J-S06031-16; J-S06032-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: W.M.S. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: S.A. No. 1295 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered July 2, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County, Orphans’
Court, at No(s): 4045
IN RE: T.L.S., JR. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: S.A., MOTHER No. 1296 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered July 2, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County, Orphans’
Court, at No(s): 4044-2015
IN RE: T.L.S., JR. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: T.L.S., SR. No. 1308 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered July 2, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County, Orphans’
Court, at No(s): 4044
IN RE: W.M.S. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: T.L.S., SR. No. 1320 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered July 2, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County, Orphans’
Court, at No(s): 4045
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., MUNDY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E: FILED APRIL 05, 2016
J-S06031-16; J-S06032-16
Appellants, S.A. (“Mother”) and T.L.S. (“Father”), appeal from the
orders entered July 2, 2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre
County, Orphans’ Court Division, by the Honorable Jonathan D. Grine,
involuntarily terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father to W.M.S.
(born December 10, 2011) and T.L.S., Jr., (born February 18, 2014)
(collectively “the Children”), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8),
and (b). Following a review of the record, we affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows:
On September 10, 2013, W.M.S. was placed into the care
and custody of paternal grandparents, [K.J. (“Paternal
Grandmother”) and W.J. (“Paternal Grandfather”)], by Tthe
Department of Youth and Family Services (“DYFS”) in New
Jersey, after being removed from the care of her biological
parents, [Mother and Father]. The family first became involved
with Centre County Children and Youth Services ("CYS") in April
of 2013 when DYFS contacted CYS asking the agency to do a
home safety assessment of [Paternal Grandmother]’s home. At
this time, [Father] was in jail and [Mother] was unable to care
for W.M.S. due to inadequate housing and drug addiction. In July
of 2013, CYS received a referral indicating that [Mother] was
taking drugs during her pregnancy with T.L.S., Jr. When CYS
made contact with [Mother], they discovered she had been
prescribed a one week supply of Suboxone on July 2, 2013.
However, when she was drug tested by an agency caseworker
on July 31, 2013, she tested positive for Suboxone and opiates.
On September 9, 2013, CYS became aware that [Mother] was
also participating in the Methadone program through State
College Medical on a continuing basis.
[In] February [of] 2014, T.L.S., Jr. was born at Mount
Nittany Medical Center. He was then transferred to Geisinger
Medical Center on February 23, 2014, due to his serious
withdrawal symptoms from Methadone. CYS gained emergency
custody on March 7, 2014 when T.L.S., Jr. was released from
Geisinger Medical Center. On March 13, 2014, T.L.S, Jr. was
adjudicated dependent.
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On March 31, 2014, CYS received a referral concerning
[Paternal Grandmother]’s drug use, lack of fuel oil in her home,
and concerns that she was permitting [Mother and Father] to
care for W.M.S. for extended periods of time. On April 1, 2014,
CYS informed [Paternal Grandmother] that it could not support
unsupervised time between W.M.S. and [Mother and Father]
given the lack of follow through with goals previously established
by DYFS, and reunification services had not commenced
concerning T.L.S., Jr. On April 2, 2014, despite CYS’ directives,
[Paternal Grandmother] and [Father] filed a [c]ustody
[a]greement returning legal custody of W.M.S. to [Mother and
Father], while primary physical custody remained with [Paternal
Grandmother]. On April 4, 2014, CYS learned that [Paternal
Grandmother] had left the state and was not planning to return
to Pennsylvania. That same day, CYS filed for and was granted
emergency protective custody of W.M.S. A [d]ependency
[p]etition was filed on April 8, 2014, and on April 16, 2014,
W.M.S. was adjudicated dependent and placed in an approved
foster home where she has since resided with her brother,
T.L.S., Jr.
