UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4543
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SHAMELL DEVON TATE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:11-cr-00358-CCE-1)
Submitted: March 17, 2016 Decided: March 21, 2016
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James E. Quander, Jr., Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Lisa Blue Boggs, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Shamell Devon Tate pled guilty to possession of ammunition
by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012).
He was sentenced to 37 months’ imprisonment, followed by a 3-
year term of supervised release. After his release, Tate
engaged in new criminal conduct, leading to a petition for
revocation of his supervised release. At the revocation
hearing, Tate admitted the alleged violations. The district
court sentenced him to 18 months’ imprisonment with no
subsequent supervised release. On appeal, counsel has filed a
brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
asserting that there are no meritorious issues for appeal but
seeking review of the revocation hearing and the reasonableness
of Tate’s revocation sentence. Tate was informed of his right
to file a pro se supplemental brief, but he has not done so.
Finding no error, we affirm.
“We review a district court’s ultimate decision to revoke a
defendant’s supervised release for abuse of discretion” and its
“factual findings underlying a revocation for clear error.”
United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015).
Here, Tate admitted to the violations of his supervised release
and noted no objection to any part of the hearing. We discern
no error in the district court’s decision to revoke Tate’s
supervised release. Moreover, we conclude that the district
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court complied with the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1 in
conducting Tate’s revocation hearing.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a
sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States
v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). A revocation
sentence that “is within the statutory maximum and is not
plainly unreasonable” will be affirmed on appeal. Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). In evaluating a revocation sentence,
we assess it for reasonableness, utilizing “the procedural and
substantive considerations” employed in evaluating an original
criminal sentence. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438
(4th Cir. 2006). A revocation sentence is procedurally
reasonable if the district court has considered the policy
statements contained in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing
Guidelines and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors enumerated
in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012). Id. at 439.
The district court also must provide an explanation for its
chosen sentence, but the explanation “need not be as detailed or
specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when
imposing a post-conviction sentence.” United States v.
Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). A revocation
sentence is substantively reasonable if the district court
states a proper basis for concluding that the defendant should
receive the sentence imposed. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Only if
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we find a sentence procedurally or substantively unreasonable
will we determine whether the sentence is “plainly” so. Id. at
439.
Here, the district court considered the parties’ arguments,
Tate’s allocution, and the relevant statutory factors before
sentencing Tate within the policy statement range. The district
court provided an explanation tailored to Tate, focusing on the
seriousness of his violations and his history of violating
conditions of supervised release. We therefore conclude that
Tate’s sentence is neither procedurally nor substantively
unreasonable. We have examined the entire record in accordance
with the requirements of Anders and have found no meritorious
issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
district court.
This court requires that counsel inform Tate, in writing,
of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States
for further review. If Tate requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Tate. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
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materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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