In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of S.S., Mother, and A.C., Father, and H.S., Child: A.C. v. Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
Apr 19 2016, 6:29 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court

the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Benjamin K. Read Gregory F. Zoeller
Jeffersonville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Robert J. Henke
Abigail R. Recker
Deputy Attorneys General
Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination April 19, 2016
of the Parent-Child Relationship Court of Appeals Case No.
of S.S., Mother,1 and A.C., 10A05-1507-JT-910
Father, and H.S., Child: Appeal from the
A.C., Clark Circuit Court
The Honorable
Appellant-Respondent,
Vicki L. Carmichael, Judge
v. Trial Court Cause No.
10C04-1503-JT-14
Indiana Department of Child
Services,

1
Mother does not participate in this appeal; however, according to Indiana Appellate Rule 17(A), a party of
record in the trial court shall be a party on appeal.

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 Appellee-Petitioner.

Kirsch, Judge.

[1] A.C. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental

rights to his child, H.S. (“Child”). Father raises several issues for our review

that we consolidate and restate as:

I. Whether Father’s due process rights were violated when he
did not have visitation with Child; and

II. Whether the juvenile court’s termination order is clearly
erroneous.

[2] We affirm.

Fact and Procedural History
[3] Father is the biological father of Child, born August 15, 2011.2 The Indiana

Department of Child Services (“DCS”) became involved with Child due to a

2
Child’s mother, S.S., signed a voluntary termination of her parental rights, and the juvenile court
terminated her parental rights; however, she does not participate in this appeal.

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 report that she was born positive for opiates. S.S. (“Mother”) also tested

positive for opiates at that time. At the time of Child’s birth, Father was

incarcerated. On September 20, 2011, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child

was a child in need of services (“CHINS”). On October 25, 2011, both Father

and Mother admitted that Child was a CHINS, and the juvenile court

adjudicated Child as such. At that time, Child remained in Mother’s care, but

Father was still incarcerated.

[4] A dispositional hearing was held, and the juvenile court issued an order

ordering Father to participate in the following services:

A. Maintain consistent contact with DCS Family Case Manager
including responding to correspondence and telephone messages
within a reasonable amount of time. Contact the DCS Family
Case Manager by telephone at least once every other week;

B. Notify the DCS Family Case Manager of any changes in
address, telephone number, people living in the home, or
employment within forty-eight (48) hours of said change;

C. Sign any necessary releases with service providers, probation
officers, or medical providers to enable the DCS Family Case
Manager to monitor compliance with court orders;

D. Refrain from using illegal drugs. Only take prescription
medication in the doses and frequencies as specified in the
prescription; and

E. Contact the DCS Family Case Manager to determine if
additional services are necessary.

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 Appellant’s App. at 24.

[5] On January 9, 2012, Child was removed from Mother’s care due to drug use,

not following court orders, and a report that Mother had gone to Tennessee and

taken Child with her. At that time, Child was placed with the maternal

grandfather and his wife (together, “Grandparents”), where she has remained

for the duration of the case. Father remained incarcerated for the length of the

CHINS case. He was serving his sentence for April 2012 convictions of

burglary and conspiracy to commit robbery. Through much of his

incarceration, he was either at the Floyd County Jail or at the Branchville

Correctional Facility (“Branchville”). Prior to DCS involvement with Child,

Father had not established paternity of Child. In January 2013, Father

participated in a paternity test that confirmed that he was the biological father

of Child. During the first few months of Child’s life before removal from the

home, Mother sometimes took Child to visit Father at both the Floyd County

Jail and the Clark County Jail. After he was transferred to Branchville, Father

would sometimes speak with Child on the phone.

[6] In October 2013, a court-ordered visitation between Child and Father was to

occur at the jail, but Child developed foot and mouth disease and the visitation

was cancelled as Child’s doctor said she should not go outside the home. On

February 20, 2014, the juvenile court ordered that Father have video contact

with Child through Father’s sister (“Aunt”) if she passed background checks.

