MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
Apr 14 2016, 8:32 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Ellen M. O’Connor Gregory F. Zoeller
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Richard C. Webster
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jacqueline Williams, April 14, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A05-1508-CR-1236
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Mark Stoner,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
The Honorable Jeffrey L. Marchal,
Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49G06-1408-CM-39471
Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Defendant, Jaqueline F. Williams (Williams), appeals her
convictions for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated causing death, a
Level 5 felony, Ind. Code § 9-30-5-5(a)(3) (2014); and driving while suspended,
a Class A misdemeanor, I.C. § 9-24-19-2.
[2] We affirm.
ISSUE
[3] Williams raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as follows: Whether the
evidence was sufficient to sustain her convictions.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] On August 13, 2014, a witness was driving southbound on I-65 in Marion
County, Indiana. The witness observed a small, dark-colored car in front of
him veer off the road from the center lane to the left, strike the concrete barrier,
ricochet across the road to the right, strike the metal guardrail, and then come
to a stop. The witness stopped his vehicle in front of the wrecked car to check if
anyone was injured. He initially observed no visible injuries to any of the
occupants. A male passenger in the rear seat was unconscious, but he regained
consciousness, exited the vehicle on his own, and sat on the guardrail. The
witness observed the male passenger had a “piece of glass sticking out of his
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face” and a “little bit of blood coming down.” (Transcript pp. 23-24). The
witness’s wife and several other individuals called 911 to report the accident.
[5] At approximately 8:50 p.m., Officer Marlin Sechrist (Officer Sechrist) of the
Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD) was driving northbound
on I-65 to work when he noticed the accident on the other side of the highway.
He turned around at the next exit and drove to the scene. Officer Sechrist
radioed IMPD’s control station to contact the Indiana State Police (ISP)
because the accident occurred on the Interstate, which was ISP’s jurisdiction.
He ensured all of the occupants of the crashed vehicle were present, checked for
serious injuries, and assessed the accident scene. Williams identified herself as
the vehicle’s driver. Another female occupant was identified as the front seat
passenger. William Trotter (Trotter) was identified as the rear seat passenger.
When Officer Sechrist spoke with Williams, he observed that her eyes were red
and bloodshot, and her speech was slurred. He smelled the odor of alcoholic
beverage coming from her breath and person.
[6] Shortly before 9:00 p.m., ISP Trooper Derek Miller (Trooper Miller) arrived at
the scene. He observed that the accident was a single vehicle crash and that the
vehicle struck the Interstate’s concrete median barrier, crossed three lanes of
traffic, struck the guardrail on the right side of the road, and stopped. Trooper
Miller spoke with Williams, who stated that she was the driver of the vehicle.
He smelled the odor of alcoholic beverage emanating from Williams’ breath
and person; he noticed that she had trouble standing, kept swaying back and
forth, and had slurred speech. Trooper Miller asked Williams if she needed any
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medical help, and she stated that she was fine. He then asked her if she had
anything to drink that night, and she stated that she had a couple of drinks.
Trooper Miller administered a field sobriety test to Williams. She failed the
test, and Trooper Miller read the implied consent law to her. Williams stated
that she did not have a driver’s license, but agreed to take the breath test. She
was transported to the Adult Processing Center and administered a breath test,
which returned a 0.095 alcohol concentration equivalent. Trooper Miller
requested Williams’ driving record, which indicated that her driver’s license
was suspended and that she had two outstanding arrest warrants.
[7] Trotter died approximately a week after the accident. An autopsy revealed that
Trotter died as a result of a decelerated “blunt force [trauma to] the head” with
bruising and bleeding to his brain, which he received as a result of the accident.
(Tr. p. 99).
[8] After filing an Information on August 14, 2014, and amending it on August 26,
2014, and June 2, 2015, the State charged Williams with Count I, operating a
vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person, a Class A misdemeanor; Count
II, operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent of 0.08 or
more, a Class C misdemeanor; Count III, driving while suspended, a Class A
misdemeanor; Count IV, operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing death, a
Level 5 felony; and Count V, operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration
equivalent of 0.08 or more causing death, a Level 5 felony. On June 3, 2015,
the trial court conducted a jury trial, and Williams was found guilty as charged.
