In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 15‐1859
MARY T. JANETOS, et al.,
Plaintiffs‐Appellants,
v.
FULTON FRIEDMAN & GULLACE, LLP and
ASSET ACCEPTANCE, LLC,
Defendants‐Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 12 C 1473 — Thomas M. Durkin, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED JANUARY 12, 2016 — DECIDED APRIL 7, 2016
____________________
Before BAUER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and
PETERSON, District Judge.
HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Section 1692g(a)(2) of the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., requires
a debt collector to disclose to a consumer “the name of the
The Honorable James D. Peterson, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation.
2 No. 15‐1859
creditor to whom the debt is owed,” either in its initial com‐
munication with the consumer or in a written notice sent
within the next five days. When defendant Fulton Fried‐
man & Gullace, LLP set out to collect debts from the plaintiffs
on behalf of creditor Asset Acceptance, LLC, it sent them let‐
ters that identified Asset Acceptance as the “assignee” of the
original creditors but said that the plaintiffs’ accounts had
been “transferred” from Asset Acceptance to Fulton. No‐
where in the letters did Fulton explicitly identify Asset Ac‐
ceptance as the current creditor.
Plaintiffs brought suit alleging that Fulton had violated
§§ 1692e, 1692e(10), and 1692g(a)(2) of the Act by failing to
disclose the current creditor’s name and that Asset Ac‐
ceptance was vicariously liable for Fulton’s violations. The
district court granted defendants’ motion for summary judg‐
ment. The court held that the letters were ambiguous as to the
identity of the current creditor but that plaintiffs needed to
present extrinsic evidence of confusion, like a consumer sur‐
vey, to survive summary judgment. The court also held that
even if plaintiffs had presented such evidence, their claims
would still fail because the ambiguity about the identity of the
current creditor was immaterial, meaning it would neither
contribute to nor undermine the Act’s objective of providing
“information that helps consumers to choose intelligently.”
See Hahn v. Triumph Partnerships LLC, 557 F.3d 755, 757–58 (7th
Cir. 2009).
We reverse. The district court correctly found that the let‐
ters were unclear, but it erred in finding that additional evi‐
dence of confusion was necessary to establish a § 1692g(a)(2)
violation. Section 1692g(a) requires debt collectors to disclose
No. 15‐1859 3
specific information, including the name of the current credi‐
tor, in certain written notices they send to consumers. If a let‐
ter fails to disclose the required information clearly, it violates
the Act, without further proof of confusion. Section 1692g(a)
also does not have an additional materiality requirement, ex‐
press or implied. Congress instructed debt collectors to dis‐
close this information to consumers, period, so these valida‐
tion notices violated § 1692g(a). Finally, because Asset Ac‐
ceptance is itself a debt collector, it is liable for the violations
of the Act by its agent. We remand this case to the district
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Background
Factually speaking, this case is a simple one. Asset Ac‐
ceptance is a debt collector that acquired, or claimed to have
acquired, consumer debts purportedly owed by the various
plaintiffs. Later, pursuant to § 1692g, Fulton sent its initial col‐
lection notices to the plaintiffs (or, for those plaintiffs with le‐
gal representation, to their attorneys). The letters followed es‐
sentially the same template. We quote the letter sent to plain‐
tiff Erik King, but there are no meaningful differences among
the letters. Before the salutation, each letter had a heading in
roughly the following form:
Re: Asset Acceptance, LLC Assignee of
AMERISTAR
Original Creditor Acct #: XX0682
Fulton, Friedman & Gullace, LLP Acct #:
XXXXXX2109
Balance Due: $17479.24
4 No. 15‐1859
Letters sent to attorneys rather than directly to the consumers
had the consumer’s name in the first line followed by the ref‐
erence to Asset Acceptance as assignee in the second. The let‐
ters began: “Please be advised that your above referenced ac‐
count has been transferred from Asset Acceptance, LLC to
Fulton, Friedman & Gullace, LLP.” They also said that if the
consumer had “already entered into a payment plan or settle‐
ment arrangement with Asset Acceptance, LLC,” Fulton was
“committed to honoring the same,” and instructed consumers
to direct all future contact, including any questions they had,
to Fulton’s offices. The letters provided no additional details
about the relationship between Asset Acceptance and Fulton.
