UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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CINA A. RYAN )
)
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Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 14-cv-1422 (TSC)
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF )
INVESTIGATION, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Cina A. Ryan brings this FOIA action seeking all files and records bearing his
name, or any variant of it. Defendants, after conducting multiple searches and finding no
responsive records, filed a first motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 4), which the court
granted in part and denied in part. (ECF No. 19). Defendants conducted a further search, and
now renew their motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 21). For the following reasons, the
court GRANTS Defendants’ motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, who brings this action pro se, alleges that he has been under constant FBI
surveillance since shortly after September 11, 2001. (Compl. ¶ 8). In October 2010, he
submitted a FOIA/Privacy Act request for his “complete FBI file.” (Hardy First Decl. ¶ 6).
After being told that he had not filed sufficient information for a search to be conducted, Plaintiff
provided additional information, and in November 2010, the FBI notified him that it had not
located any main file records responsive to his request, and any requests pertaining to
government watch lists could not be confirmed or denied pursuant to FOIA Exemption (b)(7)(E),
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5 U.S.C. § (b)(7)(E). (Id. ¶¶ 7-10). Plaintiff appealed the FBI’s response to the Department of
Justice Office of Information Policy, which subsequently affirmed the FBI’s response. (Id. ¶ 11).
On August 20, 2014, Plaintiff filed this suit.
In its first Motion for Summary Judgment, the FBI detailed how it conducted phonetic
searches of both its Automated Case Support System (“ACS”) and Electronic Surveillance
indices (“ELSUR”) for responsive records. (Id. ¶¶ 27-28). The ACS is used to conduct FOIA
searches of the agency’s Central Records System (“CRS”). (Id. ¶ 15). The CRS contains
“administrative, applicant, criminal, personnel, and other files compiled for law enforcement
purposes.” (Id.). The system consists of a numerical sequence of files that are broken down
according to subject matter, but because the CRS cannot be queried for data, the information in it
is duplicated and moved to the ACS to be searched. (Id. at ¶¶ 15-16). ACS is then queried using
alphabetized General Indices. (Id. ¶ 17). The General Indices include main entries, which carry
“the name corresponding with a subject of a file contained in the CRS,” and reference entries,
also called cross-references, which are “generally only a mere mention or reference to an
individual, organization, or other subject matter contained in a document located in another main
file on a different subject matter.” (Id.). By searching the General Indices, the FBI can
determine what information it may have in its CRS files on a particular subject matter or
individual, such as in this dispute, “Cina A. Ryan.” (Id. ¶ 18). The FBI does not index every
name in its files, only information it considers pertinent, relevant, or essential for future retrieval.
(Id. ¶ 20). Certain records contained in the CRS are maintained at FBI headquarters, while
others are maintained in field offices. (Id. ¶ 15).
The ELSUR indices maintain information on subjects whose electronic and/or voice
communications have been intercepted by the FBI. (Id. ¶ 21). The ELSUR system is separate
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from the CRS. It contains information on “individuals who were the (a) targets of direct
surveillance, (b) participants in monitored conversations, and (c) owners, lessors, or licensors of
the premises where the FBI conducted electronic surveillance.” (Id. ¶ 22). Like CRS, ELSUR
indices are maintained both in field offices and at FBI headquarters. (Id. ¶ 24).
The FBI’s phonetic searches in ACS and ELSUR used Plaintiff’s first name, middle
initial, and last name, including the alternative versions of Plaintiff’s name “Cina A. Ryan,”
“Alireza Shishechi,” and “Sina Ryan.” (Id. ¶¶ 27-28). No main or cross reference entries
subject to FOIA were found in ACS, nor were responsive records found in ELSUR. (Id.). Since
searches in both CRS and ELSUR failed to locate any information about plaintiff, Defendant
moved for summary judgment for the first time on October 9, 2014. (Hardy Third Decl. ¶
15(b)).
In reviewing the sufficiency of the searches, the court found that: (1) nothing in the
record suggested that the FBI transferred any of Plaintiff’s records to any other agency or
contractor for management since CRS would have recorded their transfer, and no such records
were found; (2) a requester’s demand that certain records systems be searched did not obligate
the agency to search those systems, since the FBI demonstrated these systems would not be
expected to contain responsive records; (3) there was no reason to believe that documents created
or physically located in field offices would not have been indexed in the searched records
systems; and (4) the FBI’s search methodology in CRS using all reasonable permutations of
Plaintiff’s name was adequate. (First Summ. J. Op. at 7-14). Therefore, the Court granted
summary judgment on the issue of whether the FBI searched appropriate locations. (Id. at 15).
