J-S27033-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
MARSDEN LARUE AYRES, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JOHN SANDRONI,
Appellant No. 1774 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment Entered November 9, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County
Civil Division at No(s): 12 CV 000222
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 22, 2016
Appellant John Sandroni appeals from the judgment entered on
November 9, 2015, by the Honorable J. Michael Williamson, Senior Judge
Specially Presiding, in the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County. Upon
our review of the record, we affirm.
The instant matter arises following Appellee Mardsen Larue Ayres’
filing of a Complaint on May 22, 2012, to enforce an “Agreement for Sale of
Manufactured Home” (hereinafter “the Agreement”) into which the parties
had entered on January 31, 2011. Pursuant to the Agreement, Appellee had
agreed to sell Appellant a mobile home for a purchase price of Sixteen
Thousand ($16,000) Dollars. In his Complaint, Appellee averred the closing
was to be held on or before April 29, 2011; however, despite Appellee’s
willingness and ability to participate therein and his fulfillment of all
*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S27033-16
conditions precedent, the sale never occurred. Complaint, filed May 22,
2012, at ¶¶ 3-5.
Appellant filed his Answer and Counterclaim to the Complaint on
November 20, 2012. In Count I of his Counterclaim, Appellant sought
money damages. Appellant indicated that Appellee, a month-to-month
tenant, had placed the manufactured home upon Appellant’s land and owed
him $3,500.00 for unpaid rent. Answer and Counterclaim filed November
20, 2012, at ¶¶ 8-9. Appellant further brought an action in ejectment
against Appellee. Id. at Count II. In response Appellee filed his Answer to
Counterclaim on February 10, 2015, wherein he averred, inter alia, that the
parties had entered into the Agreement whereby Appellant was to forgive
the owed rent and to purchase the mobile home from Appellee. Appellee
further maintained that he had not lived in the mobile home since the
execution of the Agreement and that as the owner of the home, Appellant
should pay Appellee the agreed upon purchase price. On that same day,
discerning that a resolution to the matter could not be achieved, the trial
court entered an Order scheduling the case for a one-half day jury trial.
In a separate Order of March 4, 2015, after noting that the pleadings
were closed and discovery had been completed, the trial court scheduled
trial for June 15, 2015. Following the nonjury trial, at which both sides
presented witness testimony and various exhibits, the trial court filed an
Order on August 18, 2015, wherein it found Appellant had been unjustified
in failing to close and entered judgment in favor of Appellee and against
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Appellant in the amount of Fourteen Thousand Three Hundred ($14,300.00)
Dollars together with costs of the lawsuit.1 The trial court further specified
that it had declined to award interest “on the basis that neither the parties
nor their attorneys have exercised any intelligence in trying to resolve this
matter.”
Appellant filed his “Post Trial Motions” on August 28, 2015. Therein,
2
Appellant posited that as per the terms of paragraphs ten (10) and twelve
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1
The judgment amount represented the Sixteen Thousand ($16,000.00)
Dollar purchase price of the mobile home less Seventeen Hundred
($1,700.00) Dollars for past-due rent.
2
This provision reads as follows:
CONDITIONS AND COVENANTS: AND, it is further agreed
that the following conditions and covenants are a part of this
agreement, and that each and all of them are binding upon the
parties hereto, and their respective heirs, executors,
administrators, successors and assigns:
a. This agreement and the obligations of the parties
hereunder is continent [sic] upon the BUYER’s inspection of
the manufactured home prior to closing and the BUYER
shall not be required to close unless:
i. The manufactured home is empty of its personal
property contents;
ii. The manufactured home is broom clean;
iii. All personal property scattered on the lot rented by
the SELLER from the BUYER is removed;
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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(12)3 of the Agreement, he clearly had the right to inspect the mobile home
and that he had testified he discovered the mobile home was uninhabitable
when he did so, although he admitted he could not recall the date of his
examination.4 Appellant further contended that despite the fact that no
evidence had been presented at trial regarding why the closing was delayed,
the trial court wrongly attributed such delay to what was characterized as
Appellant’s “unjustified” conduct. Stating that as Appellee initiated the
lawsuit “it was his obligation to offer that evidence,” Appellant requested the
trial court enter judgment in his favor. See Post Trial Motions at ¶¶ 6, 10-
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
iv. All monies owed by SELLER TO BUYER under the
terms of the rental agreement between them has
been paid or deducted from the purchase price to be
paid at closing;
v. The Seller has removed himself from the premises.
See Agreement for Sale of Manufactured Home, January 31, 2011, at ¶ 10.
3
Paragraph twelve indicates:
BUYER’S INSPECTION: BUYER reserved the right to make a
pre-settlement inspection of the premises within twenty-four
(24) hours of settlement; the real estate shall be substantially in
the same condition as it was when first inspected by the BUYER
prior to the execution of this Agreement and must be thoroughly
cleaned by the SELLER or agents prior to the date of closing.
See Agreement for Sale of Manufactured Home, January 31, 2011, at ¶ 12.
