FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 04 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ABBAS EGHTESADI, No. 15-15198
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:08-cv-02221-TJH
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MATTHEW CATE and P. D.
BRAZELTON,
Respondents - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Terry J. Hatter Jr., Senior District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 14, 2016**
San Francisco, California
Before: McKEOWN, WARDLAW, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Abbas Eghtesadi appeals the district court’s denial of his federal habeas
petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm. Our review
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.
1. The state appellate court reasonably determined that Juror Number Eleven
was not biased. To the extent that Supreme Court precedent clearly establishes that
a juror’s actual bias may be inferred from a dishonest response to a voir dire
question, cf. Fields v. Brown, 503 F.3d 755, 767, 771–73 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc)
(discussing cases), it was not unreasonable for the state court to conclude that Juror
Number Eleven was truthful during voir dire. Thus, the court reasonably
concluded that, although Juror Number Eleven did not disclose his relationship
with his aunt, a deputy district attorney, in his response to a voir dire question
about friends or relatives employed by “law enforcement agenc[ies],” lay jurors
would not necessarily consider a deputy district attorney to be a member of law
enforcement. See McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548,
555 (1984) (observing that “jurors are not necessarily experts in English usage,”
and “may be uncertain as to the meaning of terms which are relatively easily
understood by lawyers and judges”).
Further, the trial court, which examined Juror Number Eleven before the
jury reached its verdict, reasonably found credible his testimony that he could
continue to deliberate as a fair and impartial juror. Even if Eghtasadi’s claim were
2
construed to be one of implied juror bias, it would be barred under AEDPA,
because our circuit cases recognizing an implied juror bias claim are not “clearly
established federal law.” Hedlund v. Ryan, No. 09-99019, 2016 WL 851821, at
*12 (9th Cir. Mar. 4, 2016). Moreover, the Supreme Court has never adopted or
rejected the doctrine of implied juror bias.
2. Nor did the state court unreasonably determine that Juror Number Eleven
did not engage in reversible misconduct by telling other jurors what his aunt had
told him about prosecutorial charging practices. It was not unreasonable to
conclude, on this mixed record, that Juror Number Eleven did not speak to his aunt
during deliberations. Nor was it unreasonable for the court to conclude that,
although Juror Number Eleven’s statements were inadmissible, what little
prejudice they may have created was ameliorated by the trial court’s curative
instructions. See Smith v. Swarthout, 742 F.3d 885, 894 (9th Cir. 2014).
3. Eghtesadi fails to demonstrate that the state trial court’s extensive
evidentiary hearing on Juror Number Eleven’s alleged bias and misconduct was
constitutionally insufficient, or that further proceedings were required. See
Hedlund, No. 09-99019, 2016 WL 851821, at *11 (“‘So long as the fact-finding
process is objective and reasonably explores the issues presented, the state trial
judge's findings based on that investigation are entitled to a presumption of
3
correctness.’”) (quoting Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 975 (9th Cir. 1998) (en
banc)).
4. Finally, the state court reasonably determined that the reversal of
Eghtesadi’s conviction was not required by Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
Eghtesadi does not show that the prosecutor’s failure to correct L.D.’s
misstatement regarding the number of times she was arrested renders L.D.’s
testimony “false evidence, known to be such by representatives of the State” for
purposes of Napue. See id. at 269. Even if this testimony is deemed to fall within
Napue, the state court properly concluded that there was no “reasonable likelihood
that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.” See United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). The evidence of Eghtesadi’s guilt was
overwhelming, and the jury was already aware that L.D. had a long history of
engaging in drug use and prostitution. Thus, there is no reasonable likelihood that
the additional information that L.D. had been arrested for more than one
transgression would have caused the jury to disbelieve her account of how
Eghtesadi had sexually assaulted and stabbed her.
AFFIRMED.
4