13-4348
Chowdhury v. Lynch
BIA
Nelson, IJ
A076 186 718
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
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At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
on the 13th day of April, two thousand sixteen.
PRESENT:
DENNIS JACOBS,
ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
DULAL CHOWDHURY, AKA DULAL NIL
CHOWDHURY,
Petitioner,
v. 13-4348
NAC
LORETTA E. LYNCH1, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Joshua Bardavid, New York, New York.
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Loretta E. Lynch is automatically substituted as the
respondent in this case pursuant to Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2).
FOR RESPONDENT: Stewart F. Delery, Assistant
Attorney General; Nancy E. Friedman,
Senior Litigation Counsel; Sharon M.
Clay, Trial Attorney; Office of
Immigration Litigation, United
States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner Dulal Chowdhury, a native and citizen of
Bangladesh, seeks review of a November 4, 2013, decision of
the BIA affirming the February 16, 2012, decision of an
Immigration Judge (“IJ”), which denied his application for
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Dulal Chowdhury,
No. A076 186 718 (B.I.A. Nov. 4, 2013), aff’g No. A076 186
718 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Feb. 16, 2012). We assume the
parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
procedural history in this case.
Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
the IJ’s decision, including the portions not explicitly
discussed by the BIA. Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d
391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review
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are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see
also Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.
2009).
Chowdhury’s asylum application is governed by the REAL
ID Act. Thus, the agency may, considering the totality of
the circumstances, base a credibility finding on an asylum
applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness,” the
plausibility of his account, and inconsistencies in his
statements, without regard to whether they go “to the heart
of the applicant’s claim.” See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162,
167 (2d Cir. 2008).
The agency’s adverse credibility finding is supported
by substantial evidence. As the IJ found, Chowdhury’s
testimony was both internally inconsistent and inconsistent
with his asylum application. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at
167 (providing that an IJ may support an adverse credibility
determination with “any inconsistency or omission”). For
example, Chowdhury’s testimony regarding his alleged January
2008 beating by members of a rival political party, which
landed him in the hospital, conflicted with his description
of the incident in his asylum application, which placed the
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attack on a different date in January 2007. The IJ
considered and rejected Chowdhury’s explanation that the
asylum application must have contained a printing error.
Even if this explanation were plausible, the agency need not
credit it. Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.
2005). Chowdhury also omitted from his asylum application
any mention of a 2004 beating by members of the same
political party, which he testified resulted in another
extended hospitalization. Chowdhury had no explanation for
this omission.
The IJ also appropriately based her decision in part on
Chowdhury’s demeanor during the hearing. We grant
“particular deference” to the agency’s demeanor findings.
Shu Wen Sun v. BIA, 510 F.3d 377, 380-81 (2d Cir. 2007), see
also Li Zu Guan v. INS, 453 F.3d 129, 140 (2d Cir. 2006).
The IJ also found that Chowhury did not adequately
corroborate his claim, since there was very little objective
evidence, and the documents he submitted were of doubtful
reliability. Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d
Cir. 2007).
Accordingly, a totality of the circumstances supports
the adverse credibility determination. 8 U.S.C.
4
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.
Because the only evidence of a threat to Chowdhury’s life or
freedom depended upon his credibility, the adverse
credibility finding necessarily precludes success on his
claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under
the CAT. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d
Cir. 2006).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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