NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 15-3525
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ARTHUR L. HAIRSTON, SR.,
Appellant
v.
DR. JAY MILLER, Medical Director;
DEBRA SPOTTS, Assistant Health Services Administrator
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:14-cv-01447)
District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones III
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 1, 2016
Before: FISHER, SHWARTZ and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed April 1, 2016)
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OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Pro se appellant Arthur Hairston, Sr., a former federal inmate, appeals from the
District Court’s order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss and motion for
summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm.
Hairston was previously incarcerated at the Allenwood Low Security Correctional
Institution in Pennsylvania (“LSCI Allenwood”) from May 2010 through November
2012. He filed this Bivens1 action in the District Court against Dr. Jay Miller, the
Medical Director at LSCI Allenwood, and Assistant Health Service Administrator Debra
Spotts in their personal and official capacities, alleging that they violated his Eighth
Amendment rights by delaying and interfering with his treatment for a long-standing
back injury while he was incarcerated. Hairston alleged that while he was incarcerated at
LSCI Allenwood, he consulted with an outside neurosurgeon who recommended a course
of physical therapy for his lower back and bilateral leg pain. The neurosurgeon further
indicated that Hairston would need to undergo surgery should physical therapy not
provide him relief. Hairston alleged that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to
his health by failing to follow the neurosurgeon’s recommended course of treatment for
his injury, delaying a return visit to the neurosurgeon, and ultimately transferring him to
another facility. Hairston sought monetary damages and injunctive relief.
1
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
2
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that sovereign immunity barred
Hairston’s constitutional claims for money damages against them in their official
capacities, and a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Hairston received medical
care that satisfied the Eighth Amendment. In support of their motion for summary
judgment, the defendants submitted records detailing the treatment Hairston received for
his back injury while incarcerated at LSCI Allenwood. The Magistrate Judge
recommended granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss and motion for summary
judgment, concluding that sovereign immunity barred the claim for money damages
against the defendants in their official capacities and that Hairston failed to present
evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the defendants were
deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. The District Court adopted the
Magistrate Judge’s recommendation in its entirety over Hairston’s objections and granted
the defendants’ motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. Hairston appeals.2
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review
over the District Court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), see Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 677 F.3d
519, 529-30 (3d Cir. 2012), and for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56, see Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009). Summary
judgment is appropriate when the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
2
He also requests that we order the appellees to send him a copy of their joint appendix.
3
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find
for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
We agree with the District Court’s disposition of this case. To the extent Hairston
sought monetary damages against the defendants in their official capacities, dismissal of
those claims based on sovereign immunity was proper. See Treasurer of N.J. v. U.S.
Dep’t of the Treasury, 684 F.3d 382, 395 (3d Cir. 2012); Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d
126, 130 n.4 (3d Cir. 1986). Moreover, as the District Court correctly determined,
Hairston’s request for injunctive relief against the defendants was rendered moot by his
release from federal prison. See Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248-49 (3d Cir. 2003);
Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 206 (3d Cir. 1993).
We further agree with the District Court’s conclusion that Miller and Spotts are
entitled to summary judgment on Hairston’s Eighth Amendment claims against them in
their personal capacities. To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim for the denial or
delay of medical care, Hairston was required to demonstrate that the defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
103-05 (1976). Deliberate indifference can be shown by a prison official “intentionally
4
denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment
once prescribed.” Id. at 104-05. With respect to medical decisions, however, “prison
authorities are accorded considerable latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of
prisoners.” Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1993). Courts will “disavow
any attempt to second-guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular course of
treatment[,] which remains in a question of sound professional judgment.” Inmates of
Allegheny Cty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979) (internal alterations,
quotation marks omitted). “[M]ere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment” is
insufficient to state a constitutional violation. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir.
2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The summary judgment record shows that there is no genuine dispute that, during
his incarceration at LSCI Allenwood, Hairston received medical care for his back
condition that satisfies the Eighth Amendment.3 Specifically, while incarcerated,
Hairston was evaluated by an outside neurosurgeon in January 2011 for complaints of
lower back pain and bilateral leg pain. The neurosurgeon recommended physical
therapy, and advised that surgery would be necessary if physical therapy was
unsuccessful. Accordingly, a request for physical therapy was submitted to the prison’s
3
In his brief, Hairston argues that summary judgment should be precluded because the
District Court improperly concluded that his complaint cannot serve as an affidavit in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment because it was not signed under penalty of
perjury, despite the fact that it referenced 28 U.S.C. § 1746. However, even construing
5
Utilization Review Committee and, in March 2011, Hairston was seen by a physical
therapist who attempted to show Hairston exercises he could do for his back. Hairston,
who resided in the Special Housing Unit at the time and who was restrained in handcuffs
during the physical therapy session, complained about his restraints and was inattentive
to the exercises he was being shown. He met with a physical therapist two additional
times and similarly complained of being restrained and was uncooperative. During this
time, Hairston was also seen repeatedly by Dr. Miller and other medical providers at the
prison, who endeavored to relieve his back pain by frequently adjusting his medications
and educating him on pain management. Hairston did not always cooperate with his
prescribed treatments.
In August 2012, Hairston received a follow up letter from the outside
neurosurgeon recommending that he be re-evaluated. Accordingly, Hairston was
scheduled for a return appointment with the neurosurgeon for October 30, 2012. Due to
security- and weather-related issues from an expected severe storm, the appointment was
cancelled and rescheduled for December 13, 2012. On November 5, 2012, however,
Hairston was transferred from LSCI Allenwood to another facility after it was determined
that Hairston’s condition did not warrant placing a medical hold on him. While Hairston
believed that his condition required more extensive physical therapy, immediate surgery,
and the placement of a medical hold prohibiting his transfer to another prison, the record
the complaint as an “affidavit,” Hairston fails to set forth specific facts showing a
6
reveals that he received continual care for his back pain. His dispute as to the adequacy
of his treatment or the professional judgment of the prison medical officials does not
describe a case of deliberate indifference. See United States ex rel. Walker v. Fayette
Cty., 599 F.2d 573, 575 n.2 (3d Cir. 1979); Inmates of Allegheny Cty. Jail, 612 F.2d at
762.
Furthermore, Hairston has offered no evidence to show that Spotts, whose duties
were limited to administrative functions, acted with deliberate indifference to Hairston’s
medical needs. Correctional defendant-administrators who are not themselves physicians
cannot “be considered deliberately indifference simply because they failed to respond
directly to the medical complaints of a prisoner who was already being treated by the
prison doctor.” Durmer, 991 F.2d at 69. “If a prisoner is under the care of medical
experts . . . , a non-medical prison official will generally be justified in believing that the
prisoner is in capable hands.” Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236. Hairston provided no evidence
that Spotts provided medical care to Hairston or that her involvement in the matter was
anything more than administrative in nature. As the record does not support a finding of
deliberate indifference, the District Court properly granted summary judgment to the
defendants.
Finally, to the extent that Hairston asserts in his brief that the Magistrate Judge
and District Judge should have recused themselves, the District Court did not abuse its
genuine issue for trial.
7
discretion in denying Hairston’s motion to recuse. See SecuraComm Consulting, Inc. v.
Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144, a party
may seek to recuse a federal judge on the basis of bias or prejudice. Section 455 of title
28 requires a judge to recuse where his or her impartiality might reasonable be
questioned. Neither of these statutes provides a basis for recusal where, as here, a litigant
is simply dissatisfied with the District Court’s legal rulings. Id.
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. As defendants did not
file a joint appendix, Hairston’s motion requesting a court order for defendants to send
him a copy of their joint appendix is denied.
8