[Cite as Hannah v. Hannah, 2016-Ohio-1538.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 103012
ALICIA LYNN HANNAH
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
vs.
GARY ARNOLD HANNAH
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
JUDGMENT:
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Civil Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Domestic Relations Division
Case No. DR-04-299701
BEFORE: Keough, P.J., Boyle, J., and S. Gallagher, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 14, 2016
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Victor A. Mezacapa, III
Licata & Associates Co., L.P.A.
30500 Solon Industrial Parkway
Solon, Ohio 44139
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Annette C. Trivelli
147 Bell Street, Suite 201
Chagrin Falls, Ohio 44022
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, P.J.:
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Alicia Lynn Hannah (“Mother”), appeals the decision of
the domestic relations court that overruled her objections to a magistrate’s decision that
modified the child support obligation of defendant-appellee Gary Arnold Hannah
(“Father”). We reverse and remand.
I. Background
{¶2} Mother and Father were married on June 14, 1997, and two children were
born during the marriage. Mother subsequently filed for divorce, which was granted on
March 17, 2005. Pursuant to a shared parenting agreement approved by the court, Father
was to pay $200 per month in child support, a substantial downward deviation from
Father’s obligation as calculated under the child support computation worksheet.
{¶3} The record reflects that over the years, Mother and Father had several
disputes regarding child support that they were able to resolve by mutual agreement. In
an agreed judgment entry entered January 31, 2008, Father’s child support obligation
increased to $500 per month, which was again a substantial downward deviation from
Father’s obligation as calculated by the worksheet.
{¶4} In October 2008, Father filed a motion to modify child support, asserting
that his annual income had decreased. The parties eventually resolved this dispute, and
in January 2009, the trial court entered an agreed judgment that neither party would pay
child support because “the parties share in the parenting of the children with both having
substantial parenting time, the parties share expenses and incomes are almost equal, and
[Father] pays all extracurricular activities for the children.” Both parents were
designated health insurance obligors, and uncovered health care expenses were to be
shared equally.
{¶5} Father’s income increased in the next several years, and on February 9,
2011, the court entered another agreed judgment entry ordering Father to pay $500 per
month child support, an amount almost half the actual obligation as calculated by the
worksheet. Mother was designated as health insurance obligor.
{¶6} On March 1, 2014, Father requested administrative review of the child
support order by Cuyahoga Job and Family Services, Office of Child Support Services
(“CJFS-OCSS”). After completing the child support computation worksheet using the
annual incomes reported by each party, CJFS-OCSS determined that Father’s child
support obligation was $502.37 per month, effective March 1, 2014.
{¶7} Pursuant to R.C. 3119.63(C), Father requested judicial review of the revised
child support amount. After a hearing in February 2015, the domestic relations court
magistrate issued a decision designating Mother — not Father — as the obligor and
ordering her to pay Father $475 per month in child support if health insurance is
provided, or $458 per month child support plus $201.92 per month as cash medical
support if health insurance is not provided. Although the decision stated that the
worksheet used in computing child support was attached as Exhibit A, no worksheet was
attached to the magistrate’s decision. The trial court subsequently overruled Mother’s
objections to the magistrate’s decision and affirmed and adopted the decision. As with
the magistrate’s decision, although the trial court’s judgment entry stated that the
worksheet used to compute child support and cash medical support was attached as
Exhibit A, no worksheet was attached to the trial court’s judgment. This appeal
followed.
II. Analysis
{¶8} An appellate court review child support matters under an abuse of discretion
standard. Booth v. Booth, 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 144, 541 N.E.2d 1028 (1989). An abuse
of discretion may be found when the trial court “applies the wrong legal standard,
misapplies the correct legal standard, or relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact.”
Thomas v. Cleveland, 176 Ohio App.3d 401, 2008-Ohio-1720, 892 N.E.2d 454, ¶ 15 (8th
Dist.).
{¶9} In her first assignment of error, Mother contends that the trial court erred in
modifying Father’s child support obligation as determined by OJFS-OCSS because the
court made no finding pursuant to R.C. 3119.79 that there had been a substantial change
of circumstances. Father responds that the trial court properly determined that Mother
should be the child support obligor because his income is less than Mother’s, the
parenting schedule is almost 50/50, and he pays some of the children’s expenses.
