24th Senatorial District Republican Committee v. Alcorn

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1478

24TH SENATORIAL DISTRICT REPUBLICAN COMMITTEE;
KENNETH H. ADAMS, individually and as Chairman of the
24th Senatorial District Republican Committee,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

and

DANIEL MOXLEY,

Intervenor/Plaintiff,

JAMES B. ALCORN, in his official capacity as Chairman of the
Virginia State Board of Elections; CLARA BELLE WHEELER, in
her official capacity as Vice-Chairman of the Virginia State
Board of Elections; SINGLETON B. MCALLISTER, in her official
capacity as Secretary of the Virginia State Board of
Elections; VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF ELECTIONS;
EMMETT W. HANGER, JR.,

Defendants - Appellees.
-------------------------------------

REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VIRGINIA, INC.,

Amicus Supporting Appellants.

No. 15-1483

DANIEL MOXLEY,

Intervenor/Plaintiff – Appellant,
24TH SENATORIAL DISTRICT REPUBLICAN COMMITTEE; KENNETH H.
ADAMS, individually and as Chairman of the 24th Senatorial
District Republican Committee,

Plaintiffs,

Defendants - Appellees.
-------------------------------------
REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VIRGINIA, INC.,

Amicus Supporting Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Harrisonburg. Elizabeth K. Dillon,
District Judge. (5:15-cv-00012-EKD)

Argued: December 9, 2015 Decided: April 19, 2016

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and GREGORY and DIAZ, Circuit
Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Gregory wrote the majority
opinion, in which Judge Diaz joined. Chief Judge Traxler wrote
a dissenting opinion.

ARGUED: Jeffrey R. Adams, WHARTON, ALDHIZER & WEAVER, PLC,
Harrisonburg, Virginia, for Appellants. Joshua D. Heslinga,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellees. Richard Dean Boyer, BOYER LAW
FIRM, PLLC, Lynchburg, Virginia, for Intervenor. ON BRIEF:
Thomas E. Ullrich, WHARTON, ALDHIZER & WEAVER, PLC, Staunton,
2
Virginia; John C. Wirth, NELSON, MCPHERSON, SUMMERS & SANTOS,
L.C., Staunton, Virginia, for Appellants. Mark R. Herring,
Attorney General of Virginia, Cynthia E. Hudson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General, John W. Daniel II, Deputy Attorney General,
Kristina Perry Stoney, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Anna T. Birkenheier, Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees
Alcorn, Wheeler, McAllister, and the Virginia Department of
Elections; Chris Ashby, ASHBY LAW PLLC, Alexandria, Virginia,
for Appellee Emmett W. Hanger, Jr. Patrick M. McSweeney,
MCSWEENEY, CYNKAR & KACHOUROFF, PLLC, Powhatan, Virginia, for
Amicus Curiae.

3
GREGORY, Circuit Judge:

The 24th Senatorial District Republican Committee of

Virginia and Committee Chairman Kenneth H. Adams (together, the

“Committee”), and Plaintiff-Intervenor Daniel Moxley, appeal the

district court’s dismissal of their complaints for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). For

the following reasons, we conclude that the district court

correctly dismissed the plaintiffs’ and plaintiff-intervenor’s

complaints and therefore affirm.

Under Virginia law, political parties generally “have the

right to determine the method by which a party nomination for a

member of . . . any statewide office shall be made.” Va. Code

Ann. § 24.2-509(A). “Notwithstanding” this general rule, the

Incumbent Protection Act (the “Act”) provides that “[a] party

shall nominate its candidate for election for a General Assembly

district where there is only one incumbent of that party for the

district by the method designated by that incumbent, or absent

any designation by him by the method of nomination determined by

the party.” Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-509(B) (emphasis added).

The Republican Party of Virginia (the “Party”) is governed

pursuant to its Plan of Organization (the “Plan”), which the

4
Committee acknowledges “is the Party’s definitive statement on

any matter it addresses.” Pls.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Prelim. Inj. at

3. According to the Plan, Legislative District Committees

(“LDCs”) are unincorporated associations designated pursuant to

the Plan that “determine whether candidates for Legislative

District public office shall be nominated by Mass Meeting, Party

Canvass, Convention or Primary, where permitted to do so under

Virginia Law.” J.A. 163. The Committee is the LDC responsible

for determining the method of nomination for candidates seeking

the Republican nomination for the 24th Senatorial District for

the Virginia General Assembly.

In December 2014, the Committee exercised its authority

under the Plan and adopted a resolution designating a convention

as the method of nominating the Republican candidate for the

24th Senate District seat in the 2015 election. On February 23,

2015, incumbent state senator Emmett Hanger relied on the

authority granted to him by the Act and designated a primary as

the method of nomination.

The Committee filed this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983

and 1988 against the members of the Virginia State Board of

Elections and the Virginia Department of Elections (together,

the “Commonwealth”) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.

