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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF G.J.A., P.J.A. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: P.H.A., NATURAL FATHER :
:
: No. 1493 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Order January 14, 2015
in the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County Orphans’ Court
at No(s): 2014-937 IVT
2014-938 IVT
BEFORE: LAZARUS, STABILE, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED MARCH 23, 2016
P.H.A. (“Father”) appeals from the order dated January 14, 2015, and
entered on January 15, 2015, granting the petition filed by the Cambria
County Children and Youth Service (“CYS” or the “Agency”) to involuntarily
terminate his parental rights to his children, G.J.A., a female born in March
of 2010, and P.J.A., a male born in December of 2006 (collectively,
“Children”), pursuant the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5),
(8), and (b).1 We affirm.
The trial court has set forth the relevant history of this case in its
termination order and its order, which serves as its opinion filed pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), that relied upon the factual recitation in the termination
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
In the order dated January 14, 2015, and entered on January 15, 2015,
the trial court also involuntarily terminated the parental rights of J.S., the
natural mother of Children, (“Mother”). Mother did not file an appeal and
she is not a party to the present appeal.
J.S13043/16
order. See Trial Ct. Order, 9/25/15, at 1; Trial Ct. Order, 1/15/15, at 1-7.
We adopt the trial court’s factual recitation for purposes of this appeal. See
Trial Ct. Order, 9/25/15, at 1; Trial Ct. Order, 1/15/15, at 1-7.
Importantly, at the time of the January 15, 2015 order, Father had been
incarcerated since June of 2014 as a result of an incident that allegedly
occurred on June 4, 2013, to which he pled guilty to four counts of recklessly
endangering another person. Trial Ct. Order, 1/15/15, at 3; N.T., 12/15/14,
at 118. Previously, Father had served a prison sentence in California for a
murder conviction. Trial Ct. Order, 1/15/15, at 3. The trial court found that
there was no evidence in the record as to Father’s current sentence or when
he would be released, and that Father had testified that he is a repeat felon
under the Pennsylvania State Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 4. Father
testified that he would be released from prison in 2015. N.T. at 117.
On January 15, 2015, the trial court entered the order granting the
petition to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights to Children. On
May 5, 2015, Father filed a petition for leave to file an appeal nunc pro tunc.
On August 24, 2015, the trial court granted Father’s petition to file an appeal
nunc pro tunc within thirty days. Father timely filed his nunc pro tunc
appeal on September 23, 2015, along with a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).
In his brief on appeal, Father raises one question for this Court’s
review, as follows:
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1. Whether the trial court either abused its discretion or
committed an error of law when it granted it terminated
[sic] the father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §
2511(a)(1), (a)(5), and (a)(8) without clear and
convincing evidence?
Father’s Brief at 3.
In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we
adhere to the following standard:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion
standard when considering a trial court’s determination of
a petition for termination of parental rights. As in
dependency cases, our standard of review requires an
appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility
determinations of the trial court if they are supported by
the record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190
(2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error
of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., [614 Pa. 275,
284,] 36 A.3d 567, 572 (2011) (plurality opinion)]. As has
been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result
merely because the reviewing court might have reached a
different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v.
Kia Motors America, Inc., [613 Pa. 371, 455], 34 A.3d
1, 51 (2011); Christianson v. Ely, 575 Pa. 647, [654-
55,] 838 A.2d 630, 634 (2003). Instead, a decision may
be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon
demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality,
prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.
As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for
applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these
cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate
courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific
determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are
observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often
presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the
child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore,
even where the facts could support an opposite result, as
is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an
appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the
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trial court and impose its own credibility determinations
and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so
long as the factual findings are supported by the record
and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an
error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of
Atencio, 539 Pa. 161, [165,] 650 A.2d 1064, 1066
(1994).
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012).
The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental
rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Moreover, we have explained:
[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined
as testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and
convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise
facts in issue.”
Id. (quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)).
This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the
termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of Section
2511(a). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).
The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1),
(2), (5), (8), and (b). See Trial Ct. Op., 9/25/15, at 1. Section 2511(a)(1),
(2), (5), (8), and (b) provide as follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
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(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at
least six months immediately preceding the filing of the
petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or
failed to perform parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to
be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied
by the parent.
