UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
___________________________________
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JOHN C. GIOVANETTI, )
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Plaintiff, )
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v. ) Civil Action No. 13-1807 (RBW)
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF )
INVESTIGATION et al., )
)
Defendants. )
___________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The plaintiff, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, challenges the responses of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and the Executive Office for United States Attorneys
(“EOUSA”) to his requests for his records under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5
U.S.C. § 552 (2012). What remains of this case concerns only FBI records. See Mar. 26, 2015
Mem. Op. and Order (“Mar. 26, 2015 Opinion”) at 5-6 (finding “that EOUSA has satisfied its
disclosure obligations under the FOIA and is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”). The
FBI’s declarant stated that the FBI had processed 699 pages of records and had released to the
plaintiff all but 237 of those pages completely or partially. Id. at 3. The declarant further stated
that the plaintiff was provided the “Bates-stamped, processed and coded pages,” but those pages
were not placed in the record. Id. at 6. Thus, the defendants were ordered “to supplement the
record with the pages and/or a declaration that describes the contents of the withheld documents
in reasonable detail to permit a proper examination.” Id. at 7 (citations omitted).
Currently pending before the Court is the defendants’ Renewed Motion for Summary
Judgment on Plaintiff’s Complaint (“Defs.’ Renewed Mot.”), supported by the Third Declaration
1
of David M. Hardy (“Third Hardy Decl.”) and an index pursuant to Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d
1136, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (“Vaughn Index”), ECF No. 27. Hardy incorporates by reference
his prior declarations. See Third Hardy Decl. ¶ 4. For the reasons explained below, the Court
will grant the defendants’ renewed motion for summary judgment, and enter judgment in their
favor accordingly.
SUPPLEMENTAL BACKGROUND
In response to the Mar. 26, 2015 Opinion, the FBI reevaluated the documents that were
withheld completely, determined that additional information could be released to the plaintiff,
and, by letter dated May 26, 2015, released 79 additional redacted pages to the plaintiff. Id. ¶ 11.
The FBI has now released a total of 541 pages, 237 of which contain redactions, and it has
withheld 158 pages in full. Id. ¶ 10. The FBI has withheld information under FOIA exemptions
3, 5, 6, 7(C), 7(D), and 7(E), codified in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). Declaration of David M. Hardy
(“Second Hardy Decl.”) ¶ 53, ECF No. 13-4.
DISCUSSION
In his opposition to the motion now before the Court, the plaintiff has highlighted in his
copy of the Vaughn Index which exemptions of documents claimed by the defendant he
concedes and which ones he disputes as unsupportive of “a claim that the document is properly
withheld in full.” 1 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition to Renewed Motion for
Summary Judgment of Plaintiff’s Complaint (“Pl.’s Opp’n Mem.”) ¶¶ 11-12 and Vaughn Index,
ECF No. 34. In addition, the plaintiff questions the FBI’s “[t]rustworthiness” in light of its
discovery (and release) of hundreds of responsive pages in 2014 after its initial release of 18
pages in 2009. Pl.’s Opp’n Mem. ¶ 6.
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The fact that the plaintiff is able to make such an assessment, see Pl.’s Opp’n Mem. ¶ 12,
tends to undermine his argument that the “Vaughn Index Remains Inadequate.” Id. ¶ 8.
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1. The Plaintiff’s Challenge to the Agency’s Trustworthiness
The plaintiff contends that “after turning over [the] 18 pages [in 2009], the FBI
represented that it had no other [documents] responsive to Plaintiff’s FOIA request,” and he
notes “a sense of irony that now, at last, [the FBI represents that it] has no other [responsive]
documents.” Pl.’s Opp’n Mem. ¶ 6. But the plaintiff has not pointed to anything in the record
supporting the suggested misrepresentation, and his “skepticism,” id. ¶ 7, is based on a mistaken
premise. The plaintiff either ignores or overlooks the fact that the FBI’s 2009 release of 18
pages was in response solely to a referral of those records from EOUSA. See First Declaration
of David M. Hardy (“First Hardy Decl.”) ¶ 9 and Exhibit D (Oct. 20, 2009 Letter), ECF No. 13-
3. In response to the plaintiff’s direct request, the FBI “located one main file” pertaining to the
plaintiff. First Hardy Decl. ¶ 16. It “initially withheld all responsive records under FOIA
exemption 7(A) due to a pending investigation . . . . In response to this litigation, the FBI
processed the request again and determined that the investigation was no longer pending.” Mar.
