MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Apr 19 2016, 8:31 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK
regarded as precedent or cited before any Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Gregory F. Zoeller Stephen T. Owens
Attorney General of Indiana Public Defender of Indiana
Henry A. Flores, Jr. Vickie Yaser
Deputy Attorney General Deputy Public Defender
Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
State of Indiana, April 19, 2016
Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A04-1508-PC-1036
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
Robert Collier, The Honorable Helen W. Marchal,
Appellee-Petitioner. Judge
The Honorable Stanley E. Kroh,
Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49F15-9608-PC-124576
Brown, Judge.
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[1] The State appeals the post-conviction court’s grant of Collier’s motion for relief
from judgment. The State raises one issue which we revise and restate as
whether the court erred in granting Collier’s motion for relief from judgment.
We reverse.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On August 21, 1997, Collier pled guilty to possession of cocaine as a class D
felony. The court sentenced Collier to 545 days in the Department of
Correction with 521 days suspended and ninety days of probation.
[3] On August 1, 2001, Collier filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief
alleging that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel, was misled
by the trial court, and his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or
voluntarily made. Collier also indicated that he wished to have the Public
Defender represent him and completed an affidavit of indigence. On January 3,
2005, the court entered an order granting a motion filed by a public defender to
dismiss the petition without prejudice, and appointed counsel to pursue
proceedings under Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 2. On July 14, 2005, the court
denied Collier’s motion to file a belated notice of appeal, ordered that Collier’s
original petition for post-conviction relief be reinstated, and scheduled a hearing
for September 12, 2005.
[4] On October 6, 2005, a public defender filed a notice of withdrawal of
appearance and certification, and the court approved the withdrawal on
October 11, 2005. Collier filed a motion to withdraw his petition for post-
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conviction relief without prejudice, and the court granted the petition on
November 21, 2005.
[5] On August 20, 2007, Collier filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, claiming that he did not make a
voluntary and intelligent guilty plea, and requesting that the court vacate his
plea agreement. He completed an affidavit of indigence and indicated that he
was detained in the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility and that he wished to
have the Public Defender represent him. In September 2007, the court
summarily denied Collier’s petition for post-conviction relief. The court’s order
states in part:
2. On review of the Court’s file, the transcript of the August 21,
1997 guilty plea hearing and sentencing hearing, the Petition, and
the plea agreement, the Court finds that pursuant to Post-
Conviction Rule 1(4)(f) that if the pleadings show that the
petitioner is entitled to no relief, the court may summarily deny
the petition. The plea agreement and judgment of conviction
show the defendant pled guilty to Possession of Cocaine, Class D
felony.
3. [Collier] is asserting that if “he had known that the jury would
have the option of determining the lesser included offense of
possession of cocaine is either inherently of [sic] factually
included as a class a misdemeanor” he would not have pled
guilty. [Collier] also asserts he was not advised the court would
have the option of sentencing him to a class A Misdemeanor.
4. The court finds as a matter of law that there is no lesser
included offense for the charge of possession of cocaine, class D
felony.
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5. The transcript clearly shows [Collier] was advised at his guilty
plea hearing that the court could sentence under alternative
misdemeanor sentencing.
6. The Petition is DENIED.
Appellant’s Appendix at 189-190.
[6] Entries in the chronological case summary (“CCS”) indicate that Collier filed
correspondence with the court and the court sent him a copy of the September
2007 order denying his petition in December 2008, that Collier filed
correspondence with the court and the court sent him a copy of the CCS in
September 2009, that the petition for post-conviction relief was denied but the
file was never closed out and the court did so in July 2011, and that Collier filed
correspondence and a motion to compel documents and that the court sent a
copy of the September 2007 order in September 2012.