On April 16, 2014, formal reunification services began with
Centre County Youth Service Bureau. In particular, the goals set
for [Mother and Father] included: (1) to participate in the
reunification/permanency services provided by YSB; (2) to
cooperate and participate in the Family Connections Process; (3)
demonstrate the ability to maintain her sobriety by refraining
from using/abusing drugs (i.e., illegal drugs, non-prescribed
drugs, misusing prescription medication, misusing any other
substance) and alcohol; (4) make positive choices in order to
demonstrate her ability to lead a healthy lifestyle appropriate for
raising W.M.S. and T.L.S., Jr.; (5) demonstrate her ability to
maintain housing and financial stability; and (6) demonstrate her
ability to appropriately parent W.M.S. and T.L.S., Jr. and provide
for their basic needs. During reunification, CYS and YSB
stressed the importance of [Mother and Father] being open and
honest with their caseworkers, specifically with respect to their
prescription medications.
Supplemental Trial Court Opinion, filed January 29, 2016, 1-3.
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On March 13, 2015, Mother’s and Father’s reunification services were
terminated following a permanency review hearing. On April 7, 2015, and
April 9, 2015, CYS filed termination petitions seeking to terminate Mother’s
and Father’s parental rights to Children pursuant to section 2511(a)(2), (5),
(8), and (b) of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2) (5), (8), and
(b). The trial court held a termination hearing on July 2, 2015. At the
hearing, Stacy Pribulka, a CYS caseworker, and Raelee Hulek, a reunification
counselor for the Youth Service Bureau, testified. Counsel for Mother and
Father were present at the hearing, but Mother and Father did not attend.
By a decree dated July 2, 2015, the trial court terminated the parental rights
of Mother and Father.1
On July 27, 2015, Mother and Father filed timely notices of appeal,
along with concise statements of matters complained of on appeal pursuant
to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). 2
Mother raises the following issues on appeal:
1. The trial court erred in terminating the parental rights of
Mother: Insufficient evidence was presented to demonstrate
by a clear and convincing standard that the issues, which
prompted [CYS]’s involvement continued to exist at the time
of the hearing and could not or would not be remedied by
Mother.
1
In its Opinions in Response to Matters Complained of on Appeal, the trial
court did not perform an analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b). On January
22, 2016, this Court directed the trial court to file supplemental opinions
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) containing the requisite Section 2511(b)
analysis, and the trial court complied.
2
This Court sua sponte consolidated the appeals.
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Mother’s Brief at 1.
Father raises the following issues on appeal.
1. Whether the orphans’ court committed an abuse of discretion
or error of law when it concluded that [CYS] established
grounds for termination of parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§2511(a)(2), (a)(5) and/or (a)(8)?
2. Whether the evidence presented was insufficient to support
the orphans’ court’s order terminating parental rights under
23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(2), (a)(5) and/or (a)(8)?
Father’s Brief at 5.
We review the orders involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights
according to the following standard:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard
when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for
termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our
standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the
findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if
they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9
A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are
supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court
made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., 36
A.3d [567,] 572 [(Pa. 2011) (plurality)]. As has been often
stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because
the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion.
Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc.,
34 A.3d 1, 51 ([Pa.] 2011); Christianson v. Ely, 838 A.2d 630,
634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.
As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying
an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We
observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not
equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold
record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during
the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d
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at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an
opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and
termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to
second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility
determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial
judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the
record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an
error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of
Atencio, 539 Pa. 161, [165], 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (1994).
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826–827 (Pa. 2012).
Termination of parental rights is governed by section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis:
Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court
must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating
parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the
parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the
statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a).
Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in
the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the
standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the
emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention
paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such
bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). The
burden is on the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights
are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa.Super. 2009).
This Court must agree with only one subsection of 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a), in addition to Subsection 2511(b), in order to affirm the
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termination of parental rights. See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384
(Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). Herein, we review the orders pursuant to
section 2511(a)(5) and (b), which provide as follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
***
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with
an agency for a period of at least six months, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of the
child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not
remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of
time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the
parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to
the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable
period of time and termination of the parental rights would
best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
***
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating
the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to
the developmental, physical and emotional needs and
welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be
terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors
such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing
and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the
parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to
subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider
any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to
the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5) and (b).
