FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT March 30, 2016
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Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 15-3151
(D.C. No. 6:02-CR-10074-MLB-2)
JESUS MENDOZA, a/k/a Silva, (D. Kan.)
Defendant - Appellant.
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
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Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
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After the United States Sentencing Commission adopted a retroactive amendment
to the Sentencing Guidelines for various drug offenses, Defendant moved for a reduction
in his sentence. The district court denied the motion because Defendant’s present
sentence is below the guideline sentencing range computed under the amended
guidelines. Defendant appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
On November 20, 2006, Defendant pleaded guilty in the United States District
Court for the District of Kansas to violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
856(a)(1). The district court, without objection from Defendant, calculated a guideline
sentencing range of 324–405 months but varied downward and sentenced Defendant to
240 months’ imprisonment.
The Sentencing Commission later adopted Amendment 782, which reduces by two
levels many of the base offense levels assigned for drug offenses. The amendment is
retroactive. Applying it to Defendant would reduce his guideline sentencing range from
324–405 months to 262–327 months. Although it is not in the record, a document from
Defendant was construed by the district court as a motion to reduce his sentence because
of the amendment.
“A federal court generally ‘may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has
been imposed.’” Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 819 (2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)). But an exception lies “in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a
term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by
the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). In that event the sentencing court
“may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in [18
U.S.C. §] 3553(a).” Id. Any reduction under § 3582(c)(2) must, however, be “consistent
with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” Id. The
applicable policy statement is found at USSG § 1B1.10, “Reduction in Term of
Imprisonment as a Result of Amended Guideline Range (Policy Statement).” See Dillon,
560 U.S. at 827 (“§ 3582(c)(2) requires the court to follow the Commission’s instructions
in § 1B1.10 to determine the prisoner’s eligibility for a sentence modification.”). Unless
the defendant originally received a guideline-range reduction for providing substantial
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assistance to authorities, see USSG § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B)—which Defendant did not—that
policy statement does not authorize a reduction if the defendant’s existing sentence is
lower than the low end of the guideline range computed under the amendment. See id.
§ 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) (“[T]he court shall not reduce the defendant’s term of imprisonment
… to a term that is less than the minimum of the amended guideline range.”). Because
Defendant’s existing sentence was 240 months and his amended range was 262–327
months, he was not eligible for a reduction under § 3582(c)(2). The district court
properly dismissed his motion.
Defendant claims that the district court erred in denying a reduction without
considering any of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). And he complains that
the document construed by the court as a motion under § 3582(c) was in fact merely a
letter asking how to prepare a motion for a sentence reduction based on Amendment 782,
so the court’s misconstruction denied him the opportunity to present a more complete
§ 3582(c) motion addressing his entitlement to a reduction under the § 3553(a) factors.
For his contention that the district court was required to address the § 3553(a) factors,
Defendant relies on United States v. Trujillo, 713 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2013). But he
misreads that decision. In Trujillo the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant was eligible
for a reduction and then ordered the district court to address the § 3553(a) factors in
considering whether to grant one. See id. at 1006–11. Here, Defendant was not eligible,
so the district court correctly did not address the § 3553(a) factors. See Dillon, 560 U.S.
at 827. And because there was no need to address the § 3553(a) factors, any
misconstruction of Defendant’s letter that denied him the opportunity to discuss them was
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harmless error. See United States v. Montgomery, 439 F.3d 1260, 1263 (10th Cir. 2006)
(“Harmless error is that which did not affect the district court’s selection of the sentence
imposed.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion under § 3582(c)(2).
Appellant’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is DENIED.
Entered for the Court
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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