J-S17008-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
LE-JIARON ELMORE
Appellant No. 461 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 4, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0006566-2014
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED MARCH 18, 2016
Appellant, Le-Jiaron Elmore, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, following his guilty
plea to aggravated assault and endangering the welfare of children
(“EWOC”).1 We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
On or around June 20, 2014, the Commonwealth filed a criminal information
charging Appellant with one count each of aggravated assault, EWOC, simple
assault of a child, and recklessly endangering another person, in connection
with an incident involving Appellant’s four-month-old daughter (“Victim”)
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1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(1); 4304(a)(1), respectively.
_____________________________
*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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that occurred on April 22, 2014. On November 12, 2014, Appellant pled
guilty to aggravated assault and EWOC in exchange for the Commonwealth’s
agreement to withdraw the remaining charges. The plea was open as to
sentencing.
At Appellant’s guilty plea hearing, the Commonwealth summarized the
factual basis for the plea as follows:
Had the case proceeded to trial…the Commonwealth would
have called Detective Sellers and Detective Campbell and
also Children’s Hospital’s Drs. Rachel Berger and Jennifer
Wolford along with Zone 1 uniformed officers and
[V]ictim’s mother, …and [V]ictim’s grandmother who would
have testified that on or about April 22, 2014,
[V]ictim…was taken first to Allegheny General Hospital by
her mother for an arm injury. X-rays were taken of this
four-month-old twin female’s arms and revealed that she
had a right forearm with a spiral fracture. The x-rays
further showed three right fractured ribs that were in
different stages of healing. The four-month-old was
transferred to Children’s Hospital where additional x-rays
and skeletal surveys revealed an additional broken rib to
the left side and corner fractures to both femurs.
All parties were interviewed and police learned that
[V]ictim’s mother had left her four-month-old twins with
their father, later identified as [Appellant], for a short time
while she left their home in Pittsburgh. Upon returning[,
Victim] was crying, a cry that her mother never heard
before. [Victim’s mother] said [Appellant] was the only
caregiver. She asked him about the four-month-old. He
became highly upset and said he didn’t know why she was
crying. The mother next noticed that the four-month-old
had a dangling arm and sought medical care.
The doctors at Children’s Hospital would have testified as
experts that the abuse happened on more than one
occasion and that the abuse was caused, it was non-
accidental. With that, the Commonwealth would have
rested.
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(N.T. Guilty Plea Hearing, 11/12/14, at 4-6). The court asked defense
counsel if Appellant had any additions or corrections to the Commonwealth’s
recitation of the facts, to which counsel responded: “None, Your Honor.”
(Id. at 6). After the court conducted a guilty plea colloquy, it accepted
Appellant’s plea as knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The court noted for
the record the relevant offense gravity score (“OGS”) and Appellant’s prior
record score (“PRS”). The Commonwealth further indicated Victim’s mother
and Victim’s grandmother were present in court, and Victim’s mother had
written a letter which she asked the Commonwealth to read into the record.
The Commonwealth read the victim impact statement into the record at that
time. The court deferred sentencing pending a presentence investigation
(“PSI”) report.
On February 4, 2015, Appellant proceeded to sentencing. The court
initially noted it had read and considered the PSI report. The court also
reiterated the OGS for the aggravated assault conviction and Appellant’s
PRS. Defense counsel emphasized Appellant took responsibility for his
actions by pleading guilty. Defense counsel also mentioned Appellant’s
mental health issues. Based on Appellant’s PRS of zero and his acceptance
of responsibility, defense counsel requested a mitigated range sentence.
When the court asked Appellant if he wanted to say anything, Appellant
stated: “Just, I’m sorry.” (N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 2/4/15, at 3). The
Commonwealth explained Victim’s mother and Victim’s grandmother were
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once again present in court. The Commonwealth reminded the court about
Victim’s mother’s impact statement. The Commonwealth also discussed
Victim’s injuries. The Commonwealth further added Appellant had been
investigated for a strikingly similar incident in 2004 involving injuries to a
five-month-old child; the case was closed due, in part, to that mother’s lack
of cooperation and Appellant’s lack of cooperation. The Commonwealth
sought a high standard range or aggravated range sentence.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court sentenced Appellant to
seven (7) to twenty (20) years’ imprisonment for aggravated assault. The
court imposed no further penalty for Appellant’s EWOC conviction. In
fashioning Appellant’s sentence, the court explained:
Okay. [Appellant], I really can’t consider the prior
investigation since it did not lead to any kind of conviction.