* * *
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency for a period of at least six months, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of the
child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not
remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of
time, the services or assistance reasonably available to
the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which
led to the removal or placement of the child within a
reasonable period of time and termination of the
parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare
of the child.
* * *
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from
the date of removal or placement, the conditions which
led to the removal or placement of the child continue to
exist and termination of parental rights would best
serve the needs and welfare of the child.
* * *
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
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of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the
parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to
subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider
any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to
the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), (b).
This Court has explained that the focus in terminating parental rights
under Section 2511(a) is on the parent, but under Section 2511(b), the
focus is on the child. In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super. 2008)
(en banc). We will focus on Subsection 2511(a)(2), and adopt the trial
court’s discussion in its termination order as this Court’s own.2 See Trial Ct.
Order, 1/15/15, at 6-8.
The Supreme Court set forth our inquiry under Section 2511(a)(2) as
follows.
[Section] 2511(a)(2) provides [the] statutory ground[] for
termination of parental rights where it is demonstrated by
clear and convincing evidence that “[t]he repeated and
continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the
parent has caused the child to be without essential
parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his
physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot
or will not be remedied by the parent.” . . .
2
We note that the trial court appeared to discuss the facts in relation to
section 2511(a)(2).
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[The Supreme Court] has addressed incapacity
sufficient for termination under § 2511(a)(2):
A decision to terminate parental rights, never to be
made lightly or without a sense of compassion for
the parent, can seldom be more difficult than when
termination is based upon parental incapacity. The
legislature, however, in enacting the 1970 Adoption
Act, concluded that a parent who is incapable of
performing parental duties is just as parentally unfit
as one who refuses to perform the duties.
In re: Adoption of J.J., 511 Pa. 590, 515 A.2d 883, 891
(1986) (quoting In re: William L., 477 Pa. 322, 383 A.2d
1228, 1239 (1978)).
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 827.
This Court has stated that a parent is required to make diligent efforts
towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities.
In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002). A parent’s vow to
cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity
or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or
disingenuous. Id. at 340.
Father relies on In re R.I.S., to support his argument that
incarceration alone is not an explicit basis upon which to base termination of
parental rights. He argues that this Court must inquire whether the parent
utilized those resources at his or her command while in prison to continue
and pursue a close relationship with his children. Father’s Brief at 13; see
In re R.I.S., 36 A.3d at 572-73. Father asserts that he has worked long
hours to provide a financially stable home for Children to return to him.
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Father’s Brief at 13. Father states that he has made a commitment to
cooperate with any services offered him to facilitate the reunification, and
that he is in a transitional period of modifying his behavior, outlook, and
parenting methods to implement the permanency plans. Id.
Our Supreme Court instructed:
incarceration is a factor, and indeed can be a
determinative factor, in a court’s conclusion that grounds
for termination exist under § 2511(a)(2) where the
repeated and continued incapacity of a parent due to
incarceration has caused the child to be without essential
parental care, control or subsistence and [] the causes of
the incapacity cannot or will not be remedied.
In re Adoption of S.P., 616 Pa. at 328-329, 47 A.3d at 828.
After re-visiting its decision in In re R.I.S. regarding incarcerated
parents, the Supreme Court stated:
we now definitively hold that incarceration, while not a
litmus test for termination, can be determinative of the
question of whether a parent is incapable of providing
“essential parental care, control or subsistence” and the
length of the remaining confinement can be considered as
highly relevant to whether “the conditions and causes of
the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not
be remedied by the parent,” sufficient to provide grounds
for termination pursuant to 23 [Pa.C.S.] § 2511(a)(2).
[See In re E.A.P., 944 A.2d 79, 85 (Pa. Super. 2008)]
(holding termination under § 2511(a)(2) supported by
mother’s repeated incarcerations and failure to be present
for child, which caused child to be without essential care
and subsistence for most of her life and which cannot be
remedied despite mother’s compliance with various prison
programs). If a court finds grounds for termination under
subsection (a)(2), a court must determine whether
termination is in the best interests of the child, considering
the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and
welfare of the child pursuant to § 2511(b). In this regard,
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trial courts must carefully review the individual
circumstances for every child to determine, inter alia, how
a parent’s incarceration will factor into an assessment of
the child’s best interest.
