J-S05030-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
MICHAEL TYRONE WALKER,
Appellant No. 933 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 29, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0001328-2012
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, and PLATT,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED MARCH 18, 2016
Appellant, Michael Tyrone Walker, appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered following his convictions of one count each of murder of
the first degree, murder of the second degree, murder of the third degree,
robbery, burglary, criminal trespass, theft, receiving stolen property,
possessing instruments of crime, and eight counts of conspiracy. We affirm.
The trial court summarized the factual history of this case as follows:
On December 19, 2011, Pennsylvania State Police (PSP)
Trooper Michael Koslosky was dispatched to 720 Chestnut
Street, in Shoemakersville, Berks County, in response to a
suspected residential burglary. When Trooper Koslosky arrived
at the residence, he was met by the homeowner, Brian Trump.
Mr. Trump told the officer that when he arrived home from work
that afternoon around 4:00 p.m., his home was in disarray. Mr.
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Trump estimated that he was missing approximately $8,000.00
in cash and two handguns. Other suspicious items were found
inside the home, including discarded vinyl gloves, a prybar, and
blood spatter in the hallway and bedroom.
Mr. Trump explained to Trooper Koslosky that his house
guest, Stephen Leibensperger, had not been located. Mr.
Leibensperger had recently relocated and was staying with Mr.
Trump. Trooper Matthew Brady, a criminal investigator with the
PSP Hamburg barracks, arrived to provide assistance with
Trooper Koslosky’s initial investigation. The officers decided to
canvas the neighborhood. Troopers Brady and Koslosky
conducted a more thorough search of the residence. Trooper
Brady then located a large pool of blood in the bedroom.
Resting in the pool of blood was a black plastic handle from a
kitchen knife. Subsequently, Troopers Brady and Koslosky
located the body of Stephen Leibensperger wrapped in sheets
and bedding in the attic of Mr. Trump’s residence. Trooper
Brady officially declared the residence a crime scene.
Information from neighbors led investigators to the
retrieval of videotape footage from a Berks Area Reading
Transportation Authority (BARTA) bus depicting three black
males, all dressed in black clothing. These individuals were
identified as Appellant, Mark Ellis, Sr., and Brian Simpkins.
Cameras located on the bus traveling from Reading to
Shoemakersville, captured images of the suspects during a mid-
morning route on December 19, 2011. Additionally, police
obtained surveillance footage from a Sheetz gas station on
Shoemakersville Avenue depicting the same three individuals
exiting the bus at approximately 10:30 a.m. and walking on
Noble Avenue toward Chestnut Street.
Brian Trump was interviewed by Trooper Brady and
immediately identified Appellant to police as a person of interest.
Earlier in the day on December 19, Mr. Leibensperger called Mr.
Trump at work to inform him that Appellant had been calling the
house all morning. Trump informed Trooper Brady that
Appellant had been an intimate friend of his and was upset when
Mr. Leibensperger moved in with Mr. Trump a few weeks before
the incident. Police showed Mr. Trump images obtained from the
BARTA and Sheetz videotapes and he identified Appellant as one
of the men in the images.
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Appellant was arrested at a Rodeway Inn between the
hours of midnight and 2:00 a.m. of December 20, 2011. At the
time of Appellant’s arrest, police seized a black hooded
sweatshirt, a New York Yankees baseball hat similar to one
depicted in the surveillance video, $1,077 in cash and a pair of
white long johns that appeared to be stained with blood.
Glassine packets with white residue, a glass smoking pipe, and a
copper-colored screen were also found by police in the hotel
room where Appellant was staying.
After the arrest, Appellant was transported to the police
barracks in Hamburg, Pennsylvania. Appellant was placed in an
interview room with Trooper Wegscheider and Trooper Brady.
During the interview, Appellant stated that on December 19,
2011, Appellant, his father Mark Ellis, and step-brother Brandon
Simpkins took the [BARTA] bus from Reading to Shoemakersville
and then walked to Mr. Trump’s residence. Appellant stated that
the three individuals entered the residence and Appellant then
confronted Mr. Leibensperger with a knife. Appellant admitted to
stabbing the victim several times causing the death of Mr.
Leibensperger. Appellant, Mr. Ellis, and Mr. Simpkins then
searched the residence and removed cash and two handguns
from the residence. During the interview, Appellant expressed
that it was his intention to kill Mr. Leibensperger and Mr. Trump.
Appellant explained that after the incident, the men left the
residence to take the [BARTA] bus back to Reading.
On December 20, 2011, Appellant received a screening
and health assessment at Berks County Jail. Appellant received
detoxification treatment for alcohol at the Berks County Jail until
December 25, 2011.