Nowhere did they say who currently owned the debt.1
Lawsuits by plaintiffs Mary T. Janetos, Erik King, Pamela
Fujioka, and Ignacio Bernave were eventually combined in
one action. They alleged that the letters violated § 1692g(a)(2)
of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by failing to identify
the current creditor or owner of the debt. They also alleged
the letters violated § 1692e and e(10), which prohibit the use
of false or misleading representations or means in connection
with the collection of a consumer debt. In July 2014, the dis‐
trict court certified a plaintiff class consisting of consumers
who received the letters personally and a subclass of consum‐
ers who had been sent the letters in care of their attorneys.
On cross‐motions for summary judgment, the district
court ruled in favor of defendants. Addressing first the
§ 1692e and e(10) claims, the court acknowledged the form
letter’s ambiguity on the question of the current owner of the
1 A complete example of each type of letter is included in an appendix at
the end of this opinion.
No. 15‐1859 5
debt, noting that the word “transferred” could mean either
conveyance of title or assignment for collection and that, ap‐
plying the ordinary meaning of “transfer,” the letter did not
“suggest any particular form or method of conveyance.” Nev‐
ertheless, the court held that the ambiguous letter and plain‐
tiffs’ affidavits attesting to their own confusion failed to create
a genuine dispute of material fact for trial under § 1692e and
that plaintiffs failed to offer evidence that the omission met
the materiality requirement we have found implied for most
§ 1692e claims. The district court then rejected the plaintiffs’
§ 1692g(a)(2) claim on the same grounds as the § 1692e and
e(10) claims, including lack of materiality. Plaintiffs have ap‐
pealed.
II. Analysis
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act is designed to pro‐
tect consumers from abusive and unfair debt collection prac‐
tices. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e); Pettit v. Retrieval Masters Creditor
Bureau, Inc., 211 F.3d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 2000). To help accom‐
plish that goal, § 1692g(a) provides that in either the initial
communication with a consumer in connection with the col‐
lection of a debt or another written notice sent within five
days of the first, a debt collector must provide specific infor‐
mation to the consumer. The required information includes
“the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed.” 15
U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2). Plaintiffs argue that the letters they re‐
ceived failed to make that disclosure. Plaintiffs have also
claimed that the failure violated the more general require‐
ments of § 1692e and e(10), but at oral argument, plaintiffs’
counsel agreed those claims add nothing here to the
§ 1692g(a)(2) claim, so we focus our attention on § 1692g(a)(2).
6 No. 15‐1859
A. The Violations of § 1692g(a)(2)
When § 1692g(a) requires that a communication include
certain information, compliance demands more than simply
including that information in some unintelligible form. Oth‐
erwise, as we have said, “the collection agency could write the
letter in Hittite and have a secure defense.” Chuway v. National
Action Financial Services, Inc., 362 F.3d 944, 948 (7th Cir. 2004).
To satisfy § 1692g(a), the debt collector’s notice must state the
required information “clearly enough that the recipient is
likely to understand it.” Id.; see also Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d
497, 500 (7th Cir. 1997) (debt collector may not defeat the Act’s
purpose by “making the required disclosures in a form or
within a context in which they are unlikely to be understood
by the unsophisticated debtors who are the particular objects
of the statute’s solicitude”); Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d
30, 35 (2d Cir. 1996) (“We recognize there are many cunning
ways to circumvent § 1692g under cover of technical compli‐
ance, but purported compliance with the form of the statute
should not be given sanction at the expense of the substance
of the Act.”) (internal citation omitted).
Thus, standing alone the fact that the form letter included
the words “Asset Acceptance, LLC” did not establish compli‐
ance with § 1692g(a)(2). The Act required Fulton’s letter to
identify Asset Acceptance as the “creditor to whom the debt
is owed.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2). The letter had to make that
identification clearly enough that the recipient would likely
understand it. Chuway, 362 F.3d at 948.
