UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-1711
CAROL WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY, VIRGINIA,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior
District Judge. (1:14-cv-01247-CMH-IDD)
Submitted: March 22, 2016 Decided: April 14, 2016
Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Victor M. Glasberg, Maxwelle C. Sokol, VICTOR M. GLASBERG &
ASSOCIATES, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Michelle R.
Robl, County Attorney, Megan E. Kelly, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, Jeffrey R.B. Notz, Assistant County Attorney, Prince
William, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Carol Williams brought this action against her employer,
Prince William County, Virginia, alleging she was sexually
harassed and discriminated and retaliated against, in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012). Challenging only the
district court’s dismissal of her retaliation claim, Williams
asserts that the district court erred when it determined she
failed to state an adverse employment action because the court
applied the wrong standard for assessing adverse employment
action in the context of a retaliation claim. We agree.
We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Coleman v. Maryland Ct. of App.,
626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010). When ruling on such a
motion, we “must accept as true all of the factual allegations
contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007) (per curiam). A complaint “need only give the
defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.” Id. at 93 (alteration and internal quotation
marks omitted). However, “plaintiffs may proceed into the
litigation process only when their complaints are justified by
both law and fact.” Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193
(4th Cir. 2009). Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, the
complaint must only “state[] a plausible claim for relief” that
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“permit[s] the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct” based upon “its judicial experience and common
sense.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); see Wag
More Dogs, LLC v. Cozart, 680 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2012) (“At
bottom, a plaintiff must nudge [her] claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible to resist dismissal.” (alteration and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
Title VII prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing]
against any of [its] employees . . . because [the employee] has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by
[Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012). Because Williams
presented no direct evidence of retaliation, the district court
properly analyzed her retaliation claim under the burden-
shifting paradigm set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973). Under this framework, a plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case of retaliation by demonstrating
“(1) engagement in a protected activity; (2) adverse employment
action; and (3) a causal link between the protected activity and
the employment action.” Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190.
However, we conclude that the district court applied too
stringent a standard for determining what constitutes an adverse
employment action for purposes of stating a Title VII
retaliation claim. The district court found that Williams
failed to state an adverse employment action to establish her
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retaliation claim for the same reasons she failed to state an
adverse employment action to establish her substantive
discrimination claim. However, unlike a substantive
discrimination claim, the adverse action component of Title
VII’s antiretaliation provision “is not limited to
discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of
employment.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548
U.S. 53, 64 (2006). Instead, the adverse action component of
Title VII’s antiretaliation provision can be satisfied by
showing that the employer took “materially adverse” action in
response to an employee engaging in a protected activity, “which
in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable
worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”
Id. at 68 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In the context of job reassignment allegations, as in this
case, the Supreme Court has stated that, although a job
reassignment is “not automatically actionable,” it may be
“materially adverse depend[ing] upon the circumstances of the
particular case, and should be judged from the perspective of a
reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering all
the circumstances.” Id. at 71 (internal quotations marks and
citations omitted). While changes to the terms, conditions, or
benefits of the plaintiff’s employment are factors to be
considered when evaluating “all the circumstances,” the lack of
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such changes is not dispositive on the adverse action component
of a retaliation claim. See id. at 64, 71; see also Lettieri v.
Equant Inc., 478 F.3d 640, 650 n.2 (4th Cir. 2007) (noting that
the Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington Northern broadened
the Fourth Circuit’s adverse employment action standard to
consider injuries and harms beyond the terms and conditions of
employment). Therefore, all circumstances indicating that an
action was harmful and materially adverse to the employee should
be considered. Given Williams’ allegations about the
unfavorable circumstances she experienced after she filed her
EEO complaint, we conclude that it was error for the district
court to summarily dispose of Williams’ retaliation claim for
the same reasons it disposed of Williams’ discrimination claim.
We also conclude that it was error for the district court
to analyze only whether Williams’ transfer constituted an
adverse employment action. Namely, it is undisputed that
Williams was informed of her transfer before she filed her first
EEO complaint. Thus, Williams’ transfer could not have been in
retaliation for her EEO complaints. Contrary to the district
court’s limitation, however, Williams’ complaint alleged several
additional actions that occurred after her transfer, and which
could be construed as adverse employment actions.
In particular, Williams alleged that she was denied a
deserved pay increase, had her office and equipment taken away
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or limited, and was excluded from meetings and given
unattainable goals in her performance evaluation. It is at
least plausible that such actions would have dissuaded a
reasonable employee from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination. See Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68.
Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order to the
extent it dismissed Williams’ retaliation claim because she
failed to sufficiently allege an actionable adverse employment
action, and we remand to the district court for further
proceedings. * We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
* By this disposition, we indicate no view as to the merits
of Williams’ retaliation claim.
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