FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 24 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
EDWARD VINCENT RAY, Jr., No. 15-15657
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 4:11-cv-02923-YGR
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CAESAR BASA; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 15, 2016**
Before: GOODWIN, LEAVY, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Edward Vincent Ray, Jr., a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due
process and defamation claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo. Enlow v. Salem-Keizer Yellow Cab Co., 389 F.3d 802, 811 (9th
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Ray’s due process
claims because Ray failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
he filed his action within the statute of limitations. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
§§ 335.1 (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions); 352.1(a)
statutory tolling due to incarceration not to exceed two years); Knox v. Davis, 260
F.3d 1009, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2001) (for § 1983 claims, federal courts apply the
forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations and apply federal law to
determine accrual; a § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason
to know of the injury that forms the basis of the action). Moreover, the district
court properly concluded that Ray was not entitled to equitable tolling or equitable
estoppel, and did not establish a continuing violation of his rights. See Butler v.
Nat’l Cmty. Renaissance of Cal., 766 F.3d 1191, 1198, 1204 (9th Cir. 2014)
(explaining that federal courts borrow state law equitable tolling provisions, unless
they are inconsistent with federal law, and setting forth California’s doctrine of
equitable tolling); Lukovsky v. City & County of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044,
1051-52 (9th Cir. 2008) (setting forth California’s equitable estoppel doctrine);
Knox, 260 F.3d at 1013 (discussing continuing violation doctrine).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Ray’s § 1983
2 15-15657
defamation claim against Philips because Ray failed to raise a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Ray did not receive due process. See Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333-35 (1976) (due process requires notice and an
opportunity to be heard; discussing factors relevant for determining whether
administrative procedures satisfy due process).
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
All pending requests are denied.
AFFIRMED.
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