In re S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 830-31 (Pa. 2012) (some internal citations
omitted).
The trial court assessed the evidence regarding Father’s repeated
incapacity to parent Children, and his inability to remedy the conditions and
causes of his incapacity to parent Children, at length, which we adopt
herein. See Trial Ct. Order, 1/15/15, at 6-7. The trial court found that the
repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of Father has
caused Children to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for their physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by Father. See id. at 8.
Father contends that the trial court abused its discretion and erred as
a matter of law in terminating his parental rights, as he had appropriate
housing and was on his way to establishing a working budget. Father’s Brief
at 12. Father claims that he was maintaining the utilities for his residence,
but he had some bills that he needed to pay, so he had been working many
hours to provide for his family. Id. at 12. Father states that the trial court
acknowledged that he works very hard when he is not in jail, and that he
loves Children, who love him in return. Id. Father asserts that with the
exception of criminal charges in June of 2013, and a later arrest in June of
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2014, for failing to show at his plea hearing on the June 2013 charge, he
had not had any criminal charges since Children were born. Id. at 14-15.
Father also states that after he posted bond in June of 2013, he returned to
work in the Cambria County area in the waste disposal field, as his previous
employment had taken him out of the area. Id. at 15. Father asserts that
he was compliant “to a degree” with the Agency permanency plans for
Children, and he was in the process of figuring out how to best comply with
those plans. Id. at 16.
Our review of the record shows that there is ample evidence to
support a determination that Father failed to make sufficient progress with
the services provided to successfully be capable of parenting Children. As
the trial court’s factual findings are supported by the record, and the court’s
legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of
discretion, we affirm the trial court’s orders with regard to Subsection (a)(2).
In re S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27.
Generally, we would next review the termination of Father’s parental
rights under section 2511(b) in conducting our two-tiered analysis. In re
C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1004. We find that Father waived any challenge to
Section 2511(b) by failing to specifically challenge that section in his concise
statement and brief. See Krebs v. United Refining Co. of Pa., 893 A.2d
776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) (holding that an appellant waives issues that are
not raised in both his or her concise statement of errors complained of on
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appeal and the Statement of Questions Involved in his or her brief on
appeal). See Father’s Brief at 16 (specifically challenging Section 2511(a)
only). Even if Father had not waived any challenge to Section 2511(b), we
would find that there was sufficient, competent evidence in the record to
support the trial court’s decision.
Our Supreme Court recently stated as follows.
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a)
are met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs
and welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to
include “[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and
stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super.
2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)],
this Court held that the determination of the child’s “needs
and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional bonds
between the parent and child. The “utmost attention”
should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of
permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53
A.3d at 791.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).
We have stated that in conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not
required to use expert testimony, but may rely on the testimony of social
workers and caseworkers. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super.
2010). Further, it is appropriate to consider a child’s bond with his or her
foster parent. See In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268.
In addition, in In re T.S.M., our Supreme Court set forth the process
for evaluation of the existing bonds between a parent and a child, and the
necessity for the court to focus on concerns of an unhealthy attachment and
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the availability of an adoptive home. The Supreme Court stated the
following:
[C]ontradictory considerations exist as to whether
termination will benefit the needs and welfare of a child
who has a strong but unhealthy bond to his biological
parent, especially considering the existence or lack thereof
of bonds to a pre-adoptive family. As with dependency
determinations, we emphasize that the law regarding
termination of parental rights should not be applied
mechanically but instead always with an eye to the best
interests and the needs and welfare of the particular
children involved. See, e.g., R.J.T., [9 A.3d 1179, 1190
(Pa. 2010)] (holding that statutory criteria of whether child
has been in care for fifteen of the prior twenty-two months
should not be viewed as a “litmus test” but rather as
merely one of many factors in considering goal change).
Obviously, attention must be paid to the pain that
inevitably results from breaking a child’s bond to a
biological parent, even if that bond is unhealthy, and we
must weigh that injury against the damage that bond may
cause if left intact. Similarly, while termination of parental
rights generally should not be granted unless adoptive
parents are waiting to take a child into a safe and loving
home, termination may be necessary for the child’s needs
and welfare in cases where the child’s parental bond is
impeding the search and placement with a permanent
adoptive home. . . .
