FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 18 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
J. C., by and through his mother and No. 14-15300
guardian ad litem, W.P., and W.P.
individually, D.C. No. 3:12-cv-03513-WHO
Plaintiff - Appellant,
MEMORANDUM*
v.
CAMBRIAN SCHOOL DISTRICT;
FAMMATRE CHARTER
ELEMENTARY SCHOOL; KRISTI
SCHWIEBERT; DEBORAH BLOW,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
William Horsley Orrick III, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 17, 2016
San Francisco, California
Before: McKEOWN, WARDLAW, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
J.C. and his mother, W.P., appeal from an adverse summary judgment
dismissing claims that J.C. was wrongfully denied admission to Fammatre Charter
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Elementary School because of his disability. The district court granted summary
judgment to the defendant school, school district, and school employees on all
claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. The district court correctly granted summary judgment on J.C.’s ADA
and Rehabilitation Act claims because J.C. has failed to raise an issue of material
fact on causation. Under the ADA, J.C. is required to show that he was denied
admission “by reason of his disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The Rehabilitation
Act similarly requires J.C. to show that he was denied admission “solely by reason
of . . . his disability.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). J.C. has not presented admissible
evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact that supports his theory that the
school’s admission decision was motivated by disability discrimination. To the
contrary, the evidence shows that J.C. was denied admission pursuant to a valid
admissions policy.
Regardless of whether the school defendants were required to give
preference to existing students under California Education Code § 47605(d),
Fammatre’s enrollment policy explicitly gave preference to existing students. The
definition of “existing students” under Fammatre’s enrollment policy, however,
reasonably excluded students like J.C., who move out of district while attending
Fammatre. After the school district determined that the second grade class at
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Fammatre was at-capacity for budget reasons, the district’s decision not to admit
students on the waiting list, including J.C., was reasonable and not based on
discrimination. J.C.’s allegations of a strained relationship between his mother and
the school, isolated negative interactions between J.C., W.P. and school personnel,
and the process by which W.P. learned that J.C. would need to apply as a transfer
student, do not substantiate an allegation of disability discrimination. Because J.C.
has not raised an issue of material fact on the causation element of his ADA and
Rehabilitation Act claims, summary judgment was properly granted.
2. J.C. concedes on appeal that his state tort claims depend on his ADA and
Rehabilitation Act claims. Because summary judgment was properly granted on
those claims, we affirm the summary dismissal of J.C.’s state tort claims as well.
AFFIRMED.
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FILED
JC v Cambrian School Dist. No. 14-15300 APR 18 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
Wardlaw, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
I concur in the majority’s holding affirming the district court’s grant of
summary judgment on J.C.’s state law claims; those claims are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.
89, 117 (1984). And because J.C. cannot satisfy the Rehabilitation Act’s “strict[]”
causal standard, K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088,
1099 (9th Cir. 2013), I also concur in that portion of the majority’s holding. As to
J.C.’s ADA claim, however, I respectfully dissent.
The majority holds that J.C. has not raised a genuine dispute of material fact
on the causation element of his ADA claim, i.e., whether he was denied admission
to Fammatre “by reason of his disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. According to the
majority, the second-grade class was at capacity for budgetary reasons, so the
decision to exclude J.C. was reasonable and non-discriminatory. However,
because the district court held that J.C. was not “otherwise qualified” to attend
Fammatre and did not reach the causation element, the appropriate course is to
remand for the district court to consider this question in the first instance.
Moreover, “[w]here a party’s motive or intent is in issue, summary judgment
is rarely proper.” Atkins v. Union Pac. R. Co., 685 F.2d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir.
1982). Here, J.C. has provided sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact
as to whether the second-grade enrollment cap was motivated solely by legitimate
budgetary concerns or at least in part by discriminatory animus. It is undisputed
that J.C. was first on Fammatre’s waiting list. In other words, the enrollment cap
narrowly excluded J.C. Among other evidence, J.C. provided attendance sheets
showing that Fammatre had accommodated 89 second graders during the
2010–2011 school year, then reduced the second-grade enrollment cap to 87
students for the 2011–2012 school year. The attendance sheets also indicate that
Fammatre could have moved one third grader out of the second and third-grade
combination class, creating space for an additional second grader without adverse
financial effects. Additionally, J.C.’s mother, W.P., testified that Fammatre staff
often responded to J.C.’s disability with frustration: For example, W.P. once
visited J.C. at school and discovered that he had been excluded from a class trip to
the library. W.P. also spoke to J.C.’s teacher about a time when she forced J.C.
and another disabled student to turn their desks around and face the back of the
classroom. The majority dismisses these troubling incidents as “isolated negative
interactions,” but “[w]hen plaintiffs allege intentional discrimination under the
ADA, . . . ‘any indication of discriminatory motive may suffice to raise a question
that can only be resolved by a factfinder.’” Pac. Shores Properties, LLC v. City of
Newport Beach, 730 F.3d 1142, 1156 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting McGinest v. GTE
2
Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1124 (9th Cir. 2004)).
Based on this and other evidence, I would find that J.C. has raised a genuine
dispute of material fact on the causation element of his ADA claim. I would
further hold that the ADA claim is not barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity
under existing law, see Phiffer v. Columbia River Corr. Inst., 384 F.3d 791, 792
(9th Cir. 2004), but remand for further consideration in light of United States v.
Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006).
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