In Re the Term. of the Parent-Child Relationship of: M.R.W., M.A.W., Ja.W., Se.W., Sa.W., and C.W. (Minor Children), and J.R. (Mother) v. Ind. Dept. of Child Services (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Mar 18 2016, 8:39 am

this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
regarded as precedent or cited before any Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Steven Knecht Gregory F. Zoeller
Vonderheide & Knecht, P.C. Attorney General of Indiana
Lafayette, Indiana
Robert J. Henke
Abigail R. Recker
Deputy Attorneys General
Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In Re The Termination Of The March 18, 2016
Parent-Child Relationship Of: Court of Appeals Case No.
79A02-1506-JT-702
M.R.W., M.A.W., Ja.W.,
Se.W., Sa.W., and C.W. (Minor Appeal from the Tippecanoe
Children), Superior Court
The Honorable Faith A. Graham,
and Judge
J.R. (Mother), Trial Court Cause Nos.
Appellant-Respondent, 79D03-1501-JT-1
79D03-1501-JT-2
v. 79D03-1501-JT-3
79D03-1501-JT-4
79D03-1501-JT-5
The Indiana Department of 79D03-1501-JT-6
Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.

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 Brown, Judge.

[1] J.R. (“Mother”) appeals the involuntary termination of her parental rights with

respect to her children, M.R.W., M.A.W., Ja.W., Se.W., Sa.W., and C.W. (the

“Children”). Mother raises one issue which we revise and restate as whether

the evidence is sufficient to support the termination of her parental rights. We

affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother has six children: daughter M.R.W., born March 16, 2005; daughter

M.A.W., born March 12, 2006; son Ja.W., born March 4, 2007; daughter

Se.W., born April 17, 2010; son Sa.W., born June 6, 2012; and daughter C.W.,

born June 5, 2013. In 2012, Mother and J.W., who is the father of the Children

(“Father,” and collectively with Mother, “Parents”),1 lost their home due to

non-payment of taxes following Father’s loss of his job. The family lived with

extended family before moving into a shelter in Aurora, Indiana, where they

stayed for about six or seven months. At the shelter, Mother met Melissa

Gabbard, who was a case manager there and who encouraged her to move her

family in with Gabbard’s boyfriend, Jerry Cantine, and they did so.

[3] During the time the family lived with Cantine, M.R.W. slept in the same bed as

Cantine. Mother was aware that Cantine had a criminal history and was a sex

1
The court also terminated the parental rights of Father. Appellant’s Appendix at 65. Father, however, does
not participate in this appeal. We therefore limit our recitation of the facts to those pertinent solely to
Mother’s appeal.

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 offender. At some point in October 2013, Cantine picked M.R.W. up from

school and moved her to the State of Ohio, where he kept M.R.W. in his care.

Cantine enrolled M.R.W. in school in Ohio, and she continued to sleep in the

same bed as Cantine. Mother signed a document giving Cantine permission to

provide medical treatment to M.R.W. and to take her to school, but she said

she did not understand the agreement. Parents did not report M.R.W. missing

until some time in January 2014. On January 18, 2014, M.R.W. was found in

the care of Cantine by Hamilton County Ohio Job and Family Services, and

she was removed and placed in foster care.

[4] On February 28, 2014, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a

petition alleging that the Children were children in need of services (“CHINS”)

based on Parents failing to report until January 2014 that M.R.W. had been

taken from school without Parents’ permission in October 2013. That same

day, the court held an initial/detention hearing and formally placed the

Children in foster care. The court also accepted transfer of M.R.W.’s case from

Ohio, where she had been located and detained.

[5] On April 9, 2014, the court held a factfinding hearing on the CHINS petition,

and adjudicated the Children as CHINS. In its fact finding order, the court

noted among other things that Mother has a learning disability and that she

failed to meet the medical needs of the Children, in that they had severe head

lice, one had significant sores on his head, and the infant had severe diaper

rash, an upper respiratory infection, and pneumonia. On May 12, 2014, the

court held a dispositional hearing, and on May 15, 2014, entered its order

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 requiring Mother’s participation in reunification services, which included

therapeutic visitation with the Children, home-based case management,

individual therapy, a comprehensive psychological evaluation, random drug

screens, and following all recommendations made pursuant to those services.