On December 21, 2011, around 3:00 in the afternoon,
Trooper Brady and Trooper Wegscheider visited Appellant in
Berks County Prison. Trooper Brady provided Appellant with the
standard Miranda[1]waiver form which Appellant acknowledged
and signed. Trooper Brady asked Appellant several questions in
order to clarify issues relating to Appellant’s accomplices and the
knife found at the crime scene. The Troopers[’] follow-up
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1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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interview at Berks County Prison with Appellant lasted around
twenty (20) minutes.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/14/15, at 4-6.
The trial court explained the procedural history as follows:
Appellant was charged with Murder of the First Degree,
Murder of the Second Degree, Murder of the Third Degree,
Robbery, Burglary, Criminal Trespass, Theft By Unlawful Taking
or Disposition, Receiving Stolen Property, Possession of
Instruments of Crime, Conspiracy to Commit Murder of the First
Degree, Conspiracy to Commit Murder of the Second Degree,
Conspiracy to Commit Murder of the Third Degree, Conspiracy to
Commit Robbery, Conspiracy to Commit Burglary, Conspiracy to
Commit Criminal Trespass, Conspiracy to Commit Theft By
Unlawful Taking or Disposition, and Conspiracy to Commit
Receiving Stolen Property.
On or about March 19, 2013, the Appellant filed an
Omnibus Pretrial Motion, which the court scheduled for May 9,
2013. On or about May 9, 2013, the Appellant withdrew his
Omnibus Pretrial [M]otion. On or about May 13, 2013, this
Court entered an order directing Dr. Rotenberg to conduct a
follow-up reevaluation of the Appellant’s mental health status
upon his return to the Berks County Jail System from the
Norristown State Hospital. On September 10, 2013, [the]
Commonwealth filed a “Motion to Compel the Defense to Provide
the Commonwealth with Copies of Any Data or Result Produced
from Psychological Testing Conducted on the Defendant by their
Mental Health Expert Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 573 (C)(1)(A).[”]
On or about October 2, 2013, this Court entered an order
directing Dr. Rotenberg to re-evaluate Appellant with regard to
the issues of competency, insanity, guilty but mentally ill, and
capacity to form specific intent for the crimes charged. Dr.
Rotenberg was ordered to submit a report to defense counsel
only. On November 18, 2013, a case status was scheduled for
January 10, 2014 with Rule 600 being waived by [Appellant].
On January 10, 2014, an Omnibus Pretrial Motion Hearing was
scheduled for March 4, 2014.
Pretrial Hearings were held on March 4, 2014 and March
14, 2014. At the end of the March 14, 2014 hearing, Defense
Counsel, Elizabeth M. Ebner, Esquire, requested a continuance to
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discuss with Appellant the possibility of Appellant taking the
stand at the pretrial hearing. On May 2, 2014, Defense Counsel
requested a mental health evaluation for Appellant by Dr.
Rotenberg and requested a continuance of the pretrial hearing.
On July 3, 2014, Defense Counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw as
Court Appointed Counsel. On July 21, 2014, Attorney Ebner’s
Motion to Withdraw was granted by this Court. On July 21,
2014, this Court appointed Jay Nigrini, Esquire as Counsel for
Defendant. On October 22, 2014, a final Omnibus Pretrial
hearing was held. On December 10, 2014, this Court filed an
order and opinion dismissing Appellant’s Omnibus Pretrial
Motion.
A jury trial was held from April 20, 2015 through April 23,
2015. On April 23, 2015, Appellant was found guilty of: Count 1
- Murder of the First Degree; Count 2 - Murder of the Second
Degree; Count 3 - Murder of the Third Degree; Count 4 -
Robbery; Count 5 - Burglary; Count 6 - Criminal Trespass; Count
8 - Theft by Unlawful Taking or Disposition; Count 9 - Receiving
Stolen Property; Count 10 - Possessing Instruments of Crime;
Count 11 - Conspiracy to Commit Murder of the First Degree;
Count 12 - Conspiracy to Commit Murder of the Second Degree;
Count 13 - Conspiracy to Commit Murder of the Third Degree;
Count 14 – Conspiracy to Commit Robbery; Count 15 -
Conspiracy to Commit Burglary; Count 16 - Conspiracy to
Commit Criminal Trespass; Count 18 - Conspiracy to Commit
Theft by Unlawful Taking or Disposition; and Count 18 -
Conspiracy to Commit Receiving Stolen Property.
