IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
NO. WR-82,025-01
EX PARTE JACOB SCOTT YOUNKER, Applicant
ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
CAUSE NO. 06-DCR-045589 HC1
IN THE 268TH DISTRICT COURT FROM FORT BEND COUNTY
Per curiam. Newell, J., not participating.
ORDER
Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the
clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte
Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant pleaded guilty to possession of less
than one gram of cocaine, and was sentenced pursuant to Section 12.44(a) of the Texas Penal Code
to seventy-five days in county jail. He did not appeal his conviction.
Although Applicant has discharged his sentence in this case, he has alleged that he is
suffering collateral consequences from this conviction sufficient to allow this Court to consider his
claims by way of habeas corpus. Ex parte Harrington, 310 S.W.3d 452 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
Applicant contends that he was denied due process because the lab tech who tested the
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evidence seized in this case was Jonathan Salvador, who has since been discredited based on
misconduct. The trial court conducted a habeas hearing, and determined that the inference of falsity
in this case has not been sufficiently rebutted by the State. See Ex parte Coty, 418 S.W.3d 597 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2014). The trial court recommends that relief be granted.
In Ex parte Barnaby, No. WR-80,099-01, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. Crim. App. November 4,
2015), this Court held that materiality of false evidence in the context of a guilty plea should be
examined under the same standard used to assess materiality of counsel's deficient performance in
the context of a guilty plea: if the applicant had known that the evidence was false (i.e., "but for" the
false evidence), he would not have pleaded guilty but would have insisted on going to trial.
In this case, although Applicant did not specifically allege that his plea of guilty was
involuntary, he prepared and litigated his application for writ of habeas corpus without the benefit
of this Court’s opinion in Barnaby. Likewise, the trial court recommends that relief be granted
without the benefit of this Court’s Barnaby opinion. Therefore, additional findings of fact are
necessary in order to resolve the issue in this case.
As we held in Ex parte Rodriguez, 334 S.W.2d 294, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960), the trial
court is the appropriate forum for findings of fact. The trial court may use any means set out in TEX .
CODE CRIM . PROC. art. 11.07, § 3(d). In the appropriate case, the trial court may rely on its personal
recollection. Id.
If the trial court elects to hold a hearing, it shall determine whether Applicant is indigent.
If Applicant is indigent and wishes to be represented by counsel, the trial court shall appoint an
attorney to represent Applicant at the hearing. TEX . CODE CRIM . PROC. art. 26.04.
The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether Applicant
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would have pleaded guilty in this case had he known that the lab report contained false evidence.
The trial court shall also make any other findings of fact and conclusions of law that it deems
relevant and appropriate to the disposition of Applicant’s claim for habeas corpus relief.
This application will be held in abeyance until the trial court has resolved the fact issues. The
issues shall be resolved within 90 days of this order. A supplemental transcript containing all
affidavits and interrogatories or the transcription of the court reporter’s notes from any hearing or
deposition, along with the trial court’s supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law, shall
be forwarded to this Court within 120 days of the date of this order. Any extensions of time shall
be obtained from this Court.
Filed: April 6, 2016
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