[6] On August 11, 2014, the court found that Mother had not participated in all

visitations with the Children and that the Children’s therapists indicated a

change or increase in Mother’s visitations would be detrimental to the

Children’s progress. On November 10, 2014, the court held a review hearing

and found that the “objectives of the dispositional decree have not been

accomplished.” DCS Ex. 2 at 16. On January 6, 2015, upon the motion of

DCS, the court temporarily suspended visitation between Mother and the

Children. On January 16, 2015, the court held a permanency hearing and

changed the permanency plan to termination of Parents’ parental rights.

[7] On January 16, 2015, DCS filed its termination petitions, and on March 20 and

23, 2015, the court held evidentiary hearings. At the time of the hearings,

M.R.W., M.A.W., and Ja.W. were placed in one foster home, Sa.W. and

Se.W. were placed in a second home, and C.W. was placed in a third home.

The court heard testimony from Rachel Proctor and Kelly Smith, who worked

as home-based case managers and visitation facilitators, Vanessa Cochran, a

therapist who worked with the Children, Nancy Gehring, the CASA appointed

to the Children, Arielle Fallardeau, the therapist working with Mother and

Father, Laura Tibbets, the DCS family case manager (“FCM Tibbets”),

Jonathan Wade, a therapist who worked with Father, Soledad Smith, a

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 therapist who worked with Mother, and Margarita Lora, a therapist who

worked with Ja.W. Additionally, Mother, Mother’s father, and one of

Mother’s roommates were called to testify by Mother’s counsel. Father also

testified.

[8] On May 14, 2015, the court entered its Order to Terminate Parent-Child

Relationship terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children (the

“Termination Order”), containing detailed findings of fact and conclusions of

law. The Termination Order contained findings consistent with the above and

stated in part:

FINDINGS OF FACT

*****

2. . . . Jerry Cantine reported to officials in Ohio that he had a
notarized statement from the parents authorizing him to enroll
[M.R.W.] in school and that he was paying the parents $200.00
per week to “keep” [M.R.W.].

3. Jerry Cantine has an extensive criminal history across
multiple states including arrests and/or convictions for Sexual
Misconduct, Rape, Interference with Custody, Kidnapping,
Child Abuse, Felony Possession of Drugs, Possession of Cocaine
....

*****

5. Although the parents deny exchanging money for [M.R.W.],
they admit knowing [M.R.W.] had slept in the same bed with

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 Jerry Cantine for some time. The children confirmed [M.R.W.]
slept in the same bed as Jerry. The children also disclosed that
[M.R.W.] had been stolen by “Uncle Jerry” and that she was
mad because nobody tried to stop him. Further, the children
reported to a school bus driver that the family tried to sell the
baby rather than [M.R.W.] but nobody wanted the baby.

6. At the time of removal, the family had no stable housing and
no stable income. The family had been staying at homeless
shelters for the past year even though they owned a residence.
The family was renting the residence to others for $500.00 per
month. Neighbors reported the residence was in an unlivable
condition when the family left. The residence was eventually
sold in a sheriff’s sale on September 9, 2013 for non-payment of
taxes.

7. In 2012-2013, DCS unsubstantiated six (6) reports regarding
the hygiene and health of the children. Two (2) reports of
physical abuse (inappropriate discipline) were also
unsubstantiated. Further, a sexual abuse report in July 2013
regarding [M.R.W.] and Jerry Cantine was unsubstantiated.
Neglect (Lack of Supervision, Environment Life/Health
Endangerment) was finally substantiated based on the January
2014 missing child alert.

8. When [M.R.W., M.A.W., and Ja.W.] were enrolled in
school, they each had severe head lice that eventually required
extremely short and/or shaved haircuts to alleviate the problem.
All three (3) of them were grossly behind academically. At the
time of removal, the personal hygiene and overall health and
well-being of all of the children remained problematic. [M.R.W.]
had another severe case of head lice. [Ja.W.] had another severe
case of head lice resulting in sores on his head. [Se.W.] had a
severe case of head lice as well as a cold that was interfering with
sleep. [Sa.W.] had a severe case of head lice and a severe cold
affecting his breathing. [C.W.] had a severe upper respiratory
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 infection and diaper rash both requiring medical attention.
Emergency room physicians treated [C.W.] for pneumonia and
noted she presented with symptoms of Down Syndrome.

