J-A04043-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
IN THE ADOPTION OF: PENNSYLVANIA
S.R.M., A MINOR,
Appellee
APPEAL OF: R.M.B., FATHER
No. 991 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered May 12, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County
Orphans’ Court at No(s): 42-12-0259
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BENDER, P.J.E., and SHOGAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED APRIL 12, 2016
R.M.B. (“Father”) appeals from the order entered on May 12, 2015,
granting the petition filed by the McKean County Children and Youth Services
(“CYS” or the “Agency”) to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights to
his daughter, S.R.M. (“Child”).1 We affirm.
The orphans’ court set forth the relevant history of this case in its
memorandum. Orphans’ Court Memorandum, 5/12/15, at 1–9. We adopt
the orphans’ court’s recitation of facts for purposes of this appeal; we set
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1
On May 11, 2015, the orphans’ court involuntarily terminated the parental
rights of T.A.M. (“Mother”). Mother has not filed an appeal, and she is not a
party to this appeal.
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forth only those facts, as found by the orphans’ court, that are necessary to
understand our disposition.
Child was born in March of 2008 and initially resided with Mother and
Father. Approximately nine months after Child’s birth, Mother left Child in
the care of Father and moved to Florida, stating that she was unable to be a
parent. N.T., 4/10/15, at 112; Orphans’ Court Memorandum, 5/12/15, at 1.
Child then lived with Father, who has a history of mental illness, and
Father’s grandmother, S.B. (“Great-Grandmother”). When Father attempted
suicide, CYS assumed custody of Child, who was then nineteen months old,
and placed her in the care of Father’s aunt, S.T. (“Great-Aunt”), and uncle,
G.T. (collectively “the T.s”), on October 27, 2009. Id. Child was
adjudicated dependent on February 9, 2010.
Father resumed living with Great-Grandmother and had supervised
visitation with Child; Father also was homeless at times. Orphans’ Court
Memorandum, 5/12/15, at 3. Father had minimal compliance with court-
ordered recommendations. He was incarcerated in early 2011, released that
spring, and pled guilty on June 30, 2011, to public drunkenness, a weapon
charge, possession of marijuana, and criminal mischief. The court imposed
a probationary sentence. Id.
Once again, Father lived with Great-Grandmother and resumed
supervised visits with Child, with whom he formed a bond. Orphans’ Court
Memorandum, 5/12/15, at 3–4. He was arrested on September 7, 2011,
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related to a stabbing incident over a bottle of vodka, and he was
incarcerated. A jury found him guilty of two counts of aggravated assault
and one count each of simple assault and recklessly endangering another
person. On July 30, 2012, the court imposed an aggregate sentence of five
and one-half to eleven years in a state correctional facility. Father’s earliest
release date is March 4, 2017, and his maximum release date is September
7, 2022. Id. at 4. On appeal, this Court affirmed Father’s sentence. Id.
Meanwhile, Child was living with the T.s and occasionally visiting
Father at prison. Child allegedly formed a bond with the T.s. CYS filed a
petition to terminate parental rights in December 2012, and the T.s were
listed as prospective adoptive parents. In the summer of 2013, Great-Aunt
was found intoxicated in a local Wal-Mart parking lot. Orphans’ Court
Memorandum, 5/12/15, at 6. When Great-Aunt refused to follow through
with CYS concerns, Child was removed from the T.s’ home and placed in
foster care on October 19, 2013, with M.C. and V.C. (“the C.s”), where she
resides to this day. Initially, because the C.s were not interested in a long-
term-placement option, CYS withdrew its termination petition as adoption no
longer was an option. Eventually, the C.s capitulated and agreed to adopt
Child. However, they are not willing to transport Child to the state
correctional facility to visit with Father. Id. at 6–7.
On October 28, 2014, CYS filed a second petition for the involuntary
termination of the parental rights of Father and Mother. The orphans’ court
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held a hearing on January 5, 2015, where the current CYS caseworker,
Brittany Falconi, testified, as did Dr. Allen Ryen, who performed a bonding
assessment and was qualified as an expert. The hearing continued on April
10, 2015, where Jeanie Bailey, Child’s former CYS caseworker from March
2010 until November 2011, and prospective adoptive parents, the C.s,
testified. N.T., 4/10/15, at 8-9, 49, 82. Father also testified on his own
behalf.