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Termination of parental rights under Section 2511(a)(5) requires that
(1) the child has been removed from parental care for at least six months;
(2) the conditions which led to removal and placement of the child continue
to exist; (3) the parents cannot or will not remedy the conditions which led
to removal or placement within a reasonable period of time; (4) the services
reasonably available to the parents are unlikely to remedy the conditions
which led to removal or placement within a reasonable period of time; and
(5) termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of
the child. In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1273-1274 (Pa.
Super. 2003). This Court has held that a child’s life, happiness and vitality
cannot be put on hold until a parent finds it convenient to perform parental
duties. See In the Matter of the Adoption of A.M.B., 812 A.2d 659, 675
(Pa.Super. 2002).
Moreover, this Court has stated that after a child enters foster care,
the parents have an “affirmative duty . . . to work towards the return of the
child by cooperating with the Agency to obtain rehabilitative services
necessary for them to be capable of performing their parental duties and
responsibilities.” In re G.P.-R., 851 A.2d 967, 977 (Pa.Super. 2004). This
duty must be timely discharged, because “a parent’s vow to cooperate, after
a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of
services, may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.” In re
A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 340 (Pa.Super. 2002).
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Herein, Mother and Father argue the trial court erred in terminating
their parental rights to the Children. Mother’s Brief at 5; Father’s Brief at 5.
Regarding the first factor of Section 2511(a)(5), Mother and Father failed to
dispute the time period in which the Children were removed from their care.
With respect to the second factor of Section 2511(a)(5), the trial court found
Father and Mother are unwilling and unable to remedy the issues which led
to the removal of the Children from her care. Trial Court Opinion, filed
August 13, 2015, at 5. Specifically, the trial court found:
[Mother and Father] were provided over 2,000 hours of
reunification services, yet they failed to satisfactorily meet any
of their goals and never progressed to unsupervised visitation.
[Mother and Father]’s participation in reunification services was
inconsistent and neither took advantage of opportunities for
additional contact on a regular basis by attending the children’s
medical appointments.
Furthermore, [Mother and Father] did not demonstrate the
ability to promote the development of the [C]hildren in that they
did not consistently engage the [C]hildren in activities
recommended by Early Intervention. Most importantly, neither
parent demonstrated the open and honest behavior requested by
CYS concerning their medications. During home visits, [Mother
and Father] often spent a significant period of time searching
their home for the medications. This was of serious concern to
the reunification team as either child could find the medications
and accidentally ingest them.
Supplemental Trial Court Opinion, filed January 29, 2016, at 3.
In making its determinations, the trial court relied on the testimony of
Ms. Pribulka and Ms. Hulek. Ms. Pribulka testified that Mother and Father
received notice of the termination hearing because she hand delivered it to
Mother at their home on June 4, 2015. N.T., 7/2/15, at 4-5. Ms. Pribulka
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previously contacted Mother and Father numerous times in April of 2013,
August of 2013, and on February 19, 2014, following the birth of T.L.S. Id.
at 9-10. Ms. Pribulka related that Mother and Father have “a history of
being uncooperative with [CYS], not being truthful, not allowing workers into
the home, giving false addresses, giving false information all together at
times.” Id. at 10.
Ms. Hulek testified that CYS requested to end reunification services
with the family because CYS still has “serious concerns remaining” after
CYS’s extensive efforts to help and support Mother and Father. Id. at 59.
Ms. Hulek stated that Mother missed seven visits with the Children and
Father missed fourteen visits. Id. at 33. Ms. Hulek also revealed that
Mother and Father attended only five out of thirteen of the Children’s
medical appointments. Id. at 34. Ms. Hulek explained that because the
Children were receiving early intervention services, it was “very crucial” for
the Children’s exercises to be implemented in the home in order for them to
be effective. Id. at 36-37. Ms. Hulek testified that Mother and Father
hampered the Children’s developmental needs in that they engaged in
exercises with W.M.S during only five of their thirty-seven visits and during
just thirteen out of their thirty-seven visits with T.L.S., Jr. Id. at 37. Also,
Ms. Hulek testified that Mother attended twenty-six out of forty-three
scheduled parent sessions and Father attended twenty-four out of forty
parenting sessions. Id. at 44.