26, 2015 Op. at 3 (citations omitted). The FBI made its first release to the plaintiff on March 27,
2014, and it “released additional information contained in the released pages” on June 6, 2014.
Id.
The plaintiff has not created a genuine factual dispute concerning the reasonableness of
the FBI’s search, nor has he produced any evidence of agency bad faith. And “however fitful or
delayed the release of information under the FOIA may be, once all requested records are
surrendered, federal courts have no further statutory function to perform.” Perry v. Block, 684
F.2d 121, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1982); accord Boyd v. Criminal Div. of U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 475 F.3d
381, 388 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see, e.g., Murphy v. Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, 789 F.3d
204, 212 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (noting that “Murphy’s inadequate-search challenge fails because
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the adequacy of the search becomes a moot point if the requested information is in fact found but
not disclosed”) (citation omitted)); Whitmore v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, ___,
2015 WL 5675579, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2015) (“As long as the agency conducts a reasonable
search, it fulfills its obligations under the FOIA even if the search yields no responsive records.”)
(citation omitted)). Therefore, the plaintiff’s trustworthiness argument does not preclude the
Court from awarding the FBI summary judgment.
2. The FBI’s Asserted Exemptions
As reflected in the plaintiff’s copy of the Vaughn Index, he has conceded the defendants’
justifications for withholding information under FOIA exemptions 3, 7(D) and 7(E), see also
Pl.’s Opp’n Mem. ¶ 11, and the Court finds from its own examination of the defendants’
evidence that those withholdings are properly justified, see Second Hardy Decl. ¶¶ 16-20
(applying Exemption 3 to information obtained from the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(“FinCEN”) under the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”), 31 U.S.C. § 5319, which specifically exempts
from the FOIA FinCEN “report[s] and records of reports”); id. ¶¶ 41-44 (applying Exemption
7(D) to confidential information provided by a local law enforcement agency during the financial
fraud investigation of the plaintiff and others); id. ¶¶ 45-48 (applying Exemption 7(E) to
specifically identified investigative techniques and procedures), cf. Petrucelli v. Dep’t of Justice,
51 F. Supp. 3d 142, 168-171, 173 (D.D.C. 2014) (discussing exemptions 7(D) and 7(E));
Rosenberg v. United States Dep’t of Immigration & Customs Enf't, 13 F. Supp. 3d 92, 115
(D.D.C. 2014) (approving Exemption 3 withholding in accordance with the BSA).
The common thread of most of the withholdings disputed by the plaintiff is that they
concern third-party individuals (law enforcement personnel, government employees, persons of
investigative interest, and informants) that were withheld under the FOIA’s personal privacy
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exemptions provided for in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) and 7(C). See Vaughn Index, Bates-numbered
pages 8, 54, 256, 249, 251, 278, 280-82, 284-85, 409, 411-13, 415-16, 500-01, 543-44, 633, 657-
60, 669, 678, 681; Second Hardy Decl. ¶ 14 (“Summary of Justification Categories”). In
addition, the FBI has invoked FOIA Exemption 5, in conjunction with FOIA exemptions 6 and
7(C), as the bases for withholding certain internal documents. See Vaughn Index, Bates-
numbered pages 72-78, 168-174, 446-525, 679-680, and 681; Second Hardy Decl. ¶ 14.