On May 29, 2015, Appellant was sentenced on Count 1,
Murder of the First Degree, to the Bureau of Corrections for
confinement in a State Correctional Facility for life. On Count 4,
Robbery, Appellant was sentenced to not less than 5.5 years nor
more than 20 years of incarceration to commence at the
expiration of the sentence imposed at Count 1. On Count 5,
Burglary, Appellant was sentenced to not less than 2.5 years nor
more than 20 years of incarceration to commence at the
expiration of the sentence imposed at Count 1 and to run
concurrent with Count 4. On Count 10, Possessing Instruments
of Crime, Appellant was sentenced to not less than 1 year nor
more than 5 years of incarceration to commence at the
expiration of the sentence imposed at Count 1 and to run
concurrent with Counts 4 and 5. On Count 11, Conspiracy to
Commit Murder of the First Degree, Appellant was sentenced to
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not less than 20 years nor more than 40 years of incarceration
to commence at the expiration of the sentence imposed at Count
1 and to run concurrent with Counts 4, 5, and 10.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/14/15, at 1-3. This timely appeal followed. Both
Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant presents the following issue for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to
suppress the Appellant’s written and spoken confessions as the
Appellant was under the influence of cocaine at the time Miranda
was provided which rendered the Appellant unable to knowingly
and voluntarily waive his right to remain silent?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
In his sole issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to
grant the motion to suppress his oral and written confessions after he was
arrested. Appellant’s Brief at 9-10. Appellant asserts that the confessions
should have been suppressed because he was under the influence of
controlled substances and therefore did not knowingly and voluntarily waive
his right to remain silent.
With respect to an appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, our
Supreme Court has stated the following:
Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial
court’s denial of a suppression motion is whether the factual
findings are supported by the record and whether the legal
conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. When reviewing
the ruling of a suppression court, we must consider only the
evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence of the
defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of
the record. . . . Where the record supports the findings of the
suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse
only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.
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Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 915 A.2d 1122, 1134 (Pa. 2007) (citations
omitted). “It is within the suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to
pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their
testimony.” Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 896 A.2d 583, 585 (Pa. Super.
2006). Moreover, our scope of review from a suppression ruling is limited to
the evidentiary record that was created at the suppression hearing. In re
L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1087 (Pa. 2013).2
Further, we are aware that Pa.R.Crim.P. 581, which addresses the
suppression of evidence, provides in relevant part as follows:
(H) The Commonwealth shall have the burden . . . of
establishing that the challenged evidence was not obtained in
violation of the defendant’s rights.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H).
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2
On October 30, 2013, our Supreme Court decided In re L.J., in which the
Court held that our scope of review from a suppression ruling is limited to
the evidentiary record that was created at the suppression hearing. L.J., 79
A.3d at 1087. Prior to L.J., this Court routinely held that, when reviewing a
suppression court’s ruling, our scope of review included “the evidence
presented both at the suppression hearing and at trial.” Commonwealth v.
Charleston, 16 A.3d 505, 516 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quoting Commonwealth
v. Chacko, 459 A.2d 311 (Pa. 1983)). L.J. thus narrowed our scope of
review of suppression court rulings to the evidence presented at the
suppression hearing. In this case, Appellant’s suppression hearings were
held after L.J. was decided. Therefore, we will apply the rule announced in
L.J. to the case at bar. See L.J., 79 A.3d at 1089 (stating holding applies to
“all litigation commenced Commonwealth-wide after the filing of this
decision”).
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In Miranda, the Supreme Court set forth safeguards to protect a
person’s rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
which provides that a criminal defendant cannot be compelled to be a
witness or give evidence against himself. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461. The
Court held police officers are required to inform a suspect prior to
questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that any statement made
may be used against him, and that he has the right to an attorney.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. “The defendant may waive effectuation of these
rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.”
Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has reiterated that for a waiver of
these rights to be valid, the defendant must be adequately apprised of and
understand his rights and the consequences of waiving those rights, and
must not be threatened, forced, or coerced to waive his rights in any way.
Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 787 A.2d 394, 402 (Pa. 2001). “It is the
Commonwealth’s burden to establish whether [the accused] knowingly and
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. In order to do so, the
Commonwealth must demonstrate that the proper warnings were given, and
that the accused manifested an understanding of these warnings.”
Eichinger, 915 A.2d at 1135-1136.
In considering whether a defendant has validly waived his Miranda
rights, the trial court engages in a two-pronged analysis:
(1) whether the waiver was voluntary, in the sense that [the]
defendant’s choice was not the end result of governmental
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pressure[;] and (2) whether the waiver was knowing and
intelligent, in the sense that it was made with full comprehension
of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the
consequence of that choice.
Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 902 A.2d 430, 451 (Pa. 2006).