[7] On September 24, 2014, Collier filed another pro se petition for post-conviction
relief. On April 8, 2015, Collier, by counsel, filed a verified motion for leave to
amend his petition for post-conviction relief. That same day, Collier, by
counsel, filed a verified motion for relief from the September 2007 order that
summarily denied his petition for post-conviction relief. Collier’s counsel
requested relief “pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 60(B)(8) and Ind. Post Conviction
Rule 1 Section 2” and argued that his August 20, 2007 petition for post-
conviction relief affirmatively requested representation by the State Public
Defender and included an affidavit of indigence. Id. at 231. He further argued
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that Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(2) imposed a duty upon the court to order
a copy of the petition be sent to the Public Defender’s Office, 1 that the court’s
own records appeared to indicate that Collier was not advised of the summary
denial of his 2007 petition until it was too late to timely appeal the decision,
that counsel’s impression was that Collier suffers from cognitive and/or mental
deficiencies which interfere with his ability to represent himself, that Collier has
a ninth grade education according to the presentence investigation report
prepared in 2012, and that a review of Collier’s cocaine conviction led to the
identification of issues that have merit.
[8] On April 13, 2015, the court granted Collier’s motion for relief from judgment
before receiving a response from the State. On April 14, 2015, the State filed its
objection and a motion to reconsider the April 13, 2015 order granting Collier’s
motion for relief from judgment.
[9] On May 6, 2015, the court held a hearing, and the prosecutor argued that
Collier’s petition had been previously denied and he was seeking to reopen it
without first asking permission from the Court of Appeals to file a successive
petition. The court reversed its order granting Collier’s motion for relief from
judgment and scheduled a hearing for May 18, 2015.
1
Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(2) provides that “[i]f the court finds the indigent petitioner is incarcerated
in the Indiana Department of Correction, and has requested representation, it shall order a copy of the
petition sent to the Public Defender’s office.”
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[10] As scheduled the court held a hearing and Collier’s counsel, a public defender,
argued that Collier’s petition should have been referred to the Public Defender.
Collier’s counsel stated that the Public Defender would like to receive a referral
every time a petition for post-conviction relief alleging indigence and requesting
the Public Defender’s services is newly filed. The prosecutor argued that the
State could not agree that a court “can simply regain jurisdiction because it feels
like it.” Transcript at 18.
[11] On July 13, 2015, the court held another hearing. The prosecutor reiterated the
State’s position that the court did not have jurisdiction. Collier’s counsel
argued that the court could vacate the prior judgment and assume jurisdiction.
The court stated that it thought it was a mistake for the court to have previously
summarily denied Collier’s petition without appointing counsel and that it
would reinstate that prior petition for post-conviction relief, noting:
Okay the Court today would reinstate that prior P.C.R. that was
filed. I know procedurally that may be error and the State may
be seeking to appeal that but I suppose if that is reversed we will
be back to square one. But at this point in fairness, in equity, and
you know the P.C.R. rules are something that our Supreme
Court has set up . . . final look at how things went in the case so
what the Court would be inclined to do . . . .
Id. at 25. In an entry in the CCS dated July 13, 2015, the court granted Collier’s
“Petition to Reinstate.” Appellant’s Appendix at 7.
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Discussion
[12] The issue is whether the court erred in granting Collier’s motion for relief from
judgment. The State’s position is that the court abused its discretion when it
granted Collier’s request for relief pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B) because it lacked
jurisdiction, and that Collier’s motion was untimely, Collier never explained the
reason for the delay once he received notice of the judgment, he could not have
demonstrated excusable neglect, and the delay prejudiced the State. The State
also contends that Collier cannot demonstrate that his petition for post-
conviction relief presents a meritorious claim.
[13] Collier argues that the court had jurisdiction to grant his motion for relief from
judgment because the motion addressed only the procedural and equitable
grounds warranting relief from the lower court’s summary denial of his 2007
petition for post-conviction relief, not the legal merits of the judgment. He
posits that the cases cited by the State are distinguishable because those cases
involved litigants who enjoyed direct appeals and one or more post-conviction
proceedings through appeal, and he is in pursuit of his first full and fair post-
conviction hearing. He also argues that extraordinary circumstances such as
not referring the petition to the State Public Defender, not holding a hearing,
not serving him with notice of the denial, his incarceration, limited resources,
and education, and his desire for legal representation, excuse his failure to act.
