IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
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RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 18, 2016
NOT TG.
,S51tprttut (Court of
2015-SC-000410-MR
KRAIG HANKINS and APPELLANTS
KENNETH R. REED, ESQ.
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
V. CASE NO. 2015-CA-000569
GREENUP CIRCUIT COURT NOS. 14-CI-00223 AND 14-CI-00270
HON. THOMAS M. SMITH, SPECIAL JUDGE APPELLEE
GREENUP CIRCUIT COURT
AND
CITY OF FLATWOODS, KENTUCKY; REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST
BOBBY F. CRAGER; BRENT DEAN;
CODY DEAN; CHRIS CASTLE;
MARTY HOFFMAN; SCOTT GILLUM;
AND HEATHER MCKENZIE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellants Kraig Hankins and his attorney, Kenneth R. Reed (collectively
referred to as "Appellants"), request a writ prohibiting the trial court from
enforcing its order compelling discovery. Hankins also requests a writ
mandating additional discovery concerning his wrongful termination and tort
claims. The Real Party in Interest is the City of Flatwoods, Kentucky (the
"City"). Having reviewed the record and the law, we affirm the 'Court of
Appeals' order denying Appellants' request for writs of prohibition and
mandamus.
Factual and Procedural Background
In his underlying suit, Appellant Hankins alleges that he was wrongfully
terminated from his position as Chief of Police in retaliation for Hankins'
refusal to disclose information concerning an ongoing criminal investigation to
the City Mayor. In contrast, the City asserts that Hankins was terminated due
to insubordination, improper management, and sexual harassment. To clarify,
the present case involves an appeal from an administrative determination
under the Kentucky statutes governing police officer discipline, and a common
law wrongful termination claim. The Greenup Circuit Court consolidated the
two actions.
The. City moved for summary judgment arguing, inter alia, that Hankins
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. KRS 15.520; and KRS 95.450.
Neither Hankins nor his attorney, Mr. Reed, attended the administrative
hearing that addressed the alleged grounds for Hankins' termination.
Prior to moving for summary judgment, the City attempted to subpoena
Attorney Reed to produce various documents. Reed contended that several of
the materials sought by the City were privileged. As such, Reed refused to
produce those documents. In addition to its motion for summary judgment,
the City moved to compel the production of those materials. The trial court
held a hearing on both motions.
The court denied the City's summary judgment motion so that Hankins
could conduct discovery. The court granted the City's motion to compel in
part. In its order dated April 6, 2015, the trial court ordered Appellants to
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produce the following materials: 1) Attorney Reed's communications with the
Greenup County Commonwealth's Attorney regarding the City employees
named as defendants in the underlying case; 2) documents and electronic
communications between Reed and the City Attorney as requested in
Defendants' Subpoena Duces Tecuml; 3) responses to several discovery
requests that are only identified by number (i.e. Interrogatory Number 7); and
4) copies of two newspaper stories. It is from this order that Appellants appeal.
Appellants only take issue with items one and two. 2
Appellants argue that the contested materials are privileged and relate to
an ongoing criminal investigation of City employees that is being conducted in
part by the Kentucky State Police. In order to protect this information,
Appellant filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in the Court of Appeals.
Appellant also filed a petition for a writ of mandamus and a motion for
intermediate relief in the Court of Appeals seeking to stay the trial court's
discovery order. The Court of Appeals denied the writ petitions and the motion
for intermediate relief. Only the issue of writ relief is before this Court.
Standard of Review
An appellate court has discretion to grant a writ where a trial court is
proceeding within its jurisdiction upon a showing that the court is: 1) acting or
1 Although it is unclear from the trial court's order, the Court of Appeals
states that these materials concern "Reed's communication with the attorney for the
City while they were trying to schedule the administrative hearing."
2 Appellants also request that this Court issue a writ so that Appellant
Hankins "does not have to answer certain Interrogatories . . . ." However, Appellants
have failed to develop that argument. Therefore we will not address it.
