Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 202
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CV-15-1018
Opinion Delivered April 13, 2016
CIERA ROBINSON APPEAL FROM THE CONWAY
APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. JV-14-01]
V.
HONORABLE TERRY SULLIVAN,
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF JUDGE
HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR
CHILDREN
APPELLEES
AFFIRMED
BRANDON J. HARRISON, Judge
Ciera Robinson appeals the Conway County Circuit Court’s termination of her
parental rights to her children D.D. and S.D. She argues that termination was not in her
children’s best interest and that it does not fulfill the purpose of termination under Ark.
Code Ann. § 9-27-341(a)(3) (Repl. 2015). We affirm.
I. Facts
The case began on 1 January 2014 when Robinson called the police to report that
Bobby Ray Simmons, Jr., a celebrity, raped her in her sleep and was punishing her and
other women. She also said, among other things, that she and Bobby Ray had a child
together named Elijah but he was not born yet. She told the police that she had thought
about ending her life. After police officers arrested Robinson for marijuana possession, the
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Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) took emergency custody of D.D. and S.D.
because the children lacked a caregiver. Robinson told the caseworkers that the children’s
father, Montana Dean, lived in Ohio and that she had obtained a protection order against
Dean for allegedly molesting D.D. and S.D.
The circuit court adjudicated the children dependent-neglected in February 2014.
Robinson was not present for the adjudication hearing. Robinson was present for a May
2014 review hearing. In the May review order, the circuit court wrote: “The court agreed
to change the goal today based upon the testimony presented and the fact that mom has not
complied since the children were removed on 1/1.” The “concurrent plan of this case shall
continue to be reunification. The goal is adoption or placement with a legal
guardian/permanent custody.” The court noted that Robinson had not visited the children
since February and also observed:
Ciera does not have an identification card. Ciera testified she is homeless
and has been kicked out of shelters because Nicki Manaj [sic] is trying to kill her.
She was in a mental hospital in Ohio. Admits she is bipolar and sees spirits.
The father, Montana Dean, is not part of the case and has no significant
contacts with his children.
In October 2014 the court entered an order terminating DHS’s obligation to provide
reunification services to Robinson. The court noted the testimony of the children’s father,
Montana Dean, that “Ciera sees spirits and has sudden mood swings,” that they fought in
the past, and that he was convicted of domestic abuse against her. According to Dean,
Robinson left Ohio and did not contact him to tell him where the children were, and he
recently found out the children were in DHS custody and came down for the hearing. The
court wrote:
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The Court found specifically that there is little likelihood that services will
result in reunification due to the mother’s mental instability in continuing to
believe that nationally-known entertainers are trying to get her and rape her and
that she is off her medication and believes that she does not need any. She has
been without stable housing for most of the case and has been discharged from
multiple shelters and spent two months in jail. She has had district court criminal
cases in three separate counties since the case opened. The Court noted the
therapist’s statement that when the children are permanently placed somewhere,
they will need long-term, intensive care with structure and stability and the Court
believes Ciera cannot provide this. The Court also found that [the] children were
subjected to aggravated circumstances due to abandonment. Ciera abandoned
her children since the case has been opened for ten months and she has not visited
her children since February and up until very recently, she made no attempts to
reunify with them.
In short, the circuit court found that there was little likelihood that services would result in
reunification and concluded that aggravated circumstances were present.
In a permanency-planning order entered the same day the court explained that:
mindful of the available permanency planning dispositions and accordance with
the best interest, health and safety of the juveniles does hereby determine the goal
of the case shall be: authorizing a plan to place custody of the juveniles with a
parent, guardian, or custodian. The court finds the parent, guardian, or custodian,
is complying with the established case plan and orders of the Court, making
significant measurable progress toward achieving the goals established in the case
plan, and diligently working towards reunification or placement in the home of
the parent, guardian, or custodian. Placement of the juveniles in the home of the
parent, guardian, or custodian shall occur within a time frame consistent with the
juveniles’ developmental needs but no later than three (3) months from the date
of the permanency planning hearing. The concurrent goal is adoption.
The Court finds the case plan, services and placement in therapeutic foster
home does meet the special needs and best interest of the juveniles, with the
juveniles’ health, safety and educational needs.
....
An ICPC home-study from Ohio was approved for Timothy and April
Moore. Timothy is the uncle of Ciera. The court was very concerned about the
family’s low income level and that the father has criminal history fourteen years
ago. The Court is concerned that the Moore’s may not be financially able . . . to
add two more children to their household due to their low income and since one
of their own children is disabled and that takes a deep commitment from the
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family. The home study did not include any mention of what type of services
that will be provided to the juveniles and the Dean children’s therapist stated they
will need long-term services.