On June 17, 2015, the trial court sentenced Williams to an aggregate term of
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four years at the Department of Correction on Counts III and IV. The trial
court did not enter sentences on the remaining Counts due to double jeopardy
concerns.
[9] Williams now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
[10] Williams argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her convictions.
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a
criminal conviction, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility
of witnesses. Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012). The evidence—
even if conflicting—and all reasonable inferences drawn from it are viewed in a
light most favorable to the conviction. Id. We affirm if there is substantial
evidence of probative value supporting each element of the crime from which a
reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. A conviction can be sustained on only the
uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, even when that witness is the
victim. Id. Moreover, a conviction may be sustained on circumstantial
evidence alone so long as there are reasonable inferences from the evidence that
enable the fact-finder to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Lawrence v. State, 959 N.E.2d 385, 388 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.
[11] Indiana Code section 9-30-5-5(3) provides that a person who causes the death of
another person when operating a vehicle while intoxicated commits a Level 5
felony. Further, Indiana Code section 9-24-19-2 provides that a person who:
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(1) knows that the person’s driving privilege, license, or permit is
suspended or revoked; and
(2) operates a motor vehicle upon a highway less than ten (10)
years after the date on which judgment was entered against the
person for a prior unrelated violation of section 1 of this chapter,
this section, [I.C. §] 9-1-4-52 (repealed July 1, 1991), or [I.C. §] 9-
24-18-5(a) (repealed July 1, 2000);
commits a Class A misdemeanor.
[12] First, Williams claims that the evidence was insufficient to prove that she was
driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. Identification testimony need
not necessarily be unequivocal to sustain a conviction. Holloway v. State, 983
N.E.2d 1175, 1178 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Elements of offenses and identity may
be established entirely by circumstantial evidence and the logical inferences
drawn therefrom. Id. As with other sufficiency matters, we will not weigh the
evidence or resolve questions of credibility when determining whether the
identification evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Id. Rather, we
examine the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom that support the
conviction. Id.
[13] Here, our review of the record reveals that Williams admitted that she was the
driver of the crashed vehicle at least twice. When Officer Sechrist first arrived
at the accident scene and spoke with Williams, she stated that she was the
driver of the vehicle. Then, when Trooper Miller arrived at the scene shortly
after Officer Sechrist, he also spoke with Williams, and she again stated that she
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was the driver of the vehicle. Williams’ admissions continued even further—
she stated to the trooper that she had a “couple of drinks.” (Tr. p. 50). Finally,
when Trooper Miller read the implied consent law to Williams and asked her if
she would submit to a breath test, she stated, “I don’t have a license already,
but I’ll take the test.” (Tr. p. 58). Thus, Williams made several admissions to
the police officers at the accident scene while Trotter was still alive and sitting
on the guardrail. However, Trotter died a week later. Once the State amended
its charges to reflect Trotter’s death, Williams’ position changed. At her trial,
about a year later, Williams firmly testified that she was not behind the wheel of
her vehicle at the time of the accident and that she had only stated she was at
the request of another female occupant of the vehicle. Williams’ request
essentially amounts to an invitation for us to disregard the jury’s decision and
reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See Bailey, 979 N.E.2d at 143. As
such, we find that the fact that Williams owned the vehicle, the testimonies of
the witnesses, her own admissions to the police officers at the accident scene,
and the reasonable inferences therefrom were sufficient to enable the jury to
find Williams guilty of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.
[14] Further, as to her conviction for driving while suspended, Williams asserts that
the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “she was aware her
[driving] privileges were currently suspended.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 13). A
defendant’s knowledge of her license suspension can be inferred from the
computer printout of the driving record showing that a suspension of notice was
sent to her. Nasser v. State, 727 N.E.2d 1105, 1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans.
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denied. “An entry in the driving record of a defendant stating that notice of
suspension or revocation was mailed by the [Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV)]
to the defendant constitutes prima facie evidence that the notice was mailed to
the defendant’s address as shown in the records of [BMV].” I.C. § 9-14-3-7(c).
Our review of the record indicates that a notice of suspension was mailed to
Williams on May 1, 2000. Williams’ driving privileges were suspended
indefinitely with the effective date of May 15, 2000. Moreover, when Trooper
Miller informed Williams of the implied consent law, she stated that she did not
have a driver’s license. During the trial, Williams admitted that she told
Trooper Miller that her license was suspended. Thus, at the time of the
accident, she knew that her license was suspended. At the same time, at her
trial, Williams also claimed that she “went to [BMV] to clear up her fines. She
believed the money ‘rolled over’ and validated her license.” (Appellant’s Br. p.
