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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 15-13724
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-24418-CMA
GLORIA FERNANDEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(March 25, 2016)
Before TJOFLAT, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denied Gloria Fernandez’s
application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security
income (“SSI”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3), and the Appeals Council denied
her request to review the ALJ’s decision. The Commissioner therefore denied Ms.
Fernandez the benefits and income she seeks.
Ms. Fernandez brought this action to obtain review of the Commissioner’s
decision. The District Court, on motion for summary judgment, affirmed it. Ms.
Fernandez appeals the court’s judgment raising one issue: whether the ALJ, in
denying her application, erred by discounting the opinion of her treating
psychiatrist, Fernando Mendez-Villamil, M.D., that she is disabled and unable to
work.
Since the Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision, we review
the ALJ’s decision as the Commissioner’s decision. Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d
1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The precise question before us is whether the ALJ
properly applied the standards found in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) in evaluating
the medical opinion—in particular, Dr. Mendez-Villamil’s opinion. We review her
evaluation for substantial evidence, 1 and her application of legal principles de
novo. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005).
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In doing so, we do not reweigh the evidence, or substitute our own judgment for that of
the ALJ. Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011). Thus, so long
as her decision is supported by substantial evidence, we must affirm that decision, even if the
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Eligibility for SSI or DIB requires that the claimant is under a disability. 42
U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1), 1382(a)(1)-(2). In relevant part, a claimant is under a
disability if she is unable to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of a
medically determinable impairment that can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months.
42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The claimant bears the burden of
proving her disability, and she is responsible for producing evidence in support of
her claim. Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003).
The Commissioner uses a five-step, sequential evaluation process to
determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4),
416.920(a)(4). Under the first step, the claimant must show that she is not
currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i),
416.920(a)(4)(i). At the second step, the claimant must show that she has a severe
impairment. See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). The regulations
define a severe impairment as an “impairment or combination of impairments
which significantly limit[] [the claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic
work activities.” Id. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(a)(4)(c). Third, the claimant has the
opportunity to show that the impairment meets or equals the criteria contained in
evidence may preponderate against it. Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158-
59 (11th Cir. 2004).
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one of the Listings of Impairments. See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii),
416.920(a)(4)(iii). At the fourth step, if the claimant cannot meet or equal the
criteria in one of the Listings, the ALJ considers the claimant’s residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) and the claimant’s past relevant work to determine if she has an
impairment that prevents her from performing her past relevant work. See id.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (e), 416.920(a)(4)(iv), (e). Finally, once a claimant
establishes that she cannot perform her past relevant work due to some severe
impairment, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that a significant
number of jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant can perform. See
id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v); Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228
(11th Cir. 1999).
The Social Security Regulations define a “treating source” as a medical
source, including a physician, who has provided the claimant with medical
treatment and has, or previously had, an ongoing treatment relationship with the
claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502. A treating source is generally afforded more
weight because “these sources are more likely to be the medical professionals most
able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [the claimant’s] medical
impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that
cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of
individual examinations.” Id. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2).
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Dr. Mendez-Villamil is Ms. Fernandez’s treating source because he is her
treating physician. As such, the ALJ was required to give his opinion “substantial
or considerable weight” unless there was good cause not to do so. Lewis v.
Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997); see also 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2) (providing that a treating source’s opinion is not
given controlling weight if it is inconsistent with the other substantial evidence).
Good cause exists “when the: (1) treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by
the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician’s
opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical records.”
Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179. The opinion of a non-examining physician, standing
alone, does not constitute good cause if it contradicts the opinion of a treating
physician. Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 703 (11th Cir. 1988). The ALJ must
clearly articulate his reasons for giving less weight to the treating physician’s
opinion, and the failure to do so is reversible error. Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440.
However, where the ALJ articulates specific reasons for failing to give the opinion
of a treating physician controlling weight, there is no reversible error. Moore, 405
F.3d at 1212. When a treating physician’s opinion does not warrant controlling
weight, the ALJ must nevertheless weigh the opinion based on: (1) the length of
the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination; (2) the nature and
extent of the treatment relationship; (3) the medical evidence supporting the
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opinion; (4) consistency with the record as a whole; (5) specialization in the
relevant medical issues; and (6) other factors which tend to support or contradict
the opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).
The question here is whether the ALJ articulated good cause for giving
limited weight to Dr. Mendez-Villamil’s opinion of Ms. Fernandez’s mental
impairments and her ability to work. Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440. In assessing the
opinion evidence, the ALJ recounted the history of Ms. Fernandez’s medical
impairments, considered the treatment notes provided by Dr. Mendez-Villamil, and
reviewed the opinion evidence provided by the psychologists, Dr. James Brown,
Dr. Pauline Hightower, and Dr. Maribel Del Rio-Roberts. After conducting this
review of the record, the ALJ concluded that Dr. Mendez-Villamil’s opinion was
conclusory and inconsistent with his own treatment notes. Accordingly, the ALJ
clearly articulated her reasons for assigning limited weight to his opinion. See
Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440.
Furthermore, the ALJ’s articulated reasons are supported by substantial
evidence. See Moore, 405 F.3d at 1212. Dr. Mendez-Villamil’s positive findings
concerning Ms. Fernandez’s mental status were inconsistent with his abrupt and
unexplained conclusion that her capacity for social interaction was extremely
impaired. Additionally, Dr. Mendez-Villamil’s own treatment notes reveal that he
treated her through a course of minor, routine adjustments to her medications. As
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the ALJ noted, this conservative course of treatment was inconsistent with Dr.
Menndez-Villamil’s dire prognosis of complete inability to work and extreme
impairment. Accordingly, the ALJ had good cause not to give the doctor’s opinion
substantial weight, as his opinion was conclusory and inconsistent with his own
medical records. See Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179.
Finally, the ALJ did not err by affording more weight to the opinions of Drs.
Brown, Hightower, and Del Rio-Roberts. As noted above, the ALJ’s decision to
partially discount Dr. Mendez-Villamil’s opinion was based upon his treatment
notes and the record as a whole, not solely upon the opinions of the three
psychologists. Thus, the ALJ did not err by assigning limited weight to his opinion
as it pertained to Ms. Fernandez’s mental impairments and ability to work.
AFFIRMED.
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