MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
Mar 15 2016, 10:17 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Mark S. Lenyo Gregory F. Zoeller
South Bend, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Paula J. Beller
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Darryl Dewitte Williams, March 15, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
71A05-1506-CR-782
v. Appeal from the St. Joseph
Superior Court
State of Indiana,
The Honorable Jane Woodward
Appellee-Plaintiff. Miller, Judge
Trial Court Cause Nos.
71D01-1409-FC-136 and
71D01-1409-FC-137
Najam, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] Darryl Dewitte Williams appeals his conviction and sentence for operating a
motor vehicle while privileges were forfeited for life, a Class C felony.
Williams raises two issues for our review, which we restate as follows:
1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support
Williams’ conviction.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it did
not identify Williams’ proffered mitigating factors as
significant when the court sentenced him.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On March 10, 2014, Indiana State Police Trooper Benjamin Werner initiated a
traffic stop of a speeding vehicle in South Bend. Upon pulling the vehicle over,
the driver, Williams, immediately exited the vehicle. Trooper Werner ordered
Williams back into the vehicle, and Williams complied. Trooper Werner then
approached Williams and asked him why he had exited the vehicle. Williams
responded that “he had to go to the bathroom.” Tr. at 18. Trooper Werner
processed Williams’ driving information and learned that Williams’ driving
privileges had previously been suspended for life. When Trooper Werner
approached Williams with this information, Williams stated that “he was
driving because his wife[, Stephanie,] didn’t feel good.” Id. at 23-24. Trooper
Werner, who is trained to determine whether someone is in medical distress,
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observed Stephanie in the vehicle and observed that she “seemed fine.” Id. at
24. And Stephanie did not bring herself to Trooper Werner’s attention during
the traffic stop.
[4] During the stop, Roseland Police Department Officer Tim Witham arrived to
assist Trooper Werner. While Trooper Werner and Williams were talking,
Officer Witham spoke to Stephanie. Officer Witham observed that Stephanie
had demonstrated no medical distress “whatsoever,” and Stephanie did not
inform Officer Witham of any medical issues. Id. at 30, 32.
[5] On April 2, Williams again operated a motor vehicle while his privileges were
suspended for life. When two officers initiated a traffic stop, Williams
attempted to flee. And when those officers were arresting Williams, he forcibly
resisted them.
[6] Thereafter, the State filed two informations against Williams. Under Cause
Number 71D01-1409-FC-136 (“FC-136”), the State alleged Williams operated a
motor vehicle while privileges were suspended for life, a Class C felony, and
twice resisted law enforcement, as Class A misdemeanors, for his conduct on
April 2, 2014. Under Cause Number 71D01-1409-FC-137 (“FC-137”), the
State alleged Williams operated a motor vehicle while privileges were
suspended for life, a Class C felony, for his conduct on March 10, 2014.
[7] Williams pleaded guilty as charged in Cause Number FC-136 and had a bench
trial on the State’s charge against him in Cause Number FC-137. At trial,
Williams and Stephanie testified that Stephanie had been driving the vehicle on
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March 10, but she had an asthma attack while driving. In light of that medical
condition, Williams took over operation of the vehicle. He had driven the
vehicle for six or seven minutes before he was pulled over by Trooper Werner.
At the conclusion of the bench trial, the court found Williams guilty as charged
in FC-137.
[8] The court then held a consolidated sentencing hearing. At that hearing,
Williams asserted that the following were mitigating factors: he had been
helping his elderly mother “around her house”; he had been helping his wife
through asthma and surgery on a torn rotator cuff; he had been trying to live
responsibly; and he had pleaded guilty to the offenses in FC-136. Id. at 103. In
light of those mitigators, Williams requested his sentence be suspended to home
detention. In response, the court stated:
I can’t do what you’re asking, in terms of home detention. I can
do community corrections, and you can work your way to home
detention. But . . . at some point too much is too much. You
have a terrible criminal history. . . . Of late, it’s been driving, but
it has been . . . a war between you and the law. You do what you
want to do, it seems like, and you have ten misdemeanors, five
felonies. A lot of those have been driving in the recent years . . . .
Id. at 105-06. The court then ordered Williams to serve an aggregate term of
four years in the St. Joseph County Community Corrections Center on work
release. This consolidated appeal ensued.
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Discussion and Decision
Issue One: Sufficiency of the Evidence in FC-137
[9] Williams first asserts that his conviction in FC-137 must be reversed because he
established an affirmative defense during his bench trial. Whether Williams
established his affirmative defense “is . . . essentially a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence.” Cain v. State, 844 N.E.2d 1063, 1066 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2006).