So we don’t know what there is to know about this.
However, I am concerned, because this was a four-month-
old child. A four-month-old child, as you probably know,
can’t even sit up, let alone defend [herself] or talk.
Now, she had a fracture to her forearm, three fractured
ribs, which happened on a prior occasion, which leads me
to conclude that it wasn’t that you were angry one time
and just took off on her. She had another broken rib, and
she had two corner fractures to both of her femurs. This
shows a long term pattern of abuse by you.
I certainly feel that you are a danger to any child in our
community. I don’t see that you’re amenable to
rehabilitation.
* * *
I’m going to make a recommendation that he be
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considered for placement at Waymart, which is a mental
health state correctional institution.
(Id. at 4-5).
Appellant timely filed post-sentence motions on February 10, 2015,
which the court denied on February 13, 2015. Appellant timely filed a notice
of appeal on March 13, 2015. On March 25, 2015, the court ordered
Appellant to file by May 22, 2015, a concise statement of errors complained
of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant timely filed his
concise statement on May 21, 2015.
Appellant raises one issue for our review:
DID THE TRIAL COURT FAIL TO ADEQUATELY CONSIDER
AND APPLY ALL OF THE RELEVANT SENTENCING
CRITERIA, INCLUDING [APPELLANT’S] CHARACTER AND
REHABILITATIVE NEEDS, THE GRAVITY OF THE OFFENSE
AND THE PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC, AS REQUIRED
UNDER 42 PA.C.S.A. § 9721(B) (SENTENCING
GENERALLY; GENERAL STANDARDS) AND 42 PA.C.S.A. §
9725 (TOTAL CONFINEMENT); AND DID IT IMPROPERLY
CONSIDER A PRIOR INVESTIGATION INTO A SEPARATE
MATTER?
(Appellant’s Brief at 4).
Appellant argues the court imposed an excessive sentence due
primarily to the nature of Appellant’s crime. Appellant asserts his sentence
of seven to twenty years’ imprisonment for aggravated assault was
significantly above the sentencing guidelines. Appellant contends the court
failed to discuss the applicable sentencing guidelines at the guilty plea or
sentencing hearings. Appellant claims the court impermissibly “double
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counted” the seriousness of Appellant’s offense when it deviated from the
sentencing guidelines, because his offense gravity score already accounted
for the seriousness of Appellant’s crime. Appellant avers the court failed to
consider the relevant sentencing factors under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b).
Appellant complains the court also ignored the criteria necessary for
imposing a sentence of total confinement set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9725.
Appellant suggests the court discounted mitigating factors such as
Appellant’s age, his lack of a prior adult record, and the facts that Appellant
suffered from mental health and addiction problems, consistently remained
employed, took responsibility for his crimes by pleading guilty, and showed
remorse. Appellant objects to the court’s failure to reference the specific
content of the PSI report at the sentencing hearing. Appellant maintains the
court considered an unsubstantiated allegation from 2004 involving
Appellant’s conduct with a different child in determining Appellant’s
sentence. Absent reliance on this unsubstantiated allegation, Appellant
insists the record lacks support for the court’s statement that Appellant was
not amenable to rehabilitation and a danger to children. Appellant concludes
the court abused its sentencing discretion, and this Court must remand for
resentencing. As presented, Appellant’s claims implicate the discretionary
aspects of sentencing. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d
1031 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc) (explaining claim sentencing court failed to
consider Section 9721(b) factors pertains to discretionary sentencing
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matters); Commonwealth v. Clarke, 70 A.3d 1281 (Pa.Super. 2013),
appeal denied, 624 Pa. 671, 85 A.3d 481 (2014) (stating contention court
focused solely on serious nature of crime without adequately considering
protection of public and defendant’s rehabilitative needs concerns court’s
sentencing discretion); Commonwealth v. McAfee, 849 A.2d 270
(Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 580 Pa. 695, 860 A.2d 122 (2004)
(explaining claim court considered improper factor upon sentencing
challenges discretionary aspects of sentencing); Commonwealth v. Cruz-
Centeno, 668 A.2d 536 (Pa.Super. 1995), appeal denied, 544 Pa. 653, 676
A.2d 1195 (1996) (stating allegation court overemphasized seriousness of
crime without considering mitigating factors challenges discretionary aspects
of sentencing).
A challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing is not
automatically reviewable as a matter of right. Commonwealth v. Hunter,
768 A.2d 1136 (Pa.Super. 2001), appeal denied, 568 Pa. 695, 796 A.2d 979
(2001). Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue:
We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P.
902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and
modify sentence, see [Pa.R.Crim.P. 720]; (3) whether
appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and
(4) whether there is a substantial question that the
sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the
Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal
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denied, 589 Pa. 727, 909 A.2d 303 (2006) (internal citations omitted).
Objections to the discretionary aspects of a sentence are waived if they are
not raised at the sentencing hearing or in a timely filed post-sentence
motion. Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal
denied, 621 Pa. 682, 76 A.3d 538 (2013). “This failure cannot be cured by
submitting the challenge in a Rule 1925(b) statement.” McAfee, supra at
275.
What constitutes a substantial question must be evaluated on a case-
by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Paul, 925 A.2d 825 (Pa.Super. 2007).
A substantial question exists “only when the appellant advances a colorable
argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent
with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the
fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.”
Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 913 (Pa.Super. 2000) (internal
citation omitted). In other words, an appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement
must sufficiently articulate the manner in which the sentence violates either
a specific provision of the sentencing scheme set forth in the Sentencing
Code or a particular fundamental norm underlying the sentencing process.
Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 571 Pa. 419, 812 A.2d 617 (2002).
On appeal, this Court will not disturb the judgment of the sentencing
court absent an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 A.2d
843 (Pa.Super. 2006).
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[A]n abuse of discretion is more than a mere error of
judgment; thus, a sentencing court will not have abused
its discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment
exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of
partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. In more expansive
terms, …: An abuse of discretion may not be found merely
because an appellate court might have reached a different
conclusion, but requires a result of manifest
unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will,
or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.
The rationale behind such broad discretion and the
concomitantly deferential standard of appellate review is
that the sentencing court is in the best position to
determine the proper penalty for a particular offense based
upon an evaluation of the individual circumstances before
it. Simply stated, the sentencing court sentences flesh-
and-blood defendants and the nuances of sentencing
decisions are difficult to gauge from the cold transcript
used upon appellate review. Moreover, the sentencing
court enjoys an institutional advantage to appellate review,
bringing to its decisions an expertise, experience, and
judgment that should not be lightly disturbed. Even with
the advent of the sentencing guidelines, the power of
sentencing is a function to be performed by the sentencing
court. Thus, rather than cabin the exercise of a sentencing
court’s discretion, the guidelines merely inform the
sentencing decision.
* * *
[W]e reaffirm that the guidelines have no binding effect,
create no presumption in sentencing, and do not
predominate over other sentencing factors—they are
advisory guideposts that are valuable, may provide an
essential starting point, and that must be respected and
considered; they recommend, however, rather than
require a particular sentence. …
Commonwealth v. Walls, 592 Pa. 557, 564-70, 926 A.2d 957, 961-65
(2007) (internal quotation marks, footnotes, and citations omitted).
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Furthermore, in exercising its discretion, the sentencing
court may deviate from the guidelines, if necessary, to
fashion a sentence that takes into account the protection
of the public, the rehabilitative needs of the defendant,
and the gravity of the particular offense as it relates to the
impact on the life of the victim and the community, so long
as the court also states of record the factual basis and
specific reasons which compelled the deviation from the
guidelines. This Court must remand for resentencing with
instructions if we find that the sentencing court sentenced
outside the guidelines and the sentence was unreasonable.