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Ms. Hulek further observed that Mother and Father acted
inappropriately during their visits with the Children. Id. at 34. For instance,
Ms. Hulek explained that Mother and Father did not comply with the
pediatrician’s recommendation to limit the Children’s sugar intake and
otherwise provide them with a healthy diet. Id. at 38-39. Specifically, they
repeatedly failed to feed T.L.S. his bottle and supplemental cereal altogether
and at times either overfed W.M.S. or provided her with only candy at
mealtime. Id. In addition, Ms. Hulek added that Mother and Father
admitted to smoking in their home even though it was recommended that
they refrain from doing so due to T.L.S., Jr.’s withdrawal symptoms after
birth. Id. at 35.
The record supports the trial court’s conclusions as clear and
convincing evidence therein showed that termination was appropriate.
Mother and Father failed to remedy the conditions that led to the Children’s
placement, even though CYS made the necessary services and the
opportunities to use them readily available to them. Ultimately, Mother and
Father failed to complete their objectives and resolve their problems.
With regard to the last factor of section 2511(a)(5), the trial court
found that the termination of Mother and Father’s parental rights pursuant to
section 2511(a)(5) is in the best interests of the Children. Trial Court
Opinion, filed August 13, 2015, at 6. The trial court found that Mother and
Father are unable to provide the Children with safety, permanency and
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stability in their lives. Id. Indeed, Ms. Hulek testified that she had serious
concerns regarding Mother’s and Father’s ability to parent, for they had
never been able to progress to unsupervised visits with their children due to
their repeated failure to meet the Children’s needs. N.T., 7/2/15, at 36.
The trial court noted the Children are "thriving in their foster home where
they are provided with the consistency Mother [and Father have] been
unable or unwilling to provide.” Trial Court Opinion, filed September 13,
2015, at 6. The trial court also stressed the Children “seek out the foster
parents for support and comfort when they are injured, ill or upset.” Id.
Furthermore, the trial court determined that “the [C]hildren have been with
the current foster family for a significant portion of their lives and have
developed a strong bond with the foster family.” Id. Thus, the trial court’s
termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights would best serve the
needs and welfare of the Children pursuant to Section 2511(a)(5). In re
Adoption of M.E.P., supra.
Next, the prevailing caselaw requires us to engage in a discussion of
whether the requirements of Section 2511(b) have been satisfied. Whereas
the focus in terminating parental rights under Section 2511(a) is on the
parent, pursuant to Section 2511(b) the child is the focal point. In re
Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc).
Under Section 2511(b), we examine whether termination of parental rights
would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and
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welfare of the child. In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1286-1287 (Pa.Super.
2005). “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are
involved in the inquiry into [the] needs and welfare of the child.” Id. at
1287 (citation omitted). The court also must discern the nature and status
of the parent-child bond, while giving the utmost consideration to the effect
that permanently severing that bond may have upon the child. See id.
With regard to W.M.S.’s bond with Mother and Father, the trial court
stated:
W.M.S. is four (4) years old and she has been removed from
[Mother’s and Father’s] care in and out-of-home placement
twice. Since reunification services ended, [Mother and Father]
only attended three (3) out of nine (9) visits with [the] Children.
When W.M.S. would be told she would be going to a visit with
biological parents, she would just say “okay.” At one point when
W.M.S. was told she would be going to a visit with “mommy”
and “daddy,” she questioned who that was. W.[M.]S. refers to
[Mother] as “[T.L.S.]’s mother. During visits with [Mother] when
foster mother left the room, W.[M.]S. would ask [Mother]
repeatedly, “Where did mommy go?” She consistently refers to
foster parents as “mommy” and “daddy.” Concerns were raised
to [Mother and Father] that they were overfeeding W.[M.]S. and
that some sugar should be cut out of her diet to help relieve a
constipation issue W.[M.]S. was having. Despite being aware of
these concerns and having the specific need[s] explained,
[Mother and Father] still struggled to address the issue.
W.[M.]S. would often be tired, irritable, cranky, and hungry after
visits with [Mother and Father].