DCS family case manager (“FCM”) Amanda Rutherford (“FCM Rutherford”)

spoke with Aunt about the video visits several times, but Aunt was not able to

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 get any set up until March 20, 2015, at which time Father had been transferred

from Branchville to the Clark County Jail. Child’s therapist, Lisa Clark

(“Clark”), recommended that Child not have visitation with Father because “an

incarcerated setting would not be appropriate” for Child as Child would be in

an unfamiliar setting and would be “looking at a screen or on a phone being

unaware of exactly what . . . she’s supposed to be doing.” Tr. at 14. Clark also

expressed concern due to the fact that Child had never met Father, and she did

not think that a jail setting was appropriate for a three-year-old. There was also

concern due to the fact that Child suffered from separation anxiety and that she

would have increased anxiety in an incarcerated setting.

[7] Due to her separation anxiety, Child would cry so much at daycare that

Grandparents thought of removing her, but Clark did not recommend it and

told them Child would slowly get more comfortable. Child progressed in

therapy, and Clark attributed the progress to Child being in a familiar setting

and becoming more comfortable with Grandparents.

[8] On March 27, 2015, DCS filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights.

An evidentiary hearing was held on May 7, 2015. At the time of the

termination hearing, Father was incarcerated at Branchville and had been

incarcerated for Child’s entire life. His projected release date was November

23, 2016. Child was three-and-a-half years old at the time of the hearing, and in

that time, Father had never resided with Child, had never had exclusive care

and custody of Child, and had never paid any support for Child. Since Child

was four months old, she had resided with Grandparents, and Child’s younger

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 brother also lived in the home. Grandfather had never met Father, and Father

had made no attempts to contact Grandparents.

[9] Evidence was presented regarding Father’s criminal history. In June 2004,

Father pleaded guilty to Class D felony possession of two or more precursors

and was sentenced to three years with two and a half years suspended. In

December 2004, he pleaded guilty to Class A misdemeanor possession of a

handgun without a license and was sentenced to one year all suspended. In

April 2005, Father pleaded guilty to Class A misdemeanor check deception and

was sentenced to one year all suspended, and in October 2005, he pleaded

guilty to Class A misdemeanor conversion and was sentenced to one year

suspended to time served. In February 2008, he pleaded guilty to Class B

felony robbery and was given a ten-year sentence with five years suspended to

probation, and on April 26, 2012, he was convicted of Class B felony burglary

and Class C felony conspiracy to commit robbery, for which he was still in

prison on the date of the termination hearing with a projected release date of

November 23, 2016. Additionally, each time Father was placed on probation, a

probation violation was filed, and he was ordered to serve some of his

suspended sentence.

[10] At the termination hearing, Father presented evidence that while incarcerated

he had participated in services, which included: 24/7 Dads; in-patient, out-

patient Dads; Spiritual Literacy; Seven Habits of Highly Effective People;

Mothers Against Methamphetamine; and Purposeful Living Unit Services

program. Tr. at 51-53, 57. Father also testified that he sees a therapist every

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 other week while incarcerated. Id. at 54. He was also enrolled in the

Department of Labor Apprenticeship Program (“DOL Program”), which when

completed would allow him to receive a time cut and give him a release date of

May 25, 2016. After completing the DOL Program, Father would also be

eligible for substance abuse counseling, and he stated he intended to seek an

out-patient substance abuse program when released from incarceration.

[11] During the evidentiary hearing, FCM Rutherford testified that Child had been

removed from the home for three years and needed permanency and stability,

and therefore, termination and adoption were in Child’s best interests. Id. at

107, 113. FCM Rutherford stated that she based her recommendations on

Father’s incarceration and his lack of a bond with Child. Id. at 113-14.

Additionally, the Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) testified that

termination was in the best interests of Child because Father was due to be

incarcerated for at least another year, Child did not know Father, and it would

be traumatic to remove Child from the only home she has ever known. Id. at

79-80. DCS planned for Child to be adopted upon termination of parental

rights, and Grandparents intended to adopt Child. On July 2, 2015, the

juvenile court issued its findings, conclusions, and order terminating Father’s

parental rights. Father now appeals.

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 Discussion and Decision

I. Due Process Violation
[12] The Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibits state action that

deprives a person of life, liberty, or property without a fair proceeding. In re

C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 916 (Ind. 2011) (citing In re Paternity of M.G.S., 756

N.E.2d 990, 1004 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied). When the State seeks to

terminate the parent-child relationship, it must do so in a manner that meets the

requirements of due process. Id. at 917. Although due process has never been

defined, the phrase embodies a requirement of fundamental fairness. Id. The

fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a

meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge,

424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).

