J-A03040-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
DENAYA DAVIS
Appellee No. 446 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Order March 4, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Municipal Court of Philadelphia
At No(s): MC-51-CR-0031625-2013
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MUNDY, J., and DUBOW, J.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED MARCH 30, 2016
Appellant, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, appeals from the order
of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which affirmed the
suppression order entered in the Municipal Court in favor of Appellee,
Denaya Davis. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
At around 8:40 p.m. on August 14, 2013, Mattie Scott was driving
westbound on Larchwood Avenue when she approached the intersection at
61st Street, which had a four-way stop sign. Ms. Scott stopped at the
intersection. As Ms. Scott started to make a left turn, Appellee drove
through the intersection eastbound on Larchwood Avenue without stopping.
Ms. Scott’s vehicle struck Appellee’s vehicle. Appellee exited her vehicle and
began to jump up and down, screaming that Ms. Scott had hit and damaged
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Appellee’s car. Ms. Scott’s car was damaged beyond repair. Minutes later,
Officer Nicholson arrived at the scene in response to a radio call. The officer
first spoke to Ms. Scott and inquired if she needed medical attention.
Witnesses to the accident then pointed Officer Nicholson to a van
approximately thirty feet away. Appellee was sitting in the passenger seat
of the van. Officer Nicholson approached the van and asked Appellee if she
needed medical attention. Appellee said she was fine and would go to the
hospital on her own. Officer Nicholson then asked Appellee to exit the van
so he could view her driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance for
his accident report. As he spoke to Appellee, Officer Nicholson noticed she
would stare off into space or not answer some of his questions. Appellee
also had glassy eyes and slurred speech. Based on his observations of
Appellee’s condition, Officer Nicholson asked if she had been drinking and
insisted she receive medical attention. As Officer Nicholson continued to talk
to Appellee, he detected a strong odor of alcohol on her breath. Appellee
finally admitted she had attended a happy hour event where she drank three
shots of liquor and a beer. Officer Nicholson then called for a police wagon,
and Appellee was placed under arrest and subjected to a breath test.
The Commonwealth charged Appellee with one (1) count of driving
under influence of alcohol (“DUI”), 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1). Appellee filed
a motion to suppress all evidence gathered following Officer Nicholson’s
“stop” of Appellee. On October 24, 2013, the Municipal Court held a hearing
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and granted Appellee’s motion to suppress. The Commonwealth timely
appealed to the Court of Common Pleas (“CCP”) on November 22, 2013. On
March 4, 2014, the CCP affirmed the suppression order. On April 3, 2014,
the Commonwealth timely filed a notice of appeal and a voluntary concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).1
The Commonwealth raises the following issue for our review:
DID THE [CCP], SITTING AS AN APPELLATE COURT, ERR
IN AFFIRMING THE SUPPRESSION ORDER OF THE
MUNICIPAL COURT, WHICH ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT
[APPELLEE] HAD BEEN PLACED UNDER SUPPOSED ARREST
WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE BECAUSE A POLICE OFFICER
INVESTIGATING A CAR ACCIDENT IN WHICH [APPELLEE]
HAD BEEN INVOLVED AS A DRIVER SPOKE TO [APPELLEE]
AND ASKED FOR HER LICENSE AND REGISTRATION?
(Commonwealth’s Brief at 4).
The Commonwealth argues Officer Nicholson’s initial interaction with
Appellee required no suspicion of criminal activity. The Commonwealth
contends Officer Nicholson lawfully approached and questioned Appellee as
part of the officer’s duty to render aid in the aftermath of the accident. The
Commonwealth claims Officer Nicholson approached Appellee to determine if
she needed medical attention, not to investigate a crime. The
Commonwealth asserts Officer Nicholson initially was concerned that
Appellee had suffered a traumatic brain injury because she had glassy eyes
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1
The Commonwealth certified that the suppression order terminated or
substantially handicapped the prosecution, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).
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and did not promptly respond to the officer’s questions. The Commonwealth
submits Officer Nicholson then observed other signs indicating that Appellee
had been drinking, including slurred speech and the odor of alcohol on her
breath. The Commonwealth maintains Appellee admitted she had consumed
several alcoholic beverages. The Commonwealth contends Officer Nicholson
had probable cause to arrest Appellee at that point. The Commonwealth
disputes the CCP’s finding that a seizure or arrest occurred at any time
before Appellee was placed in the police vehicle. The Commonwealth
asserts Officer Nicholson had reasonable suspicion to conduct an
investigative detention, in any event, because Appellee had wandered away
from the accident scene, and it was clear one or both drivers had
disregarded a stop sign and caused a severe collision. The Commonwealth
concludes this Court should reverse the suppression order and remand for
further proceedings. We agree.
We review an order granting a motion to suppress according to the
following principles:
[We] consider only the evidence from the defendant’s
witnesses together with the evidence of the prosecution
that, when read in the context of the entire record,
remains uncontradicted. As long as there is some
evidence to support them, we are bound by the
suppression court’s findings of fact. Most importantly, we
are not at liberty to reject a finding of fact which is based
on credibility.
The suppression court’s conclusions of law, however, are
not binding on an appellate court, whose duty is to
determine if the suppression court properly applied the law
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to the facts.
Commonwealth v. Goldsborough, 31 A.3d 299, 305 (Pa.Super. 2011),
appeal denied, 616 Pa. 651, 49 A.3d 442 (2012) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
Contacts between the police and citizenry fall within three general
classifications:
The first [level of interaction] is a “mere encounter” (or
request for information) which need not be supported by
any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to
stop or respond. The second, an “investigative detention”
must be supported by reasonable suspicion; it subjects a
suspect to a stop and period of detention, but does not
involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the
functional equivalent of arrest. Finally, an arrest or
“custodial detention” must be supported by probable
cause.
Commonwealth v. Bryant, 866 A.2d 1143, 1146 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal
denied, 583 Pa. 668, 876 A.2d 392 (2005). To determine if an interaction
rises to the level of an investigative detention, i.e., a Terry2 stop, “the court
must examine all the circumstances and determine whether police action
would have made a reasonable person believe he was not free to go and was
subject to the officer’s orders.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108,
116 (Pa.Super. 2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 832 A.2d
1123, 1127 (Pa.Super. 2003)). See also Commonwealth v. Conte, 931
A.2d 690, 691, 693 (Pa.Super. 2007) (characterizing as “mere encounter”
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2
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
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initial interaction between officer and defendant, where officer pulled up
behind defendant’s disabled vehicle on side of road, activated patrol car’s
overhead lights, walked toward defendant, and asked him what had
happened and if he needed assistance; stating “our expectation as a society
is that a police officer’s duty to serve and protect the community he…patrols
extends beyond enforcement of the Crimes Code or Motor Vehicle Code and
includes helping citizens evidently in distress”).
Police must have reasonable suspicion that a person is engaged in
unlawful activity before subjecting that person to an investigative detention.
Commonwealth v. Cottman, 764 A.2d 595 (Pa.Super. 2000).
[T]o establish grounds for reasonable suspicion, the officer
must articulate specific observations which, in conjunction
with reasonable inferences derived from those
observations, led him reasonably to conclude, in light of
his experience, that criminal activity was afoot and that
the person he stopped was involved in that activity. The
question of whether reasonable suspicion existed at the
time [the officer conducted the stop] must be answered by
examining the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether the officer who initiated the stop had a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the
individual stopped. Therefore, the fundamental inquiry of
a reviewing court must be an objective one, namely,
whether the facts available to the officer at the moment of
the [stop] warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the
belief that the action taken was appropriate.
Commonwealth v. Basinger, 982 A.2d 121, 125 (Pa.Super. 2009)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
“Probable cause justifying a warrantless arrest is determined by the
‘totality of the circumstances.’” Commonwealth v. Banks, 540 Pa. 453,
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455, 658 A.2d 752, 752 (1995).
Probable cause is made out when the facts and
circumstances which are within the knowledge of the
officer at the time of the arrest, and of which he has
reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to
warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that
the suspect has committed or is committing a crime. The
question we ask is not whether the officer’s belief was
correct or more likely true than false. Rather, we require
only a probability, and not a prima facie showing, of
criminal activity.