[The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, P.L. 105-89,]
ASFA[,] was enacted to combat the problem of foster care
drift, where children . . . are shuttled from one foster
home to another, waiting for their parents to demonstrate
their ability to care for the children. See In re R.J.T., 9
A.3d at 1186; In re Adoption of S.E.G., [901 A.2d 1017,
1019 (Pa. 2006)]. This drift was the unfortunate
byproduct of the system’s focus on reuniting children with
their biological parents, even in situations where it was
clear that the parents would be unable to parent in any
reasonable period of time. Following ASFA, Pennsylvania
adopted a dual focus of reunification and adoption, with
the goal of finding permanency for children in less than
two years, absent compelling reasons. See, 42 Pa.C.S. §
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6301(b)(1); 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)(9) (requiring courts to
determine whether an agency has filed a termination of
parental rights petition if the child has been in placement
for fifteen of the last twenty-two months).
In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268-69.
In the present matter, the trial court considered the needs and welfare
of Children, and set forth its bond-effect analysis. The trial court also
provided an explanation of why its termination decision was not based on
matters that were outside of Father’s control. We adopt the trial court’s
discussion herein. See Trial Ct. Order, 1/14/15, at 7-8. The trial court
properly considered the best interests of Children in rendering its decision
that although there was evidence of a bond between Children and Father, it
was in their best interests to sever that bond for their safety and security
needs. See id.; In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268-69.
Father testified that he loves Children, and they love him, and the trial
court found that testimony credible. N.T. at 105; Trial Ct. Order, 1/14/15,
at 7. As we stated in In re Z.P., a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold
in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the
responsibilities of parenting.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1125. Rather, “a
parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his child is
converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child’s
right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a
permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856
(Pa. Super. 2004). Again, as the trial court’s factual findings are supported
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by the record, and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error
of law or an abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s decision with
regard to subsection (b). In re S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27. Accordingly, we
affirm the trial court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/23/2016
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Circulated 03/03/2016 02:09 PM
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CAMBRIA COUNTY, PA
ORPHANS1 COURT DIVISION
IN RE: No. 2014-937 IVT
No. 2014-938 IVT
GLORIA JEAN ANDERSON
PAUL JACOB ANDERSON
APPEARANCES:
For the Petitioner: TIMOTHY M. AYRES, ESQ.
For Minor Children: SUZANN LEHMIER, ESQ.
For Natural Father: JAMES R. KOBAN, II, ESQ.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 14th day of January, 2015 ., after
coriduc ti ng an ev i de n t i.a ry riea r inq fol J.owing due not ice, the
Court makes the following findings and judicial
determ.1nations:
:. On October 10, 2014, Petitioner, Cambria
CoGnty Children and Youth Services (CYS), filed Pet1tio11s to
Terminate the Parentaj Rights of Paul H. Anderson, age 64,
the b i.o Loqi cal ta ther, and ,Josie L. Stonerook, age 41, the
biological mother, to their two children Gloria Jean
Anderson, DOB [vJarch 3, 20)0, age tour, and Paul ,Jaccb
Anderson, DOB December 6, 2U06, age 8. The grounds averre,:J
i. ncl ude 2 CJ Pa . C~ . S . Se;; L ion 2 '.)lJ (a ) subs e ct ions I, 2 r S an ci
2
8.
2. Father filed a Petition for Appointment of
Counsel and the Court appointed him counsel and appointed a
Guardian Ad Litem for the two children. Mother neither
sought in forma pauperis status nor requested counsel.
3. A hearing was held by the Court on
December 15, 2014. Mother did not appear. Father was
transported to the hearing from the Cambria County Prison
and testified.
4. The Court gave all counsel until December 29,
2014, to file memoranda and all counsel submitted their
legal memoranda to the Court.
5. The evidence presented showed that the
Anderson-Stonerook family had been involved with CYS since
2010 due to such issues as housing, finances, mental health,
parenting skills, and drug and alcohol abuse. The children
were removed and then returned by the Juvenile Court under
order dated October 11, 2011.
6. Services were reinitiated with the family on
January 13, 2013, and the children removed by emergency
order Ln June 2013, and were declared dependent by order
dated June 18, 2013. Father had been arrested for
aggravated assault and ether charges and Mother was
basicaJ.ly unfit to care for the children on her own due to
the same ho0sing issues, mental health, parenting, and drug
3
abuse issues. Mother's actions and inactions placed the
safety of the children at risk.