In the foster home, W.M.S. is receiving the stability,
consistency, and safety that she needs. W.M.S. is happy,
healthy, and comfortable in foster parents’ care, and she looks
to foster parents to meet her needs. For the foregoing reasons,
and based upon the testimony and evidence presented at the
termination hearing, the [trial court] found as follows, pursuant
the guidance set forth in section 2511(b): the emotional bonds
between [Mother and Father] are tenuous; termination of
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[Mother’s and Father’s] parental rights would not have a
detrimental effect on W.M.S.; termination of [Mother’s and
Father’s] parental rights provides W.M.S. with the permanency
which is in her best interest; and termination of [Mother’s and
Father’s] parental rights provides W.M.S. with the means to
continue her strong emotional bonds with her foster parents.
Supplemental Trial Court Opinion, filed January 29, 2016, at 5-6.
When considering T.L.S.’s bond with Mother and Father, the trial court
found:
T.L.S. Jr. has been in foster care since he left the hospital after
his birth. Understandably, T.L.S., Jr. is exceedingly attached and
emotionally bonded with his foster parents. When he would be
taken away from his foster mother to attend a visit, he would cry
and scream due to the separation. During visits in which foster
mother participated, he would look to foster mother to fulfill any
of his needs. Even when [Mother and Father were] attempting
to engage him in play, he would run to foster mother if he
needed anything. He refers to foster mother as “ma.” When
[Mother and Father] would attempt to talk with him, he would
not look at them and he would hide around his foster mother. If
[Mother and Father] would try to hold him, he would cry and
scream. On one occasion, T.L.S., Jr. tripped and fell during a
visit and ran to foster mother for help, despite [Mother and
Father]’s attempt to comfort him. During visits, [Mother and
Father] would miss giving T.L.S., Jr. a bottle completely and
would feed him late, despite being provided with a schedule
which specifically outlined when bottles should be given and
when meals should be provided. T.L.S., Jr. would often be tired,
irritable, cranky, and hungry after visits with [Mother and
Father].
In the foster home, T.L.S., Jr. is receiving the stability,
consistency, and safety that he needs. T.L.S., Jr. is happy,
healthy, and comfortable in foster parents’ care, and he looks to
foster parents to meet his needs. For the foregoing reasons, and
based upon the testimony and evidence presented at the
hearing, the [trial court] found as follows, pursuant the guidance
set forth in Section 2511(b): the emotional bonds between
[Mother and Father] and T.L.S., Jr. are tenuous; termination of
[Mother and Father’s] parental rights would not have a
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detrimental effect on T.L.S., Jr.; termination of [Mother’s and
Father’s] parental rights provides T.L.S., Jr. the permanency
which is in his best interest; and termination of [Mother and
Father’s] parental rights provides T.L.S., Jr. with the means to
continue his strong emotional bonds with his foster parents,
which have been in existence since his birth.
Supplemental Trial Court Opinion, filed January 29, 2016, at 6-7.
Ms. Pribulka and Ms. Hulek testified that termination of Mother’s and
Father’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. N.T., 7/2/15 at 29,
64-65. Ms. Pribulka stated that while W.M.S. had experienced developmental
delays, once she was placed with foster mom she made “great progress over
this past year.” Id. at 28-29. Moreover, Ms. Pribulka testified that the
Children have bonded with their foster parents. Id. at 29. Ms. Hulek also
related that the Children are thriving in the foster home, and they are
“receiving the stability and consistency and safety that they need.” Id. at
59. Ms. Hulek explained that the Children “need and deserve permanency,”
and that Mother and Father “did not demonstrate that they could provide
those things.” Id. at 59-60.
Mother and Father argue in their respective briefs that at the
termination hearing a bond evaluation was not performed by a professional.
This Court has held that when evaluating a parental bond, the trial court is
not required to use expert testimony. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121
(Pa.Super. 2010). We find that the trial court adequately considered the
best interests of the Children and thoroughly contemplated their
developmental, physical and emotional needs in determining that Mother’s
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and Father’s parental rights should be terminated pursuant to Section
2511(b), and the record supports the trial court’s best interest analysis. In
re C.M.S., supra.
With the above standard of review in mind, we have thoroughly
reviewed the record, the briefs, and the applicable law, and we find no abuse
of the trial court’s discretion in terminating Mother and Father’s parental
rights to the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5) and (b).
Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/5/2016
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