Nowhere did the letter say that Asset Acceptance cur‐
rently owned the debts in question. Asset Acceptance was
identified as the “assignee” of another company, not as the
current creditor or owner of the debt. The letter went on to
No. 15‐1859 7
say that the referenced account “has been transferred from
Asset Acceptance, LLC, to Fulton, Friedman & Gullace, LLP.”
These statements simply did not say who currently owned the
debts. Instead, each recipient was left to guess who owned the
debt following the “transfer” of the “account.” On its face,
then, the letter failed to disclose the information that
§ 1692g(a)(2) required. The district judge correctly recognized
this ambiguity, noting that the word “transfer” could mean
either conveyance of title or assignment for collection, and
that the letter did not “suggest any particular form or method
of conveyance.” Janetos v. Fulton Friedman & Gullace, LLP, No.
12 C 1473, 2015 WL 1744118, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 13, 2015).
Defendants argue that the letter nevertheless complied
with § 1692g(a)(2) because, when read in its entirety, it implic‐
itly disclosed the legal relationship between Asset Acceptance
and Fulton, which in turn made clear that Asset Acceptance
continued as the owner of the debt. We disagree. We address
each portion of the context that defendants argue satisfied
their § 1692g(a)(2) obligation. First, defendants argue that the
letter made clear that Fulton is a law firm and a debt collector.
True enough, but neither point leads to a “basic logical deduc‐
tion” that Fulton must have been collecting the referenced
debts on Asset Acceptance’s behalf or that Asset Acceptance
remained the current owner of the debts. See Pettit, 211 F.3d
at 1060 (unsophisticated consumer is “capable of making
basic logical deductions and inferences”).
Defendants also argue that a reasonable consumer would
know her account history and so would recognize Asset Ac‐
ceptance as the debt owner who had sought to collect, ob‐
tained a judgment, and transferred the account to Fulton for
post‐judgment collection. There are two problems with this
8 No. 15‐1859
position. First, debt collectors frequently obtain default judg‐
ments against consumers. See Suesz v. Med‐1 Solutions, LLC,
757 F.3d 636, 638–39 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc). While most con‐
sumers will likely be aware of the legal proceedings against
them, some may not, often through no fault of their own. For
example, plaintiff King testified here that the summons and
complaint never reached him, so he was unaware of Asset Ac‐
ceptance’s lawsuit against him until he received the letter
from Fulton more than three years later.
Second and more fundamental, even where a consumer
would recognize Asset Acceptance as having owned the debt
at some time in the past (perhaps from pre‐lawsuit collection
efforts or the lawsuit itself), the form letter said that the “ac‐
count” had since been “transferred” from Asset Acceptance
to Fulton. Defendants do not explain how, in light of this lan‐
guage, an understanding of Asset Acceptance’s former role
would have shown its current role.
Finally, defendants point to the language in which Fulton
committed to honoring any payment plans or settlement ar‐
rangements the consumer may have made with Asset Ac‐
ceptance. Again, defendants fail to explain how this language
showed that Asset Acceptance was the current owner of the
debts or that Fulton was nothing more than a “post‐lawsuit
collector.” Accordingly, the letters did not disclose the name
of the current creditor, and so violated § 1692g(a)(2).2
2 For purposes of the present appeal, it does not matter whether Fulton
sent the letters directly to the consumers or to their attorneys:
It would be passing odd if the fact that a consumer was
represented excused the debt collector from having to
No. 15‐1859 9
B. Ambiguity as a Defense?
Defendants also argue that the letters were at worst merely
ambiguous. This means, they argue, that plaintiffs were re‐
quired to come forward with extrinsic evidence of actual con‐
fusion to survive summary judgment on their § 1692g(a)(2)
claims. We disagree.
