UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-2065
BRIAN BAKER,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
CITY OF CHESAPEAKE,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District
Judge. (2:14-cv-00318-RAJ-DEM)
Submitted: March 17, 2016 Decided: April 8, 2016
Before KING, FLOYD, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Margaret Mary Looby, Chesapeake, Virginia; Shannon Beth Bayona,
TAYLOR BAYONA LAW GROUP, PC, Chesapeake, Virginia, for
Appellants. Ryan C. Samuel, Dana E. Sanford, OFFICE OF THE CITY
ATTORNEY, Chesapeake, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Brian Baker appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor
of the City of Chesapeake, Virginia (“the City”). Baker
alleged, among other things, that the City discriminated against
him and failed to accommodate his disability, in violation of
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12213
(2012) (“ADA”), discriminated against him on account of his
Caucasian race, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012) (“Title VII”), and
wrongfully retaliated against him, in violation of the ADA and
Title VII. On appeal, Baker argues that the district court
erred in granting summary judgment because genuine issues of
material fact remain as to whether the City (1) discriminated
against him due to his disability, (2) retaliated against him
for reporting disparate treatment, and (3) failed to accommodate
his disability. 1 We affirm.
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, drawing
all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.
Butler v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 404, 407
(4th Cir. 2015). Summary judgment is only appropriate when
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
1
As the City observed in its brief, Baker does not pursue
his Title VII claim of race discrimination on appeal.
2
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). In opposing summary judgment, “the nonmoving
party must rely on more than conclusory allegations, mere
speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or the
mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Dash v. Mayweather,
731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013).
First, a plaintiff has two means of showing disability
discrimination under the ADA: (1) “through direct and indirect
evidence,” or (2) “through the McDonnell Douglas [ 2]
burden-shifting framework.” Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the
CT’s., 780 F.3d 562, 572 (4th Cir. 2015). We have long observed
a strict distinction between claims proceeding with direct
evidence of discrimination and those proceeding under the
McDonnell Douglas framework. See Hill v. Lockheed Martin
Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 284-85 (4th Cir. 2004) (end
banc), abrogated on other grounds by Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med.
Ctr. v. Nasser, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013).
Yet before the district court, Baker proceeded only under
the McDonnell Douglas framework in seeking to prove
discrimination. Consequently, in the absence of exceptional or
extraordinary circumstances that would justify reviewing the
2 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973).
3
issue on the merits, Baker has waived his right to contend on
appeal that his direct evidence of discrimination precluded
summary judgment. See Holland v. Big River Minerals Corp., 181
F.3d 597, 605 (4th Cir. 1999) (“Generally issues that were not
raised in the district court will not be addressed on appeal.”);
see also Foster v. Univ. of Maryland-Eastern Shore, 787 F.3d
243, 250 n.8 (2015) (holding that discussion of direct-evidence
discrimination claim limited to footnote in opening brief was
insufficient to warrant appellate review).
To make a prima facie showing of disability discrimination
under McDonnell v. Douglas, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
(1) he has a disability, (2) he is qualified for his former
position, and (3) the employer discharged him because of his
disability. Jacobs, 780 F.3d at 572.
After reviewing the record, we concur with the district
court’s assessment of Baker’s case: he presented insufficient
evidence causally linking his discharge with his disability.
While Baker disputes the City’s proffered rationale for his
termination, he points to no evidence causally connecting his
disability to his dismissal; therefore, this claim fails.
Next, Baker asserts that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment on his retaliation claim. To make out
a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that
(1) he engaged in “protected activity,” (2) the employer “took
4
adverse action” against him, and (3) “that a causal relationship
existed between the protected activity and the adverse
employment activity.” Foster, 787 F.3d at 250 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
On appeal, Baker argues that the City “took adverse action”
against him by terminating his employment, which he deems the
final event in a causal chain linking back to a complaint of
disparate treatment. But before the district court, Baker cited
only a letter of reprimand as the City’s “adverse action”
supporting his claim of retaliation. His “causal chain” theory
is completely absent from the district court record; therefore,
we hold that Baker has waived the right to present this claim on
appeal. See Holland, 181 F.3d at 605.
Finally, to establish a claim under the ADA for a failure
to accommodate, a plaintiff must show that (1) he suffered a
disability; (2) his employer knew of the disability; (3) with
reasonable accommodations, he was otherwise qualified to perform
the essential functions of the job; and (4) his employer refused
to make such reasonable accommodations. Wilson v. Dollar Gen.
Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 345 (4th Cir. 2013).
Our review of the record reflects that the City never
refused a request for accommodation. As the district court
properly concluded, without evidence of such a refusal, we
5
cannot say that the City failed to accommodate Baker’s
disability.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
6