4
Appellant acknowledged at trial that no inspection took place within
twenty-four hours of the settlement date, which was to have been April 29,
2011. N.T., 11/6/15, at 12-14.
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12. The trial court denied Appellant’s Post Trial Motions on August 31, 2015,
and judgment was entered in favor of Appellee on November 9, 2015.5
On September 28, 2015, Appellant filed his notice of appeal, and in an
order of September 30, 2015, the trial court directed Appellant to file a
concise statement of the matters complained of on appeal. Appellant filed
the same on October 21, 2015. In its “1925(a) Order” of October 26, 2015,
upon noting that Appellant’s concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal “simply reiterates the testimony from his perspective and suggests
we should have ruled in his favor,” the trial court indicated that it be relying
upon its Order of August 18, 2015.
In his brief, Appellant presents the following question for our review:
Was the Trial Court required to interpret and enforce the
contract between the parties in accordance with the terms of the
contract, as made by the parties?
Brief for Appellant at 2. Before considering the merits of this issue, we must
first consider whether Appellant has properly preserved it for our review.
As this Court has noted, a timely-filed Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement
does not automatically equate to issue preservation. Jiricko v. Geico Ins.
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5
Even though Appellant’s notice of appeal was filed prior to the entry of
judgment, “it is clear that jurisdiction in appellate courts may be perfected
after an appeal notice has been filed upon the docketing of a final
judgment.” Johnston the Florist, Inc. v. TEDCO Const. Corp., 657 A.2d
511, 513 (Pa.Super. 1995) (citation omitted).
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Co., 947 A.2d 206, 210 (Pa.Super. 2008). “[T]he Pa.R.A.P.1925(b)
statement must be sufficiently ‘concise’ and ‘coherent’ such that the trial
court judge may be able to identify the issues to be raised on appeal. . . .”
Id. In this regard, Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) provides in pertinent part:
(4) Requirements; waiver.
....
(ii) The Statement shall concisely identify each ruling or error
that the appellant intends to challenge with sufficient detail to
identify all pertinent issues for the judge. The judge shall not
require the citation to authorities; however, appellant may
choose to include pertinent authorities in the Statement.
....
(iv) The Statement should not be redundant or provide
lengthy explanations as to any error. Where non-redundant,
non-frivolous issues are set forth in an appropriately concise
manner, the number of errors raised will not alone be grounds
for finding waiver.
....
(vii) Issues not included in the Statement and/or not
raised in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph
(b)(4) are waived.
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) (emphasis added).
In Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa.Super. 1998), our
Supreme Court held that when a trial court directs a defendant to file a
concise statement of matters complained of on appeal, “any issues not
raised in a 1925(b) statement will be waived.” In Commonwealth v.
Dowling, 778 A.2d 683, 686–87 (Pa.Super. 2001), this Court extended
that holding to include vague 1925(b) statements and in doing so held that
“a concise statement which is too vague to allow the court to identify the
issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of no concise statement
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at all.” Id. Therefore, an appellant waives any issues he attempts to raise in
a Rule 1925(b) statement the vagary of which prevents the trial court from
sufficiently identifying and properly addressing them. This remains true
even if the trial court correctly guesses the issues the appellant wished to
assert on appeal and writes an opinion pursuant to that supposition.
Commonwealth v. Heggins, 809 A.2d 908, 912 (Pa.Super. 2002).
Herein, the trial court properly directed Appellant to provide a concise
statement of matters complained of on appeal in accordance with Rule
1925(b). While Appellant filed said statement on October 21, 2015, the
statement was significantly deficient in that Appellant failed to state with any
specificity therein an alleged error of law committed by the trial court.
Instead, as the trial court noted in its 1925(a) Order, Appellant merely
reiterated his version of the facts which he argued dictated a favorable
result. Indicating that it had resolved credibility issues in favor of Appellee
and against Appellant, the trial court relied upon its reasoning set forth in its
August 18, 2015, Order.
Since Appellant failed to raise any legal issues therein, his concise
statement does comply with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b); therefore, Appellant has not
preserved any issues for this Court’s review.6
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6
Even had Appellant properly raised the issue he presents herein before the
trial court, in the argument portion of his appellate brief, which is essentially
devoid of any citation to legal authority, he reiterates his version of the facts
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Judgment affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/22/2016
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
and challenges the trial court’s credibility determinations. It is well-settled
that in a nonjury trial, the trial court sits as fact finder where there is
conflicting evidence. Commonwealth v. Hart, 460 A.2d 745 (Pa. 1983).
The fact finder as the entity viewing the witnesses makes credibility
determinations and resolves conflicts with regard to their testimony and in
doing so is free to believe all, some, or none of the evidence presented.
Haan v. Wells, 103 A.3d 60, 72 (Pa.Super. 2014). Moreover, while the
factfinder may not render a verdict based upon conjecture, it possesses the
duty to assess damages, and an appellate court should give deference to its
decisions. Boehm v. Riversource Life Ins. Co., 117 A.3d 308, 328
(Pa.Super. 2015). We have thoroughly reviewed the trial testimony and
exhibits as well as the trial court’s consideration of the same and discern no
abuse of discretion.
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