J-A07024-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
PATRICK CHURILLA
Appellant No. 690 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 22, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0012399-1992
CP-02-CR-0015417-1992
BEFORE: BOWES, J., MUNDY, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED APRIL 13, 2016
Appellant, Patrick Churilla, appeals nunc pro tunc from the aggregate
judgment of sentence of life in prison imposed by the trial court on
November 1, 1993, and, after remand from this Court, on April 22, 2015.
After careful review, we affirm.
In Appellant’s prior appeal, we explained as follows.
In 1992, while incarcerated on unrelated charges,
Appellant confessed to the 1990 murder, robbery,
and attempted rape of a woman in the Lawrenceville
section of Pittsburgh. On one criminal information,
Appellant was charged with homicide. On a second
criminal information, Appellant was charged with
robbery, indecent assault, and criminal attempt to
commit rape. Because the illegal conduct charged
constituted a single criminal episode, the two
criminal informations were joined for trial. On
November 1, 1993, a jury convicted Appellant of
first-degree murder, and he received a sentence of
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life imprisonment. Also, on that date, the jury
convicted Appellant of all of the charges on the
second criminal information. However, sentencing
on the non-homicide convictions was deferred,
pending the preparation of a presentence report, and
scheduled for December 13, 1993. However, both
the Commonwealth and Appellant agree that
sentencing in the second criminal information did not
occur on December 13, 1993, or on any other date.
On April 27, 1994, Appellant filed mandatory post-
verdict motions[1], which the trial court never
addressed.
In June of 2008, Appellant began filing pro se
motions, which the trial court treated as PCRA
petitions, and appointed PCRA counsel. Eventually,
in May of 2011, appointed counsel filed an amended
PCRA petition. The Commonwealth responded that
Appellant’s judgment of sentence was not final, that
Appellant should be formally sentenced, and that his
appellate rights should be reinstated. On July 14,
2011, although never having sentenced Appellant on
the convictions pertaining to the second criminal
information, the PCRA court entered an order
reinstating Appellant’s direct appeal rights.
Commonwealth v. Churilla, 116 A.3d 683 (Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished
memorandum at 1).
Thereafter, Appellant appealed to this Court. We quashed the appeal
“because there has not been a judgment of sentence to all of Appellant’s
convictions, [such that] the judgment of sentence is not final.” Id. at 2.
The trial court summarized the ensuing procedural posture as follows.
This matter was remanded to th[e trial c]ourt by the
Pennsylvania Superior Court pursuant to a
____________________________________________
1
Pursuant to former Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1123.
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Memorandum Opinion dated December 9, 2014. The
Superior Court had determined that following his
conviction for Criminal Homicide, Robbery, Indecent
Assault and Criminal Attempt, though the [trial
c]ourt immediately imposed sentence on the
homicide count following the jury’s verdict,
[Appellant] was never brought back to court to be
sentenced on the remaining counts. Th[e trial c]ourt
was directed to permit [Appellant] to file Post-Verdict
Motions and then to dispose of those motions and
impose sentence on the non-homicide counts.
[Appellant] did file a Post-Verdict Motion, claiming
that the [trial c]ourt erred in denying the Motion to
Suppress the statements that [Appellant] gave to
corrections officers at the State Correctional
Institution at Rockview and the subsequent
statements he gave to law enforcement summoned
by the corrections staff[.]
Trial Court Opinion, 6/17/15, at 2-3.
On April 22, 2015, the trial court denied Appellant’s post-verdict
motion, granted Appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to robbery,
and imposed no further penalty on the remaining charges of indecent assault
and attempted rape. N.T., 4/22/15, 3-4. Appellant filed this timely appeal
on May 4, 2015. Although the trial court did not order compliance with
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925, the trial court filed an
opinion on June 17, 2015.
On appeal, Appellant presents a single issue for our review.
Whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress
Appellant’s statements to correction officers when
Appellant was in custody and being interrogated but
was not given Miranda warnings?
Appellant’s Brief at 5.
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Our review of a trial court’s suppression ruling is guided by the
following.
Our standard of review in addressing a
challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is
limited to determining whether the suppression
court’s factual findings are supported by the record
and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those
facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth
prevailed before the suppression court, we may
consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth
and so much of the evidence for the defense as
remains uncontradicted when read in the context of
the record as a whole. The suppression court’s legal
conclusions are not binding on an appellate court,
whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court
properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the
conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to
our plenary review. Commonwealth v. Jones, 605
Pa. 188, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (2010) (citations,
quotations, and ellipses omitted). Moreover,
appellate courts are limited to reviewing only the
evidence presented at the suppression hearing when
examining a ruling on a pre-trial motion to suppress.
See In re L.J., 622 Pa. 126, 79 A.3d 1073, 1083–
1087 (2013).
Commonwealth v. Mathis, 125 A.3d 780, 783 (Pa. Super. 2015).