It is true that for claims under § 1692e claims, or at least
those based on its general prohibitions against false, decep‐
tive, or misleading statements and practices, we have sorted
cases into three categories. Ruth v. Triumph Partnerships, 577
F.3d 790, 800 (7th Cir. 2009). The first category includes cases
in which the challenged language is “plainly and clearly not
misleading.” No extrinsic evidence is needed to show that the
debt collector ought to prevail in such cases. Lox v. CDA, Ltd.,
689 F.3d 818, 822 (7th Cir. 2012). The second Lox category “in‐
cludes debt collection language that is not misleading or con‐
fusing on its face, but has the potential to be misleading to the
unsophisticated consumer.” Id. In such cases, “plaintiffs may
prevail only by producing extrinsic evidence, such as con‐
sumer surveys, to prove that unsophisticated consumers do
convey to the consumer the information to which the stat‐
ute entitles him. For example, sections 1692g(a)(1) and (2)
provide that the required notice must state the amount of
the debt and the name of the creditor. Is it to be believed
that by retaining a lawyer the debtor disentitles himself
to the information?
Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2007).
We held in Evory that “any written notice sent to the lawyer must contain
the information that would be required by the Act if the notice were sent
to the consumer directly.” Id.
10 No. 15‐1859
in fact find the challenged statements misleading or decep‐
tive.” Id., quoting Ruth, 577 F.3d at 800. The third category is
cases in which the challenged language is “plainly deceptive
or misleading,” such that no extrinsic evidence is required for
the plaintiff to prevail. Id.
Defendants argue that if the letters here are not “category
one,” they are at worst “category two”—that is, susceptible to
more than one interpretation—so that plaintiffs had to pre‐
sent extrinsic evidence of consumer confusion to survive sum‐
mary judgment. Such evidence is not necessary here, where
§ 1692g(a)(2) requires a particular disclosure—the name of
the current creditor—and defendants’ letters simply fail to
provide it, directly or indirectly. The recipients of these letters
would therefore find themselves obliged to guess who cur‐
rently owned the debts in question. Since the name was on the
letters, some might correctly guess that Asset Acceptance was
the current creditor, but a lucky guess would have nothing to
do with any disclosure the letters provided. Compliance with
the clear requirements of § 1692g(a)(2) demands more.
Chuway v. National Action Financial Services, Inc., 362 F.3d
944 (7th Cir. 2004), is a helpful guide to this case. It involved
§ 1692g(a)(1), which requires the debt collector’s notice to
state “the amount of the debt.” In Chuway, the defendant sent
the plaintiff a dunning letter that stated the “balance” of the
debt but added: “To obtain your most current balance infor‐
mation, please call” the number provided. Id. at 947. The
plaintiff alleged a violation of § 1692g(a)(1). See id. at 946–47.
The district court had granted summary judgment to the de‐
fendant, finding that while the letter was “problematic” and
had the “potential to confuse an unsophisticated consumer,”
there was no outright contradiction in terms. Id. at 949.
No. 15‐1859 11
We reversed. We concluded that although the “balance”
was disclosed in the dunning letter, the reference to obtaining
the “most current balance information” implied that the con‐
sumer might actually have owed some unspecified larger
amount. Id. at 947–48. For present purposes, the critical point
is that we also held in Chuway that under those circumstances,
the plaintiff did not need to present extrinsic evidence of con‐
fusion. Her affidavit attesting to her own confusion, coupled
with the fact that it was “apparent just from reading the letter
that it is unclear,” was sufficient to create a triable issue. Id. at
948.
The violation here was even clearer than the one in Chu‐
way. Here, the letters Fulton sent did not actually identify As‐
set Acceptance as the current creditor at all, and in fact leave
the impression that Asset Acceptance may well have trans‐
ferred ownership of the debts to Fulton. Plaintiffs Janetos,
King, and Fujioka, as in Chuway, also provided evidence in
the form of affidavits that after reading the letters, they were
unable to determine who currently owned the debts. No fur‐
ther evidence of consumer confusion is necessary under these
circumstances.3
C. No Materiality Requirement
The district court held in the alternative that defendants
were entitled to summary judgment because any violation of
§ 1692g(a)(2) was not “material.” But for good reason, we
have not extended the implicit materiality requirement of
§ 1692e to reach claims under § 1692g(a). As noted above,
3 Plaintiff Bernave did not so testify. According to plaintiffs’ reply brief,
English is not his native language and he could not read the letter at all.