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is about to act erroneously; 2) there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or
otherwise, and 3) great injustice and irreparable injury will result if the petition
is not granted. Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Ky. 2004). We review the
Court of Appeals' determination under an abuse of discretion standard.
Sowders v. Lewis, 241 S.W.3d 319, 322 (Ky. 2007).
Analysis
On the issue of enforcement of the trial court's discovery order, the Court
of Appeals concluded that writ relief was unavailable to Hankins because he
failed to demonstrate irreparable injury. However, we have previously held that
"violation of a privilege satisfies both the requirement of no adequate remedy by
appeal, 'because privileged information cannot be recalled once it has been
disclosed,' and the substitute requirement in 'special cases' that the
administration of justice would suffer." Collins v. Braden, 384 S.W.3d 154, 158
(Ky. 2012) (citing St. Luke Hospitals, Inc. v. Kopowski, 160 S.W.3d 771, 775
(Ky. 2005). Therefore, this case is proper for writ review.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that Appellants
failed to satisfy their burden of proving to the trial court that the contested
communications are privileged. 3 See Collins, 384 S.W.3d 154 at 163 (denying
writ relief to claimants where record was insufficient to permit determination
whether various documents regarding hospital's investigation of patient's death
were protected by attorney-client privilege).
3 Appellants repeatedly refer to the communications as "privileged" without
stating which specific privilege that they are invoking. We will assume Appellants are
referring to the attorney-client privilege.
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Collins provided three ways in which a party asserting privilege could
protect its interest: 1) an in camera review by the trial court; 2) a detailed
privilege log with descriptions sufficient to establish the privilege; or 3) an offer
of proof describing the documents. Id. at 164. Appellants have not availed
themselves of any of these approaches. Thus, Appellants have failed to
"provide the [trial] court with sufficient information to show the existence of the
elements of the privilege and to allow review of that decision by higher courts."
Id. at 164-65.
Appellants contend that Collins is inapplicable here. They argue that we
should apply the standard in McMurry v. Eckert, 833 S.W.2d 828 (Ky. 1992). In
that case, this Court granted a writ prohibiting the trial court from ordering the
production of an attorney's notes concerning statements made by a physician
during an interview between the physician and the attorney. Id. at 830. The
court determined that the notes were protected under the work-product
doctrine. Id. (citing CR 26.02(3)(b)). McMurry is inapplicable here because
Appellants are claiming that the communications that were the subject of the
trial court's order compelling discovery were protected by privilege, not the
work-product doctrine. Furthermore, the primary issue in McMurry discussed
the appropriateness of the practice of deposing opposing counsel, not the
disclosure of third party communications. In contrast, Collins addressed the
issue of attorney-client privilege. Thus, Collins is controlling here.
Moreover, the communications at issue here were between Attorney Reed
and either the Greenup County Commonwealth's Attorney or the City Attorney.
These are clearly third party communications that are not protected by
attorney-client privilege. See Collins, 384 S.W.3d at 159. Therefore, the Court
of Appeals did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellants' petition for a writ
of prohibition.
Appellants also request a writ mandating additional discovery concerning
Hankins' wrongful termination case. On this issue, Appellants have failed to
demonstrate that they are entitled to writ relief. The Court of Appeals correctly
determined that although the trial court cautioned Appellants not to engage in
a fishing expedition, the trial court's order does not preclude the additional
discovery of the nature Appellants assert in their petition. Thus, the Court of
Appeals did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellants' petition for a writ of
mandamus.
Appellants also speculate that the trial court may order Attorney Reed's
deposition and sanctions. However, these concerns were not mentioned in the
trial court's order at issue here. Therefore, we will not address these issues.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals' order denying
Appellants' request for writs of prohibition and mandamus.
All sitting. All concur.
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COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS:
Kevin L. Murphy
APPELLEE:
Hon. Thomas M. Smith
Special Judge, Greenup Circuit Court
COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST:
Licha Hannah Farah, Jr.
Robert Stephen McGinnis
Theodore R. Martin
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