In his argument, Appellant concedes that on September 4, 1992, while
incarcerated at SCI Rockview on unrelated charges, he “asked Officer Donald
E. Young if he could speak with Captain Charles Hall. After he was escorted
to the captain’s office, Appellant was questioned as to what he wanted.
Appellant told Captain Hall that he killed someone in Pittsburgh, he wanted
to get that off his chest, and wanted to speak with the police.” Appellant’s
Brief at 17. Despite asking to speak with the corrections officers, Appellant
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asserts that the officers “interrogated him” and he “was never properly
warned pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona.” Id. at 19, 25.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that “we have repeatedly
declined to adopt any categorical rule with respect to whether the
questioning of a prison inmate is custodial.” Howes v. Fields, 132 S.Ct.
1181, 1187 (2012). When a prisoner is questioned, “the determination of
custody should focus on all the features of the interrogation. These include
the language that is used in summoning the prisoner to the interview and
the manner in which the interview is conducted.” Id. at 1192. The United
States Supreme Court commented as follows.
[O]ur decisions do not clearly establish that a
prisoner is always in custody for purposes of
Miranda whenever a prisoner is isolated from the
general prison population and questioned about
conduct outside the prison.
Not only does the categorical rule applied below go
well beyond anything that is clearly established in
our prior decisions, it is simply wrong. The three
elements of that rule—(1) imprisonment, (2)
questioning in private, and (3) questioning about
events in the outside world—are not necessarily
enough to create a custodial situation for Miranda
purposes.
As used in our Miranda case law, “custody” is a
term of art that specifies circumstances that are
thought generally to present a serious danger of
coercion.
Id. at 1188-89.
Instantly, “no serious danger of coercion existed.” In advancing his
argument, Appellant cites Commonwealth v. Chacko, 459 A.2d 311 (Pa.
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1983), to support his contention that he was subjected to a custodial
interrogation, asserting that he “was in custody for purposes of Miranda”
because “[t]he captain said he asked Appellant about what Appellant
wanted, to which Appellant said that he murdered someone.” Appellant’s
Brief at 25. Appellant further maintains that the captain “continued to
interrogate Appellant as to when the murder occurred and Appellant
responded that the murder could have occurred years earlier.” Id. at 26.
Appellant recognizes that the captain testified that his two purposes for
questioning Appellant were to determine “1.) whether he should refer
[Appellant] to the police and 2.) whether he should place [Appellant] in
observation.” Id.
Interrogation is defined as “police conduct ‘calculated to, expected to,
or likely to evoke admission.’” Commonwealth v. Heggins, 809 A.2d 908,
914 (Pa. Super. 2002), appeal denied, 827 A.2d 430 (Pa. 2003), quoting
Commonwealth v. Mannion, 725 A.2d 196, 200 (Pa. Super. 1999) (en
banc). In Chacko, prison guards advised the appellant that the Major of the
Guard wanted to see him. Chacko, supra at 313-314. When the appellant
met with the Major of the Guard, the Major of the Guard asked the appellant
if he was involved in a prison stabbing the day before, and the appellant
replied that he had committed the stabbing. Id. at 314. Our Supreme
Court determined that this interaction constituted a custodial interrogation
which warranted Miranda warnings. Id. at 315. The facts before us in the
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present case, however, are distinguishable, and not indicative of either
coercion or interrogation. The trial court related the facts as follows.
The record established that while incarcerated on
unrelated charges at the State Correctional
Institution at Rockview, [Appellant] summoned
Correctional Officer Ronald Young to his cell and told
him that he needed to speak to a [supervising
corrections officer]. (N.T. 100). When asked why,
he said that he wanted to confess to something he
had done in Pittsburgh; that he had killed someone.
(N.T. 101). According to Young, the only question
he asked [Appellant] was why he wanted to see [the
supervising corrections officer]. (N.T. 111).
Young reported this to Captain Charles Hall
who directed that [Appellant be] brought to his
office. According to Captain Hall, he was told by
[O]fficer Young that “…he had an inmate that [w]as
pacing in his cell and claimed he had done something
in Pittsburgh that he couldn’t live with anymore, and
he had to talk to somebody, or he was going to hurt
himself bad.” (N.T. 116). When [Appellant]
entered, [Captain Hall] asked him what “his problem
was.” (N.T. 117). [Appellant] said that he needed to
speak to someone with the Pittsburgh Police and,
when [Captain Hall] asked him what he wanted to
talk with them about, [Appellant] said that he had
killed someone in Pittsburgh around Halloween,
1991. While talking to [Appellant], Captain Hall
checked his records and noted that [Appellant] was
incarcerated in October 1991. (N.T. 120). He asked
[Appellant] about this, and [Appellant] insisted that
he had killed someone and volunteered that he
probably had the year wrong. (N.T. 120).
