Slip Op. 16-31
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ALUMINUM EXTRUSIONS FAIR
TRADE COMMITTEE,
Plaintiff,
v.
Before: Timothy C. Stanceu, Chief Judge
UNITED STATES,
Court No. 14-00206
Defendant,
and
RHEETECH SALES & SERVICES,
INC.,
Defendant-Intervenor.
OPINION
[Affirming a final scope ruling of the International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of
Commerce, interpreting the scope of antidumping and countervailing duty orders on certain
aluminum extrusions from the People’s Republic of China]
Dated: March 31, 2016
Robert E. DeFrancesco, III, Wiley Rein LLP, Washington, DC, for plaintiff. With him
on the brief was Alan H. Price.
Douglas G. Edelschick, Trial Attorney, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice,
Washington, DC, for defendant. With him on the brief were Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, and Reginald T. Blades, Jr.,
Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief was David P. Lyons, Office of Chief Counsel for
Trade Enforcement & Compliance, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, DC.
Peter S. Herrick, Peter S. Herrick, P.A., St. Petersburg, FL, for defendant-intervenor.
Stanceu, Chief Judge: Plaintiff Aluminum Extrusions Fair Trade Committee (“AEFTC”)
contests an August 7, 2014 final determination of the International Trade Administration, United
States Department of Commerce (“Commerce” or “the Department”), in which Commerce ruled
Court No. 14-00206 Page 2
that “aluminum frames for screen printing, with mesh screen attached” (“screen printing
frames”) are not within the scope of antidumping and countervailing duty orders on aluminum
extrusions from the People’s Republic of China (the “Orders”).
Before the court is plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the agency record, in which
plaintiff argues that Commerce erred in ruling the merchandise to be outside the scope of the
Orders. Defendant United States opposes plaintiff’s motion and argues that the Final Scope
Ruling should be affirmed. The court denies plaintiff’s motion.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Contested Decision and the Administrative Proceeding
The decision contested in this litigation is the Final Scope Ruling on Rheetech Sales &
Services Inc.’s Screen Printing Frames with Mesh Screen Attached, A-570-967, C-570-968
(Aug. 7, 2014) (Admin.R.Doc. No. 9), available at http://enforcement.trade.gov/download/prc-
ae/scope/48-screen-printing-frames-7aug14.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2016) (“Final Scope
Ruling”).
Commerce issued the Final Scope Ruling in response to a request (“Scope Ruling
Request”) filed on March 4, 2014 by Rheetech Sales & Services, Inc. (“Rheetech”), a U.S.
importer and the defendant-intervenor in this litigation. Alum. Extrusions from the People’s
Republic of China Scope Ruling Request Regarding Rheetech Sales & Services, Inc. (Mar. 4,
2014) (Admin.R.Doc. No. 1) (“Scope Ruling Request”). In comments filed with Commerce on
May 16, 2014, plaintiff argued that the screen printing frames are “subject merchandise,” i.e.,
merchandise that is subject to the Orders. Letter from Wily Rein LLP to Sec’y of Com., re:
Comments on Rheetech’s Scope Ruling Request and Response to the Department’s
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Questionnaire 11-12 (May 16, 2014) (Admin.R.Doc. No. 6) (“AEFTC’s Scope Ruling Request
Comments”).
B. The Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders
Commerce issued the Orders in May 2011. Aluminum Extrusions from the People’s
Republic of China: Antidumping Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. 30,650 (Int’l Trade Admin.
May 26, 2011) (“AD Order”); Aluminum Extrusions from the People’s Republic of China:
Countervailing Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. 30,653 (Int’l Trade Admin. May 26, 2011) (“CVD
Order”).
C. Proceedings before the Court of International Trade
AEFTC commenced this action by filing a summons on September 4, 2014. Summons,
ECF No. 1. Plaintiff followed with a complaint on October 3, 2014. Compl., ECF No. 10. The
court granted defendant-intervenor status to Rheetech, which has not since filed a brief in this
litigation. Order (Oct. 15, 2014), ECF No. 15. Plaintiff submitted its motion for judgment on
the agency record, pursuant to USCIT Rule 56.2, on March 30, 2015. Pl.’s R. 56.2 Mot. for J. on
the Agency R., ECF No. 21 (“Pl.’s Br.”). Defendant responded on August 6, 2015. Def.’s Resp.
to Pl.’s Mot. for J. on the Agency R., ECF No. 30. Plaintiff replied on September 4, 2015. Pl.
