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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-11772
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 9:13-cv-80720-KAM
JOHN PINSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
a financial institution,
CPCC DELAWARE BUSINESS TRUST,
An unknown entity,
a.k.a. CPCC Delaware Statutory Trust,
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO,
Defendants-Appellees,
LAW OFFICES OF MARSHALL C. WATSON, P.A.,
Defendant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(March 28, 2016)
Before TJOFLAT, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This lawsuit stems from a residential mortgage John Pinson gave JPMorgan
Chase Bank, NA (Chase) on December 23, 2005, to secure a debt in the sum of
$202,000, and concerns seven letters sent to Pinson about the mortgage and one
visit a lawyer made to his residence. 1 On July 26, 2013, Pinson, proceeding pro se,
brought this action against Chase, JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPMorgan) and CPCC
Delaware Business Trust (CPCC) 2 seeking damages under the Fair Debt
Collections Practice Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692. After the district court
converted the defendants’ motion to dismiss Pinson’s second amended complaint
to a motion for summary judgment, it granted the defendants summary judgment. 3
Pinson appeals. We affirm.
1
Four of the letters were communications from Pinson and are irrelevant.
2
Pinson also sued a law firm engaged by Chase to collect a debt he owed. He
subsequently dismissed that defendant from the case.
3
Invoking the district court’s supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, Pinson
also sought relief under the Florida Consumer Collections Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 559.72.
After entering judgment against Pinson on the FCCPA claims, the court declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction and dismissed the § 559.72 claims without prejudice.
2
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I.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d
1333, 1335 (11th Cir. 2012). We accept the complaint’s allegations as true and
construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. The factual
allegations in the complaint must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955,
1965, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). Further, the complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570,
127 S. Ct. at 1974.
To state a plausible FDCPA claim, “a plaintiff must allege, among other
things, (1) that the defendant is a debt collector and (2) that the challenged conduct
is related to debt collection.” Reese v. Ellis, Painter, Ratterree & Adams LLP, 678
F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2012). Obligations to pay a residential mortgage
qualify as “debt” for purposes of the FDCPA. Id. at 1216-17. When determining
whether a communication is “in connection with the collection of any debt,” courts
look to the language of the letters in question---specifically to statements that
demand payment and discuss additional fees if payment is not tendered. Caceres
v. McCalla Raymer, LLC, 755 F.3d 1299, 1302 (11th Cir. 2014); see also Reese,
678 F.3d at 1217. A communication can have more than one purpose---for
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example, providing information to a debtor as well as collecting a debt. Reese, 678
F.3d at 1217. A demand for payment need not be expressed. A letter may imply a
demand for payment if it states the amount of the debt, describes how the debt may
be paid, provides the phone number to call and address to send the payment to, and
expressly states that the letter is for the purpose of collecting a debt. Caceres, 755
F.3d at 1303 n.2.
We conclude that Pinson’s second amended complaint failed to allege that
JPMorgan or CPCC attempted to collect a debt, and thus, did not sufficiently plead
facts to state a FDCPA claim. Reese, 678 F.3d at 1216. The second amended
complaint made the general statement that CPCC and JPMorgan were debt
collectors for purposes of the FDCPA, and that JPMorgan directly or indirectly
engaged in the collection of an alleged debt for a third party, but it did not allege
any specific actions taken by either CPCC or JPMorgan. Thus, Pinson failed to
allege that any “challenged conduct [was] related to debt collection” because his
complaint lacked any facts about CPCC or JPMorgan’s conduct as it related to him
or his debt. Id.
II.
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Rioux v. City of
Atlanta, Ga., 520 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008). “Summary judgment is
rendered ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
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on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.’” Id. In making this assessment, we must view all evidence and all factual
inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, and must resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of
the nonmovant. Id.
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of
establishing the absence of a dispute over a material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). The burden
then shifts to the non-moving party, who may not rest upon mere allegations, but
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(e); Eberhardt v. Waters, 901 F.2d 1578, 1580 (11th Cir. 1990).
The FDCPA imposes civil liability on “debt collectors” for certain
prohibited debt-collection practices. Harris v. Liberty Cmty. Mgmt., Inc., 702 F.3d
1298, 1299 (11th Cir. 2012). The FDCPA defines a “debt collector,” in relevant
part, as one who engages “in any business the principal purpose of which is the
collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or
indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.”
15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6); Harris, 702 F.3d at 1302. The term “debt collector” as used
in the FDCPA does not include “any person collecting or attempting to collect any
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debt owed or due or asserted to be owned or due another to the extent such activity
. . . concerns a debt which was originated by such person.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692a(6)(F).
Rule 902(4) of the Federal Rules of Evidence states that “a copy of an
official record—or a copy of a document that was recorded or filed in a public
office as authorized by law—if the copy is certified as correct by the custodian or
another person authorized to make the certification” is self-authenticating. Fed. R.
Evid. 902(4).
We find no error in the district court’s decision granting summary judgment
on Pinson’s FDCPA claim against Chase. First, Chase presented a certified copy
of the mortgage, filed in Palm Beach County, Florida, showing that Pinson
borrowed funds from it in December 2005. While Pinson argues that the mortgage
was not authenticated, as a certified copy of a public record it is self-
authenticating. Fed. R. Evid. 902(4). In short, Chase was the lender on Pinson’s
mortgage.
Second, because Chase was the lender, Pinson’s argument that Chase was a
debt collector for purposes of the FDCPA fails. Section 1692a(6)(F) exempts
original creditors, such as Chase, from its definition of debt collector. 15 U.S.C. §
1692a(6)(F). Third, the district court did not improperly disregard an affidavit
supplied by Pinson in opposition to summary judgment. At the summary judgment
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hearing, the court thoroughly considered the affidavit and questioned Pinson as to
its contents, giving him the opportunity to explain the affidavit and what triable
issues it created. Pinson’s unsupported statement that he did not believe Chase
was the originator of his loan was insufficient to create a triable issue of fact.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s summary judgment is
AFFIRMED.4
4
Pinson contends that the court abused its discretion in denying him an opportunity to
amend his second amended complaint. The amendment would have been futile; hence, no abuse
of discretion occurred.
7