Ms. Falconi testified that Child is comfortable in the C.s’ home, is
bonded with them, and loves them. N.T., 1/5/15, at 34–35. She offered
that the involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights would best serve
Child’s developmental, physical and emotional needs, and welfare. Id. at
41. Ms. Falconi testified that it was not in Child’s best interest to prolong
foster care, given the length of time Child has been in placement, because
Father’s release date and his situation upon release are unknown, and in
light of the C.s’ willingness to adopt Child. Id. Ms. Falconi opined that the
termination of Father’s parental rights and Child’s adoption by the C.s would
provide Child with permanency. Id. She acknowledged that Child has a
relationship with Father. Id. at 42. Ms. Falconi stated that the C.s provide
Child with comfort, security, and stability. Id.
The orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights on May 12,
2015, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). On June 11,
2015, Father timely filed a notice of appeal along with a concise statement
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of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and
(b), in which he raised nine issues for review.
In his brief on appeal, Father raises the following single issue:
Whether the Court below erred in finding that termination
of the parental rights of [Father] would best serve the needs and
welfare of [Child] under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5), 23 Pa.C.S. §
2511(a)(8) and 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b), including that that
determination was against the weight of the evidence and that
there was not sufficient evidence to support that conclusion.
Appellant’s Brief at 5 (footnote omitted).2
Father argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding
that severing his bond with Child served Child’s needs and welfare. Father
further avers that Dr. Ryen’s expert testimony indicated that severing the
bond between Father and Child would have devastating effects on Child.
Citing In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481 (Pa. 1993), Father asserts that the
termination of his parental rights cannot be sustained.
In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we
adhere to the following standard:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion
standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a
petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency
cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to
accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the
trial court if they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T.,
608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings
are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial
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2
In his brief, Father states that he has consolidated the first eight claims
listed in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement into this single issue.
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court made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; In re
R.I.S., 614 Pa. 275, 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality). As
has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result
merely because the reviewing court might have reached a
different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel-Bassett v. Kia
Motors America, Inc., 613 Pa. 371, 455, 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa.
2011); Christianson v. Ely, 575 Pa. 647, 838 A.2d 630, 634
(Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of
discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.
As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for
applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these
cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are
not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold
record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during
the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at
1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an
opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and
termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to
second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility
determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial
judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the
record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an
error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of
Atencio, 539 Pa. 161, 165, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).
In re I.E.P., 87 A.3d 340, 343–344 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting In re
Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826–827 (Pa. 2012)).
The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental
rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). We
have explained that the “standard of clear and convincing evidence is
defined as testimony that is so ‘clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to
enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of
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the truth of the precise facts in issue.’” Id. (quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d
1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)). Moreover, this Court may affirm the trial
court’s decision regarding the termination of parental rights with regard to
any one subsection of section 2511(a). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384
(Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).
The orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). Order, 5/12/15, at 1–2.3 Section
2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b) provide as follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
***
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be
without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the
conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
***
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with
an agency for a period of at least six months, the
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3
On the second page of its order, the orphans’ court apparently made a
clerical error in citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), which was not quoted in the
order. Further, although the trial court did not cite section 2511(b) in its
order, it discussed and considered this section in its memorandum that
accompanied the order. Orphans’ Court Memorandum, 5/12/15, at 11.
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conditions which led to the removal or placement of the
child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not
remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of
time, the services or assistance reasonably available to
the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which
led to the removal or placement of the child within a
reasonable period of time and termination of the parental
rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the
child.
***
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with
an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the
date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to
the removal or placement of the child continue to exist
and termination of parental rights would best serve the
needs and welfare of the child.
***
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of
a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The
rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511. This Court has explained that the focus in terminating
parental rights under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but under section
2511(b), the focus is on the child. In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999,
1008 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc).
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In his brief, Father does not discuss Section 2511(a). See Wirth v.