*****

11. Case conferences, family team meetings, and review hearings
were held periodically. [DCS] and CASA prepared separate
written reports and recommendations prior to each hearing.

12. A permanency hearing was held on January 16, 2015 at
which time the permanent plan was determined to be initiation of
proceedings for termination of parental rights and adoption.
Neither parent had yet shown a real investment in reunification.
DCS filed its petitions in the above-referenced Cause No. on
January 16, 2015. The evidentiary hearing on the Verified
Petitions to Terminate Parental Rights was held on March 20,
2015. At the time of the termination hearing, the circumstances
of the parents had not improved. The parents were in no better
position to care for the children.

13. The parents have a long-term history of housing instability. .
..

14. The parents still do not have independent housing and have
taken no concrete steps to obtain independent housing. The
parents have been secretive and dishonest regarding current and
future living arrangements. The parents are currently residing
with three (3) other adults and a teenager in a four (4) bedroom
home.

15. Mother is not employed and made little to no effort to obtain
employment. Instead, Mother submitted her third application for
disability citing learning difficulties and pinched nerves making it

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 difficult to remain on her feet resulting in a need for pain
medication. Mother lacks the motivation to take care of either
herself or a home and was discharged from services to assist in
obtaining disability for lack of attendance.

*****

18. Mother completed assessments timely. Mother attended
appointments and generally participated in services. Mother
regularly attended supervised visits as scheduled. However,
Mother demonstrated very little engagement and made no
progress in achieving therapeutic goals.

*****

20. Neither parent has demonstrated a true understanding of the
trauma suffered by the children as a result of neglect and lack of
supervision. Neither parent has truly acknowledged
responsibility for the abuse inflicted on the children by Jerry
Cantine. At times, the parents have demanded physical evidence
and refused to accept even the possibility of abuse in order to
assist the children.

21. The parents participated in therapeutically supervised visits
with the children. Therapists noted tremendous chaos during
visits. At the onset of visits, the children would gorge themselves
on food. The parents made progress regarding appropriate
nutrition for the children and provided activities for the family.
The sibling bonds improved over the course of time. However,
the level of hostility and aggression observed in the parents
increased. Visits were eventually suspended when the parents
failed to respond to a choking hazard, became aggressive, and
violated visitation guidelines all in the presence of the children.

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 22. CASA, Nancy Gehring, supports termination of parental
rights in the best interests of the children. CASA agrees that
adoption is appropriate for the children. The children are doing
well in their respective placements and have no special needs that
would prevent adoption. The children are adoptable even if their
current placement is unable to adopt for any reason. The oldest
four (4) children have all disclosed abuse by “Uncle Jerry”.

23. [M.R.W.] has disclosed physical, emotional, and sexual
abuse by Jerry Cantine including days without being fed.
[M.R.W.] has made significant progress in therapy addressing
self-hatred and self-banning behaviors. [M.R.W.] is able to
express positive emotions and is happy in a concurrent foster
placement.

24. [M.A.W.] also disclosed sexual abuse by Jerry Cantine while
sleeping in the same bed. [M.A.W.] has made progress in
therapy in addressing emotional awareness. [M.A.W.] expresses
happiness to be in foster care.

25. [Ja.W.] disclosed physical and sexual abuse by Jerry Cantine
specifically stating that “Uncle Jerry” touched his ‘no-no’ and it
hurt. [Ja.W.] defines his ‘no-no’ as his behind. [Ja.W.] displays
a great deal of fear regarding Jerry Cantine.

26. [Se.W.] has also shared experiences of possible sexual abuse.
[Se.W.] reports telling Mother that she was touched by Jerry and
that Mother told Jerry to stop. [Se.W.] has also made great
progress in therapy.

27. When notified of the children’s disclosures, both parents
initially denied the events could have happened stating the
children were always under supervision. The parents vacillated
greatly for months regarding the children’s trauma at points
believing the children and at other points disbelieving the

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 children. The parents verbalized some responsibility during the
CHINS proceeding but subsequent statements indicate otherwise.
As recently as February, Mother still stated she does not
understand why the children were removed. . . .

28. CASA notes the “crux of whole case” is that neither parent
accepts responsibility for DCS involvement a year later. Even at
the termination hearing, neither parent was able to fully accept
responsibility for the children’s abuse. Mother testified Jerry
Cantine intimidated and physically assaulted her but that she
trusted Ms. Gabbard who introduced the family to Jerry Cantine
and that is what caused the family trouble. . . .

