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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 15-12873
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 9:08-cr-80094-DMM-3
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
NATHANIEL HARDIMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(March 30, 2016)
Before TJOFLAT, ROSENBAUM, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Nathaniel Hardiman, represented by counsel on appeal, appeals the district
court’s denial of his pro se motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2) based on Amendment 782 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines
(“U.S.S.G.”). 1 The district court found Hardiman ineligible for § 3582(c)(2) relief
because he was sentenced as a career offender, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, so Amendment
782, which lowered the base offense levels for most drug offenses under U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1, did not lower the guideline range upon which his sentence was based. On
appeal, Hardiman argues that, because he received a downward variance to the low
end of the crack-cocaine guideline range that would have applied if he were not a
career offender, he is eligible for a sentence reduction based on the Supreme
Court’s decision in Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2685
(2011). He contends that Freeman abrogated our decision in United States v.
Moore, 541 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2008), in which we concluded that career
offenders were not eligible for relief under § 3582(c)(2) based on changes to the
crack-cocaine guidelines. After careful review, we affirm.
I.
Hardiman pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute fifty grams or more of crack
cocaine. At his sentencing in 2009, the district court found that Hardiman had
1
In the underlying motion, Hardiman appears to have moved for relief based on
Amendment 750, but the district court construed his request as based on Amendment 782, as the
court previously had denied Hardiman relief under Amendment 750. Our analysis is the same
regardless of the particular amendment at issue.
2
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prior felony convictions that qualified him as a career offender under U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.1. Under the career-offender guideline range, Hardiman faced 262 to 327
months in prison. Nevertheless, the court found that the career-offender guideline,
while technically applicable, produced an unreasonable sentencing range. The
court therefore downwardly varied from that range, pursuant to Booker 2 and 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a), and sentenced Hardiman to 130 months in prison—equivalent to
the low end of the guideline range (130 to 162 months) produced by the crack-
cocaine guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1.
Since 2009, the Sentencing Commission has twice amended the drug-
quantity table in § 2D1.1 to reduce the base offense levels applicable to crack-
cocaine offenses. Hardiman first sought a sentence reduction in July 2012 after the
Commission issued Amendment 750.3 The court found Hardiman ineligible for
relief as a career offender and denied the motion.
Hardiman next sought a sentence reduction in September 2014, which the
district court construed as requesting a reduction under Amendment 782. The
court again found Hardiman ineligible and denied the motion. The court explained
that Amendment 782 did not apply because, “[a]lthough the Court varied
downward from the guidelines range, the Defendant was classified as a career
2
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
3
Hardiman also requested relief under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, but this Act
cannot serve as a basis for a § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction and does not apply retroactively.
United States v. Berry, 701 F.3d 374, 377-78 (11th Cir. 2012).
3
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offender and the Court’s variance does not change the Defendant’s career offender
status.” Doc. 564. Hardiman now appeals.
II.
We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction
under § 3582(c)(2). See United States v. Davis, 587 F.3d 1300, 1303 (11th Cir.
2009).
Section 3582(c)(2) permits district courts to reduce a defendant’s term of
imprisonment in the limited circumstances where the defendant was sentenced
“based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the
Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). A defendant’s eligibility for a
sentence reduction is determined by calculating the “amended guideline range that
would have been applicable” if the retroactive amendment had been in effect at the
defendant’s original sentencing. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1). The amended
guideline range is determined by substituting only the amended guideline for the
one originally used. Id.; see United States v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 778, 780 (11th Cir.
2000).
A sentence reduction is not consistent with the policy of the Sentencing
Commission—and therefore is not authorized under § 3582(c)(2)—if the
retroactive amendment “does not have the effect of lowering the defendant’s
applicable guideline range.” U.S.S.G. § 1B.10(a)(2)(B); see 18 U.S.C.
4
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§ 3582(c)(2) (providing that any sentence reduction must be “consistent with
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”). The
commentary to § 1B1.10 explains that the “applicable guideline range” is
“determined before consideration of any departure provision in the Guidelines
Manual or any variance.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(A). The Supreme Court has
held that a commentary provision “which functions to interpret a guideline or
explain how it is to be applied” is binding as long as the commentary does not
conflict with the Constitution, a federal statute, or the guideline at issue. Stinson v.
United States, 508 U.S. 36, 42-43, 45, 113 S. Ct. 1913, 1917-19 (1993) (alterations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
In Moore, we explained that § 3582(c)(2) authorizes reductions to only those
sentences that were “based on” sentencing ranges that were subsequently lowered
by a retroactive amendment. Moore, 541 F.3d at 1327; see id. at 1326 (“Where a
retroactively applicable guideline amendment does not alter the sentencing range
upon which a defendant’s sentence was based, § 3582(c)(2) does not authorize a
sentence reduction.”). Because Amendment 706 did not alter the career-offender
offense levels, we concluded that it did not lower the sentencing range upon which
a career offender’s sentence had been based. Id. at 1327. We also noted that the
commentary to § 1B1.10(a) “ma[de] clear” that a § 3582(c)(2) reduction was not
authorized where an amendment lowered a defendant’s base offense level for the
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offense of conviction but not the career-offender sentencing range under which the
defendant was sentenced. Id. at 1327-28; see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(A)
(explaining that a reduction under § 3582(c)(2) is not consistent with the policy
statement if the retroactive amendment “is applicable to the defendant but the
amendment does not have the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable
guideline range because of the operation of another guideline or statutory
provision”).
Nevertheless, we distinguished the facts in Moore from two out-of-circuit
district court cases in which the sentencing courts, by applying a downward
departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, “reduced the defendants’ offense levels to those
that would be in effect absent the career offender guideline.” Id. at 1229-30.