However, the court denied summary judgment as to one search. The court determined
that “the record did not clearly demonstrate that the ELSUR database was searched in a way that
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would reveal documents indexed to all variations of Plaintiff’s name.” (Id.). While the third
declaration from David Hardy, the Section Chief of the Record/Information Dissemination
Section, Records Management Division of the FBI, noted that “the FBI’s ELSUR Indices were
searched using both the names ‘Cina A. Ryan,’ and ‘Cina Ryan,’ as well as the other names
[Plaintiff] provided,” Hardy’s prior declarations only “establish[ed] that the FBI ran searches in
ELSUR . . . for ‘Cina A. Ryan,’ ‘Alireza Shishechi,’ and ‘Sina Ryan.’ Other names (‘Cina
Rayan,’ ‘Sina Rayan,’ ‘Cina A. Rayan,’ ‘Sina A. Rayan,’, and ‘Cina Ryan’) were used to search
CRS but are not specifically identified as having been used to search ELSUR.” (Id. at 14)
(internal citations omitted). While the FBI could reasonably have believed that, “based on the
phonetic search function, running an additional search for ‘Cina Ryan’ in ELSUR would be
unnecessarily duplicative,” given the ambiguity in the declarations, the court did not have
enough evidence to conclude that the ELSUR search was conducted in an adequate manner. (Id.
at 14-15).
Following the court’s ruling, the FBI subsequently conducted further queries and now
renews its motion for summary judgment, arguing that its searches of the ELSUR database are
adequate to meet its obligations under FOIA. Plaintiff again opposes summary judgment,
arguing that the searches are still not adequate.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact, and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). “A fact is ‘material’ if a dispute over it might affect the
outcome of a suit under governing law[.]” Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (internal citation omitted). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists,
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the court must view all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The moving party bears the
“initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying
those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits . . . which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
nonmoving party, in response, must “go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by
the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324 (internal quotation marks omitted). “If
the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be
granted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1986) (internal citations
omitted). “[T]he judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of
the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 249.
“FOIA provides a ‘statutory right of public access to documents and records' held by
federal government agencies.” Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. DOJ, 602
F. Supp. 2d 121, 123 (D.D.C.2009) (quoting Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir.
1982)). FOIA requires that federal agencies comply with requests to make their records
available to the public, unless such “information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory
language.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(a), (b).
“FOIA cases are typically and appropriately decided on motions for summary judgment.”
Gold Anti-Trust Action Comm., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 762 F. Supp. 2d
123, 130 (D.D.C. 2011) (internal citation omitted). When an agency moves for summary
judgment on the grounds that it has discharged its FOIA obligations, all underlying facts and
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inferences are analyzed in the light most favorable to the FOIA requester, and only after the
agency proves that it has fully discharged its FOIA obligations is summary judgment
appropriate. Moore v. Aspin, 916 F. Supp. 32, 35 (D.D.C. 1996); Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 705 F.2d 1344, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1983). An agency will be granted summary judgment on
the adequacy of its search if it “show[s] beyond material doubt [ ] that it has conducted a search
reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.” Morley v. CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1114
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing Weisberg, 705 F.2d at 1351).
“The question is not whether there might exist any other documents possibly responsive
to the request, but rather whether the search for those documents was adequate.” Steinberg v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 23 F.3d 548, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original) (internal citation
omitted). Adequacy “is judged by a standard of reasonableness and depends, not surprisingly,
on the facts of each case.” Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1485 (D.C. Cir.
1984). “There is no requirement that an agency seek every record system,” rather a search may
be reasonable if it includes all systems “that are likely to turn up the information requested.”
Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Courts are mindful,
however, that “congressional intent tilt[s] the scale in favor of disclosure.” Morley, 508 F.3d at
1114 (internal citation omitted).