Neither party is correct.
{¶10} Father requested administrative review of his child support obligation by
OJFS-OCSS pursuant to R.C. 3119.60, which provides that an obligor may request
review by a child support enforcement agency of a child support order. As part of the
review, R.C. 3119.63 requires the agency to calculate a revised amount of child support to
be paid. CJFS-OCSS determined that Father’s obligation should be increased from $500
per month to $502.37. Father then exercised his statutory right under R.C. 3119.63(E) to
request a court hearing on the revised amount.
{¶11} Following the receipt of such a request, R.C. 3119.64 requires the court to
conduct a hearing in accordance with R.C. 3119.66. R.C. 3119.66, in turn, requires the
court to “conduct a hearing to determine whether the revised amount of child support is
the appropriate amount and whether the amount of child support being paid under the
court child support order should be revised.”
{¶12} Finally, pursuant to R.C. 3119.70, if a court conducts a hearing pursuant to
R.C. 3119.66 and determines that the revised child support amount is appropriate, the
court must “issue a revised court child support order requiring the obligor to pay the
revised amount.” But, if the court finds that the revised child support amount calculated
by the agency is not appropriate, then the court must “determine the appropriate child
support amount and, if necessary, issue a revised court child support order requiring the
obligor to pay the child support amount determined by the court.” R.C. 3119.70(B); see
also Li v. Yang, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96741, 2012-Ohio-2491, ¶ 34, citing Staugler v.
Staugler, 160 Ohio App.3d 690, 2005-Ohio-1917, 828 N.E.2d 673 (3d Dist.).
{¶13} Thus, as this court has stated:
Under the plain language of both R.C. 3119.66 and 3119.70(B), before
revising an obligor’s amount of child support pursuant to an administrative
recommendation, the trial court must first determine whether the revised
amount of child support as recommended is appropriate. Only if the trial
court first finds that the amount of revised child support, as calculated by
[OJFS-OCSS] is inappropriate may it then make an independent
determination concerning the appropriateness of the amount of child
support currently being paid.
Li at ¶ 35.
{¶14} In this matter, the magistrate’s decision noted only that “[t]he court has
reviewed the findings of the CJFS-OCSS.” The decision made no finding regarding the
appropriateness of the agency’s determination, other than to note that by law, the agency
cannot grant a deviation from the obligation as calculated by the worksheet. Likewise,
the trial court made no determination that the agency’s revised child support amount was
inappropriate when it adopted the magistrate’s decision. R.C. 3119.66 and 3119.70
clearly require a determination by the court regarding the validity of the agency’s child
support calculation before the court may conduct an independent review and order a
revised amount. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in adopting the
magistrate’s decision that revised the agency’s child support determination without
making such a finding. See Li, supra (no error in revising agency support order where
trial court first determined that the agency had used an incorrect business income for the
father).
{¶15} Moreover, we find no errors in the agency’s calculation that would have
required redetermination of Father’s child support obligation by the court. The agency
based its calculation upon annual income figures and financial documents provided by
each party. There was no evidence presented to the domestic relations court magistrate
demonstrating that these figures were incorrect and, in fact, with the exception of the
amount of child support Father pays for a child from another relationship, Mother and
Father stipulated in the trial court that the agency had used correct figures for the parties’
annual incomes, adjustments to income, child care expenses, and out-of-pocket costs for
providing health care for the children. Although Father’s gross annual income was less
than Mother’s, the agency’s worksheet calculation determined that Father’s child support
obligation was $502.37, an insignificant deviation from the existing order that Father pay
$500 per month in child support. Notably, the revised figure was arrived at despite
Father’s “misstatement” to the agency that he was paying $500 per month in child support
for another child, when his actual obligation for this child is only $300 per month.
{¶16} We also find nothing in the statutory framework that would allow the court
upon judicial review of the agency’s revised child support obligation to reverse the
agency’s designation of which party is the obligor and which the obligee. R.C. 3119.70
provides that after a hearing, the court may either require “the obligor” to pay the revised
amount determined by the agency, or if that amount is not the appropriate amount, it may
issue a revised court child support order requiring “the obligor” to pay the child support
amount determined by the court. There is no provision in the statute that allows the court
upon judicial review of the agency’s child support determination to change the obligor
designation from one party to another. Accordingly, the trial court erred in adopting the
magistrate’s decision changing and designating Mother as the support obligor and Father
as the support obligee.