FOIA Exemption 5
Exemption 5 of the FOIA provides that “inter–agency or intra–agency memorand[a] or
letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the
agency” are not subject to disclosure. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). “To qualify [for non-disclosure
under Exemption 5], a document must thus satisfy two conditions: its source must be a
Government agency, and it must fall within the ambit of a privilege against discovery under
judicial standards that would govern litigation against the agency that holds it.” Dep’t of Interior
v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 8 (2001).
The threshold issue that must be addressed when Exemption 5 is asserted is whether the
records in question qualify as “inter-agency or intra-agency memorand[a].” Judicial Watch, Inc.
v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 90 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13 (D.D.C. 2000). “With respect to the secondary
consideration under Exemption 5—whether such materials would not be ‘available by law in
litigation with the agency,’” id., “the parameters of Exemption 5 are determined by reference to
the protections available to litigants in civil discovery,” Burka v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 87 F.3d 508, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Thus, if a document requested pursuant to the FOIA
would normally be subject to disclosure in the civil discovery context, “it must also be disclosed
under [the] FOIA.” Id. Conversely, information that is routinely not subject to disclosure in the
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civil discovery process is exempt from disclosure under Exemption 5. Id. Moreover, “to justify
nondisclosure under Exemption 5, an agency must show that the type of material it seeks to
withhold is generally protected in civil discovery for reasons similar to those asserted by the
agency in the FOIA context.” Id. at 517. Thus, courts have incorporated three traditional civil
discovery privileges into Exemption 5: (1) the deliberative process privilege; (2) the attorney-
client privilege; and (3) the attorney work-product privilege. N.L.R.B. v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co.,
421 U.S. 132, 148-49, 154-55 (1975); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d
854, 862, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Here, the FBI cites the deliberative process privilege and the
attorney work-product privilege as grounds for withholding certain documents.
1. Deliberative Process Material
The deliberative process privilege protects from disclosure “‘documents reflecting
advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which
governmental decisions and policies are formulated.’” Cleveland v. United States Dep’t of State,
___ F. Supp. 3d ___, ___, 2015 WL 5313411, at *9 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2015) (quoting Klamath,
532 U.S. at 8). The purpose of the deliberative process privilege is “(1) to encourage open, frank
discussions on matters of policy between subordinates and superiors; (2) to protect against
premature disclosure of proposed policies before they are finally adopted; and (3) to protect
against public confusion that might result from disclosure of reasons and rationale that were not
in fact ultimately the grounds for an agency’s action.” Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Dep’t of
Agric., 311 F. Supp. 2d 44, 57 (D.D.C. 2004) (citing Russell v. Dep’t of Air Force, 682 F.2d
1045, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1982)); Coastal States, 617 F.2d at 866; Jordan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
591 F.2d 753, 772-73 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc)). Thus, when a court reviews whether an
agency properly withheld documents under the deliberative process privilege, the critical
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question to ask is whether “disclosure of [the] materials would expose an agency’s
decisionmaking process in such a way as to discourage candid discussion within the agency and
thereby undermine the agency’s ability to perform its functions.” Formaldehyde Inst. v. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., 889 F.2d 1118, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (quoting Dudman Commc’ns
Corp. v. Dep't of the Air Force, 815 F.2d 1565, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (alteration in original));
see also Sears, 421 U.S. at 151 (noting that “the ultimate purpose of [the deliberative process]
privilege is to prevent injury to the quality of agency decisions”).
To be exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process privilege, the agency must
show that the information is both (1) “predecisional” and (2) “deliberative.” Nat’l Ass’n of
Home Builders v. Norton, 309 F.3d 26, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2002). “A document is predecisional if it
was ‘prepared in order to assist an agency decision-maker in arriving at his decision,’ rather than
to support a decision already made.” Petroleum Info. Corp. v. Dep’t of Interior, 976 F.2d 1429,
1434 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Eng'g Corp., 421 U.S.