Montana Dean testified that he wants custody of the children but is not in
a position to have custody of them. He lives with his mother in Toledo, Ohio,
and makes $500.00 a week as an apprentice steel worker in Ohio. He said it may
take two months to get stable housing. Montana has a criminal history. . . . The
Court ordered ADHS to conduct a background check [on him]. . . . The Court
also stated that if the Moore family is being pursued for custody, then Timothy
Moore needs to come to Arkansas and meet with the children to develop a
relationship and to understand their long-term counseling needs.
A second permanency-planning order was entered in February 2015. The circuit
court determined the “goal of the case shall be adoption. Mother has not followed the case
plan. She recently attempted suicide and is not receiving any help with her mental health
issues.” The court also explained:
The Father Montana Dean was not present at this hearing. His ICPC
referral has been sent, but his criminal background checks have come back and
he has extensive criminal convictions in his past. Among others, since 2008 he
has been convicted on Disorderly Conduct, Menacing, Domestic violence against
a family member, Reckless violation of a temporary protection order, and
Resisting arrest. The caseworker testified Mr. Dean has not remained in touch
with her since the last hearing. He contacted the referred therapist one time, but
has not followed up since. The caseworker further testified that based on these
issues, the Department will not recommend placing the juveniles with their father.
In April 2015, DHS filed a petition for termination of parental rights against
Robinson and Dean, alleging several statutory grounds for termination were present, that
DHS was “seeking to clear the juveniles for adoption,” and that the children faced potential
harm if custody was returned to their parents. The court held a termination hearing in July
and August 2015; DHS abandoned its termination petition against Dean, but pursued the
petition against Robinson.
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The circuit court entered an order terminating Robinson’s parental rights in
September 2015. The court found, among other things, that the testimony of adoption
specialist Monica Spencer was credible and that D.D. and S.D. “are highly adoptable.” It
reasoned that termination was in the children’s best interest because the children had
remained out of Robinson’s custody for seventeen months and that Robinson’s only contact
with the juveniles was at a 27 April 2015 family-therapy session. In finding that clear and
convincing evidence supported its decision to terminate Robinson’s parental rights, the
court wrote that Robinson’s “refusal to acknowledge her mental illness, her refusal to take
any prescribed medications, her arrest record, her continued bizarre claims and behaviors,
and her suicide attempt during the case” showed that she was an unfit parent. The court
explained that “although this is not the exclusive permanency planning option available, as
the father’s parental rights are not being terminated . . . the facts demonstrate how [D.D.
and S.D.] would be at risk of potential harm if returned to the mother.”
Robinson has appealed the termination order “and all adverse rulings made therein.”
II. Discussion
An order forever terminating parental rights must be based on clear and convincing
evidence that termination is in the child’s best interest and a statutory ground for termination
exists. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A)–(B) (Repl. 2015). “Best interest” includes
consideration of the likelihood that the juvenile will be adopted and the potential harm
caused by returning custody of the juvenile to the parent. Donley v. Ark. Dep’t of Human
Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 335, at 1.
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We review cases involving the termination of parental rights de novo. Griffin v. Ark.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 95 Ark. App. 322, 236 S.W.3d 570 (2006). While we
review the factual basis for terminating parental rights under a clearly erroneous standard,
no deference is given to the circuit court’s decision with regard to errors of law. Id.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341 is titled “Termination of Parental
Rights.” Subsection (a)(3) states:
The intent of this section is to provide permanency in a juvenile’s life in
all instances in which the return of a juvenile to the family home is contrary to
the juvenile’s health, safety, or welfare and it appears from the evidence that a
return to the family home cannot be accomplished in a reasonable period of time
as viewed from the juvenile’s perspective.
Our court has interpreted this statute to allow termination of an unfit parent’s rights when
the children remain or return to the “family home” of a fit parent. See Ross v. Ark. Dep’t
of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 660, 378 S.W.3d 253.
Other cases have interpreted “family home” narrowly. For example, in Donley, a
mother argued that the circuit court should place her child permanently with her sister, who
had custody of her child’s younger sibling, instead of the court terminating her parental
rights. 2014 Ark. App. 335. In other words, the circuit court had a less drastic measure of
relative placement that could still fulfill the legislative goal of permanency for the child. But
we rejected this argument holding that the termination statute (Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-
341) contains no preferential consideration for relative placement and that the termination
statute should not be read “in conjunction with other statutory provisions of the juvenile
code.” Id.
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In Lively v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, we reversed a court’s order
terminating a father’s rights when the child remained in the mother’s custody and the case
closed. There, we wrote that the circuit court considered that the father’s “drug use, mental
instability, and criminal convictions posed a risk of harm to the children should they be
returned to his custody” but it “did not address whether termination (rather than a less-
drastic alternative, such as a no-contact order or supervised visitation) was in the children’s
best interest” given that the children benefited significantly from their father’s financial
support. 2015 Ark. App. 131, at 8–9, 456 S.W.3d 383, 389.