12 No. 15‐1859
§ 1692e is “designed to provide information that helps con‐
sumers to choose intelligently, and by definition immaterial
information neither contributes to that objective (if the state‐
ment is correct) nor undermines it (if the statement is incor‐
rect).” Hahn v. Triumph Partnerships LLC, 557 F.3d 755, 757–58
(7th Cir. 2009). Portions of § 1692e are drafted in broad terms,
prohibiting the use of “any false, deceptive, or misleading
representation or means in connection with the collection of
any debt.” For such claims, we must assess allegedly false or
misleading statements to determine whether they could have
any practical impact on a consumer’s rights or decision‐mak‐
ing process—that is, whether they represent the kind of con‐
duct the Act was intended to eliminate.
For § 1692g(a)(2), however, that decision has been made
for us. In enacting § 1692g(a)(2), Congress determined that a
debt collector must include in its § 1692g(a) notice “the name
of the creditor to whom the debt is owed.” With that specific
disclosure requirement, Congress decided that the failure to
make the disclosure is a failure the Act is meant to penalize.
The undisputed facts show such a failure here. Since
§ 1692g(a)(2) clearly requires the disclosure, we decline to of‐
fer debt collectors a free pass to violate that provision on the
theory that the disclosure Congress required is not important
enough. There is also no need for individual inquiry about the
materiality to any given recipient. Cf. Warren v. Sessoms & Rog‐
ers, P.A., 676 F.3d 365, 374 (4th Cir. 2012) (declining to establish
a materiality requirement for violations of § 1692e(11), which
requires debt collectors to disclose their status as debt collec‐
tors, because the “statute expressly prohibits this exact omis‐
sion”) (emphasis in original), abrogated on other grounds,
Campbell‐Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016).
No. 15‐1859 13
In rejecting any requirement of materiality for a violation
of § 1692g(a)(2), we do not mean to suggest the required in‐
formation is not important. Knowing the current creditor “po‐
tentially affects the debtor in the most basic ways, such as
what the debtor should write after ‘pay to the order of’ on the
payment check to ensure that the debt is satisfied.” Eun Joo
Lee v. Forster & Garbus LLP, 926 F. Supp. 2d 482, 488 (E.D.N.Y.
2013). Defendants argue, and the district judge concluded,
that in this particular case knowing the current creditor
would not have affected consumers’ rights: Fulton was Asset
Acceptance’s legitimate collection agent, so a payment to Ful‐
ton would have extinguished the debt regardless of whether
the consumer knew Asset Acceptance actually owned the
debt. But that point overlooks another serious problem with
the failure to disclose the current creditor: the potential for
fraud.
Suppose the sender of these letters had been not Fulton
but a party who had no legal right to collect the debts on Asset
Acceptance’s behalf—perhaps someone who gathered debt
information from public court records. The letters did not
identify who currently owned the debts, so a consumer wish‐
ing to verify that a payment would extinguish her obligation
could not contact the current creditor to confirm that paying
the letter‐writer would be the proper course of action. In fact,
the Fulton letters actually instructed consumers to direct all
further contact not to Asset Acceptance but to Fulton itself.
Unless the unsophisticated consumer makes the effort to de‐
mand verification under § 1692g, an unscrupulous sender
could confirm that the consumer should send it a payment to
extinguish the debt. That consumer would find that she had
lost that money while her actual debt remained unpaid. So
14 No. 15‐1859
while defendants are correct that Fulton was in fact author‐
ized to collect debts on Asset Acceptance’s behalf, not all con‐
sumer debtors will be so lucky.
To sum up our view of the merits, if the validation notice
required under § 1692g(a)(2) does not identify the current
creditor clearly and accurately, the law has been violated. A
plaintiff need not offer additional evidence of confusion or
materiality to prove the violation. The undisputed facts here
show that Fulton’s letters to plaintiffs violated § 1692g(a)(2).
Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment as to liability un‐
der that provision.
D. Debt Collector’s Liability for Agent’s Violations
Asset Acceptance argues that even if Fulton is not entitled
to summary judgment, Asset Acceptance cannot be held vi‐
cariously liable for the letters that Fulton drafted and sent.
