NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 13 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LUSINE PETROSYAN; AGHVAN No. 13-70311
KNYAZYAN,
Agency Nos. A097-596-684
Petitioners, A097-596-685
v.
MEMORANDUM*
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 15, 2016**
San Francisco, California
Before: W. FLETCHER, RAWLINSON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Lusine Petrosyan petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing her appeal of a decision by an Immigration Judge (“IJ”)
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except
as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
denying her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under
the Convention Against Torture. We deny the petition.
1. Admission of a Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) overseas
investigative report—which suggested that two documents Petrosyan submitted
were fraudulent—did not render the proceedings “so fundamentally unfair that the
alien was prevented from reasonably presenting [her] case.” Singh v. Holder, 638
F.3d 1264, 1269 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Although the author of the report did not testify, Petrosyan was “allowed to examine
[the report], and given ample time to produce substantial evidence to rebut it.”
Angov v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 2013). Moreover, the IJ considered
the author’s failure to testify when weighing the report’s reliability.
2. The transfer of Petrosyan’s case to a second IJ after the retirement of the
first did not render the proceedings fundamentally unfair. Petrosyan never objected
to the transfer. The second IJ did not simply adopt the first IJ’s commentary, but
rather reviewed the complete record of the proceedings before concurring with his
predecessor that there were material credibility issues.
3. The IJ’s decision is supported not only by the DHS report, but
independently by the failure of Petrosyan’s husband to testify. The pre-REAL ID
Act regulations applicable to Petrosyan’s applications for relief “unambiguously
contemplate cases where an applicant’s testimony alone will not satisfy his burden
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of proof,” including where, as here, “an applicant inexplicably fails to present easily
available, material, non-duplicative, corroborating evidence to support [her] asylum
claim.” Sidhu v. INS, 220 F.3d 1085, 1090 (9th Cir. 2000). Petrosyan’s husband
was present throughout the proceedings, and was a derivative beneficiary of her
application whose own alleged persecution formed part of her claim. He could have
offered first-hand testimony about a beating he allegedly received because of
Petrosyan’s work as a journalist and corroborated her own claims of persecution.
See id. (failure to produce corroborating testimony from petitioner’s father could
“constitute substantial evidence” when father “had first-hand knowledge of much of
the persecution” and “was the only witness to some events that are at the core of his
asylum application”); see also Singh, 638 F.3d at 1270-71 (“[I]f the asylum seeker
whose credibility has been questioned testifies that his family was subjected to
atrocities in their home, and corroboration is readily available because members of
the family live with him in California, it is reasonable to question his credibility if
none of them testify to corroborate his account.”).
DENIED.
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