[14] Even assuming, without deciding, that a motion for relief from judgment under
Ind. Trial Rule 60(B) was proper here, we conclude that Collier’s motion was
not filed within a reasonable time. We review a trial court’s ruling on Rule 60
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motions for abuse of discretion. Outback Steakhouse of Fla., Inc. v. Markley, 856
N.E.2d 65, 72 (Ind. 2006). See also Huntington Nat. Bank v. Car-X Assoc. Corp., 39
N.E.3d 652, 658 (Ind. 2015) (“[T]he decision whether to grant or deny a party’s
motion is left to the trial court’s equitable discretion and is highly fact
specific.”). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s judgment is
clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and inferences supporting the
judgment for relief. Wagler v. West Boggs Sewer Dist., Inc., 980 N.E.2d 363, 371
(Ind. Ct. App. 2012), reh’g denied, trans. denied, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 952 (2014).
When reviewing the trial court’s determination, we will not reweigh the
evidence. Id.
[15] Ind. Trial Rule 60(B) “affords relief in extraordinary circumstances which are
not the result of any fault or negligence on the part of the movant.” Dillard v.
Dillard, 889 N.E.2d 28, 34 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Goldsmith v. Jones, 761
N.E.2d 471, 474 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), reh’g denied). “On a motion for relief
from judgment, the burden is on the movant to demonstrate that relief is both
necessary and just.” Id. at 33 (quoting G.B. v. State, 715 N.E.2d 951, 953 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1999)). A trial court must balance the alleged injustice suffered by the
moving party against the interests of the party who prevailed and society’s
interest in the finality of judgment. Wagler, 980 N.E.2d at 371.
[16] Collier’s motion requested relief pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 60(B)(8). Ind. Trial
Rule 60(B) provides in part:
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On motion and upon such terms as are just the court may relieve
a party or his legal representative from a judgment, including a
judgment by default, for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) any ground for a motion to correct error, including without
limitation newly discovered evidence, which by due diligence
could not have been discovered in time to move for a motion to
correct errors under Rule 59;
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) entry of default or judgment by default was entered against
such party who was served only by publication and who was
without actual knowledge of the action and judgment, order or
proceedings;
*****
(8) any reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment, other than those reasons set forth in sub-paragraphs
(1), (2), (3), and (4).
[17] A motion for relief from judgment filed for reason (8) shall be filed within a
reasonable time and must allege a meritorious claim or defense. Ind. Trial Rule
60(B). Determining what is a reasonable time period depends on the
circumstances of each case, as well as the potential prejudice to the party
opposing the motion and the basis for the moving party’s delay. Parham v.
Parham, 855 N.E.2d 722, 728 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. “The trial
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court’s residual powers under subsection (8) may only be invoked upon a
showing of exceptional circumstances justifying extraordinary relief.” Brimhall
v. Brewster, 864 N.E.2d 1148, 1153 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citation omitted), trans.
denied.
[18] The record reveals that Collier pled guilty to possession of cocaine as a class D
felony on August 21, 1997. In September 2007, the post-conviction court
denied his petition for post-conviction relief. The CCS entries indicate that the
court sent Collier a copy of the September 2007 order denying his petition in
December 2008 and again in September 2012. Collier did not file a motion for
relief from the September 2007 order denying his petition for post-conviction
relief until more than seven and one-half years later on April 8, 2015. Under
the circumstances, we cannot say that Collier filed his motion for relief from
judgment within a reasonable time.
Conclusion
[19] For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the post-conviction court’s grant of
Collier’s motion for relief from judgment.
[20] Reversed.
Kirsch, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
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