*****

30. Although the parents may love the children, neither has the
ability to meet the children’s needs. It is clearly unsafe for the
children to be in the care of the parents. All imaginable services
have been offered and nothing is singularly different in today’s
circumstances since the time of removal. To continue the parent-
child relationships would be detrimental to the children. The
children need permanency now.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in the removal of the children from the parents’ care or
the reasons for the continued placement outside the home will
not be remedied.

*****

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 4. For the foregoing reasons, it is in the best interests of [the
Children] that the parental rights of [Mother] and [Father] be
terminated.

Appellant’s Appendix at 61-65.

Discussion

[9] The issue is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the termination of

Mother’s parental rights. In order to terminate a parent-child relationship, DCS

is required to allege and prove, among other things:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least
six (6) months under a dispositional decree.

(ii) A court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6
that reasonable efforts for family preservation or
reunification are not required, including a description of
the court’s finding, the date of the finding, and the manner
in which the finding was made.

(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has
been under the supervision of a local office or probation
department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most
recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date
the child is removed from the home as a result of the child
being alleged to be a child in need of services or a
delinquent child;

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

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 (i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
placement outside the home of the parents will not be
remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-
being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). If the court finds that the allegations in a petition

described in Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4 are true, the court shall terminate the parent-

child relationship. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a).

[10] The State’s burden of proof for establishing the allegations in termination cases

“is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-

1261 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2), reh’g denied. This is “a

‘heightened burden of proof reflecting termination’s ‘serious social

consequences.’” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014) (quoting In re G.Y.,

904 N.E.2d at 1260-1261, 1260 n.1). “But weighing the evidence under that

heightened standard is the trial court’s prerogative-in contrast to our well-

settled, highly deferential standard of review.” Id. “We do not reweigh the

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 evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses, but consider only the

evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn

from the evidence.” Id. (quoting Egly v. Blackford Cnty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 592

N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 1992)). “We confine our review to two steps: whether

the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings, and then whether

the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.” Id.

[11] “Reviewing whether the evidence ‘clearly and convincingly’ supports the

findings, or the findings ‘clearly and convincingly’ support the judgment, is not

a license to reweigh the evidence.” Id. “[W]e do not independently determine

whether that heightened standard is met, as we would under the ‘constitutional

harmless error standard,’ which requires the reviewing court itself to ‘be

sufficiently confident to declare the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’”

Id. (quoting Harden v. State, 576 N.E.2d 590, 593 (Ind. 1991) (citing Chapman v.

California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967), reh’g denied)). “Our review must

‘give ‘due regard’ to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of the

witnesses firsthand,’ and ‘not set aside [its] findings or judgment unless clearly

erroneous.’” Id. (quoting K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., Dearborn Cnty. Office,

989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013) (citing Ind. Trial Rule 52(A))). “Because a

case that seems close on a ‘dry record’ may have been much more clear-cut in

person, we must be careful not to substitute our judgment for the trial court

when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence.” Id. at 640.

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[12] Here, Mother does not challenge the court’s conclusions regarding Ind. Code §

31-35-2-4(b)(2)(A) and -4(b)(2)(D). We therefore confine our discussion to the

other parts of Section 4(b)(2).

Remedy of Conditions

[13] We note that the involuntary termination statute is written in the disjunctive

and requires proof of only one of the circumstances listed in Ind. Code § 31-35-

2-4(b)(2)(B). Because we find it to be dispositive under the facts of this case, we

limit our review to whether DCS established that there was a reasonable

probability that the conditions resulting in the removal or reasons for placement

of the Children outside the home will not be remedied. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-

4(b)(2)(B)(i).

[14] In determining whether the conditions that resulted in the Children’s removal

will not be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at

642-643. First, we identify the conditions that led to removal; and second, we

determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will

not be remedied. Id. at 643. In the second step, the trial court must judge a

parent’s fitness as of the time of the termination proceeding, taking into

consideration evidence of changed conditions and balancing a parent’s recent

improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there

is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. We entrust that

delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent’s prior

history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination. Id.

Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not
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 preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of

their future behavior. Id.