13). Now, on appeal, after Williams’ admission to Trooper Miller and the
prima facie proof of mailing of the notice to her, she still maintains that the State
did not meet its burden of proof. We find Williams’ argument unpersuasive.
Her argument, again, essentially amounts to a request for us to reweigh the
evidence and disregard the fact-finder’s decision. We cannot do that. Both
conflicting positions were presented at the trial where the jury received an
opportunity to weigh the evidence and assess the witnesses’ credibility. At the
conclusion of the trial, the jury found Williams guilty of driving while
suspended. As such, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence
for the jury to find Williams guilty of driving while suspended beyond a
reasonable doubt.
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[15] Finally, Williams asserts that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that her operation of the vehicle while intoxicated was the substantial
cause of the death of Trotter. To establish causation, the State must show that
the defendant caused the accident. Smith v. State, 496 N.E2d 778, 781 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1986) (citing Micinski v. State, 487 N.E.2d 150, 154 (Ind. 1986) (holding
that the State need not prove that the defendant’s intoxication caused the
accident; the State only need to prove that the defendant caused the accident)),
reh’g denied, trans. denied.
A conviction for operating while intoxicated causing death
requires proof that the defendant’s operation of a motor vehicle
while intoxicated was a “substantial cause,” and not merely a
“contributing cause” of the resulting death. The well-settled rule
is that the State must prove the defendant’s conduct was the
proximate cause of the victim’s injury or death.
Abney v. State, 858 N.E.2d 226, 228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (internal citations
omitted).
[16] In Abney, a defendant, who was operating his vehicle while intoxicated, struck a
bicyclist and left the accident scene. Id. at 227. He was apprehended shortly
thereafter when police noticed him driving a vehicle with extensive front-end
damage—shattered windshield, caved hood and top of the car, and deployed
airbag. Id. Among other charges, the defendant was convicted for operating a
vehicle while intoxicated causing death. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued
that someone else caused the bicyclist’s death—someone else hit the bicyclist,
who then, allegedly already deceased, was thrown on top of the defendant’s
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vehicle. Id. at 230. The Abney court found that the defendant’s claim, and even
the opinion of the defendant’s accident reconstruction expert, relied on
considerable speculation. Id. The Abney court declined to reweigh the evidence
and held that the evidence presented to the jury, which primarily consisted of
evidence that the defendant was the substantial cause of the bicyclist’s death,
was sufficient for the jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant’s operation of a motor vehicle caused the bicyclist’ death. Id.
[17] Here, Williams claims that her operation of the vehicle while intoxicated was
not a substantial or proximate cause of Trotter’s death because Trotter had a
number of other medical conditions that could have caused or contributed to
his death. We find that this claim is similar to the defendant’s argument in
Abney; therefore, we find the Abney court’s decision instructive. By arguing that
Trotter’s death might have been caused by something other than her operation
of the vehicle and the crash, like the defendant in Abney, Williams invites us to
speculate and reweigh the evidence. We cannot do that. See id. Our review of
the record in light most favorable to Williams’ convictions indicates that she
was the driver of the vehicle. She was intoxicated and crashed the vehicle,
hitting the Interstate’s concrete barrier and the metal guardrail. Williams had
several passengers in the vehicle; one of the passengers, Trotter, died in the
hospital a week after the accident due to injuries sustained in the crash—i.e.,
blunt force trauma to his head. We find that this evidence and the reasonable
inferences therefrom were sufficient for the jury to determine beyond a
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reasonable doubt that Williams’ operation of the vehicle while intoxicated
caused Trotter’s death.
[18] In sum, we decline Williams’ request to reweigh the evidence presented at her
jury trial. Applying our standards of review, we find that there was substantial
and sufficient evidence of probative value allowing the jury to determine
beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams was the driver; she was intoxicated
while driving; her driver’s license was suspended; and she crashed the vehicle
and caused Trotter’s death.
CONCLUSION
[19] Based on the foregoing, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to support
Williams’ convictions.
[20] Affirmed.
[21] Kirsch, J. and Pyle, J. concur
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