{¶17} With respect to Mother’s argument that the trial court erred in modifying the
child support order without first making the requisite finding pursuant to R.C. 3119.79(C)
that there was a “substantial change in circumstances,” we note that R.C. 3119.79 does
not apply to this case. R.C. 3119.79 addresses the court’s recalculation of the amount of
a child support obligation upon the request of a party to the court. “In other words, it
applies to a party’s motion to modify child support obligations.” Rockey v. Rockey, 4th
Dist. Highland No. 08CA4, 2008-Ohio-6525, ¶ 28, citing Butler v. Butler, 4th Dist. Scioto
No. 02CA2833, 2002-Ohio-5877, ¶ 21. Statutory sections R.C. 3119.60 through
3119.65, on the other hand, relate to an administrative review of the child support
obligation. Id.
{¶18} Here, upon Father’s request, OJFS-OCSS conducted an administrative
review of the child support order pursuant to R.C. 3119.60 through R.C. 3119.65. Then
the trial court, through the magistrate, conducted a hearing pursuant to R.C. 3119.66 upon
Father’s request for judicial review. The court did not conduct a hearing pursuant to
R.C. 3119.79 upon a motion for modification of child support.1 Accordingly, the court
was not required to find a “substantial change of circumstances” under R.C. 3119.79.
Rather, the court was required to determine the “appropriate amount” under R.C.
3119.66. Rockey at ¶ 29.
Indeed, the magistrate’s decision states “[t]his matter is before the court upon defendant’s
1
request for review of administrative adjustment recommendations.”
{¶19} Because the magistrate erred in revising the agency’s decision regarding
Father’s child support obligation, the trial court abused its discretion in adopting the
magistrate’s decision. The first assignment of error is sustained, albeit on grounds other
than those argued by Mother.
{¶20} In her second assignment of error, Mother contends that the trial court erred
in adopting the magistrate’s decision because the court made no determination pursuant to
R.C. 3119.22 that deviating from the agency’s designation of Father as the support
obligor was in the best interest of the minor children. Because this matter arose from
Father’s request for judicial review pursuant to R.C. 3119.63, the trial court was not
required to find that deviation was in the best interest of the children. Rather, as stated
above, it was required to determine the “appropriate amount” of child support that the
obligor, in this case Father, should pay. R.C. 3119.66. The second assignment of error
is therefore overruled.
{¶21} In her third assignment of error, Mother contends that the trial court erred in
adopting the magistrate’s decision because no child support computation worksheet was
attached to either the magistrate’s or the trial court’s decision. In Marker v.
Grimm, 65 Ohio St.3d 139, 601 N.E.2d 496 (1992), the Ohio Supreme Court interpreted
former R.C. 3113.215 and held that in any action in which a court or agency is
determining child support, a child support computation worksheet must actually be
completed and made a part of the trial court’s record. Recently, in In re J-L.H., 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 100469, 2014-Ohio-1245, this court noted that R.C. Chapter 3119 is for
the most part a re-enactment of former R.C. 3113.215, and held that the Marker rule is
applicable to R.C. Chapter 3119.
{¶22} Although a child support computation worksheet was apparently completed
by the domestic relations court magistrate in this case, the worksheet is not part of the
trial court record. Nevertheless, in light of our resolution of Mother’s first assignment of
error, we find this assignment of error to be moot.
{¶23} In sum, we find that the magistrate erred by modifying Father’s child
support obligation at a hearing on an administrative adjustment decision without first
determining the validity of the underlying agency decision. The magistrate also erred in
changing Father’s status as obligor to obligee. Therefore, the trial court abused its
discretion in adopting the magistrate’s decision. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment
is reversed. The matter is remanded with instructions that the trial court enter judgment
ordering Father to pay $502.37 per month in child support, effective March 1, 2014, as
ordered by OJFS-OCSS.
{¶24} Judgment reversed and remanded.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into
execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, PRESIDING JUDGE
MARY J. BOYLE, J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR