UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-1912
JOSE RODOLFO MEDRANO-GAYTAN, a/k/a Rodolfo Medrano-Gaytan,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: February 23, 2016 Decided: March 18, 2016
Before WILKINSON, KING, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Randall L. Johnson, JOHNSON & ASSOCIATES, P.C., Arlington,
Virginia, for Petitioner. Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Emily Anne Radford, Assistant
Director, Brett F. Kinney, Office of Immigration Litigation,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for
Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jose Rodolfo Medrano-Gaytan, a native and citizen of El
Salvador, petitions for review of an order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (Board) dismissing his appeal from the
immigration judge’s (IJ) order denying his motion to reopen. We
deny the petition for review.
An alien may file one motion to reopen within 90 days of
the entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) (2015).
This time limit does not apply if the basis for the motion is to
seek asylum or withholding of removal “based on changed country
conditions, . . . if such evidence is material and was not
available and would not have been discovered or presented at the
previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) (2012);
accord 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(c)(4)(i) (2015). The alien bears the
burden of establishing changed country conditions. See Wanrong
Lin v. Holder, 771 F.3d 177, 185 (4th Cir. 2014) (noting that
alien’s burden “was to show that country conditions in [his
country] were materially different from those conditions at the
time of his original removal proceedings”); In re S-Y-G-, 24 I.
& N. Dec. 247, 253 (B.I.A. 2007).
We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of
discretion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b); Mosere v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d
397, 400 (4th Cir. 2009). The “denial of a motion to reopen is
2
reviewed with extreme deference, given that motions to reopen
are disfavored because every delay works to the advantage of the
deportable alien who wishes merely to remain in the United
States.” Sadhvani v. Holder, 596 F.3d 180, 182 (4th Cir. 2009)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The motion
“shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to
be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by
affidavits and other evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.23(b)(3) (2015).
We also recognize three independent grounds on which a
motion to reopen removal proceedings may be denied: “(1) the
alien has not established a prima facie case for the underlying
substantive relief sought; (2) the alien has not introduced
previously unavailable, material evidence; and (3) where relief
is discretionary, the alien would not be entitled to the
discretionary grant of relief.” Onyeme v. INS, 146 F.3d 227,
234 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05
(1988)). We will “reverse the denial of such a motion only if
the [Board] acted arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to
law.” Prasad v. Holder, 776 F.3d 222, 225 (4th Cir. 2015). Our
review is limited to “the administrative record on which the
order of removal is based.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A) (2012);
Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 123 n.3 (4th Cir.
2011).
3
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the finding
that Medrano-Gaytan did not establish a change in country
conditions that would warrant excusing the 90-day time limit for
motions to reopen. Accordingly, because Medrano-Gaytan’s motion
to reopen was untimely, and he did not show a material change in
country conditions, we deny the petition for review. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
4