Aluminum Extrusions Fair Trade Committee’s Reply Br., ECF No. 31.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The court exercises subject matter jurisdiction under section 201 of the Customs Courts
Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c), which grants jurisdiction over civil actions brought under
Court No. 14-00206 Page 4
section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930 (“Tariff Act”).1 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(vi).
Section 516A provides for judicial review of a determination of “whether a particular type of
merchandise is within the class or kind of merchandise described in an . . . antidumping or
countervailing duty order.” Id. In reviewing the contested scope ruling, the court must set aside
“any determination, finding, or conclusion found . . . to be unsupported by substantial evidence
on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Id. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i).
B. Description of the Merchandise in Rheetech’s Scope Ruling Request
The Final Scope Ruling described the merchandise as “aluminum frames with a mesh
screen attached for screen printing designs onto fabric” and as “welded 6063-T5 aluminum
rectangular frames with polyester woven mesh glued to one side of the frame.” Final Scope
Ruling 5 (footnote omitted). It also stated that “[t]he frames are imported completely assembled,
with no finishing required before being sold.” Id. (footnote omitted). Commerce further stated
in the Final Scope Ruling that “[a]s decribed by Rheetech, the screen printing frames are placed
in screen printing machines and are inherently part of a larger whole,” id. at 12 (footnote
omitted), and that “[t]he screen printing frames are fully and permanently assembled and
completed, and are ready for installation into the screen printing machines, at the time of entry,”
id. (footnote omitted).
C. The Scope Language of the Orders
The scope language of the antidumping duty order and the scope language of the
countervailing duty order are essentially the same. The Orders apply to “aluminum extrusions
which are shapes and forms, produced by an extrusion process, made from aluminum alloys
1
All statutory citations herein are to the 2012 edition of the United States Code and all
regulatory citations herein are to the 2014 edition of the Code of Federal Regulations.
Court No. 14-00206 Page 5
having metallic elements corresponding to the alloy series designations published by The
Aluminum Association commencing with the numbers 1, 3, and 6 (or proprietary equivalents or
other certifying body equivalents).” AD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,650; CVD Order, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 30,653.
The scope of the Orders includes goods made of the specified aluminum alloys that
resulted from an extrusion process but also were subjected to certain specified types of industrial
processes after extrusion. These post-extrusion processes are drawing, fabricating, and finishing;
the scope language provides non-exhaustive lists of types of fabricating and finishing operations.
As to finishing, for example, the good may be “brushed, buffed, polished, anodized (including
bright-dip anodized), liquid painted, or powder coated.” AD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,650; CVD
Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,654. For fabricating, the Orders include a good that is, for example,
“cut-to-length, machined, drilled, punched, notched, bent, stretched, knurled, swedged, mitered,
chamfered, threaded, and spun.” Id. The scope includes these aluminum extrusions even if they
are “described at the time of importation as parts for final finished products that are assembled
after importation” or “identified with reference to their end use.” AD Order, 76 Fed. Reg.
at 30,650-51; CVD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,654. Subject to a specific exclusion (the “finished
goods kit exclusion”), “the scope includes the aluminum extrusion components that are attached
(e.g., by welding or fasteners) to form subassemblies, i.e., partially assembled merchandise . . . .”
AD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,651; CVD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,654.
The scope language of the Orders provides an exclusion from the scope for certain
“finished merchandise,” which reads as follows:
Court No. 14-00206 Page 6
The scope . . . excludes finished merchandise containing aluminum extrusions as
parts that are fully and permanently assembled and completed at the time of entry,
such as finished windows with glass, doors with glass or vinyl, picture frames
with glass pane and backing material, and solar panels.
AD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,651; CVD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,654.