[13] In determining if a parent’s due process rights have been violated in a

termination of parental rights proceeding, the following three factors are

balanced: (1) the private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of

error created by the State’s chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing

governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure. Id. (citing

A.P. v. Porter Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 734 N.E.2d 1107, 1112 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2000), trans. denied). “The balancing of these factors recognizes that

although due process is not dependent on the underlying facts of the particular

case, it is nevertheless ‘flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the

particular situation demands.’” Id. (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334). Both a

parent’s interest in the care, custody, and control of his child and the State’s
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 interest in protecting the welfare of a child are substantial, and therefore, when

assessing if there has been a denial of due process, we focus on the risk of error

created by the State’s actions. Id. at 918.

[14] Father argues that his due process rights were violated because he was not

afforded visitation with Child even though he repeatedly requested visitation

through DCS. He contends that, although the juvenile court ordered video

visitation, he was not able to have contact with Child because she was ill, and

even after she recovered, no other visitations were arranged. Father also claims

that DCS obtained a therapist’s recommendation that visitations not occur

because they would be harmful to Child. He asserts that since DCS was in the

best position to ensure that visitations occurred between him and Child, he was

denied due process when DCS failed to allow him to have visitation with Child.

[15] Initially, we note that Father has waived this argument by failing to raise it

during the CHINS case or termination proceedings. It is well established that a

party on appeal may waive a constitutional claim. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Office

of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 194 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Generally, an

issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, and when a party does so, it

waives the claim. In re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832, 834 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)

(finding mother’s claim that her due process rights were violated was waived

because she raised the claim for the first time on appeal). Here, Father does not

point to any place in the record where he raised this due process issue to the

juvenile court. Therefore, as Father is raising this issue for the first time on

appeal, we conclude that he has waived his claim.

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[16] Waiver notwithstanding, Father’s argument fails. DCS is not required to offer

a parent services aimed at reunification with the child when the parent is

incarcerated. Castro v. State Office of Family & Children, 842 N.E.2d 367, 377

(Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (determining DCS’s failure to offer incarcerated parent

services did not constitute a deprivation of due process rights), trans. denied.

“[T]he law concerning termination of parental rights does not require [DCS] to

offer services to the parent to correct the deficiencies in childcare.’” In re B.D.J.,

728 N.E.2d 195, 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). “‘Individuals who pursue criminal

activity run the risk of being denied the opportunity to develop positive and

meaningful relationships with their children.’” K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child

Servs., Dearborn Cnty. Office, 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1235-36 (Ind. 2013) (quoting In re

A.C.B., 598 N.E.2d 570, 572 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)).

[17] Here, the evidence showed that Father had been incarcerated since before Child

was born and had only seen her a few times when she was less than four

months old and before she was removed from Mother’s care. Clark, Child’s

therapist, recommended against Child visiting Father in prison because an

incarcerated setting would not be appropriate for Child, who was only three

and a half years old. Clark also expressed concern due to the fact that Child

had never met Father, and due to the fact that Child suffered from separation

anxiety and that she would have increased anxiety in an incarcerated setting.

[18] Further, although visitation never occurred after Child became a ward of DCS,

the juvenile court did order visitation to occur in October 2013, which was

unable to take place due to Child becoming ill. Later, in February 2014, the

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 juvenile court ordered video visitation to occur through Aunt, but she was not

able to set up any visitations until March 20, 2015. Therefore, based on the

evidence, visitation was actually court-ordered, but did not occur due to other

issues. Additionally, although the therapist did recommend against visitations

due to the incarcerated setting, restrictions on visitations and services are

justified when a parent is incarcerated and do not constitute a due process

violation. See Castro, 842 N.E.2d at 377. Father has not demonstrated any

violation of his due process rights.

II. Termination Order Not Clearly Erroneous
[19] We begin our review by acknowledging that this court has long had a highly

deferential standard of review in cases concerning the termination of parental

rights. In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. When

reviewing a termination of parental rights case, we will not reweigh the

evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258,

265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence

and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id.

Moreover, in deference to the trial court’s unique position to assess the

evidence, we will set aside the court’s judgment terminating a parent-child

relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d at 14.

[20] Here, in terminating Father’s parental rights to Child, the juvenile court entered

specific findings and conclusions. When a trial court’s judgment contains

specific findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard

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 of review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147

(Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings,

and second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id.

“Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to

support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98,

102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the trial court’s

decision, we must affirm. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150,

1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[21] The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In

re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 923 (Ind. 2011). These parental interests, however, are

not absolute and must be subordinated to the child’s interests when determining

the proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights. In re J.C., 994

N.E.2d 278, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). In addition, although the right to raise

one’s own child should not be terminated solely because there is a better home

available for the child, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is

unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. Id.

[22] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, the State is

required to allege and prove, among other things:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

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 (i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement
outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the
parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the
child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). The State’s burden of proof for establishing these

allegations in termination cases “is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” In

re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2).

Moreover, if the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in section

4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a) (emphasis added).

[23] In his argument, Father does not challenge any of the juvenile court’s findings

of fact. As Father does not challenge any of the juvenile court’s findings of fact,

these unchallenged facts stand as proven. See In re B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373

(Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (failure to challenge findings by the trial court resulted in

waiver of the argument that the findings were clearly erroneous), trans. denied;

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 McMaster v. McMaster, 681 N.E.2d 744, 747 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (when father

failed to challenge specific findings, court accepted them as true).

[24] Father argues that that DCS failed to prove the required elements for

termination by sufficient evidence. Specifically, he contends that DCS failed to

prove by clear and convincing evidence that the conditions that resulted in

Child being removed would not be remedied because the juvenile court did not

take proper consideration of his current abilities and progress made. Father

further alleges that DCS failed to present sufficient evidence that the

continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of

Child because there was no evidence there would be any negative effect on

Child if the relationship between her and Father continued. Father lastly

asserts that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that

termination of his parental rights was in the best interests of Child because it

was error to rely on the CASA’s testimony, as a conclusion on this element

should be based on the totality of the evidence and the CASA did not make

contact with Father before making her determination.

[25] In determining whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that

led to a child’s removal and continued placement outside the home would not

be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231.

First, “we must ascertain what conditions led to their placement and retention

in foster care.” Id. Second, “we ‘determine whether there is a reasonable

probability that those conditions will not be remedied.’” Id. (citing In re I.A.,

934 N.E.2d 1132, 1134 (Ind. 2010) (citing In re A.A.C., 682 N.E.2d 542, 544

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 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997))). In the second step, the trial court must judge a parent’s

fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration

evidence of changed conditions and balancing a parent’s recent improvements

against “‘habitual pattern[s] of conduct to determine whether there is a

substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.’” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d

636, 643 (Ind. 2014) (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). “We entrust that

delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent’s prior

history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” Id.

Although trial courts are required to give due regard to changed conditions, this

does not preclude them from finding that a parent’s past behavior is the best

predictor of their future behavior. Id.

[26] In the present case, the evidence showed that Child was removed from

Mother’s care in January 2012, due to Mother’s drug use, not following court

orders, and a report that Mother had gone to Tennessee and taken Child with

her. At that time, Child was placed with Grandparents, where she has

remained for the duration of the case. Father was incarcerated at the time of

Child’s birth and remained incarcerated for the entirety of the CHINS case and

termination proceedings. Child was never placed in Father’s care and custody

because he was incarcerated at the time of removal and was still incarcerated at

the time of the termination hearing with a projected release date of November

23, 2016. Further, after his release, Father planned to live in a halfway house,

and Child would be unable to live there with him. Therefore, the reason for

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 Child’s removal or the fact she was never placed in Father’s care – his

incarceration – had not been remedied at the time of the termination hearing.

[27] Father relies on Rowlett v. Vanderburgh County Office of Family & Children, 841

N.E.2d 615 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied, for his contention that evidence

of his rehabilitation while incarcerated constituted changed circumstances. In

Rowlett, although the father had a habitual pattern of criminal conduct and drug

use prior to incarceration, the court reasoned that this past conduct did not

accurately reflect the father’s status and ability to care for his children at the

time of the termination hearing because evidence was presented to show that

the father had made positive strides toward turning his life around and was set

to be released six weeks after the hearing. Id. at 621-22. However, in the

present case, Father was not due to be released until a year and a half after the

termination hearing, and he did not present any independent evidence to

demonstrate the positive strides shown in Rowlett. At the evidentiary hearing,

Father presented evidence that he participated in services while incarcerated

and had made significant progress in improving himself through the programs

he completed. However, other than Father’s self-serving testimony, no other

independent evidence was presented to support his contentions.