Commonwealth v. Rosha Charles Williams, 2 A.3d 611, 616 (Pa.Super.
2010) (en banc), appeal denied, 610 Pa. 585, 19 A.3d 1051 (2011) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Thompson, 604 Pa. 198, 203, 985 A.2d 928, 931
(2009)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in
original). “Furthermore, a police officer may utilize both his experience and
personal observations to render an opinion as to whether a person is
intoxicated.” Commonwealth v. Hope L. Williams, 941 A.2d 14, 27
(Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc). See also Commonwealth v. Funk, 385 A.2d
995 (Pa.Super. 1978) (en banc) (stating police had probable cause to arrest
defendant on suspicion of DUI where defendant had been in serious car
accident, his breath reeked of alcohol, and he was in stupor consistent with
either intoxication or concussion).
Instantly, Appellee was involved in a car accident in the middle of a
four-way stop intersection. The accident caused significant damage to the
vehicles involved. Officer Nicholson arrived at the scene in response to a
radio call. After speaking to the other driver, Officer Nicholson walked
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toward Appellee, whom witnesses indicated was sitting in a van parked
approximately thirty feet away. Officer Nicholson asked Appellee if she
needed medical assistance. The initial interaction between Officer Nicholson
and Appellee required no particular level of suspicion.3 Officer Nicholson was
simply fulfilling his duty to render aid to a driver he had reason to believe
was in distress. See Conte, supra; Bryant, supra. Additionally, Officer
Nicholson’s request for Appellee’s license, registration, and proof of
insurance, was in furtherance of the officer’s duty to create an accident
report and did not trigger an investigative detention of Appellee. See 75
Pa.C.S.A. § 3744(a) (stating: “The driver of any vehicle involved in an
accident resulting in…damage to any vehicle or other property which is
driven or attended by any person shall give his name, address and the
registration number of the vehicle he is driving, and shall upon request
exhibit his driver’s license and information relating to financial responsibility
to…any police officer at the scene of the accident or who is investigating the
accident”); 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3746(c) (stating: “Every accident reported to a
police department required in this section shall be investigated by a police
officer who shall provide each driver a signed statement that the accident
was reported”).
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3
Contrary to the CCP’s determination, no police-initiated traffic stop
occurred. Appellee’s vehicle was stopped by the collision itself, and Appellee
was sitting in another vehicle when Officer Nicholson approached her.
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As Officer Nicholson continued his interaction with Appellee, he
observed she had glassy eyes, slurred speech, and would stare off into space
or fail to respond to certain questions. When Officer Nicholson asked
Appellee if she had been drinking, the officer had reasonable suspicion
Appellee was intoxicated, based on the nature of the accident and his
observations of Appellee’s behavior and appearance. See Basinger, supra.
The officer noticed an odor of alcohol on Appellee’s breath, and Appellee
admitted she had consumed several alcoholic drinks.4 Officer Nicholson
then placed Appellee under arrest. At that point, the police had probable
cause to arrest Appellee on suspicion of DUI based on the totality of the
circumstances, including (1) the occurrence of a motor vehicle collision in
the middle of a four-way stop intersection, which suggested at least one
driver was at fault; (2) Appellee’s act of wandering away from the accident
and entering a different vehicle on the side of the road; (3) Officer
Nicholson’s observations of Appellee’s demeanor and physical symptoms;
and (4) Appellee’s admission that she had been drinking alcohol. Officer
Nicholson did not have to rule out definitively every other possible
explanation for Appellee’s behavior and condition, such as a brain injury, to
establish probable cause. See Rosha Charles Williams, supra; Funk,
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4
Although unchallenged in this case, Appellant was not “in custody,” when
she admitted she had consumed several alcoholic drinks, for purposes of
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
See generally Hope L. Williams, supra.
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supra. Accordingly, we reverse the order affirming suppression and remand
the case for further proceedings.
Order reversed; case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction is
relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/30/2016
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