Our standard of review of such a challenge is well-settled. We
consider the evidence most favorable to the [judgment], along
with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in order to
determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We neither reweigh
the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. If there is
substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element
of the crime, we will not disturb the conviction.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
[10] We first observe that Williams explicitly concedes that the State presented
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Williams committed the offense of
operating a vehicle while privileges are suspended for life. Appellant’s Br. at
12. Instead of challenging the State’s case, Williams asserts that he presented
sufficient evidence to establish an affirmative defense. In particular, Williams
relies on Indiana Code Section 9-30-10-18 (2012), which states: “In a criminal
action brought under section . . . 17 . . . of this chapter, it is a defense that the
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operation of a motor vehicle . . . was necessary to save life or limb in an
extreme emergency.”
[11] Williams’ argument on appeal ignores our standard of review. Williams insists
that this court credit his and Stephanie’s testimony regarding her alleged
asthma attack and disregard the evidence most favorable to the trial court’s
judgment. We will not do so. The trier of fact was free to not credit Williams
or Stephanie in the first instance, and we will not reweigh their testimony on
appeal. And, in any event, both Trooper Werner and Officer Witham testified
that, at the time of the traffic stop, Stephanie did not appear to have any
medical issues and did not inform them of any medical issues. Indeed,
immediately after Trooper Werner had initiated the traffic stop, Williams stated
that he had to go to the bathroom; Williams did not inform Trooper Werner of
any emergency circumstances. We will not reweigh the evidence most
favorable to the trial court’s rejection of Williams’ affirmative defense on
appeal, and we affirm his conviction in Cause Number FC-137.
Issue Two: Sentencing
[12] Williams next asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it did not
identify his proffered mitigating circumstances as significant during sentencing.
As our supreme court has made clear:
sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial
court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of
discretion. . . . An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is
clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
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before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual
deductions to be drawn therefrom.
One way in which a trial court may abuse its discretion is failing
to enter a sentencing statement at all. Other examples include
entering a sentencing statement that explains reasons for
imposing a sentence—including a finding of aggravating and
mitigating factors if any—but the record does not support the
reasons, or the sentencing statement omits reasons that are
clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration,
or the reasons given are improper as a matter of law. Under
those circumstances, remand for resentencing may be the
appropriate remedy if we cannot say with confidence that the
trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly
considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.
Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-91 (Ind. 2007) (“Anglemyer I”) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218
(“Anglemyer II”). “An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a
mitigating factor requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence
is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Id. at 493. “However,
‘If the trial court does not find the existence of a mitigating factor after it has
been argued by counsel, the trial court is not obligated to explain why it has
found that the factor does not exist.’” Id. (quoting Fugate v. State, 608 N.E.2d
1370, 1374 (Ind. 1993)).
[13] Williams’ arguments on appeal largely rehash the statements he made to the
trial court. In particular, Williams again asserts that he helps his elderly mother
and his wife and that he has been trying to live a responsible life. But Williams
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does not support those statements by showing how the proffered mitigators,
either alone or together, were significant and clearly supported by the record.
See id. Accordingly, we reject those arguments on appeal.
[14] We separately address Williams’ contention that the trial court abused its
discretion when it failed to identify his guilty plea in Cause Number FC-136 as
a mitigating circumstance. Our supreme court has held that “a defendant who
pleads guilty deserves ‘some’ mitigating weight be given to the plea in return.”
Anglemyer II, 875 N.E.2d at 220 (quoting McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 584, 591
(Ind. 2007). But this does not obviate the appellant’s burden to show that guilty
plea was “significant.” Id. “For example, a guilty plea may not be significantly
mitigating when it does not demonstrate the defendant’s acceptance of
responsibility,” id., “or where the evidence against him is such that the decision
to plead guilty is merely a pragmatic one,” Wells v. State, 836 N.E.2d 475, 479
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.
[15] Here, Williams contends that he must be entitled to mitigating weight simply by
virtue of having pleaded guilty in Cause Number FC-136. But the above
authorities make clear that a guilty plea is not automatically a significant
mitigating circumstance. And Williams makes no argument on appeal to show
that his guilty plea was “significantly mitigating.” Anglemyer II, 875 N.E.2d at
220. Accordingly, we affirm Williams’ sentence.
[16] Affirmed.
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Riley, J., and May, J., concur.
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