On February 4, 2015, Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence of
DUI, in which he alleged that Sgt. Greenwood illegally stopped Appellant’s
vehicle. After a hearing on April 15, 2015, the court denied Appellant’s
motion to suppress. On May 20, 2015, Appellant proceeded to a stipulated
bench trial; and the court found Appellant guilty of DUI—high rate of alcohol.
That same day, the court sentenced Appellant to a term of forty-eight (48)
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hours to six (6) months’ imprisonment. On May 27, 2015, Appellant timely
filed a notice of appeal. On May 29, 2015, the court ordered Appellant to file
a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b), and Appellant timely complied on June 16, 2015.
Appellant raises one issue for our review:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
[APPELLANT’S] MOTION TO SUPPRESS[?]
(Appellant’s Brief at 5).
Appellant argues Sgt. Greenwood merely possessed reasonable
suspicion that Appellant violated 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3361 (driving vehicle at safe
speed) when Sgt. Greenwood initiated the traffic stop. Appellant maintains
Sgt. Greenwood needed probable cause to stop Appellant because a traffic
stop for failure to drive vehicle at safe speed does not serve an investigatory
purpose. Appellant contends Sgt. Greenwood’s testimony that he initiated
the traffic stop to investigate a possible motor vehicle violation establishes
that Sgt. Greenwood lacked the probable cause necessary to stop Appellant
for a violation of Section 3361. Appellant asserts the Commonwealth’s
failure to introduce evidence of Appellant’s speed and the road conditions
further demonstrates that Sgt. Greenwood lacked probable cause to stop
Appellant. Appellant concludes the traffic stop of Appellant without probable
cause was unlawful and violated his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, and this Court should vacate his conviction. We disagree.
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Our standard of review of the denial of a motion to suppress evidence
is as follows:
[An appellate court’s] standard of review in addressing a
challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited
to determining whether the suppression court’s factual
findings are supported by the record and whether the legal
conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because
the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court,
we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth
and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains
uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a
whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are
supported by the record, [the appellate court is] bound by
[those] findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal
conclusions are erroneous. Where…the appeal of the
determination of the suppression court turns on allegations
of legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are
not binding on [the] appellate court, whose duty it is to
determine if the suppression court properly applied the law
to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the [trial court
are] subject to…plenary review.
Commonwealth v. Hoppert, 39 A.3d 358, 361-62 (Pa.Super. 2012),
appeal denied, 618 Pa. 684, 57 A.3d 68 (2012).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures. Commonwealth v. Carter, 105 A.3d
765, 768 (Pa.Super. 2014) (en banc), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 117 A.3d
295 (2015). “While warrantless seizures such as a vehicle stop are generally
prohibited, they are permissible if they fall within one of a few well-
delineated exceptions.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 606 Pa. 198, 204, 996
A.2d 473, 476 (2010). One such exception allows police officers to detain
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drivers for a brief investigation when they possess reasonable suspicion that
a violation of the vehicle code has taken place. Id. at 204, 996 A.2d at 477.
See also 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b).
Importantly, “[t]raffic stops based on reasonable suspicion: either of
criminal activity or a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code under the authority
of Section 6308(b) must serve a stated investigatory purpose.”
Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal
denied, 611 Pa. 650, 25 A.3d 327 (2011). “Mere reasonable suspicion will
not justify a vehicle stop when the driver’s detention cannot serve an
investigatory purpose relevant to the suspected violation.” Id. “Where a
vehicle stop has no investigatory purpose, the police officer must have
probable cause to support it.” Commonwealth v. Enick, 70 A.3d 843, 846
(Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 624 Pa. 671, 85 A.3d 482 (2014).
“Probable cause is made out when the facts and circumstances which are
within the knowledge of the officer at the time of the [stop], and of which he
has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a [person]
of reasonable caution in the belief that the suspect has committed or is
committing a crime.” Commonwealth v. Thompson, 604 Pa. 198, 203,
985, A.2d 928, 931 (2009). “Probable cause does not require certainty, but
rather exists when criminality is one reasonable inference, not necessarily
even the most likely inference.” Commonwealth v. Lindblom, 854 A.2d
604, 607 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 582 Pa. 672. 868 A.2d 1198
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(2005).
Section 3361 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code sets forth the
offense of driving vehicle at safe speed as follows:
§ 3361. Driving vehicle at safe speed
No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is
reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having
regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing,
nor at a speed greater than will permit the driver to bring
his vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance
ahead. Consistent with the foregoing, every person shall
drive at a safe and appropriate speed when approaching
and crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing,
when approaching and going around curve, when
approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any narrow
or winding roadway and when special hazards exist with
respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of
weather or highway conditions.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3361. Significantly, “[i]f a vehicle is stopped for speeding,
the officer must possess probable cause to stop the vehicle.”
Commonwealth v. Salter, 121 A.3d 987, 993 (Pa.Super. 2015). A police
officer must possess probable cause to stop a vehicle for a speeding violation
because nothing more can be determined regarding the violation once the
vehicle is stopped. Id.
Instantly, the trial court reasoned as follows:
Here, Sgt. Greenwood was conducting an investigation,
and while doing so, noticed Appellant’s vehicle coming
towards him. Sgt. Greenwood estimated that Appellant
was traveling approximately fifteen miles per hour over the
posted speed limit. Sgt. Greenwood attempted to grab
Appellant’s attention by waving his flashlight, but was
unable to do so. Appellant then crossed over the center
yellow line in order to narrowly avoid striking the vehicle
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obstructing his lane of travel. Due to Appellant’s high rate
of speed and his inability to safely navigate the obstacle in
the roadway, Sgt. Greenwood stopped him for failing to
drive at a safe speed. Accordingly, this [c]ourt found that
Sgt. Greenwood had probable cause to stop Appellant for
violating [75 Pa.C.S.A.] § 3361.
(Trial Court Opinion, filed 7/29/15, at 4). The record supports the trial
court’s sound reasoning. See Hoppert, supra.
Further, after Sgt. Greenwood initiated the traffic stop, he observed
that Appellant’s eyes were glassy and bloodshot, Appellant’s speech was
slurred, Appellant smelled of alcohol, and there were an unusual number of
air fresheners in Appellant’s car. Sgt. Greenwood subsequently removed
Appellant from the vehicle and performed sobriety tests, which Appellant
failed. Based on these observations of Appellant, Sgt. Greenwood concluded
probable cause existed to arrest Appellant for violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. §
3802. See Commonwealth v. Hilliar, 943 A.2d 984 (Pa.Super. 2008),
appeal denied, 598 Pa. 763, 956 A.2d 432 (2008) (holding probable cause
existed to arrest driver for DUI where driver smelled of alcohol and his
speech was slurred). Thus, neither the traffic stop nor Appellant’s
subsequent arrest for DUI violated Appellant’s constitutional rights; and the
trial court properly denied Appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence of
DUI. See Hoppert, supra. Accordingly, we affirm.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/11/2016
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Com. v. Lewis, R.
Combined Opinion