Commonwealth v. Kenner, 784 A.2d 808, 811 (Pa.Super. 2001), appeal
denied, 568 Pa. 695, 796 A.2d 979 (2002) (internal citations omitted).
Pursuant to Section 9721(b), “the court shall follow the general
principle that the sentence imposed should call for confinement that is
consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it
relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the
rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). See also
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9725 (stating court shall impose sentence of total
confinement if, having regard to nature and circumstances of crime and
history, character, and condition of defendant, it is of opinion that total
confinement is necessary because: (1) there is undue risk defendant will
commit another crime during period of probation or partial confinement; (2)
defendant needs correctional treatment that can be provided most
effectively by commitment to institution; or (3) lesser sentence will
depreciate seriousness of crime).
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“[T]he court shall make as part of the record, and disclose in open
court at the time of sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons for the
sentence imposed.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). Nevertheless, “[a] sentencing
court need not undertake a lengthy discourse for its reasons for imposing a
sentence or specifically reference the statute[s] in question….”
Commonwealth v. Crump, 995 A.2d 1280, 1283 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal
denied, 608 Pa. 661, 13 A.3d 475 (2010). Rather, the record as a whole
must reflect the sentencing court’s consideration of the facts of the case and
the defendant’s character. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Fowler, 893
A.2d 758 (Pa.Super. 2006) (explaining where sentencing court had benefit
of PSI report, we can presume it was aware of relevant information
regarding defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along
with mitigating factors); Cruz-Centeno, supra at 546 (stating: “Having
been fully informed by the pre-sentence report, the sentencing court’s
discretion should not be disturbed”).
Instantly, Appellant raised the following issue in his Rule 1925(b)
statement:
The trial court abused its discretion in sentencing
[Appellant] to seven to 20 years of incarceration at CC#
2014-06566. This sentence was manifestly unjust,
unreasonable and excessive. The trial court failed to
adequately consider and apply all of the relevant
sentencing criteria, including the protection of the public,
the gravity of the offense, and [Appellant’s] rehabilitative
needs, as required under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721 (Sentencing
Generally) and 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9725 (Total Confinement).
Specifically, the court did not adequately consider that
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[Appellant] had a prior record score of zero, took
responsibility for his crimes, and has severe mental-health
issues. Moreover, the trial court improperly considered a
prior investigation into an unrelated matter in determining
that [Appellant] is not amenable to rehabilitation.
(Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, filed May 21, 2015, at 2).
Significantly, Appellant did not include in his Rule 1925(b) statement his
claims on appeal that the court focused solely on and “double counted” the
seriousness of Appellant’s offense, failed to discuss the sentencing guidelines
at the guilty plea or sentencing hearings, did not reference the specific
content of the PSI report at sentencing, and ignored the mitigating factors of
Appellant’s age, addiction problems, consistent employment, and display of
remorse. Thus, these claims are waived. See Commonwealth v.
Schutzues, 54 A.3d 86 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 620 Pa. 699, 67
A.3d 796 (2013) (holding defendant waived challenge to discretionary
aspects of sentencing where he failed to preserve claim in Rule 1925(b)
statement).
Appellant also failed to preserve these complaints in his post-sentence
motion, constituting waiver of these claims on this basis as well. See
(Appellant’s Post-Sentence Motion, filed February 10, 2015, at 1-4); Griffin,
supra. Additionally, Appellant’s post-sentence motion omits the claims
raised for the first time in his Rule 1925(b) statement that the court ignored
the sentencing criteria set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9725, and considered a
prior investigation involving Appellant to determine he was not amenable to
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rehabilitation.2 Consequently, these averments are likewise waived.3 See
(Appellant’s Post-Sentence Motion at 1-4); Griffin, supra; McAfee, supra.
Appellant’s remaining averments, preserved in his post-sentence
motion and Rule 1925(b) statement, that the court did not adequately
consider and apply the Section 9721(b) sentencing factors, and imposed a
manifestly excessive above-the-guideline sentence, without consideration of
Appellant’s mental health and rehabilitative needs, lack of a prior record,
and acceptance of responsibility, present substantial questions for review.