In Crowley v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, we rejected a father’s argument
that permanency could be achieved through a no-contact order instead of terminating his
parental rights when the children were placed permanently with their mother. 2016 Ark.
App. 66. We reasoned that when a parent has subjected his children to violence and abuse,
termination of that parent’s rights fulfills the purpose of Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(a)(3).
Robinson does not challenge any statutory ground or the court’s prior finding that
her mental instability, delusions, and abandonment of the children constituted aggravated
circumstances. She instead contends that termination is unnecessary and not in her
children’s best interest. According to Robinson, “the children were poised to be returned
to their father’s custody, and their mother, while suffering from mental illness, had not
harmed them, had been diligent in her efforts to maintain a relationship with them, and had
a very positive impact on the girls’ otherwise negative behavior when she had contact with
them.” Permanency for her children need not be achieved “by employing the draconian
approach of termination” but instead “should be handled as countless others like it are
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handled, through an order of visitation, or even an order of no contact, which could be
lifted at a later date.” She argues that the state’s termination of her parental rights does not
fulfill the purpose the General Assembly intended under Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(a)(3).
We affirm the circuit court’s decision that termination of Robinson’s parental rights
was in the children’s best interest and necessary to provide permanency for them. While
Montana Dean’s parental rights were not terminated at the hearing, there was no certainty
that the children were going to be placed permanently with him. At the hearing’s close,
the court said, “I cannot do that [place the children with Dean] until I have a report, we
are ahead of ourselves, until I have a report from the therapist, I don’t know what’s going
on with these kids and that I know that dad—well, we are going, I am not going to do that
at this time.” Later it again said:
The children can’t be monitored I know in another state, but, I do not know
what shape the children are in, whether they are physically ready [to go] . . . I
know there is going to have to be services in place for them before I can consider
dad as a placement[.]. . . He is going to have to have a plan in place up in Toledo
such as in counseling, baby sitting arrangements, et cetera. I think he is an
appropriate placement. The only thing holding back right now other than if the
children are ready to go is this home study. . . . [I]f there is a domestic battery,
you never can be placed or do we know? . . . [W]e will just see where we are in
four months. We are not going to make any promises to anybody about anything.
The court was actively considering how it might place the children safely in their father’s
care, but there was no guarantee that permanency would be achieved by that means.
Robinson has no quarrel with the court’s finding that her children are “highly
adoptable” because she believes that “they will not need to be cleared for adoption in order
to achieve permanency.” She instead argues that she can help care for the children while
they are in their father’s custody. But it is not at all certain that the children would be
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placed in their father’s custody, and the court concluded that the children faced future harm
if Robinson’s rights were not terminated.
Robinson’s therapist, Sharon Cummins, testified that Robinson faithfully attended
therapy every other week for nine months. But, importantly, Cummins agreed that
Robinson lacked insight and made no progress in recognizing the extent of her mental
illness. While Robinson testified that she had lived in the same shelter for eight months,
done hundreds of hours of community service, paid off large amounts of criminal fines, and
bought presents for the children, she did not have a stable home to which the children could
return. She was living in a temporary shelter at the time of termination. DHS could not
find her during periods of the case. She did not visit the children for long stretches of time
either. She started, but never finished, the court-ordered psychological examination and
parenting classes. Her obsessions and/or hallucinations about celebrities continued
throughout the case, and she would not take medication prescribed for her bipolar
condition. Medical records were entered into evidence showing that Robinson had several
severe mental-health diagnoses and that she had been in and out of inpatient mental-health
facilities since she was a teenager.
Robinson may not have intentionally harmed her children, and could act as a
competent parent at times, but overall she could not successfully engage in the case plan and
guarantee her children’s return. Her inability to recognize the dangers her mental illness
posed supports the circuit court’s conclusion of potential harm—meaning that there was no
way to know with sufficient confidence that D.D. and S.D. would be safe in Robinson’s
custody. See Rossie-Fonner v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 29, 388 S.W.3d
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38 (affirming termination where parent had a lifelong history of serious mental illness and
the nature of this illness was permanent and unpredictable and would therefore continue to
present a serious risk of harm to children). Therefore the circuit court’s conclusion that a
termination of Robinson’s parental rights was necessary and in her children’s best interest
was not clearly erroneous.
III. Conclusion
We affirm the termination of Robinson’s parental rights to D.D. and S.D.
Affirmed.
GLADWIN, C.J., and WHITEAKER, J., agree.
Leah Lanford, Arkansas Public Defender Commission, for appellant.
Jerald A. Sharum, County Legal Operations, for appellee.
Chrestman Group, PLLC, by: Keith L. Chrestman, attorney ad litem for minor
children.
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