168, 184 (1975)). The preparation of the document, therefore, must be “[a]ntecedent to the
adoption of an agency policy.” Jordan, 591 F.2d at 774. However, a document cannot be
characterized as predecisional “if it is adopted, formally or informally, as the agency position on
an issue or is used by the agency in its dealings with the public.” Coastal States, 617 F.2d at
866. Examples of predecisional documents include “recommendations, draft documents,
proposals, suggestions, and other subjective documents which reflect the personal opinions of the
writer rather than the policy of the agency.” Id.
The FBI withheld as deliberative process material “drafts of documents prepared in the
prosecution of plaintiff and others.” Second Hardy Decl. ¶ 24. Hardy represents that the
documents reflect “deliberations that formed an integral part of the process by which decisions
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about the final content of the documents were made, in addition to the overall decision-making
process regarding the litigation strategy of the FBI and other defendants during plaintiff’s
criminal lawsuit.” Id. ¶ 24 n.6. According to Hardy, “[t]hese materials were also predecisional;
the drafts were preliminary versions of documents ultimately filed with the court in plaintiff’s
and others’ criminal cases and thus, pre-dated decisions about the final content of the documents
that were filed.” Id. and n.6 (referencing Bates-numbered pages 72-78, 168-174, 177-195, and
447-452).
The plaintiff counters correctly that it “makes no sense” that a “document reflecting the
internal deliberations of a court,” as stated in the Vaughn Index describing pages 72-78 and 169-
174, could be withheld under Exemption 5. Pl.’s Opp’n Mem. at 11. 2 However, despite Hardy’s
carelessly worded description of these withheld documents in his Vaughn Index 3, it is clear that
the documents contain information reflecting the internal deliberations of the agency in preparing
“documents ultimately filed with the court.” Second Hardy Decl. ¶ 24. This conclusion is
evidenced by Hardy’s indication that “[t]he FBI released copies of the versions that were filed
with the court to [the] plaintiff, to the extent that such final versions were maintained in the
FBI’s files.” Id. ¶ 24 n.5.
2. Attorney Work Product
The FBI withheld as attorney work product “materials created by attorneys involved in
the criminal case of one of plaintiff’s co-conspirators.” Second Hardy Decl. ¶ 26. The “records
were exchanged within the Department of Justice (i.e., between the FBI and U.S. Attorney’s
Office)[,] . . . [and] they were created by attorneys during civil litigation as part of the attorneys’
2
The page citations to the plaintiff’s opposition are those assigned by the Court’s electronic
case filing system.
3
This error should have been detected by the defendants’ counsel. Such oversights do not
reflect well on the quality of counsel’s advocacy.
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representation of the government in response to plaintiff’s lawsuit.” Id. The plaintiff does not
dispute the FBI’s justification for withholding the foregoing records under the attorney work-
product privilege, which “does not distinguish between factual and deliberative material.”
Martin v. Office of Special Counsel, 819 F.2d 1181, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Rather, he argues
that the defendants have not demonstrated “that the document[s] [were] properly withheld in
full.” Pl.’s Opp’n Mem. at 10. But, where, as here, “‘a document is fully protected as work
product, . . . segregability [of that document] is not required.’” Wright v. United States Dep’t of
Justice, 121 F. Supp. 3d 171, 187 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Judicial Watch, Inc. v. United States
Dep’t of Justice, 432 F.3d 366, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant summary judgment to the defendants on
their withholding of documents under Exemption 5 based on both the deliberate process
privilege and the attorney work-product privilege.
FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C)
FOIA Exemption 6 provides that “personnel and medical files and similar files the
disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” are not
subject to disclosure. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). “To determine whether an agency has properly
invoked . . . [a] personal privacy exemption[ ], a court must balance the public interest in
disclosure against the privacy interest the exemption is intended to protect.” Moore v. Bush, 601
F. Supp. 2d 6, 13 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 175 (1991)).
“Generally, government employees and officials . . . have a privacy interest in protecting their
identities because disclosure ‘could subject them to embarrassment and harassment in the
conduct of their official duties and personal affairs.’” Moore, 601 F. Supp. 2d at 14 (quoting
Halpern v. FBI, 181 F.3d 279, 296-97 (2d Cir. 1999)).