See Cartrette, supra (indicating claim court ignored appropriate sentencing
factors under Section 9721(b) raises substantial question); Commonwealth
v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal denied, 105 A.3d 736
(2014) (explaining excessive sentence claim, raised in conjunction with
assertion court failed to consider mitigating factors, raises substantial
question).
In analyzing Appellant’s preserved challenge to the court’s sentencing
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2
Moreover, the record belies this claim where the trial court expressly stated
at sentencing and in its Rule 1925(a) opinion that it did not consider the
Commonwealth’s statements regarding a prior investigation involving
Appellant. (See N.T. Sentencing Hearing at 4; Trial Court Opinion, filed July
21, 2015, at 3.)
3
To the extent Appellant complains the court incorrectly stated the
maximum sentence for aggravated assault at the guilty plea hearing,
Appellant raises that claim for the first time on appeal, so it is waived. See
Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating issues not raised before trial court are waived and
cannot be raised for first time on appeal). Notably, Appellant did not seek to
withdraw his guilty plea based on the alleged miscommunication.
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discretion, the trial court reasoned:
At the sentencing hearing, this [c]ourt noted that it had
read and considered a Pre-Sentence Investigation report.
It then placed its reasons for imposing sentence on the
record:
THE COURT: Okay. [Appellant], I really can’t
consider the prior investigation since it did not lead
to any kind of conviction. So we don’t know what
there is to know about this.
However, I am concerned, because this was a four-
month-old child. A four-month-old child, as you
probably know, can’t even sit up, let alone defend
[herself] or talk.
Now, she had a fracture to her forearm, three
fractured ribs, which happened on a prior occasion,
which leads me to conclude that it wasn’t that you
were angry one time and just took off on her. She
had another broken rib, and she had two corner
fractures to both of her femurs. This shows a long
term pattern of abuse by you. I certainly feel that
you are a danger to any child in our community. I
don’t see that you’re amendable to rehabilitation.
[(N.T. Sentencing Hearing at 4)].
As the record reflects, this [c]ourt appropriately read and
considered the pre-sentence investigation report,
considered the factors and severity of the present offense,
evaluated [Appellant’s] potential for rehabilitation and
imposed a sentence which took all of these factors into
consideration. Contrary to [Appellant’s] assertion, the
record specifically notes that this [c]ourt did not consider a
prior child abuse investigation referenced by the
Commonwealth. Moreover, the record reflects great
deliberation and consideration in the formulation of the
sentence. … Given the facts of this case, the sentence
imposed was appropriate, not excessive and well within
this [c]ourt’s discretion. This claim must fail.
(Trial Court Opinion at 3-4). We see no reason to disrupt the court’s broad
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sentencing discretion. See Walls, supra; Crump, supra; Fullin, supra;
Kenner, supra.
The record makes clear the court heard the Commonwealth’s recitation
of the facts at the guilty plea hearing, which Appellant did not dispute. The
court also listened to Victim’s mother’s impact statement. The court
evaluated the arguments of counsel at sentencing, including but not limited
to, defense counsel’s request for a mitigated range sentence based on
Appellant’s PRS of zero and his acceptance of responsibility. Additionally,
the court had the benefit of a PSI report, so we can presume the court was
aware of relevant information regarding Appellant’s character and weighed
those considerations along with mitigating factors. See Fowler, supra;
Cruz-Centeno, supra. The PSI report contained a description of
Appellant’s offenses, victim impact statements, Appellant’s age, criminal
history, employment history, family history, marital history, education, and
physical and mental health information. The court also recommended
placement for Appellant at a mental health state correction institution,
confirming the court gave thought to Appellant’s mental health issues.
Under these circumstances, we cannot say the sentence imposed was
“unreasonable.” See Kenner, supra. Therefore, Appellant’s sentencing
challenge merits no relief. See Walls, supra; Fullin, supra; Kenner,
supra. Accordingly, we affirm.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/18/2016
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