[28] Additionally, evidence was presented of Father’s extensive criminal history,

which included numerous convictions and probation violations. Father had

been convicted of two misdemeanors and four felonies since 2004 and had

violated his probation for each conviction prior to the ones for which he was

incarcerated at the time of the hearing. A juvenile court must balance a

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 parent’s recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine

whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. In re

E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. In making this determination, the juvenile court can

properly consider evidence of a parent’s prior criminal history. In re D.B., 942

N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Based on the evidence presented, we

conclude that the juvenile court did not err in finding that there was a

reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the removal and the

reasons for continued placement of Child outside the home would not be

remedied.

[29] Father also contends that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence

that there was a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child

relationship posed a threat to the well-being of Child. However, we need not

address such argument. Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written such

that, to properly effectuate the termination of parental rights, the juvenile court

need only find that one of the three requirements of subsection (b)(2)(B) has

been established by clear and convincing evidence. A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1156.

Therefore, as we have already determined that sufficient evidence supported the

conclusion that the conditions that resulted in the removal of Child would not

be remedied, we will not address any argument as to whether sufficient

evidence supported the conclusion that the continuation of the parent-child

relationship posed a threat to the well-being of Child.

[30] Father next argues that insufficient evidence was presented to prove that

termination is in the best interest of Child. In determining what is in the best

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 interests of the child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the

evidence. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing In re

D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 267), trans. dismissed. In doing so, the trial court must

subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child involved. Id.

Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where the child’s emotional

and physical development is threatened. Id. (citing In re R.S., 774 N.E.2d 927,

930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied). The trial court need not wait until the

child is irreversibly harmed such that his or her physical, mental, and social

development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child

relationship. Id. Additionally, a child’s need for permanency is an important

consideration in determining the best interests of a child, and the testimony of

the service providers may support a finding that termination is in the child’s

best interests. Id. (citing McBride, 798 N.E.2d at 203).

[31] Here, the evidence presented showed that Father was not able to provide for

Child’s needs and to provide her with the necessary stability and permanency.

At the time of the termination hearing, Father was incarcerated, and he had

been for the entirety of the CHINS case and Child’s life. He was not due to be

released until November 2016 and intended to live in a halfway house after his

release for a period of time, a place where Child could not live with him. At the

time of the hearing, Father would be incarcerated for at least another year and a

half, and he did not know or have a relationship with Child. A parent’s

historical inability to provide a suitable environment along with the parent’s

current inability to do the same supports a finding that termination of parental

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 rights is in the best interests of the children. In re A.P., 981 N.E.2d 75, 82 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2012).

[32] Further, at the time of the termination hearing, Child had been living with

Grandparents since removal and for most of her life. Evidence was presented

that removing Child from the only home she has even known would be

traumatic, particularly given that she suffered from separation anxiety. During

the time that Child has lived with Grandparents, she has made progress in

therapy, which Clark attributed to being in a familiar setting and becoming

more comfortable with Grandparents. “Permanency is a central consideration

in determining the best interests of a child.” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1265.

FCM Rutherford testified that Child needed permanency and stability and that

termination and adoption were in Child’s best interests. Tr. at 107, 113. She

based her recommendations on Father’s incarceration and his lack of a bond

with Child. Id. at 113-14. Further, the CASA testified that termination was in

the best interests of Child because of Father’s continued incarceration, Child’s

lack of a relationship with Father, and the trauma that could occur if Child was

removed from the only home she has ever known. Id. at 79-80. Based on the

above, we conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to prove that

termination was in the best interest of Child.

[33] We will reverse a termination of parental rights “only upon a showing of ‘clear

error’-- that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake

has been made.” In re A.N.J., 690 N.E.2d 716, 722 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)

(quoting In re Egly, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 1992)). Based on the record

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 before us, we cannot say that the juvenile court’s termination of Father’s

parental rights to the Child was clearly erroneous. We therefore affirm the

juvenile court’s judgment.

[34] Affirmed.

[35] Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.

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