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FOIA Exemption 7 protects from disclosure “records or information compiled for law
enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that” disclosure would cause an enumerated harm. 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(7). “To show that . . . documents were compiled for law enforcement purposes,
the [agency] need only establish a rational nexus between [an] investigation and one of the
agency’s law enforcement duties and a connection between an individual or incident and a
possible security risk or violation of federal law.” Blackwell v. FBI, 646 F.3d 37, 40 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (citations omitted). It is apparent from the plaintiff's FOIA request that the responsive
records were compiled for law enforcement purposes, namely, his criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, the Court will examine the defendants’ asserted privacy interests under Exemption
7(C) only. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 655 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(explaining the “need only [to] consider whether [the Justice Department] properly invoked
Exemption 7(C),” which “is more protective of privacy than Exemption 6 and thus establishes a
lower bar for withholding material” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Larson v.
Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 862-63 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[A]gencies may invoke the exemptions
independently and courts may uphold agency action under one exemption without considering
the applicability of the other.”) (citation omitted)).
As just noted, FOIA Exemption 7(C) protects from disclosure information in law
enforcement records that “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). And in determining whether this exemption applies
to particular information, the Court must balance the interest in privacy of individuals mentioned
in the records against the public interest in disclosure. See Am. Civil Liberties Union, 655 F.3d
at 6. The privacy interest at stake belongs to the individual, not the government agency, see
United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763-
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65 (1989), and “individuals have a strong interest in not being associated unwarrantedly with
alleged criminal activity,” Stern v. FBI, 737 F.2d 84, 91-92 (D.C. Cir. 1984). When balancing an
individual’s privacy interest against the public interest in disclosure, “the only public interest
relevant for purposes of Exemption 7(C) is one that focuses on ‘the citizens’ right to be informed
about what their government is up to.’” Davis v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 968 F.2d 1276,
1282 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 773). It is a FOIA requester’s
obligation to articulate a public interest sufficient to outweigh an individual’s privacy interest,
and the public interest must be significant. Nat’l Archives and Records Admin. v. Favish, 541
U.S. 157, 172 (2004). In addition, the requester must “produce[ ] evidence sufficient to warrant
a belief by a reasonable person that the alleged Government impropriety might have occurred.”
Id. at 159. Otherwise, the balancing requirement does not come “into play.” Id.
It is well established that law enforcement personnel, witnesses, informants, and “third
parties who may be mentioned in investigatory files” have “an obvious privacy interest
cognizable under Exemption 7(C) in keeping secret the fact that they were subjects of a law
enforcement investigation.” Nation Magazine, Wash. Bureau v U.S. Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885,
894 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). Consequently, “[a]s a general rule, third-party
identifying information contained in [law enforcement] records is ‘categorically exempt’ from
disclosure.” Lazaridis v. U.S. Dep't of State, 934 F. Supp. 2d 21, 38 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting
Nation Magazine, 71 F.3d at 896). Thus, the Court of Appeals has noted that “[a]s a result of
Exemption 7(C), FOIA ordinarily does not require disclosure of law enforcement documents (or
portions thereof) that contain private information.” Blackwell, 646 F.3d at 41 (citing cases).
