NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MAR 25 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
RICHARD CAPRI, No. 14-17211
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:12-cv-00417-RCJ-VPC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JAMES COX; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 15, 2016**
Before: GOODWIN, LEAVY, and CHRISTEN Circuit Judges.
Richard Capri, a Nevada state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs and due process claims. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Capri’s deliberate
indifference claim because Capri failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact
as to whether defendants Peery, Gedney, and Marr were deliberately indifferent in
treating his inguinal hernia. See id. at 1057-58 (a prison official is deliberately
indifferent only if he or she “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate
health”; a mere difference of opinion is insufficient to establish deliberate
indifference (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Capri’s due
process claim because Capri failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether voluntary castration was a term of Capri’s plea agreement. See United
States v. Heredia, 768 F.3d 1220, 1230 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Plea agreements are
essentially contracts. We enforce their literal terms, construing any ambiguities in
the defendant’s favor.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Brown v.
Poole, 337 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The intent of the parties becomes
clear upon an examination of the language of the plea agreement and the conduct
of the parties during the plea colloquy.” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
AFFIRMED.
2 14-17211