[15] In making such a determination, the court must judge a parent’s fitness to care

for his or her child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into

consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392

(Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Due to the permanent effect of termination, the trial court

also must evaluate the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct to determine the

probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child. Id. “The statute does

not simply focus on the initial basis for a child’s removal for purposes of

determining whether a parent’s rights should be terminated, but also those bases

resulting in the continued placement outside the home.” Id. (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). A court may properly consider evidence of

a parent’s prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect,

failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment. Id.

A trial court can reasonably consider the services offered by DCS to the parent

and the parent’s response to those services. Id. Further, where there are only

temporary improvements and the pattern of conduct shows no overall progress,

the court might reasonably find that under the circumstances, the problematic

situation will not improve. Id. A trial court need not wait until a child is

irreversibly influenced by a deficient lifestyle such that his or her physical,

mental, and social growth are permanently impaired before terminating the

parent-child relationship. In re Z.C., 13 N.E.3d 464, 469 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014),

trans. denied.

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[16] Mother argues that she has made efforts to remedy the conditions causing the

Children’s removal by attending meetings, in which she “was punctual and

organized.” Appellant’s Brief at 12. She asserts that she did the homework

assigned to her, had a positive attitude, and began to make some progress,

including providing healthier and more nutritious food and managing the

Children’s behavior during meals. She argues that she felt betrayed by

Gabbard, who introduced her family to Cantine, and accordingly it took her

awhile to begin to open up to the DCS case workers. She maintains that she

has begun to internalize what she has been taught by her therapist and that her

engagement has enabled her to make progress. She argues that she is working

with her case manager regarding budgeting, housing, and the Children’s

behavioral problems and continues to work with her therapist as well.

[17] DCS argues that Mother does not specifically challenge any of the court’s

findings of fact, that those findings stand as proven, and that this Court need

only review the unchallenged findings to determine whether they support the

termination judgment. DCS argues that, at the time of the termination hearing,

Mother still did not have stable housing and had not benefitted from services to

identify sexual predators and the trauma the Children experienced from

Cantine. It asserts that the record reflects Mother failed to benefit from

individual therapy services, in which she did not make progress “until only a

couple sessions just prior to the termination hearing.” Appellee’s Brief at 32.

DCS maintains that Mother continues to deny her responsibility for the sexual

abuse experienced by the Children, failed to make a budget to obtain stable

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 housing, and was residing with a couple she had known for only six months.

DCS notes that visitations ceased after the Parents became more aggressive

during the visits.

[18] To the extent Mother does not challenge any of the juvenile court’s findings of

fact, these unchallenged facts stand as proven. See In re B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369,

373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (failure to challenge findings by the trial court resulted

in waiver of the argument that the findings were clearly erroneous), trans.

denied; McMaster v. McMaster, 681 N.E.2d 744, 747 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (when

the father failed to challenge specific findings, the court accepted them as true).

[19] The Children were removed from Mother’s care due to her failure to provide

them with stable housing, the lack of stable income, and the sexual abuse

suffered by the Children, especially M.R.W. Regarding abuse, the court in its

Termination Order found that Mother put the Children in a situation in which

at least M.R.W., M.A.W., and Ja.W became victims of sexual abuse, and

Se.W. also spoke of experiences of possible sexual abuse. Mother allowed

M.R.W. to sleep in the same bed as Cantine, who she knew to have a history as

a criminal and sex offender. Mother allowed Cantine to move M.R.W. to Ohio

in October 2013, and she did not report M.R.W. to be missing until January

2014. Cantine reported that he paid Parents $200 per week to keep M.R.W.,

although Mother denied this. The Children also told their bus driver about

Mother’s decision to permit Cantine to move M.R.W. and that the family had

tried to sell the baby, presumably C.W., rather than M.R.W. but that nobody

wanted the baby.