Commonwealth, 95 A.3d 822, 837 (Pa. 2014) (holding that “[w]here an
appellate brief fails to . . . develop an issue in any . . . meaningful fashion
capable of review, that claim is waived. It is not the obligation of an
appellate court to formulate appellant’s arguments for him.”) (internal
quotations omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (providing that appellate
briefs must contain “such discussion and citation of authorities as are
deemed pertinent”). Therefore, we find that Father has waived any
challenge to the involuntary termination of his parental rights under Section
2511(a).4
Even if Father had preserved this challenge, we would find that there
is competent evidence in the record to support the involuntary termination
of his parental rights under Subsection 2511(a)(2). This Court has stated
that a parent is required to make diligent efforts toward the reasonably
prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities. In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d
326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002). A parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long
period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of
services, may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous. Id. at 340.
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4
Father also waived any challenge regarding the orphans’ court’s
consideration of an open adoption in this matter by his failure to develop any
argument concerning that doctrine. See Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d 21,
29–30 (Pa. Super. 2006) (Appellate arguments that are not appropriately
developed are waived).
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In Adoption of S.P., our Supreme Court instructed that:
incarceration is a factor, and indeed can be a determinative
factor, in a court’s conclusion that grounds for termination
exist under § 2511(a)(2) where the repeated and continued
incapacity of a parent due to incarceration has caused the
child to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence and that the causes of the incapacity cannot or
will not be remedied.
Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 828.
After re-visiting its decision in In re: R.I.S., 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa.
2011), regarding incarcerated parents, the Supreme Court stated:
[W]e now definitively hold that incarceration, while not a
litmus test for termination, can be determinative of the
question of whether a parent is incapable of providing
“essential parental care, control or subsistence” and the
length of the remaining confinement can be considered as
highly relevant to whether “the conditions and causes of the
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent,” sufficient to provide grounds for
termination pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2). [See In
re:] E.A.P., 944 A.2d [79, 85 (Pa. Super. 2008)] (holding
termination under § 2511(a)(2) supported by [the]
mother’s repeated incarcerations and failure to be present
for [the] child, which caused [the] child to be without
essential care and subsistence for most of her life and which
cannot be remedied despite [the] mother’s compliance with
various prison programs). If a court finds grounds for
termination under subsection (a)(2), a court must
determine whether termination is in the best interests of the
child, considering the developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare of the child pursuant to §
2511(b). In this regard, orphans’ courts must carefully
review the individual circumstances for every child to
determine, inter alia, how a parent’s incarceration will factor
into an assessment of the child’s best interest.
Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 830–831 (some internal citations omitted).
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Here, the orphans’ court found that due to Father’s extended period of
incarceration and the possibility that he will not be released on his minimum
date, and that he will be unable to provide proper parental care and control
even after he is released from incarceration, competent evidence supported
the involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights under Section
2511(a)(2). Orphans’ Court Memorandum, 5/12/15, at 19. Thus, we would
find that the competent evidence in the record supports the orphans’ court’s
decision and that the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion in
terminating Father’s parental rights. Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826–
827.
Next, we review the termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). Our Supreme Court has stated:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a
court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child
have been properly interpreted to include “intangibles such as
love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781,
791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa.
1993)], this Court held that the determination of the child’s
“needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional
bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost attention”
should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of
permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at
791.
In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).
Father asserts that Dr. Ryen’s expert testimony indicated Father has a
close, primary, secure bond with Child. Father’s Brief at 24–25. Father
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avers that Dr. Ryen testified that he was opposed to the involuntary
termination of Father’s rights and that such termination would be harmful to
Child. Id. at 25; N.T., 4/10/15, at 113, 115–116, 121.
The orphans’ court summarized Dr. Ryen’s testimony as follows:
Dr. Allen Ryen testified at the termination hearing [by
telephone,] and his reports were admitted as exhibits (Exhibits
#7 and #8). Dr. Ryen has been qualified as an expert regarding
bonding and bonding issues numerous times in McKean County
and many other counties in Northwestern Pennsylvania. He has
extensive training and experience regarding childhood
development and the effects of changes in custody and child
dependency. He testified that there is a primary and secure
bond between [Child] and . . . Father. He observed the
interaction between [Child] and Father during a visit at Father’s
SCI [State Correctional Institution] facility. He described Father
and [Child’s] interaction as “downright wonderful and
heartwarming.” He concluded that it was in [Child’s] interests to
have Father’s rights terminated as Father will be unavailable for
an unknown and significant period of time; and, at some point,
[Child] will “examine her rescue fantasy and find that it isn’t
realistic.” He indicated that a child needs a positive and secure
environment to develop in; and, [Child] has that type of
environment with the [C.s]. However, he also testified that “I
would certainly not support terminating contact and support with
. . . Father.” He indicated that there are three options: 1) open
adoption; 2) Subsidized Legal Custodianship; and, 3) involuntary
termination of parental rights with no continued contact with
Father. He testified that option 3, termination with no continued
contact with Father: “is the last thing that I would want to see.”