To meet its burden and show adequacy, “the agency may rely on reasonably detailed,
nonconclusory affidavits submitted in good faith.” Weisberg, 745 F.2d at 1485. These
declarations are “accorded a presumption of good faith, which cannot be rebutted by ‘purely
speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of other documents.’” SafeCard
Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (internal citation omitted). An agency
can show “reasonableness” in its affidavit by “setting forth the search terms and the type of
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search performed, and averring that all files likely to contain responsive materials (if such
records exist) were searched.” Sanders v. Obama, 729 F. Supp. 2d 148, 155 (D.D.C. 2010), aff’d
sub nom., Sanders v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 10-5273, 2011 WL 1769099 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 21,
2011) (internal citation omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
The sole issue in dispute here is whether Defendant adequately searched the ELSUR
indices. In support of its Motion, Defendant provided a Fourth Declaration from David Hardy to
address concerns the court identified in its prior Opinion. In his declaration, Hardy explains that
because ELSUR only contains information gathered as a result of electronic surveillance, related
information necessarily required for such surveillance would be maintained in a case file in CRS;
for example, all court records authorizing the electronic surveillance. (Hardy Fourth Decl. ¶ 7).
Therefore, the “existence of a CRS record is a condition precedent for the existence of records in
the ELSUR system.” (Id.). Since there were no responsive records found in CRS, the FBI
would not expect to find any records in the ELSUR system. (Id.). Nonetheless, in response to
the court’s Opinion, the FBI conducted additional searches in ELSUR, this time using the
variations of Plaintiff’s name “Cina Rayan,” “Sina Rayan,” “Cina A. Rayan,” and “Sina A.
Rayan.” (Id. ¶¶ 9-10). Those searches yielded no responsive information.
Plaintiff, however, contends these searches are still not adequate, although certain of his
arguments do not appear to be responsive to the FBI’s assertions. First, Plaintiff challenges
whether the searches the FBI undertook were conducted in good faith. (Pl. Opp’n ¶¶ 10-12).
Specifically, Plaintiff queries whether “the FBI has demonstrated that, in the past, it has never
misled courts of law in this type of case,” and states, without any factual basis, that he is “100%
certain” that the FBI is still concealing thousands of pages of his records. (Id. ¶ 10). Plaintiff
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also asks whether the court has verified the FBI’s affidavits against his FOIA request records to
confirm whether they are true. (Id. ¶ 12). Plaintiff alludes to alleged statements by former FBI
Director Robert Mueller and President Obama discussing surveillance, which the court interprets
as a challenge to the FBI’s good faith. (Id. ¶¶ 32-33).
Second, Plaintiff discusses his general frustration at his inability to obtain counsel in this
matter. (Id. ¶¶ 16-19). Third, he alleges that the government and judicial system are biased
against him and those who are not “at the top.” (Id. ¶ 34). Fourth, Plaintiff states that a letter he
sent to former FBI Director Mueller in 2011 did not appear to be in the docket on PACER. (Id.
¶¶ 35-36).1 Fifth, Plaintiff alleges that there is a YouTube video of him discussing how the FBI
controls his mind under the name “Singh R.” (the court construes this mention of a possible alias
to relate to the adequacy of the agency’s search). (Id. ¶ 48). Finally, Plaintiff asks the court to
provide him with guidance to enable him to better pursue his case. (Id.).
The court addresses Plaintiff’s arguments mindful that “[a]document filed pro se is ‘to be
liberally construed,’ and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007) (internal citation omitted).2
Having reviewed the Defendants’ motion, the Fourth Hardy Declaration, and the record
herein, the court finds that the FBI has conducted an adequate search for responsive records
corresponding to Plaintiff’s request. Any ambiguity the court found in Defendant’s prior motion
as to whether it searched ELSUR for the name “Cina Ryan” is eliminated by the clear
explanation in Hardy’s Fourth Declaration that (i) a failure to find responsive documents in CRS
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Plaintiff attached a copy of the letter to his Opposition. (Pl. Opp’n., Ex. 24)
2
The court will not discuss Plaintiff’s various allegations of government misconduct unrelated to this FOIA dispute.
See generally, Pl’s Opp’n.
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means that Defendant is unlikely to find responsive records in ELSUR; and (ii) that prior
ELSUR searches did include variations of the names Plaintiff has gone by—including the name
on his government-issued identification. (Hardy Fourth Decl. ¶ 8). Moreover, Defendant further
supported the adequacy of its search by conducting additional searches in ELSUR using different
possible phonetic spellings of Plaintiff’s name. (Id. ¶¶ 9-10). Defendant’s search methodology
was discussed in “detailed, nonconclusory affidavits submitted in good faith,” Weisberg, 745
F.2d at 1485, and provided the search terms used, the files searched, and explicitly declared that
all files likely to contain responsive records were searched. Sanders, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 155.
This satisfies Defendant’s burden to demonstrate it has conducted an adequate search for records
responsive to Plaintiff’s request.