Those reduced offense levels were then used to determine the guideline ranges
under which the defendants were sentenced. Id. Because Amendment 706
lowered the offense levels that were used to determine the applicable guideline
ranges, we stated that “a reduction in sentence is within the district court’s
discretionary authority under § 3582(c)(2).” Id. at 1330. We found no similar
circumstances with respect to the defendants in Moore, because there was no
“indication that the court based [the] sentence[s] on the guideline range that would
have applied absent the career offender designation.” Id.
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In Freeman, the Supreme Court addressed whether defendants who enter
into Rule 11(c)(1)(C), Fed. R. Crim. P., plea agreements are eligible for
§ 3582(c)(2) relief. 131 S. Ct. at 2690. A four-justice plurality stated that
§ 3582(c)(2) “should be available to permit the district court to revisit a prior
sentence to whatever extent the sentencing range in question was a relevant part of
the analytic framework the judge used to determine the sentence or to approve the
agreement.” Id. at 2692-93. The plurality concluded that the judge’s decision to
accept a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea “is likely to be based on the Guidelines; and when it
is, the defendant should be eligible to seek § 3582(c)(2) relief.” Id. at 2695.
In an opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Sotomayor determined that
sentences imposed pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreements, as a general
matter, were not “based on” the guidelines. Id. at 2696-97 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring in the judgment). But a particular defendant may be eligible for
§ 3582(c)(2) relief if the agreement “expressly uses a Guidelines sentencing range
to establish the term of imprisonment, and that range is subsequently lowered by
the Commission.” Id. at 2698 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
In Lawson, we rejected the argument that Freeman overruled or abrogated
our decision in Moore. United States v. Lawson, 686 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir.
2012). We explained that neither the plurality opinion nor Justice Sotomayor’s
concurrence dealt with the issue presented in Moore—“defendants who were
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assigned a base offense level under one guideline section, but who were ultimately
assigned a total offense level and guideline range under § 4B1.1.” Id. Thus,
Moore remains binding precedent in this Circuit. Id. at 1321; see also United
States v. Tellis, 748 F.3d 1305, 1309-10 (11th Cir. 2014) (again rejecting the
argument that Freeman overruled Moore).
Here, the district court properly denied Hardiman’s § 3582(c)(2) motion.
Despite Hardiman’s contention that Moore has been abrogated by Freeman, we
have held that Moore continues to be good law in this Circuit. See Lawson, 686
F.3d at 1321. Because Hardiman was found to be a career offender and sentenced
under § 4B1.1, Amendment 782 did not have the effect of lowering the guideline
range upon which his sentence was based. See Moore, 541 F.3d at 1327.
Amendment 782 lowered the crack-cocaine base offense levels in § 2D1.1 but did
nothing to the career-offender base offense levels in § 4B1.1. Accordingly, under
Moore and Lawson, Amendment 782 did not alter the career-offender guideline
range upon which his sentence was based, so a § 3582(c)(2) reduction is not
authorized.
Acknowledging these general points, Hardiman counters that his sentence in
fact was “based on” the crack-cocaine guideline range because the sentencing court
downwardly varied from the career-offender guideline range to the low end of the
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range calculated under § 2D1.1.4 In similar circumstances, the Sixth Circuit held
that a career offender was eligible for § 3582(c)(2) relief when the sentencing
judge varied from the career-offender guideline range to a range “that would have
applied to [the defendant] under the crack cocaine guidelines if he were not a
career offender.” United States v. Jackson, 678 F.3d 442, 444-45 (6th Cir. 2012).
Even our decision in Moore suggested that § 3582(c)(2) relief may not be
completely foreclosed to a career offender when there is an “indication that the
court based [the] sentence on the guideline range that would have applied absent
the career offender designation.” Moore, 541 F.3d at 1330.
Nonetheless, commentary to the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement
on § 3582(c)(2) sentence reductions, which became effective in November 2011,
forecloses Hardiman’s argument. Under § 3582(c)(2), any sentence reduction
must be “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission,” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), and a reduction is not consistent with the
Commission’s policy statement if the retroactive amendment “does not have the
effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline range,” U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). The commentary to § 1B1.10, in turn, defines the “applicable
guideline range” as the range “determined before consideration of . . . any
4
We note that there is some force to this position because, from a practical standpoint,
Hardiman’s sentence was “based on” the crack-cocaine guideline range, and Hardiman may very
well have received a sentence below 130 months of imprisonment had Amendment 782 been in
effect at the time of his original sentencing.
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variance. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(A). Therefore, Hardiman’s eligibility for a
sentence reduction is determined before considering the downward variance he
received at sentencing. In effect, the fact that Hardiman received a downward
variance from the career-offender guideline range is irrelevant to his eligibility for
§ 3582(c)(2) relief.
Hardiman asserts without further analysis that the commentary defining
“applicable guideline range” is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of § 3582(c)(2) in Freeman. However, Freeman addressed the
question of whether a term of imprisonment was “based on” a sentencing range
that has been lowered. See 131 S. Ct. at 2690-91. Freeman did not address
§ 3582(c)(2)’s other explicit requirement that any reduction must be “consistent
with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” See 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The relevant commentary to § 1B1.10 explains how to
determine when a reduction is consistent with the Sentencing Commission’s policy
statement on § 3582(c)(2) reductions—specifically when an amendment “lower[s]
the defendant’s applicable guideline range.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). The
commentary does not interpret, and is not plainly inconsistent with, § 3582(c)(2).
Accordingly, we reject Hardiman’s argument on this point.
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III.
In sum, the district court properly denied Hardiman’s § 3582(c)(2) motion
because he was sentenced as a career offender and Amendment 782 did not lower
his applicable guideline range, even though he received a downward variance to a
term of imprisonment within the range that would have applied if he were not a
career offender.
AFFIRMED.
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