NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 15-2257
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APRIL ROSE HOCK,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY
________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 5-13-cv-02329)
District Judge: Honorable Petrese B. Tucker
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 12, 2016
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, AMBRO, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed April 6, 2016)
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OPINION*
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Appellant April Rose Hock appeals her denial of disability insurance benefits.
The District Court affirmed the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). We
agree.
I.
Ms. Hock applied for disability insurance benefits in July 2009, alleging disability
as of January 2009 due to major depressive disorder and schizoaffective disorder. Her
initial application was denied at the administrative level and she requested an
administrative hearing before an ALJ. At the administrative hearing in June 2011, the
ALJ heard testimony from Ms. Hock and a vocational expert. In August 2011, the ALJ
denied Ms. Hock’s claim for disability insurance benefits. She decided that Ms. Hock
was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act because she could
perform numerous jobs in the national economy notwithstanding her credibly established
limitations. The ALJ found that Ms. Hock has the residual functional capacity to perform
work at all exertional levels so long as (1) she was “confined to work involving simple,
routine tasks[] not involving detailed instructions,” and (2) the work was “self-paced and
low stress in nature, and require[d] no more than limited contact with the public and
coworkers.” (1 App. A13-A14.)
In reaching her conclusion, the ALJ considered the opinions of four medical
professionals: Dr. Ronald Sherman (an examining psychologist); Dr. Thomas Lane (the
Social Security Administration’s consulting psychologist); Dr. Rosemary Horstmann (a
treating psychiatrist); and Carl Sebastianelli, M.A. (the Social Security Administration’s
non-examining psychologist). The ALJ accorded little weight to Dr. Sherman’s opinion
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because he saw Ms. Hock on only one occasion yet “recorded more extensive clinical
findings and extreme limitations than even the treating source had identified.” (1 App.
A19.) The ALJ accorded some weight to Dr. Lane’s opinion but discounted his
conclusion that Ms. Hock’s limitations were only severe in a “work/public setting”
because that conclusion was based solely on her self-reported symptoms and unsupported
by the objective evidence in the record. (1 App. A18-A19.) That objective evidence
showed, among other things, that Ms. Hock worked part-time at her father’s shop. (Id.)
The ALJ accorded “less weight” to Dr. Horstmann’s opinion, notwithstanding that she
treated Ms. Hock, because the former’s opinion was unsupported by objective medical
evidence in the record and was inconsistent with her own treatment notes and the level of
treatment provided. (1 App. A20.) Ms. Hock’s symptoms improved when she took
medication, according to Dr. Horstmann’s treatment notes, but the latter’s opinion did not
account for that. (Id.) Finally, the ALJ accorded greater weight to Mr. Sebastianelli’s
opinion, even though he did not treat Ms. Hock, because he considered “the longitudinal
record” thoroughly and his assessments were “more consistent” with Ms. Hock’s overall
treatment history. (1 App. A19.)
After the Appeals Council denied Ms. Hock’s request for review, she appealed the
ALJ’s decision to the District Court. The appeal was referred to a U.S. Magistrate Judge,
who recommended affirming the denial of benefits. The Court adopted the
recommendation. This timely appeal followed.
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II.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “The role of this Court is identical to that of
the District Court, namely to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support
the Commissioner’s decision.” Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999).
“Substantial evidence has been defined as ‘more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.’” Id. (quoting Ventura
v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995)). It “may be somewhat less than a
preponderance of the evidence.” Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir.
2005).
III.
Ms. Hock claims that the ALJ erred for two reasons. The first is that the ALJ
failed to evaluate properly the medical evidence in determining her residual functional
capacity. Specifically, she argues that it was improper for the ALJ, based on the record,
to discount the opinions of Dr. Sherman, Dr. Lane, and Dr. Horstmann while crediting
Mr. Sebastianelli’s opinion.
We disagree. “[T]he ALJ is entitled to weigh all evidence in making [her]
finding.” Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 196 (3d Cir. 2011). Here, the ALJ’s
assessment of the various medical opinions in this case was based on her consideration of
the objective evidence in the record, and it contained substantial evidence to support each
of her conclusions. The ALJ clearly explained that she gave greater weight to Mr.
Sebastianelli’s opinion because it was consistent with the objective evidence in the record
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and the overall history of Ms. Hock’s treatment. His was the only opinion that took into
account the evidence that Ms. Hock was able to perform numerous activities of personal
care and daily living. Ms. Hock argues that his opinion did not consider evidence that
she cannot function in a work environment, but he specifically reported that she was able
to understand, retain, and perform one- or two-step tasks, and evidence of Ms. Hock’s
later part-time employment at her father’s body shop supports the ALJ’s decision to
credit Mr. Sebastianelli’s conclusion.
The ALJ also clearly explained that she gave less weight to the opinions of Dr.
Sherman, Dr. Lane, and Dr. Horstmann because the severity of the limitations they
reported were unsupported by or inconsistent with the objective record evidence. For
example, Dr. Lane’s report indicated that Ms. Hock was oriented and displayed normal
speech, thought content, memory, and concentration, but that contradicted his opinion
that she had extreme limitations in her ability to understand, remember, and carry out
short instructions. Similarly, the ALJ correctly observed that even though Dr. Sherman
reported that (i) Ms. Hock was alert and oriented, (ii) her speech was clear and relevant,
and (iii) her thought content was organized, he “recorded more extensive clinical findings
and extreme limitations than even the treating source had identified.” (1 App. A19.)
Finally, Dr. Horstmann’s treatment notes show that Ms. Hock worked at her father’s
body shop answering and directing calls for approximately ten hours a week and that she
regularly babysat her friend’s young children. Those activities were inconsistent with Dr.
Horstmann’s finding that Ms. Hock had a marked limitation on normal workday and
workweek activities. As such, although there was record evidence suggesting a contrary
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conclusion, the ALJ did not “‘reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason,’”
Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058,
1066 (3d Cir.1993)), but rather articulated reasons for her decision that were supported
by substantial evidence and were not contrary to law.
Ms. Hock’s second argument is that the ALJ’s credibility determination was
incorrect. She argues that none of the ALJ’s reasons for finding her not credible
“contradict a finding that [she] is incapable of withstanding the mental demands of full-
time competitive employment.” (Hock Br. 40.)
Again we disagree. The ALJ’s credibility determination was supported by
substantial evidence. For example, the ALJ relied on evidence that Ms. Hock
successfully took multiple trips to California by herself, but she claimed she could not
travel more than a few miles from home without severe symptoms. (1 App. A18.) In
addition to relying on evidence that Ms. Hock independently performed many activities
of daily living, such as running errands outside her house, babysitting, and answering
phones at her father’s shop, the ALJ relied on the absence of evidence in the record to
corroborate the more severe limitations to which Ms. Hock testified. As courts should
“ordinarily defer to an ALJ’s credibility determination,” Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d
376, 380 (3d Cir. 2003), we hold that Ms. Hock has not presented sufficient reason for us
to disturb the ALJ’s conclusion.
* * * * * *
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We have considered Ms. Hock’s remaining arguments and find them
unpersuasive. Because the District Court correctly held that the ALJ’s decision was
supported by substantial evidence, we affirm.
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