Captain Hall acknowledged that he did not
Mirandize [Appellant]. He explained, “I told him he
didn’t have to say anything to me. I didn’t want to
know anything about what he had done, but that if
he had done something and wanted to talk to the
police, that’s to the extent that I wanted to know
about it.” (N.T. 122). Captain Hall explained
further:
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“Really, what I was looking at, primarily, was
that the inmate seemed upset. He was willing
to admit at that time of the night to something
and said that he couldn’t live with himself.
I wasn’t really concerned with whether he did
it whether he didn’t. I was concerned that he
was alive to talk to people about the situation,
had he done it or he didn’t do it or whatever.”
N.T. 126.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/17/15, at 3-4.
Our review of the suppression hearing confirms the trial court’s
recitation of the facts. Corrections Officer Young testified that Appellant
approached him on September 4, 1992, asking to speak with a supervisor.
N.T., 10/28/93, at 101. Officer Young responded that he “couldn’t call one
over unless you tell me the exact reason why you need one.” Id. Officer
Young testified that prisoners ask for a supervisor “a lot,” and he had “to
have a pretty good reason to interrupt a [supervisor] because he’s got a lot
more work to do than I do.” Id. at 110. Appellant then told Officer Young
that he “had hurt someone pretty bad in Pittsburgh.” Id. at 102. Officer
Young took Appellant to see Captain Hall, and Appellant told Captain Hall he
wanted to speak with the Pittsburgh Police. Id. at 103. When Captain Hall
asked Appellant why he wanted to speak with the police, Appellant stated
that “he had murdered a person in the Pittsburgh area on or about – he said
1991[.]” Id. Officer Young opined that Appellant “was voluntarily telling
[Captain Hall] all the information he was giving him.” Id. at 112.
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In addition to the testimony cited by the trial court, Captain Hall
testified that ultimately he told Appellant “there’s nobody in the Pittsburgh
police that I think would want to talk to you at this time of night [but] I’ll
make sure you get to talk to somebody.” Id. at 120-121. Captain Hall had
Appellant placed in a “treatment building, observation cell” so “he had no
means to hurt himself.” Id. at 121. Captain Hall summarized, “[Appellant]
volunteered, in this case, that he murdered somebody. I didn’t ask him who
he murdered, how or anything, just he wanted to talk to the Pittsburgh
police.” Id. at 123. Captain Hall testified that his purpose in questioning
Appellant was “not to find out if his claim was legitimate” but to determine
“whether or not I ought to refer it to anybody or whether I ought to confine
him under closer observation.” Id. at 129.
Based on the above testimony, the trial court explained its reasoning
for denying suppression as follows.
After the [trial c]ourt heard [] testimony and
the argument of counsel regarding the admissibility
of [Appellant’s] statements to Officer Young and
Captain Hall, the [trial c]ourt stated, on the record,
that it had found that the interaction between
[Appellant] was not a custodial interrogation at all.
This [trial c]ourt did not err in denying
[Appellant’s] request to suppress the statements he
made to Officer Young and Captain Hall. The
statements to Officer Young were clearly voluntary
statements made by [Appellant] without any
interrogation from Officer Young. [Appellant] called
him to his cell and stated that he needed to see a
[supervisor]. In asking him why he wanted to see a
supervisor, Officer Young was not conducting an
interrogation about a possible criminal offense, but
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rather, was finding out why he needed to speak with
a supervisor. When [Appellant] responded that he
needed to speak to the supervisor because he had
killed someone in Pittsburgh and wanted to talk to
the Pittsburgh Police, that statement was also
voluntary and not elicited from [Appellant] by
Officer Young.
[Appellant’s] interaction with Captain Hall also
did not constitute a custodial interrogation. Captain
Hall was not asking [Appellant] questions designed
to elicit information concerning a crime, but, rather,
was trying to find out why [Appellant] wanted to
speak with a Pittsburgh Police Officer. In addition,
as Captain Hall explained, [Appellant] had made
statements indicating he may want to hurt himself
and it was important for the Captain to evaluate the
seriousness of these threats to determine whether
[Appellant] needed to be placed in an area of the
prison where he could be observed. Ultimately,
based on [Appellant’s] statements, he was moved to
where he could be observed.
…
Here, [Appellant] was certainly aware that his
statements would be shared with law enforcement.
He was making the statements in an attempt to
convince the corrections officers to allow him to
speak with [the Pittsburgh Police]. Obviously,
[Appellant] was aware that his statements would be
relayed to law enforcement because that is exactly
what he was asking Officer Young and Captain Hall
to do.
…
In this case, [Officer Young and Captain Hall]
were responding to [Appellant’s] request that he be
permitted to speak with Pittsburgh Police Officers
regarding a crime that he claimed to have committed
years earlier. Their questions to [Appellant] were
limited in purpose; that purpose being to find out
why [Appellant] wanted to talk to the Pittsburgh
Police and also to assess his mental state.
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Trial Court Opinion, 6/17/15, at 4-6, citing Trial Court Slip Opinion,
12/17/14.
The trial court’s rationale is supported by the record and consonant
with prevailing case law. Accordingly, we find that Miranda was not
implicated in this case, and affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/13/2016
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