7. Father is a career criminal having served time
in California on murder charges. At the present time, he is
incarcerated as a result of an incident allegedly occurring
on June 4, 2013. On December 1, 2013, he pled guilty to
four counts of recklessly endangering another person based
on information in the probable cause which states:
"Your Affiant is Officer Donald J. Wyar of
the Portage Borough Police Department. On June
4, 2013, I was called at the office by
Stephanie Rogers who stated she was having
problems with her neighbor, the Defendant. I
responded to the scene and the actor was GOA.
I spoke with Rogers, Figard and Barrett who
stated the actor waved a knife and stated he
was going to kill Rogers. I then spoke with
Bairett who stated earlier in the day the
Defendant grabbed her in the vagina area and
smacked her on the butt. Barrett then
retreated into her house. I cleared the scene
and minutes later Officer Wyar and I were
dispatched to 814 Conemaugh Avenue for the same
type of incident where the Defendant was
threatening neighbors using racial slurs. The
Defendant was also highly intoxicated. The
Defendant was taken into custody and while in
custody at the office, the Defendant did spit
in the face of Officer Wyar while
Officer Labosky was standing to Officer Wyar's
right. The Defendant also threatened to kill
and/ or ha rm all off .i ce rs . This officer
summoned three PSP troopers to the office to
assist. The Defendant continued to use racial
slurs. The Defendant was then placed in
shackles to stop him from kicking and a spit
mask was placed on the Defendant to stop him
f rom spitting. " (Exhibit 8) .
8. Vather's senten~ing was scheduled for
4
December 1], 2014. However, according to his testimony, he
filed a Motion to Withdraw his plea. In rather convoluted
testimony, Father stated he may withdraw the Petition to
Withdraw the Plea. In any event, there is no evidence in
the record as to what his sentence or status may be or when
he will be released. According to his testimony under the
Pennsylvania State Sentencing Guidelines, he is a RFEL or
repeat felon.
9. Since the children were last placed in agency
custody, the Juvenile Court has held three permanency review
hearings.
(a) At the hearing held on November 20, 2013, the
Juvenile Court found that Father and Mother had made minimal
progress toward achieving permanency. Mother still had not
addressed her housing, mental health, or substance abuse
issues. Father was working long hours in Harrisburg and
displayed anger control issues.
(b) At the hearing held on May 5, 2014, the
Juvenile Court agajn found the parties to be minimally
compliant w i.th the permanency plan. Mother and Father were
living apart. Mother did not have an appropriate home. She
had not addressed her mental health or substance abuse
issues. F~ther did move back to Cambria County and had
adequate housir;q. However, he had not addressed his mental
health or subs t auce abuse Losues.
5
(c) At the permanency review hearing held on
July 23, 2014, the Juvenile Court found that no progress had
been made by either parent. Father was incarcerated as a
result of his arrest on June 4, 2014, and Mother was found
to not be a placement option due to her cognitive
limitations. She continued her substance abuse, often
visiting the local ER in attempts to obtain narcotics.
10. Both parents were evaluated by Dennis M.
Kashurba, a licensed psychologist, on two occasions;
February of 2011 and December of 2013 with the following
findings:
A. On both occasions, Mother was found to have a
diagnostic impression of Axis I: Neglect of Child, by
history; opiate dependence, currently in early partial
remission; B~nzodiazepine abuse, by history; relational
problems, NOS.
Axis II: Personality Disorder, NOS (currently
with predominantly dependent traits, with history of
schizotypal traits), mild mental retardation.
Mr. Kashurba cor1cluded that the total information
available at that time suggested that Josie's status had not
improved since the time of prior evaluation nearly three
years ago. She continued to present as an individual with
limited cognitive ability and a high degree of cognitive
distortions which prevented her from harnessing her
6
relatively limited cognitive ability to a degree that would
make her a suitable primary parent figure for her children.
Thus, the then current status of having her children remain
in foster care appeared to afford Josie the maximum
opportunity to be positively involved in the children's
lives as had been the case at the time of prior evaluation.