In contrast, none of Plaintiff’s arguments are availing, because they do not deal with the
adequacy of the search, nor do they raise any genuine material issue of fact. “[F]actual disputes
that are ‘irrelevant or unnecessary’ do not affect the summary judgment determination.”
Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). With regard to
Plaintiff’s otherwise unsupported allegation of bad faith, the court notes that agency declarations
in FOIA disputes are presumed to be in good faith, and that presumption “cannot be rebutted by
‘purely speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of other documents.’”
SafeCard Servs., 926 F.2d at 1200, (citing Ground Saucer Watch, Inc. v. CIA, 692 F.2d 770, 771
(D.C. Cir. 1981)). But that is all Plaintiff provides—conclusory, unfounded allegations of
wholesale government crimes and conspiracies, while submitting no fact based allegation that
Defendant is attempting to mislead the court.3 Additionally, as Plaintiff noted in his Opposition,
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Plaintiff alleges that the court’s use of the word “allegations” is “unfair, unjust,” and “prejudicial.” (Pl. Opp’n ¶¶
11, 19). The word allegation connotes an unproven statement. See ALLEGATION, Black's Law Dictionary (10th
ed. 2014) (“allegation n. (15c) 1. A declaration that something is true; esp., a statement, not yet proved, that
someone has done something wrong or illegal. 2. Something declared or asserted as a matter of fact, esp. in a legal
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the FBI directly responded to Plaintiff’s concerns of bad faith in Hardy’s Third Declaration,
including his allegations regarding the S, H, and I drives. (Pl. Opp’n ¶ 11).
Plaintiff’s assertions regarding his inability to obtain counsel are similarly unresponsive
to the Defendants’ Motion. While it is undoubtedly difficult for a non-lawyer to represent
himself, the court has taken Plaintiff’s pro se status into account and tried to address the
Plaintiff’s claims in language understandable to a non-lawyer, including, amongst other things,
holding a hearing at Plaintiff’s request, and addressing multiple non-substantive issues.
As to the letter which Plaintiff alleges he sent in 2011 to then-FBI Director Mueller,
Plaintiff states that he signed the letter with the name “Cina Ryan.” (Pl. Ex. 24). Since this is a
name Defendant specifically queried in CRS, based on the Hardy Declarations, it is clear that if
such a letter was received by Defendant, it was not indexed. (Hardy Fourth Decl. ¶ 8). The
failure to index this letter—if the FBI actually received it—is likely because “[t]he decision to
index names other than subjects, suspects, and victims is a discretionary decision,” and
Defendant “indexes only that information considered to be pertinent, relevant, or essential for
future retrieval,” which it may not have found the allegations of government misconduct
contained in the letter to be. (Hardy First Decl. ¶ 20).
Lastly, while a YouTube video of Plaintiff under the name “Singh, R.” may exist, it is not
an FBI file, and Plaintiff has not previously alleged that he has gone by that name, nor that the
FBI would have any reason to search for records responsive to that name. Plaintiff’s Complaint
requests his “complete file” responsive to “his name, Cina A. Ryan and any and all variant
spelling such as Cina Ryan, Sina Ryan, and the name he was formerly known by, Alireza
pleading; a party's formal statement of a factual matter as being true or provable, without its having yet been proved;
averment.”).
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Shishechi.” (Compl. at 1). The FBI conducted multiple, adequate phonetic searches in CRS and
ELSUR for all possible variants of these requested names.
“While the pleadings of pro se parties are to be ‘liberally construed, and a pro se
complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers,’ ‘[t]his benefit is not . . . a license to ignore the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure [.]’” Neuman v. United States, 70 F. Supp. 3d 416, 422 (D.D.C. 2014) (internal
citations omitted). “Accordingly, in the context of Rule 56, a ‘pro se plaintiff must meet his
burden of proving that there exists a genuine dispute as to a material fact to survive a motion for
summary judgment.’” Mokhtar v. Kerry, 83 F. Supp. 3d 49, 61 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing Id.). The
court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden under Rule 56, because he raises no genuine
issue of material fact, and Defendant has met its burden by demonstrating the adequacy of its
search.
IV. CONCLUSION
The FBI has conducted an adequate search for any records responsive to Plaintiff’s FOIA
request. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is therefore GRANTED.
A corresponding order will issue separately.
Dated: March 31, 2016
Tanya S. Chutkan
TANYA S. CHUTKAN
United States District Judge
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