Orphans’ Court Memorandum, 5/12/15, at 8–9.
Dr. Ryen opined that Child’s bond with Father likely remained due to a
“rescue fantasy.” N.T., 1/5/15, at 78. He explained that such fantasies
exist in children where there is a disruption of the primary bond due to
incarceration of a parent or divorce. The Child forms a fantasy, as in this
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case, believing “my father is going to come home and we’re going to live
together happily ever after.” Id. at 78–79. Dr. Ryen clarified that the
rescue fantasy becomes part of the child’s security, and it helps the child “to
maintain a sense of intactness and stability and safety.” Id. at 79.
Dr. Ryen testified that Father self-reported his diagnoses of borderline
personality disorder, bi-polar affective disorder with attention deficit
disorder, a history of drug use, and a suicide attempt. N.T., 1/5/15, at 81.
The expert explained the significance of these mental illnesses and their
impact on parenting, as follows:
[T]hese [illnesses] . . . all represent a risk to [Father’s] ability to
parent a child, his ability to have a relationship with any human
being for that matter. Um—you know a[n] . . . affective disorder
untreated ah—has some very negative repercussions . . . upon
the adjustment . . . of anybody who is going to be dependent on
him. . . .
* * *
Personality Disorders on the other hand tend to be rather
enduring. They tend to be rather ah—resistant to
treatment . . . .
* * *
[P]eople with Borderline Personality Disorders for example[,
their] relationships tend to be characterized by you know
instability and change. You know, having you know intense need
with intense emotional swings and sometimes to a point of
psychosis but, you know, they tend not to go away without an
awful lot of very good treatment.
What I’m saying in general is that there are a number of
risk factors that [Father] shared with me you know each of them
has implication for his stability into the future and you know
combined or maybe multiplicative sorts of implications and I’m
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simply concluding that his long term stability is—has a worst
prognosis by virtue of these factors that [Father] shared with
me.
N.T., 1/5/15, at 81–84.
Dr. Ryen testified that while there is affection between Father and
Child, there also is great affection between Child and the C.s. N.T., 1/5/15,
at 76, 91–92. Dr. Ryen opined that he preferred Child in an open-adoption
situation; he also noted that Father realistically might not be able to assume
parental duties before Child reaches eighteen years of age. Id. at 89–90,
100–103, 114–122. Lastly, the expert recognized that the involuntary
termination of Father’s parental rights would provide permanency for Child.
Id. at 93.
In conducting a bonding analysis, the orphans’ court is not required to
use expert testimony but may rely on the testimony of social workers and
caseworkers. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010).
Furthermore, it is appropriate to consider a child’s bond with the foster
parents, as well. T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268. In T.S.M., our Supreme Court set
forth the process for evaluating the existence of a bond between a parent
and a child and reiterated the importance of the orphans’ court’s focus on
concerns of the quality of the attachment and the availability of an adoptive
home. The Supreme Court stated the following:
[C]ontradictory considerations exist as to whether termination
will benefit the needs and welfare of a child who has a strong but
unhealthy bond to his biological parent, especially considering
the existence or lack thereof of bonds to a pre-adoptive family.
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As with dependency determinations, we emphasize that the law
regarding termination of parental rights should not be applied
mechanically but instead always with an eye to the best interests
and the needs and welfare of the particular children involved.
See, e.g., R.J.T., [9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010)] (holding that
statutory criteria of whether [the] child has been in care for
fifteen of the prior twenty-two months should not be viewed as a
“litmus test” but rather as merely one of many factors in
considering goal change). Obviously, attention must be paid to
the pain that inevitably results from breaking a child’s bond to a
biological parent, even if that bond is unhealthy, and we must
weigh that injury against the damage that bond may cause if left
intact. Similarly, while termination of parental rights generally
should not be granted unless adoptive parents are waiting to
take a child into a safe and loving home, termination may be
necessary for the child’s needs and welfare in cases where the
child’s parental bond is impeding the search and placement with
a permanent adoptive home.