D. Commerce Was Correct in Ruling that the Screen Printing Frames Are Not Within the
Scope of the Orders
As the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held in a leading case, “[s]cope orders
may be interpreted as including subject merchandise only if they contain language that
specifically includes the subject merchandise or may be reasonably interpreted to include it.”
Duferco Steel, Inc. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1087, 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Duferco”).
Applied to the facts of this case, the Duferco principle presents the question of whether
the “general scope language,” i.e., the scope language considered apart from any specific
exclusion from the scope, reasonably may be interpreted to include the screen printing frames.
If so, then a second question is whether the screen printing frames satisfy the requirements of a
specific exclusion set forth in the scope language and therefore must be determined to be outside
the scope of the Orders.
For the reasons discussed below, the court concludes that the general scope language may
not reasonably be interpreted to include the screen printing frames. It is unnecessary, therefore,
to consider the question of a specific exclusion. However, even if, arguendo, the general scope
language were presumed to include the screen printing frames, this merchandise necessarily
would be excluded from the scope of the Orders by operation of the “finished merchandise
exclusion” referenced above.
The general scope language provides that the Orders apply to “aluminum extrusions
which are shapes and forms, produced by an extrusion process . . . .” AD Order, 76 Fed. Reg.
Court No. 14-00206 Page 7
at 30,650; CVD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,653. The intended meaning of the term “shapes and
forms” is clarified by the following general scope language: “Aluminum extrusions are produced
and imported in a wide variety of shapes and forms, including, but not limited to, hollow
profiles, other solid profiles, pipes, tubes, bars and rods.” AD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,650;
CVD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,654. The examples presented to clarify the term “shapes and
forms” are of single extruded articles. These examples are an indication that the scope of the
Orders was not intended to include, as a general matter, any assembled good that contains an
aluminum extrusion as a part.
The screen printing frames are not themselves “extrusions” but rather are assemblies,
each of which consists of a frame, which is a welded assembly of extrusions, and a polyester
mesh screen that is attached to the frame. There is no dispute in this case that the frame is
assembled by welding together extrusions that are of an aluminum alloy specified in the Orders.
Under the general scope language, a good resulting from an extrusion process performed
upon a covered aluminum alloy remains in the scope even if, after being extruded, it has been
subjected to one of three specified types of processes: drawing, fabricating, and finishing. Id.
Absent from the list of post-extrusion processes identified in the general scope language is an
assembly process. To the contrary, the reference in the general scope language to fabrication
includes an indication that assembly is not one of the contemplated post-extrusion processes:
“Aluminum extrusions may also be fabricated, i.e., prepared for assembly.” Id. (emphasis
added).
The court concludes that it is not reasonable to interpret the general scope language to
place within the scope of the Orders, as a general matter, any assembled good containing as a
component an “aluminum extrusion,” even as the term “extrusion” is broadly defined therein. In
Court No. 14-00206 Page 8
other words, the Orders apply to “extrusions,” a term that is defined expansively by the Orders to
include goods that have been processed in various ways following an extrusion process. The
term “extrusions,” however, is not defined in the general scope language so broadly as to include
all goods consisting of assemblies of which extrusions are parts.
The only reference in the general scope language that describes assemblies of any kind as
being within the scope of the Orders is the reference to certain “subassemblies,” which in context
reads as follows:
Subject aluminum extrusions may be described at the time of importation as parts
for final finished products that are assembled after importation, including, but not
limited to, window frames, door frames, solar panels, curtain walls, or furniture.
Such parts that otherwise meet the definition of aluminum extrusions are included
in the scope. The scope includes the aluminum extrusion components that are
attached (e.g., by welding or fasteners) to form subassemblies, i.e., partially
assembled merchandise unless imported as part of the finished goods ‘kit’ defined
further below.2
AD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,650-51; CVD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,654.
2
The reference in the text to “the finished goods ‘kit’” is a reference to a specific
exclusion from the scope of the Orders that reads as follows:
The scope also excludes finished goods containing aluminum extrusions that are
entered unassembled in a “finished goods kit.” A finished goods kit is understood
to mean a packaged combination of parts that contains, at the time of importation,
all of the necessary parts to fully assemble a final finished good and requires no
further finishing or fabrication, such as cutting or punching, and is assembled “as
is” into a finished product. An imported product will not be considered a
“finished goods kit” and therefore excluded from the scope of the investigation
merely by including fasteners such as screws, bolts, etc. in the packaging with an
aluminum extrusion product.