The defendants have shown that most of the records were withheld properly under
Exemption 7(C) because they pertain to third-party individuals. The FBI’s declarant has
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categorized the individuals into the following groups—FBI special agents and support personnel,
individuals of investigative interest, individuals who provided information to the FBI,
individuals merely mentioned, non-FBI federal government personnel, local law enforcement
officers, and a victim—and has adequately explained the harms associated with releasing their
information. See Second Hardy Decl. ¶¶ 30-40. The plaintiff disputes the withholding of FD-
515 Accomplishment Reports and “electronic printouts of accomplishment reports,” Pl.’s Opp’n
Mem. at 12-13, but those documents are described in the Vaughn Index not only as “pertaining
solely to a third party individual” but also as containing no mention of the plaintiff. See Bates-
numbered pages 246-285, 409-416, 500-501, 543-544, 657-660. Thus, not only are the
documents exempt, but they appear to be non-responsive to the plaintiff’s request for “all
records/documents, information and rough notes/logs[s] you have in your files pertaining to me
and mentioning my name” arising out of United States v. John C. Giovanetti, No. 8:07-CR-295-
127-MAP. Mar. 26, 2015 Opinion at 2. Moreover, the plaintiff has proffered no evidence to
warrant an inquiry as to whether an overriding public interest compels the disclosure of the
otherwise exempt third-party information. Accordingly, the Court will grant summary judgment
to the defendants on their withholding of information under Exemption 7(C).
3. Record Segregability
Under the FOIA, “even if [the] agency establishes an exemption, it must nonetheless
disclose all reasonably segregable, nonexempt portions of the requested record(s).” Roth v. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, 642 F.3d 1161, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation omitted) (alterations in original).
Therefore, “[i]t has long been the rule in this Circuit that non-exempt portions of a document
must be disclosed unless they are inextricably intertwined with exempt portions.” Wilderness
Soc’y v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 344 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18 (D.D.C. 2004) (quoting Mead Data Cent.,
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Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). An agency must provide “a
detailed justification and not just conclusory statements to demonstrate that all reasonably
segregable information has been released.” Valfells v. CIA, 717 F. Supp. 2d 110, 120 (D.D.C.
2010) (citation omitted). “Agencies are entitled to a presumption that they complied with the
obligation to disclose reasonably segregable material.” Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494
F.3d 1106, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Although the “quantum of evidence
required to overcome that presumption is not clear,” id., the plaintiff must produce some
evidence to do so. See id. (comparing “clear evidence” standard with the less demanding
reasonableness standard) (citations omitted)).
Hardy represents that the FBI “processed and released all reasonably segregable
information from the [responsive] records,” that the processing was conducted “to achieve
maximum disclosure,” and that following a “careful[ ]” examination, it was “determined that the
information withheld from plaintiff, if disclosed,” could result in the harms described in the
Vaughn index and the declarations. Second Hardy Decl. ¶ 53. According to Hardy, “each
responsive page was individually examined to identify non-exempt information that could be
reasonably segregated from exempt information for release.” Id. ¶ 51. The FBI determined that
the documents withheld in part “comprise a mixture of material that could be segregated for
release,” whereas the documents withheld in full contain “all information . . . either fully covered
by one or more of the cited FOIA exemptions” or “non-exempt information” that “was so
intertwined with exempt material, that no information could be reasonably segregated for
release.” Id. ¶ 52(b)-(c). In response to the Court’s March 26, 2015 Order, the FBI again
examined “[e]ach document . . . individually . . . to identify non-exempt information that could
be reasonably segregated from exempt information for release, determined that some documents
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“warranted further segregability,” and released an additional 79 pages to the plaintiff. Third
Hardy Decl. ¶¶ 9, 11.
The plaintiff has not produced any evidence that calls into question “the good-faith
presumption afforded” Hardy’s representations. Wright, 121 F. Supp. 3d at 188. Therefore, the
Court concludes that the FBI has satisfied its segregability obligation under the FOIA. See id. at
187 (noting that “[a]n affidavit attesting to the performance of a review of the documents and a
Vaughn index describing each document satisfies the FOIA’s segregability requirement”) (citing
cases)).
CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that the defendants have now fully
complied with their disclosure obligations under the FOIA and are therefore entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. 4
_______s/______________
Reggie B. Walton
DATE: March 31, 2016 United States District Judge
4
A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
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