We stated the specific law in Pennsylvania pertaining to the waiver of
Miranda warnings while intoxicated as follows:
The fact that an accused has been drinking
does not automatically invalidate his subsequent
incriminating statements. The test is whether he
had sufficient mental capacity at the time of giving
his statement to know what he was saying and to
have voluntarily intended to say it. Recent imbibing
or the existence of a hangover does not make his
confession inadmissible, but goes only to the weight
to be accorded to it.
Commonwealth v. Adams, 385 Pa. Super. 513, 561 A.2d 793,
795 (Pa. Super. 1989) (citation omitted). “[W]hen evidence of
impairment is present, it is for the suppression court to decide
whether the Commonwealth has established by a preponderance
of the evidence that the suspect nonetheless had sufficient
cognitive awareness to understand the Miranda warnings and to
choose to waive his rights.” Commonwealth v. Britcher, 386
Pa. Super. 515, 563 A.2d 502, 507 (Pa. Super. 1989) (citations
omitted).
Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1137-1138 (Pa. Super. 2009)
(footnote omitted).
After a thorough review of the certified record, the briefs of the
parties, the applicable law, and the suppression court’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law, we conclude Appellant’s issue merits no relief. It is our
conclusion that the record demonstrates the suppression court did not err in
determining Appellant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his
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Miranda rights and that the suppression court’s opinion properly disposes of
the issue presented. Suppression Court Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law in Disposition of [Appellant’s] Omnibus Pretrial Motion, filed 12/10/14,
at 3-16. Indeed, the record establishes that Appellant “had sufficient mental
capacity at the time of giving his statement to know what he was saying.”
Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1137-1138 (citing Adams, 561 A.2d at 795). We
will not disturb the suppression court’s credibility determinations. Thus,
Appellant’s claim that he was too impaired to waive his Miranda rights fails.
Accordingly, we adopt the trial court’s reasoning as our own, and affirm on
the basis of its opinion with regard to Appellant’s issue.3
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/18/2016
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3
The parties are directed to attach a copy of the trial court’s opinion filed
December 10, 2014, in the event of further proceedings in this matter.
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,.
~ COMMONWEAL TH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF BERKS COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
. .
vs. CRIMINAL DIVISION
MICHAEL T. WALKER, No. CP 06 CR 1328-2012
Defendant JUDGE THOMAS G. PARISI
\
·ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 9th day of December, 2014, it is ORDERED that the Defendant's I
Omnibus Pretrial Motion is hereby DENIED.
BY THE COURT:
THOMAS G. PARISI, J.
Distribution:
Clerk of Courts Original
Computer X
Defendant X
Defense Attorney _N_1.. x'gn'--·_ni _
District Attorney Glessner
Adult Probation X
· Judge X
.
; I
: I
,I
I
!
COMMONWEAL TH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
,... OF BERKS
. . COUNTY,. PENNSYLVANIA .
vs. CRIMINAL DIVISION
MICHAELT. WALKER No. CP 06 CR 1328-2012
Defendant mDGE THOMAS G. PARISI
Jay Nigrini, Attorney for Defendant
Jason Glessner, Attorney for the Commonwealth
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OFLAW IN DISPOSITION OF
DEFENDA~T'S OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION
. .
Defendant is charged with Murder of the First Degree, Murder of the Second Degree,
Murder of the Third Degree, Robbery, Burglary, Criminal Trespass, Theft By Unlawful Taking
or Disposition, Receiving Stolen Property, Possession of Instruments of Crime, Conspiracy to
Commit Murder of the First Degree, Conspiracy to Commit Murder of the Second Degree,
Conspiracy to Commit Murder of the Third Degree, Conspiracy to Commit Robbery, Conspiracy
to Commit Burglary, Conspiracy to Commit Criminal Trespass, Conspiracy to Commit Theft By
Unlawful Taking or Disposition, and Conspiracy to Commit Receiving Stolen Property.
. .
Defendant filed an Omnibus Pretrial Motion on March 27, 2013. Omnibus Pretrial
Hearings were held on March 4, 2014 and March ·14, 2014. At the end of the March 14, 2014
hearing, Defense Counsel, Elizabeth M. Ebner, Esquire, requested a continuance to discuss with
Defendant the possibility of Defendant taking the stand at the pretrial hearing. On May 2, 2014,
Defense Counsel requested a mental health evaluation for Defendant and requested a . . i
continuance of the pretrial hearing. On July 3, 2014, Defense Counsel filed a Motion to
Withdraw as Court Appointed Counsel. On July 21, 2014, Attorney Ebner's Motion to With.draw
was fil