[Cite as State v. McQuirt, 2016-Ohio-1095.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee : C.A. CASE NO. 26667
:
v. : T.C. NO. 15CR76
:
ROBBIE McQUIRT : (Criminal Appeal from
: Common Pleas Court)
Defendant-Appellant :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on the ___18th___ day of ____March_____, 2016.
...........
CARLEY J. INGRAM, Atty. Reg. No. 0020084, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 301 W.
Third Street, 5th floor, Dayton, Ohio 45422
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
J. ALLEN WILMES, Atty. Reg. No. 0012093, 7821 N. Dixie Drive, Dayton, Ohio 45414
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
ROBBIE McQUIRT, #714768, Chillicothe Correctional Institute, P. O. Box 5500,
Chillicothe, Ohio 45601
Defendant-Appellant
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FROELICH, J.
{¶ 1} Robbie McQuirt pled guilty in the Montgomery County Court of Common
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Pleas to one count of domestic violence (two prior convictions), a third-degree felony. In
exchange for the plea, the State dismissed a second count of domestic violence. The
parties agreed to a prison sentence between 12 and 24 months and that the court would
not grant judicial release. The trial court accepted McQuirt’s plea and sentenced him to
24 months in prison.
{¶ 2} McQuirt’s appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), indicating that he was unable to find any
potential assignments of error having arguable merit. By entry, we informed McQuirt that
his attorney had filed an Anders brief on his behalf and granted him 60 days from that
date to file a pro se brief. No pro se brief was filed.
{¶ 3} We have conducted our independent review of the record pursuant to
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and we agree with
appellate counsel that there are no non-frivolous issues for review.
I. Factual and Procedural History
{¶ 4} In January 2015, McQuirt was indicted on two counts of domestic violence,
in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), based on events that occurred on November 14, 2014,
and January 9, 2015, involving his then-girlfriend. The indictment alleged that McQuirt
had previously been convicted of domestic violence in 2002 (Circleville M.C. No.
02CRB1135) and 2012 (Franklin Cty. M.C. No. 12CRB5716). Each count was a felony
of the third degree, with a maximum penalty of 36 months in prison.
{¶ 5} Trial was originally scheduled for March 16, 2015. At McQuirt’s counsel’s
request, the trial was rescheduled for March 23, 2015.
{¶ 6} During the pendency of the case, McQuirt, through counsel, filed several
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motions, including two motions for a continuance, a motion for a competency evaluation
for and exclusion of a child-witness, a motion for a jury view, and requests for discovery.
On March 20, 2015, McQuirt filed numerous pro se motions, including a motion for the
provision of media evidence, a motion for his investigator to gain access to OnBase
records, a demand for discovery of an OnBase table of contents, a motion for discharge
on speedy trial grounds, a motion to represent himself, and a motion to “impeach witness.”
{¶ 7} On March 22, the day before trial, McQuirt’s counsel filed a supplemental
demand for discovery related to jail telephone calls and motions in limine related to
McQuirt’s criminal history and statements of the complainant during recorded telephone
calls with McQuirt while McQuirt was in jail.
{¶ 8} The trial court addressed most of the counsel’s motions and the pro se
motions in a conference on the morning of the first day of trial (March 23) and in
subsequent written rulings. The case proceeded to trial on the afternoon of March 23,
2015.
{¶ 9} On the morning of March 25, 2015, prior to beginning the third day of trial,
the parties reached a plea agreement. The trial court conducted a plea hearing, during
which McQuirt pled guilty to one count of domestic violence, with an agreed sentencing
range of 12 to 24 months, with no judicial release. The second count of domestic
violence was dismissed. The court ordered a presentence investigation.
{¶ 10} The trial court held a sentencing hearing on April 8, 2015. The trial court
indicated that it had reviewed the presentence investigation report, defense counsel’s
sentencing memorandum, and letters of support from McQuirt’s mother and from a co-
worker. During statements from counsel, the State requested a 24-month sentence, and
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defense counsel asked for a 12-month sentence. McQuirt also made a statement to the
court. The court imposed 24 months in prison, with 104 days of jail time credit. The
court advised McQuirt that it would not consider him for judicial release. The court
informed McQuirt that he was subject to a mandatory term of 3 years of post-release
control and of the consequences of violating post-release control. The court ordered
McQuirt to pay court costs. McQuirt was informed of his right to appeal.
{¶ 11} McQuirt appeals from his conviction.
II. Anders Review: No Non-Frivolous Issues Exist
{¶ 12} On appeal, McQuirt’s counsel asks this court to review whether McQuirt
“waived all possible rulings, pretrial and during trial,” by entering a guilty plea in the middle
of the trial. Counsel also raises the trial court’s compliance with Crim.R. 11 at the plea
hearing and whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a 24-month sentence,
the maximum term of the agreed-upon range.
{¶ 13} As an initial matter, we find that there are no non-frivolous issues related to
the trial court’s pretrial rulings and rulings at trial. A plea of guilty is a complete admission
of guilt. E.g., State v. Faulkner, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2013-CA-43, 2015-Ohio-2059,
¶ 9; State v. Wheeler, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24112, 2011-Ohio-3423, ¶ 3; Crim.R.