Aluminum Extrusions from the People’s Republic of China: Antidumping Duty Order, 76 Fed.
Reg. 30,651 (Int’l Trade Admin. May 26, 2011); Aluminum Extrusions from the People’s
Republic of China: Countervailing Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. 30,654 (Int’l Trade Admin.
May 26, 2011).
Court No. 14-00206 Page 9
With respect to the first two sentences of the above-quoted language, the screen printing
frames are not plausibly described as “parts for final finished products that are assembled after
importation” that “otherwise meet the definition of aluminum extrusions.” Id. Even were it
presumed that the screen printing frames are “parts for final finished products,” they would not
answer to the description “parts that otherwise meet the definition of aluminum extrusions.” As
discussed above, the definition of “aluminum extrusions” is “shapes and forms produced by an
extrusion process . . . ,” AD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,650; CVD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,653,
which after extrusion may be subjected to “drawing, fabricating, and finishing.” AD Order,
76 Fed. Reg. at 30,650; CVD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,654.
The third sentence in the language quoted above, i.e., the sentence referring to
“subassemblies,” is inapplicable to the goods under consideration when read according to plain
meaning. Citing the Scope Ruling Request, Commerce described the screen printing frames as
“imported completely assembled, with no finishing required before being sold.” Final Scope
Ruling 5 (footnote omitted). Because the “subassemblies” reference is an exception to the
definition of “extrusions” put forth in the remainder of the general scope language and therefore
should be read narrowly, it would be a mistake to construe the subassemblies reference to apply
more broadly than its plain meaning would indicate.
Because screen printing frames are not “shapes and forms produced by an extrusion
process,” because they are, instead, assemblies, and because they are not described by the term
“subassemblies, i.e., partially assembled merchandise” as that term is used in the general scope
language, the general scope language is not reasonably interpreted to include these imported
products. The court concludes, therefore, that Commerce was correct in deciding that the screen
printing frames described in the Scope Ruling Request are not within the scope of the Orders.
Court No. 14-00206 Page 10
In the Final Scope Ruling, Commerce did not expressly conclude that the screen printing
frames fall within the general scope language. Instead, Commerce concluded that the screen
printing frames satisfy the terms of the finished merchandise exclusion. Final Scope Ruling 11
(“. . . we find that Rheetech’s Screen Printing Frames at issue meet the exclusion criteria for
finished goods.”). In so ruling, Commerce relied upon its regulation, 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(1),
and two of its previous scope rulings.3
Commerce did state that, based on its examination of the language of the scope and the
determination in one of its previous rulings, it found that “the product in question is a
‘subassembly’ that meets the criteria for a finished good and is therefore excluded from the
scope of the Orders.” Final Scope Ruling 13 (citing Final Scope Ruling on Side Mount Valve
Controls, A-570-967, C-570-968 (Oct. 26, 2012) available at
http://enforcement.trade.gov/download/prc-ae/scope/27-Innovative%20Controls-Side-Mount-
Valve-Controls-20121026.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2016)). The statement at issue could be read
to mean that Commerce determined the merchandise to be within the scope of the Orders under
the aforementioned subassemblies provision but ultimately determined it should be excluded
from the scope of the Orders because it met the requirements of the “finished merchandise
exclusion.” This interpretation of the Final Scope Ruling, however, leads to two problems of
construction. First, the “subassemblies” provision applies to “partially assembled merchandise”
while the finished merchandise exclusion is confined to “merchandise” that is “fully and
completely assembled.” The language Commerce chose when drafting the two provisions would
3
In the cited regulation, Commerce provided, in pertinent part, that “in
considering whether a particular product is included within the scope of an order . . . , the
Secretary will take into account the following: . . . The descriptions of the merchandise
contained in the petition, the initial investigation, and the determinations of the Secretary
(including prior scope determinations) and the Commission.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(1).
Court No. 14-00206 Page 11
seem to be mutually exclusive. Second, once a finding is reached that a good is within the
meaning of the scope term “subassemblies, i.e., partially assembled merchandise,” the good is, at
least arguably, included within the scope “unless imported as part of the finished goods ‘kit’
defined further below.” AD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,651; CVD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,654.
In setting forth the subassemblies provision, the scope language mentions the finished goods kit
exclusion without making a parallel reference to the finished merchandise exclusion, which
suggests that the subassemblies provision and the finished merchandise exclusion were intended
to be mutually exclusive. Given these two problems of construction, a better interpretation of the
Final Scope Ruling may be that Commerce reached a decision that the screen printing frames are
not within the scope of the Orders by analyzing the applicability of the finished merchandise
exclusion without first deciding conclusively whether the general scope language described these
goods.4 But regardless of whether Commerce considered the screen printing frames to fall
4
While not expressly concluding that the screen printing frames fall within the general
scope language, Commerce opined that the aluminum frame portion of the article, if considered
separately, would fall within the general scope language, stating as follows:
The scope of the Orders describes aluminum extrusions as “shapes
and forms, produced by an extrusion process, made from aluminum alloys
having metallic elements corresponding to the alloy series designations
published by the Aluminum Association commencing with the numbers 1,
3, and 6 (or proprietary equivalents or other certifying body equivalents.)”
Taken by itself, the aluminum frame of the screen printing frames would
fall within this description.
Final Scope Ruling on Rheetech Sales & Services Inc.’s Screen Printing Frames with Mesh
Screen Attached, A-570-967, C-570-968 (Aug. 7, 2014) (Admin.R.Doc. No. 9), available at
http://enforcement.trade.gov/download/prc-ae/scope/48-screen-printing-frames-7aug14.pdf (last
visited Mar. 28, 2016). Reaching this conclusion was not necessary to the Department’s
decision, and the court is unable to agree with the conclusion if the conclusion was intended as a
construction of the general definition of “extrusions” absent consideration of the
“subassemblies” provision discussed elsewhere in this Opinion. Additionally, in response to
AEFTC’s comment that Commerce should find that frames imported without the mesh screens
(continued…)
Court No. 14-00206 Page 12
within the “subassemblies” provision, or simply did not decide that question and instead
proceeded directly to the question of whether the goods are described by the finished
merchandise exclusion, Commerce unquestionably reached the correct result in placing these
goods outside the scope of the Orders.
The finished merchandise exclusion applies to “finished merchandise containing
aluminum extrusions as parts that are fully and permanently assembled and completed at the time
of entry.” AD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,651; CVD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,654. Were the
screen printing frames presumed, arguendo, to be described by the general scope language, they
would be excluded from the scope because they would satisfy the requirements of this exclusion.
As Commerce found, and as is shown by substantial evidence on the record, these goods “are
imported completely assembled, with no finishing required before being sold.” Final Scope
Ruling 5 (footnote omitted).
In summary, the court’s analysis of the scope language of the Orders differs somewhat
from that applied by Commerce in the Final Scope Ruling. Nevertheless, the question before the
court is whether the court should grant or deny plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the agency
record, not whether the court agrees entirely with the Department’s analysis. Because the screen
printing frames would not fall within the scope of the Orders under either analysis, plaintiff’s
motion must be denied and judgment entered for defendant. See USCIT R. 56.2(b).
In contesting the Final Scope Ruling, plaintiff raises a number of arguments that fail to
persuade the court that Commerce erred in placing the screen printing frames outside the scope
of the Orders.
(continued…)
would be within the scope, Commerce declined to decide that issue as it was not presented in the
Scope Ruling Request. Id. at 13.
Court No. 14-00206 Page 13
Plaintiff argues that the screen printing frames are, as Commerce found, “subassemblies,”
Pl.’s Br. 8 (citing Final Scope Ruling 13), and maintains that “[s]ubassemblies, by definition, are
not final finished products[] and thus cannot meet the ‘finished merchandise’ exclusion in the
scope of the AD/CVD orders,” id. at 9. Plaintiff submits that “[t]here was no substantial
evidence on the record to support the agency’s conclusion that Rheetech’s products fit within this
narrow exclusion to the scope.” Id. at 8. Plaintiff asserts, correctly, that Commerce found the
goods at issue are “‘placed in screen printing machines and are inherently part of a larger
whole,’” id. at 8 (quoting Final Scope Ruling 12), but based on the Department’s own finding
that the screen printing frames are imported in fully assembled form and the supporting record
evidence, the court must reject plaintiff’s argument. The screen printing frames are not correctly
described as “partially assembled merchandise” that must be placed within the scope of the
Orders by operation of the subassemblies provision. Commerce expressly found that these goods
“are imported completely assembled, with no finishing required before being sold.” Final Scope
Ruling 5 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Similarly, it found that “[t]he screen printing
frames are fully and permanently assembled and completed, and are ready for installation into
the screen printing machines, at the time of entry,” id. at 12 (footnote omitted).
In making its “subassemblies” argument, AEFTC relies on Shenyang Yuanda Alum.
Indus. Eng’g Co. v. United States, 776 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2015). That decision is inapposite
because it involved goods found to be parts of curtain walls, not goods identical or similar to
those under consideration here.
Plaintiff contends, further, that “[s]creen printing frames are simply component parts for
a larger finished machine[] and are thus not independent finished goods.” Pl.’s Br. 10. This
argument presumes that to fall outside the scope of the Orders an assembled good such as the
Court No. 14-00206 Page 14
screen printing frame must be “independent,” i.e., not used as a component or accessory with any
other good. The scope language does not so provide. Instead, while stating that “[s]ubject
aluminum extrusions may be described at the time of importation as parts for final finished
products that are assembled after importation . . . ,” the scope language qualifies this statement
by providing that “[s]uch parts that otherwise meet the definition of aluminum extrusions are
included in the scope.” AD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,650-51 (emphasis added); CVD Order,
76 Fed. Reg. at 30,654 (emphasis added). As the court discussed previously, the assembled good
at issue in this case does not meet that definition.
AEFTC argues that the screen printing frames do not satisfy the requirements of the
finished merchandise exclusion, asserting that the mesh screen is not fully and permanently
assembled to the frame at the time of entry. Pl.’s Br. 11. According to this argument, because
only one of the four sides of the mesh screen is glued to the frame, “the mesh must therefore be
either removed or fully glued down by the purchaser prior to use.” Id. (citing AEFTC’s Scope
Ruling Request Comments at 13-14). Plaintiff’s argument must be rejected. First, under the
court’s analysis of the scope the screen printing frames are not described by the general scope
language, regardless of the exclusions. Second, plaintiff’s assertion that the mesh must be
removed or glued down prior to use is not supported by the record evidence and is at odds with
the Department’s findings. Consistent with the record evidence, Commerce found that the
screen printing frames are “fully and permanently assembled,” Final Scope Ruling 12, and that
upon importation the mesh screen is affixed in place with glue and only replaced after
approximately 50,000 imprints, use for four or five different designs, or upon being torn or
loosened, id. at 5 (citing Letter from Peter S. Herrick, P.A., to Sec’y of Com. re: Rheetech Sales
Court No. 14-00206 Page 15
& Services, Inc. (“Rheetech”) – Screen Printing Frames Response to Request for Information
Dated April 3, 2014 (Apr. 15, 2014) 2,4 (Admin.R.Doc. No. 5)).
Finally, citing various past determinations interpreting the scope of the Orders, plaintiff
argues that in the Final Scope Ruling “Commerce unlawfully departed from its past practice in
interpeting the ‘finished merchandise’ exclusion, with insufficient explanation and rationale.”
This argument fails because the scope language of the Orders is not reasonably interpreted to
include the screen printing frames. In circumstances such as those presented here, “Congress
intended the language of the orders to govern.” Duferco, 296 F.3d at 1098.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed in the foregoing, the court must deny plaintiffs’ motion for
judgment on the agency record. The court will enter judgment for defendant.
/s/ Timothy C. Stanceu
Timothy C. Stanceu
Chief Judge
Dated: March 31, 2016
New York, New York