Carol Williams v. Prince William County, VA

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1711

CAROL WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY, VIRGINIA,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior
District Judge. (1:14-cv-01247-CMH-IDD)

Submitted: March 22, 2016 Decided: April 14, 2016

Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Victor M. Glasberg, Maxwelle C. Sokol, VICTOR M. GLASBERG &
ASSOCIATES, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Michelle R.
Robl, County Attorney, Megan E. Kelly, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, Jeffrey R.B. Notz, Assistant County Attorney, Prince
William, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

Carol Williams brought this action against her employer,

Prince William County, Virginia, alleging she was sexually

harassed and discriminated and retaliated against, in violation

of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42

U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012). Challenging only the

district court’s dismissal of her retaliation claim, Williams

asserts that the district court erred when it determined she

failed to state an adverse employment action because the court

applied the wrong standard for assessing adverse employment

action in the context of a retaliation claim. We agree.

We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Coleman v. Maryland Ct. of App.,

626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010). When ruling on such a

motion, we “must accept as true all of the factual allegations

contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

94 (2007) (per curiam). A complaint “need only give the

defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon

which it rests.” Id. at 93 (alteration and internal quotation

marks omitted). However, “plaintiffs may proceed into the

litigation process only when their complaints are justified by

both law and fact.” Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193

(4th Cir. 2009). Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, the

complaint must only “state[] a plausible claim for relief” that

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“permit[s] the court to infer more than the mere possibility of

misconduct” based upon “its judicial experience and common

sense.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); see Wag

More Dogs, LLC v. Cozart, 680 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2012) (“At

bottom, a plaintiff must nudge [her] claims across the line from

conceivable to plausible to resist dismissal.” (alteration and

internal quotation marks omitted)).

Title VII prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing]

against any of [its] employees . . . because [the employee] has

opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by

[Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012). Because Williams

presented no direct evidence of retaliation, the district court

properly analyzed her retaliation claim under the burden-

shifting paradigm set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973). Under this framework, a plaintiff

establishes a prima facie case of retaliation by demonstrating

“(1) engagement in a protected activity; (2) adverse employment

action; and (3) a causal link between the protected activity and

the employment action.” Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190.

However, we conclude that the district court applied too

stringent a standard for determining what constitutes an adverse

employment action for purposes of stating a Title VII

retaliation claim. The district court found that Williams

failed to state an adverse employment action to establish her

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retaliation claim for the same reasons she failed to state an

adverse employment action to establish her substantive

discrimination claim. However, unlike a substantive

discrimination claim, the adverse action component of Title

VII’s antiretaliation provision “is not limited to

discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of

employment.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548

U.S. 53, 64 (2006). Instead, the adverse action component of

Title VII’s antiretaliation provision can be satisfied by

showing that the employer took “materially adverse” action in

response to an employee engaging in a protected activity, “which

in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable

worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”

Id. at 68 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In the context of job reassignment allegations, as in this

case, the Supreme Court has stated that, although a job

reassignment is “not automatically actionable,” it may be

“materially adverse depend[ing] upon the circumstances of the

particular case, and should be judged from the perspective of a

reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering all

the circumstances.” Id. at 71 (internal quotations marks and

citations omitted). While changes to the terms, conditions, or

benefits of the plaintiff’s employment are factors to be

considered when evaluating “all the circumstances,” the lack of

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such changes is not dispositive on the adverse action component

of a retaliation claim. See id. at 64, 71; see also Lettieri v.

Equant Inc., 478 F.3d 640, 650 n.2 (4th Cir. 2007) (noting that

the Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington Northern broadened

the Fourth Circuit’s adverse employment action standard to

consider injuries and harms beyond the terms and conditions of

employment). Therefore, all circumstances indicating that an

action was harmful and materially adverse to the employee should

be considered. Given Williams’ allegations about the

unfavorable circumstances she experienced after she filed her

EEO complaint, we conclude that it was error for the district

court to summarily dispose of Williams’ retaliation claim for

the same reasons it disposed of Williams’ discrimination claim.

We also conclude that it was error for the district court

to analyze only whether Williams’ transfer constituted an

adverse employment action. Namely, it is undisputed that

Williams was informed of her transfer before she filed her first

EEO complaint. Thus, Williams’ transfer could not have been in

retaliation for her EEO complaints. Contrary to the district

court’s limitation, however, Williams’ complaint alleged several

additional actions that occurred after her transfer, and which

could be construed as adverse employment actions.

In particular, Williams alleged that she was denied a

deserved pay increase, had her office and equipment taken away

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or limited, and was excluded from meetings and given

unattainable goals in her performance evaluation. It is at

least plausible that such actions would have dissuaded a

reasonable employee from making or supporting a charge of

discrimination. See Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68.

Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order to the

extent it dismissed Williams’ retaliation claim because she

failed to sufficiently allege an actionable adverse employment

action, and we remand to the district court for further

proceedings. * We dispense with oral argument because the facts

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

VACATED AND REMANDED

* By this disposition, we indicate no view as to the merits
of Williams’ retaliation claim.

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