UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4485
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ALEJANDRO RAMIREZ-CASTANEDA,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,
Chief District Judge. (5:15-cr-00053-D-1)
Submitted: March 8, 2016 Decided: March 23, 2016
Before KING, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. John Stuart Bruce, Acting United States Attorney,
Jennifer P. May-Parker, Phillip A. Rubin, Assistant United
States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM
Alejandro Ramirez-Castaneda appeals the 18-month sentence
imposed following his guilty plea to illegal reentry, in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2012). On appeal, Ramirez-
Castaneda challenges only the substantive reasonableness of the
upward departure sentence imposed by the district court. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying “a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). Where, as here, the defendant
alleges no significant procedural error, we consider the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence to determine whether
the court abused its discretion in determining that the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors supported the sentence it
imposed. See United States v. Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d 359, 366
(4th Cir. 2011). In reviewing a sentence outside the Guidelines
range, we determine “whether the district court acted reasonably
both with respect to its decision to impose such a sentence and
with respect to the extent of the divergence from the
[G]uideline[s] range.” United States v. Perez-Pena, 453 F.3d
236, 241 (4th Cir. 2006).
Ramirez-Castaneda argues on appeal that the extent of the
district court’s departure was unwarranted under the
circumstances presented, including his prior lengthy state
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sentence and the deterrent effect of the heightened penalties to
which he would be exposed for any future illegal reentry. These
arguments are insufficient to demonstrate that the court’s
upward departure was unreasonable. The district court expressly
grounded its sentence in numerous § 3553(a) factors — including
the need to protect the public, to deter future criminal
conduct, and to promote respect for the law, as well as Ramirez-
Castaneda’s history and the circumstances of the offense. The
court based Ramirez-Castaneda’s upward departure on his five
illegal entries into the United States and multiple instances of
criminal conduct while present in the country, including recent
felony convictions arising from intoxicated driving that
severely injured an innocent motorist.
While Ramirez-Castaneda and his counsel advised the court
that he was sincerely remorseful and resolved not to reoffend,
Ramirez-Castaneda’s alcohol abuse, pattern of blatant disrespect
for the law, and family ties to Raleigh amply supported the
court’s determination that he would continue his persistent
recidivism, even in the face of the increased consequences of
any future illegal reentries. Further, after observing Ramirez-
Castaneda during allocution, the court was entitled to determine
that his assurances that he would not reoffend were not
credible. See Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d at 366 (recognizing
deference accorded sentencing determinations, including
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credibility determinations). In short, Ramirez-Castaneda’s
arguments represent mere disagreement with the sentencing
court’s exercise of its discretion “insufficient to justify
reversal of the district court.” See United States v. Howard,
773 F.3d 519, 531 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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