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[20] The court found that Mother has not demonstrated a true understanding of the

abuse the Children suffered as the result of her neglect and has not

acknowledged responsibility for exposing them to Cantine. It found that

Mother initially denied that such abuse could have happened, that she

vacillated for months regarding the trauma, that she verbalized some

responsibility during the CHINS proceeding but that subsequent statements

indicated otherwise, and that as recently as February 2015 she stated that she

still did not understand why the Children had been removed. It noted that, in

the CASA’s view, the “crux of whole case” is that Mother has not accepted

responsibility for DCS’s involvement and that at the termination hearing she

did not fully accept responsibility for the Children’s abuse, claiming that it was

the result of intimidation and physical assaults by Cantine. Appellant’s

Appendix at 65. The court found that, although Mother completed assessments

in a timely fashion and generally participated in services, she has demonstrated

little engagement and has not made progress in achieving therapeutic goals. It

found that the supervised visits were chaotic and that the level of hostility and

aggression Mother displayed at the visits increased over time, resulting in the

suspension of those visits when she failed to respond to a choking hazard and

became aggressive. In addition, the court found:

The parents made limited to no progress toward understanding
sexual abuse, recognizing signs of trauma in children, identifying
potential perpetrators, parenting victims of sexual abuse, or
preventing children’s victimization. Neither parent has the
ability to make safe decisions for the children. The parents are
likely to allow anyone with resources needed by the family to

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 access the children. The family plan at the time of termination
was for the children to be returned to the home where the parents
currently reside with Father working while Mother provides
supervision. The parents do not know the full background of all
of the adults residing in that home. Further, the owner of the
home offered to become a foster placement for the children after
knowing the parents for only a short period of time and the
parents agreed.

Id.

[21] Also, regarding stable and suitable housing and income, the court found that

Mother has a long history of housing instability, she still does not have

independent housing and has not taken steps toward obtaining such housing,

she has been secretive and dishonest regarding her living arrangements, and

that currently she and Father are residing with three other adults and a teenager

in a four-bedroom home. The court found that Mother has not made an effort

to obtain employment and instead has submitted multiple applications for

disability, in which she cites learning difficulties and pinched nerves as reasons

for qualifying for disability. For her part, Mother argues only that she is

working with her case manager and her therapist on budgeting and housing, in

which she cites to her own testimony for the proposition.

[22] Based upon the court’s findings and the record, we conclude that clear and

convincing evidence supports the trial court’s determination that there is a

reasonable probability that the conditions leading to the Children’s removal will

not be remedied.

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 Best Interests

[23] We next consider Mother’s assertion that DCS did not present clear and

convincing evidence that termination was in the Children’s best interests. She

argues that the service providers agree that Mother loves her Children and

wants to help them have a better future. She notes that currently the Children

are divided between three foster homes and that once the therapeutic visits

ended the siblings who were not sharing a foster home were no longer able to be

together except on three occasions. She also asserts that the Children “seemed

to enjoy visits with their parents.” Appellant’s Brief at 18.

[24] We are mindful that in determining what is in the best interests of a child, the

trial court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and to the

totality of the evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 798

N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In so doing, the court must subordinate

the interests of the parent to those of the children. Id. The court need not wait

until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child

relationship. Id. Children have a paramount need for permanency which the

Indiana Supreme Court has called a central consideration in determining the

child’s best interests. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 647-648. However, “focusing on

permanency, standing alone, would impermissibly invert the best-interests

inquiry . . . .” Id. at 648. This court has previously held that the

recommendation by both the case manager and child advocate to terminate

parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal

will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that

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 termination is in the child’s best interests. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 987

N.E.2d 1150, 1158-1159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[25] At the termination hearing, FCM Tibbets testified that termination was in the

Children’s best interest for many reasons, including that Mother has not

benefitted significantly from services provided and that she does not have the

necessary housing, income, or transportation to provide for the six Children.

Also, when asked whether it was in the Children’s best interest to be returned to

Mother, CASA Gehring testified that they should not be returned and that she

did not believe the Children “would be safe, even from the get go.” Transcript

at 73. Based on these statements, as well as the totality of the evidence in the

record and set forth in the Termination Order, including Mother not reporting

M.R.W. for three months following Cantine taking her to Ohio, reports that

M.R.W., M.A.W., Ja.W., and Se.W. had been sexually abused, Mother’s lack

of suitable housing and income, and her limited progress with services, we

conclude that the court’s determination that termination was in the Children’s

best interests is supported by clear and convincing evidence. See In re J.C., 994

N.E.2d 278, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (observing that “[r]ecommendations of

the case manager . . . in addition to evidence the conditions resulting in removal

will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence

that termination is in the child’s best interests”), reh’g denied.

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 Conclusion

[26] We conclude that the trial court’s judgment terminating the parental rights of

Mother is supported by clear and convincing evidence. We find no error and

affirm.

[27] Affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and Mathias, J., concur.

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