* * *
[The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, P.L. 105-89]
ASFA[,] was enacted to combat the problem of foster care drift,
where children . . . are shuttled from one foster home to
another, waiting for their parents to demonstrate their ability to
care for the children. See In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1186; In re
Adoption of S.E.G., [901 A.2d 1017, 1019 (Pa. 2006)]. This
drift was the unfortunate byproduct of the system’s focus on
reuniting children with their biological parents, even in situations
where it was clear that the parents would be unable to parent in
any reasonable period of time. Following ASFA, Pennsylvania
adopted a dual focus of reunification and adoption, with the goal
of finding permanency for children in less than two years, absent
compelling reasons. See, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(1); 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 6351(f)(9) (requiring courts to determine whether an agency
has filed a termination of parental rights petition if the child has
been in placement for fifteen of the last twenty-two months).
T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268–269.
The existence of a bond or attachment between parent and child will
not necessarily result in the denial of a termination petition. In re T.A.M.,
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33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011); In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa.
Super. 2008). This Court will not prolong instability for children when it is
clear that their biological parents are unable to provide for their basic needs
in the near future. T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 270.
Although he was not in favor of termination of Father’s parental rights,
Dr. Ryen testified, “Right now we’ve got a very young needy child who needs
to belong to somebody and something. She needs a personal and a family
identity that’s realistic on a daily . . . basis.” N.T., 1/5/15, at 118. Dr. Ryen
acknowledged that the orphans’ court “may not have a choice” because
termination of Father’s parental rights would provide Child with permanency.
Id. at 121.
In the present matter, the orphans’ court adequately considered the
developmental, physical, and emotional needs of Child. The court
thoroughly considered Child’s bond with Father along with the effect of
severing that bond. The orphans’ court also provided an explanation
concerning why its termination decision was not based on matters outside of
Father’s control, including housing and lack of employment, as Father
claimed. Rather, the orphans’ court based its decision on Father’s current
incarceration and his inability to provide proper parental care and control
when released from incarceration. Orphans’ Court Memorandum, 5/12/15,
at 19. Although there was evidence of a bond between Child and Father, the
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court properly determined that it was in Child’s best interest to sever that
bond. Id.; In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268–269.
Father posits that the instant case is distinguishable from In re
D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662 (Pa. 2014), and T.S.M., the cases upon which the
orphans’ court primarily relied. Father also urges that these facts are
distinguishable from the facts in Adoption of S.P. We find no merit to this
argument. The orphans’ court properly relied on D.C.D. and Adoption of
S.P. to set forth our Supreme Court’s instructions regarding the involuntary
termination of parental rights of an incarcerated parent. Likewise, the
orphans’ court’s reliance on T.S.M. in setting forth the High Court’s
guidance, when there is evidence of a bond between a child and a parent but
it is in the best interest of the child to sever that bond, was relevant.
Finally, we reject Father’s suggestion that In re E.M. is apt herein.
Father’s Brief at 25. In E.M., the orphans’ court involuntarily terminated the
parental rights of a mentally retarded mother to her two sons pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2). Our Supreme Court found that the psychological
evaluations recommended by the agency’s expert witness had not been
performed, and the bond between the mother and the children should have
been more fully explored. Thus, our Supreme Court reversed and remanded
the matter for a re-evaluation. E.M., 620 A.2d at 485.
In the case sub judice, the orphans’ court found that Child loves
Father. N.T., 4/10/15, at 141. The orphans’ court also found that Child
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loves the C.s. Id. As we explained in Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1125, a child’s life
“simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the
ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” Indeed, we have stated
that it “is appropriate to rely on past behavior rather than future promises.”
In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1254 (Pa. Super. 2003). A “parent’s basic
constitutional right to . . . the rearing of his child is converted, upon the
failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper
parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe
environment.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004).
Because the orphans’ court’s factual findings are supported by the record,
and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an
abuse of discretion, we affirm the orphans’ court’s order involuntarily
terminating Father’s parental rights.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/12/2016
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