Again, we disagree. At least two other circuits have held debt
collectors liable for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Prac‐
tices Act committed by others acting on their behalf. E.g., Pol‐
lice v. National Tax Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d 379, 404–06 (3d Cir.
2000); Fox v. Citicorp Credit Services, Inc., 15 F.3d 1507, 1516 (9th
Cir. 1994). The key question, according to the Third Circuit in
Pollice, is whether the defendant whom the plaintiff seeks to
hold vicariously liable is itself a debt collector: “We believe
this is a fair result because an entity that is itself a ‘debt col‐
lector’—and hence subject to the FDCPA—should bear the
burden of monitoring the activities of those it enlists to collect
debts on its behalf.” Id. at 405; cf. Wadlington v. Credit Ac‐
ceptance Corp., 76 F.3d 103, 108 (6th Cir. 1996) (“We do not
think it would accord with the intent of Congress, as mani‐
fested in the terms of the Act, for a company that is not a debt
collector to be held vicariously liable for a collection suit filing
No. 15‐1859 15
that violates the Act only because the filing attorney is a ‘debt
collector.’”) (emphasis in original).
We agree with the Third Circuit’s approach in Pollice. A
debt collector should not be able to avoid liability for unlaw‐
ful debt collection practices simply by contracting with an‐
other company to do what the law does not allow it to do it‐
self. Like the Third Circuit, we think it is fair and consistent
with the Act to require a debt collector who is independently
obliged to comply with the Act to monitor the actions of those
it enlists to collect debts on its behalf. On the other hand, a
company that is not a debt collector would not ordinarily be
subject to liability under the Act at all. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)
(defining “debt collector”); Pettit v. Retrieval Masters Creditor
Bureau, Inc., 211 F.3d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 2000) (provisions of
the Act “generally apply only to debt collectors”). As the Sixth
Circuit explained in Wadlington, it makes less sense to impose
vicarious liability on such a company for its attorney’s viola‐
tions simply because the attorney happens to be a debt collec‐
tor. 76 F.3d at 108; accord, Pollice, 225 F.3d at 404–05. Asset Ac‐
ceptance is itself a debt collector, so under the logic of Pollice
and Fox, it may be held liable for Fulton’s violations of the Act
in the course of activities undertaken on its behalf.
Asset Acceptance argues that Fox is no longer good law in
the Ninth Circuit in light of Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection
Services, Inc., 460 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2006). But Clark did not
overrule Fox; it addressed instead whether an attorney could
be held vicariously liable for the acts of his client. Clark, 460
F.3d at 1173. That’s the converse of the question before us, so
Clark did not undermine the reasoning of Fox and Pollice and
is not applicable here. Asset Acceptance also relies on two dis‐
16 No. 15‐1859
trict court decisions holding that actual control over the spe‐
cific challenged conduct was required. See Tilmon v. LVNV
Funding, LLC, 2014 WL 335234 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 2014) (with pro
se plaintiff); Clark v. Main Street Acquisition Corp., 2013 WL
2295879 (S.D. Ohio May 24, 2013), aff’d on other grounds, 553
Fed. Appx. 510 (6th Cir. 2014). We do not find those cases per‐
suasive as applied to principals that are themselves debt col‐
lectors. Additionally, neither Fox nor Pollice based vicarious
liability on a showing of actual control over the specific activ‐
ity alleged to violate the Act. See Pollice, 225 F.3d at 404–05;
Fox, 15 F.3d at 1516 (rejecting argument that debt collector
could not be vicariously liable “for a venue decision made
solely by” its attorney) (emphasis added).
* * *
For these reasons, the district court erred in holding that
plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of proof on the
§ 1692g(a)(2) claim. As a matter of law, the letters violated
§ 1692g(a)(2) by failing to make the mandated disclosure. No
additional showing of materiality was required. Asset Ac‐
ceptance, as a debt collector, cannot escape liability for Ful‐
ton’s actions on its behalf. The judgment of the district court
is therefore REVERSED. Plaintiffs are entitled to a finding of
liability for violations of § 1692g(a)(2). The case is
REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
No. 15‐1859 17
APPENDIX
18 No. 15‐1859