11(B)(1). Consequently, a guilty plea waives all appealable errors that may have
occurred in the trial court, unless such errors precluded the defendant from knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily entering his guilty plea. See, e.g., State v. Kelley, 57 Ohio
St.3d 127, 566 N.E.2d 658 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus; Wheeler at ¶ 3.
{¶ 14} In general, a defendant’s guilty plea precludes, among other claims, that (1)
defendant’s statutory speedy trial rights were violated, Kelley at paragraph one of the
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syllabus; (2) the trial erred in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment, State
v. Hess, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24453, 2012-Ohio-961, ¶ 23; (3) trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance, State v. Kidd, 2d Dist. Clark No. 03CA43, 2004-Ohio-6784, ¶ 16;
(4) defendant’s conviction was based on insufficient evidence or was against the manifest
weight of the evidence, State v. Barrett, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24150, 2011-Ohio-
2303, ¶ 3; and (5) the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress, Wheeler. Upon
review of the record before us, we find no error that would have precluded McQuirt from
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering his guilty plea. Accordingly, McQuirt’s
guilty plea waived any challenge to the court’s pretrial rulings and rulings at trial.
{¶ 15} Second, appellate counsel asserts that no arguably meritorious claims exist
concerning McQuirt’s plea.
{¶ 16} Crim.R. 11(C)(2) requires the court to address the defendant personally and
(a) determine that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with an understanding of
the nature of the charges and the maximum penalty, and, if applicable, that the defendant
is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions; (b) inform
the defendant of and determine that the defendant understands the effect of the plea of
guilty and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and
sentencing; and (c) inform the defendant and determine that he or she understands that,
by entering the plea, the defendant is waiving the rights to a jury trial, to confront
witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses, and
to require the State to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which he or she
cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself. State v. Brown, 2d Dist.
Montgomery No. 21896, 2007-Ohio-6675, ¶ 3.
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{¶ 17} The Supreme Court of Ohio has urged trial courts to literally comply with
Crim.R. 11. State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 29.
However, because Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b) involve non-constitutional rights, the trial
court need only substantially comply with those requirements. E.g., State v. Nero, 56
Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990). “Substantial compliance means that under
the totality of the circumstances the defendant subjectively understands the implications
of his plea and the rights he is waiving.” Id. In contrast, the trial court must strictly
comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), as it pertains to the waiver of federal constitutional rights.
Clark at ¶ 31.
{¶ 18} Furthermore, when non-constitutional rights are at issue, a defendant who
challenges his plea on the basis that it was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
made generally must show a prejudicial effect. State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176,
2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 17. Prejudice in this context means that the plea
would otherwise not have been entered. Id. at ¶ 15.
{¶ 19} Upon review of the transcript of the plea hearings, the trial court fully
complied with the requirements of Crim.R. 11. The court inquired about McQuirt’s ability
to understand the proceedings. All of McQuirt’s answers reflected that he was able to
proceed with the plea hearing.
{¶ 20} During the plea hearing, McQuirt indicated that he was on probation in two
other counties. The trial court informed McQuirt that it had no control over what would
occur in the other counties; McQuirt expressed that he was willing to proceed with the
plea. The trial court informed McQuirt of the maximum penalty for his offense and that
he was eligible for community control, but that he would receive a sentence within a range
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of 12 to 24 months. The court stated that it would not consider him for judicial release.
The court indicated that it would not impose a fine, but it could impose court costs. The
court told McQuirt of his post-release control obligation and the consequences if he
violated it.
{¶ 21} McQuirt stated that he understood that his guilty plea was a complete
admission of guilt. He indicated that he was not coerced to enter the plea and that he
was entering his plea voluntarily. The trial court informed McQuirt of the constitutional
rights that he was waiving by his plea, and McQuirt stated that he understood that he was
giving up his right to appeal pretrial rulings and was withdrawing any pending motions
before the court. McQuirt further stated that he understood the charge against him, that
the facts as alleged were true, and that he had discussed the elements of the offense and
any possible defenses with his attorney. McQuirt signed a plea form reflecting the plea
agreement reached by the parties.
{¶ 22} Upon review of the record, we find no non-frivolous issues related to
McQuirt’s plea.
{¶ 23} Finally, we find no non-frivolous argument related to McQuirt’s sentence.
Absent the parties’ agreement, McQuirt faced a sentence between 9 and 36 months in
prison. The agreed sentencing range of 12 to 24 months was authorized by law, and
McQuirt received a sentence within the agreed sentencing range. McQuirt’s
presentence investigation report indicated that he had several juvenile adjudications and
adult misdemeanor convictions. We cannot clearly and convincingly find that the
sentence was unsupported by the record or conclude that it was an abuse of
discretion.
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III. Conclusion
{¶ 24} The trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.
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DONOVAN, P.J. and WELBAUM, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Carley J. Ingram
J. Allen Wilmes
Robbie McQuirt
Hon. Steven K. Dankof