B. On both occasions, Father was found to have
the following diagnostic impression: Axis I, neglect of
child, by history; partner relational problem, adult
antisocial behavior, by history. Axis II, personality
disorder, NOS (with a history of predominantly narcissistic
traits along with paranoid or antisocial features.)
Mr. Kashurba concluded that consistent with his
opinion at the time of the prior testing, there continued to
be no unequivocal information present to suggest that Paul
does not have the ability to adequately independently parent
his children. However, at the time of prior evaluation, it
was his opinion that Paul had "abdicated" the responsibility
for raising the children to the bio mom of the children who
he did not feel was capable of independently parenting the
chjldren. This parental role abdication appeared to have
continued by virtue of Paul having limited contact with the
children due to his employment outside of the immediate
geographical area over. several months' time. Father
continued to be fully aware that if the children were placed
7
in his care, he would need to obtain suitable caregiver
services for them during his time of employment. He also
seems to be aware that the children's bio mom would not
likely be a suitable option in terms of caregiver status
while he is at work. Father also does appear to have an
appropriate degree of affection for his children and to be
able to express cormnitment to pursuing their best interests
on an ongoing basis. He also verbalized his con@itment to
cooperating with whatever services would be offered to
facilitate future possible reunification.
11. While it is inconclusive which kind of bond
and to what extent a bond exists between Mother and
children, Mother does not have the capacity to raise these
children.
12. It is apparent from the testimony of the
caseworker and Father that strong bonds exist between Father
and children. They love him and he loves them. When he is
not in jail, he works hard. He works so hard and so many
hours he has no time to take care of the children. The
relationship between Mother and Father is on and off and
Mother taking care of the children while he is at work is
not a viable option.
13. The Court's major concern is the safety of
the children. Any detriment to the children and severing of
the bonds between Father and children and Mother and
8
children is outweighed by their safety and security needs.
A parent's love of his or her children does not preclude a
termination.
14. Petitioner CYS has established a legal basis
for terminating the parental rights of Paul H. Anderson and
Josie Stonerook.
15. The following subsections of 23 Pa.C.S.
§2511 (a) establish the basis for terminating the parental.
rights of these parents:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period
of at least 6 months immediately preceding the filing of the
petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or
failed to perform parental duties;
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be
without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his/her physical or mental well-being and the
conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent;
( ') l The ch iLd has been removed from the care of
the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with
an agency for a period of at least 6 months, the conditions
which 1ed to r.he remova l or pl accrncnr. of tt'1e child oonr i nue s
10 exist, the parent cannot. or 1:1i_1_l r.o t. rerne dv those
9
conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services
or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not
likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or
placement of the child within a reasonable period of time
and termination of the parental rights would best serve the
needs and welfare of the child;
(8) The child has been removed from the care of a
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an
agency, twelve months or more have elapsed from the date of
removal or placement, the conditions which led to the
removal or placement of the child continue to exist and
terminations of the parental rights would best serve the
needs and welfare of the child.
16. In terminating the parental rights of these
parents, the Court has found that this will best meet the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of
the children.
17. The parental rights and duties of Paul H.
Anderson and Josie Stonerook to Gloria Jean Anderson and
Paul Jacob Anderson are forever terminated. Said
terminations to extinguish the power and right of Paul H.
Anderson and Josie Stonerook to object to or receive notice
of the adoption proceedings. The adoptions of Gloria Jean
Anderson anrl Paul Jacob Anderson may continue without
further notice to o r coris errt of Paul H. Anderson and .Jo s i e
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lI Stonerook. The custody of Gloria Jean Anderson and Paul
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Jacob Anderson is hereby confirmed in Cambria County
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f [ Children and Youth Services pending the final adoption
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d proceedings.
!I Notice to Paul H. Anderson and Josie Stonerook
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You are hereby notified that you have the right
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any time and update medical and/or social history
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1 · information with the following:
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1. The Court that terminated your parental
11
iI rights;
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if 2. The Court that finalized the adoption;
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Ir 3. The agency that coordinated the adoption;
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l t 4. The information registry established by the
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'i [ Pennsylvania Department of Human Services pursuant to
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i~ 23 Pa.C.S. §2921 for the purpose of making that information
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11 available to the person to be adopted and to the adoptive
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parents under the conditions provided by law.
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