FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAR 25 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MANJINDER SINGH, No. 13-73924
Petitioner, Agency No. A043-927-490
v.
MEMORANDUM*
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 17, 2016**
San Francisco, California
Before: McKEOWN, WARDLAW, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Manjinder Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the Board
of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”)
denial of his application for and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.1 Because the record does not compel the
conclusion that “it is more likely than not” Singh will be tortured if he returns to India,
we deny the petition for review. See Bromfield v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th
Cir. 2008).
1. The BIA considered all evidence Singh presented and provided a reasoned
explanation as to why it dismissed Singh’s appeal. See Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762,
772 (9th Cir. 2011). The BIA listed the five bases on which Singh relied to support
his CAT claim, and explained why each was insufficient for Singh to establish a
probability that he would be tortured. Substantial evidence in the record supports the
BIA’s analysis. Id. at 770. Although the BIA clearly erred in finding that Singh’s
letters from Kulvir Singh were not specific to Singh, the BIA properly found that the
letters did not demonstrate a probability that Singh would be tortured if returned to
India. Singh’s claim regarding the letters relies on a string of suppositions: that Kulvir
Singh would have saved all of Singh’s letters; that the letters would have been
1
The government argues that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) bars our jurisdiction. Section
1252(a)(2)(C) bars jurisdiction over final orders of removal when an alien admits to
committing an aggravated felony. We have jurisdiction over Singh’s CAT claim,
however, because both the IJ and the BIA denied CAT relief on the merits and did not
rely on his prior convictions. See Brezilien v. Holder, 569 F.3d 403, 410 (9th Cir.
2009) (holding that “as to factual issues, when an IJ does not rely on an alien's
conviction in denying CAT relief and instead denies relief on the merits, none of the
jurisdiction-stripping provisions . . . apply to divest this court of jurisdiction” (ellipsis
in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
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amongst the property authorities removed from Kulvir Singh’s house in 2012; and that
the non-political nature of Singh’s letters would prompt the authorities to target Singh,
who was not living in India and who was one of the many people writing to Kulvir
Singh. Such speculation cannot satisfy Singh’s burden under 8 C.F.R. §
1208.16(c)(2). See Blandino-Medina v. Holder, 712 F.3d 1338, 1348 (9th Cir. 2013)
(affirming denial of CAT relief when petitioner relied on “a series of worst-case
scenarios”). Additionally, the BIA did not clearly err in finding that neither Singh’s
membership in the Akali Dal Panch Pardhani party, which Singh testified has about
a hundred thousand members, nor his pro-Khalistan views made it likely that he
would be tortured.
Singh’s assertion that he would be tortured because of an article he wrote for
a Canadian newspaper in 2003 is similarly speculative. Singh testified that Punjabi
police repeatedly threatened his uncle after the article was published and wanted to
pay Singh to write positive articles about the Punjabi Prime Minister. Without more,
Singh cannot show that he is likely to be tortured by police because of this now
decade-old article, even if he relocated elsewhere in India. Cf. Maldonado v. Lynch,
786 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (recognizing that evidence that the
applicant could relocate within the country of removal must be considered under 8
C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)).
3
Substantial evidence in the record similarly supports the BIA’s rejection of
Singh’s argument that he is likely to be tortured because of his status as a criminal
deportee. Singh acknowledged that he was not similarly-situated to his co-defendant
because Singh came to the United States on a visa, rather than by seeking asylum.
Additionally, Singh testified that while some people he knows were detained and
beaten after their deportation, some of them were not detained.
2. Contrary to Singh’s argument, the BIA explicitly considered the country
reports in the record and recognized that the country reports “indicate a generalized
use of custodial torture in India.” The BIA properly found, however, that these
country reports did not show that the forces responsible for custodial torture would
target Singh and make it more likely than not that Singh would be tortured upon his
return to India.
3. Singh contends that the BIA failed to recognize that he could not relocate
within India because he will be detained upon his arrival in India–apparently at any
airport in India. But the record does not support his argument and instead supports
the opposite conclusion: country reports state that Indian authorities generally do not
trace an individual who moves to another area unless there are outstanding charges
against the individual, and that authorities lack the ability to perform background
checks when individuals relocate within India. Chebchoub v. INS, 257 F.3d 1038,
4
1044 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming BIA’s use of country reports to “refute a generalized
statement” regarding the practice of exile in Morocco), superseded by statute on other
grounds as stated in Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1046 (9th Cir. 2010).
The Petition for Review is DENIED.
5