The Committee’s complaint alleges that the Act infringes on its

5
First Amendment right to freedom of association by preventing it

from determining the method of nomination in contravention of

the terms of the Plan. 1

Senator Hanger and Moxley, who sought the Party’s

nomination for Senator Hanger’s seat on the 24th District, both

moved to intervene. Moxley alleged that the Act violates his

constitutional rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment because it confers on an incumbent an

electoral advantage and invidiously discriminates against him

and all other potential challengers to Hanger.

Plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction

seeking to enjoin the Commonwealth from implementing a primary.

Three days before a scheduled hearing on the preliminary

injunction, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing

that the Committee failed to establish standing because the Plan

expressly incorporates Virginia law into its delegation of

authority to the LDC.

At the outset of the motion hearing, the district court

asked counsel whether there were any “issues of disputed fact.”

J.A. 203. Counsel for the Committee responded, “We believe we

1 Although the Committee argues here that it also raises an
equal protection challenge, it did not plead a claim under the
Equal Protection Clause in the district court. Because this
issue is raised for the first time on appeal, we decline to
address it. See Muth v. United States, 1 F.3d 246, 250 (4th
Cir. 1993).

6
do not.” The district court heard from both sides on the

standing issue and the proper interpretation of the Plan. See

J.A. 213-229.

The district court subsequently granted the defendants’

motions to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs failed to meet

their burden to establish standing, and denying the remaining

pending motions as moot, including the motions for preliminary

injunction.

II.

On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the district court

erred by dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. We review the district court’s dismissal for lack

of standing de novo. Lee Graham Shopping Center, LLC v. Estate

of Kirsch, 777 F.3d 678, 680 (4th Cir. 2015).

To have standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) “he has

suffered an actual or threatened injury,” (2) “a causal

connection between the injury complained of and the challenged

action,” and (3) “the injury can be redressed by a favorable

decision.” Marshall v. Meadows, 105 F.3d 904, 906 (4th Cir.

1997). An “injury in fact” is “an invasion of a legally

protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized

. . . and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or

hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,

7
560 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiffs

have the burden of alleging sufficient facts to demonstrate

standing. Marshall, 105 F.3d at 906 (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v.

City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990)).

III.

Before we turn to the language of the Plan itself, we

address the Committee’s argument that the construction of the

Plan is a jurisdictional fact intertwined with the facts central

to the merits of the dispute and that dismissal under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) prior to allowing discovery was

premature. In the alternative, the Committee argues that the

evidence was insufficient to dismiss at the 12(b)(1) stage,

particularly because the proper construction of the Plan was a

contested fact. The Committee concedes that it waived a hearing

on the motions to dismiss, but nevertheless insists that the

district court failed to develop sufficient facts to resolve the

jurisdictional issue.

“[A] defendant may challenge subject matter jurisdiction in

one of two ways.” Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192

(4th Cir. 2009) (citing Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th

Cir. 1982)). “First, the defendant may contend that a complaint

simply fails to allege facts upon which subject matter

jurisdiction can be based.” Id. (citing Adams, 697 F.2d at

8
1219). Alternatively, the defendant may contend “that the

jurisdictional allegations of the complaint were not true.”

Adams, 697 F.2d at 1219. In the second scenario, “[a] trial

court may then go beyond the allegations of the complaint” and

hold an evidentiary hearing to “determine if there are facts to

support the jurisdictional allegations.” Id. There is no

presumption of truth and the court weighs the evidence presented

in a 12(b)(1) hearing to determine jurisdiction. Id. “If,

however, the jurisdictional facts are intertwined with the facts

central to the merits of the complaint, ‘a presumption of

truthfulness should attach to the plaintiff’s allegations.’”

Rich v. United States, 811 F.3d 140, 145 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing

Kerns, 585 F.3d at 193). And “the court should resolve the

relevant factual disputes only after appropriate discovery.”

Id. (citation omitted).

The Committee relies primarily on our decision in Kerns for

its argument that dismissal at the pleading stage was premature.

However, we have said that the “controlling jurisdictional fact

in Kerns—whether an employee was acting within the scope of her

employment for purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act—has no

analog” where the issue before the court is “purely a legal

question that can be readily resolved in the absence of

discovery.” Blitz v. Napolitano, 700 F.3d 733, 739 (4th Cir.

2012). In Blitz, we analyzed whether the Transportation

9
Security Administration’s standard operating procedures for

checkpoint screening constituted an “order” under 49 U.S.C.

§ 46110. Id. at 735. The district court had decided the

question, and granted defendant’s motion to dismiss under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), without reviewing the

written procedures themselves and without an administrative

record before it. Id. at 738. We decided that because an

extensive administrative record had been filed in a similar case

before the D.C. Circuit, and that such a record would be

submitted if Plaintiffs filed their petition in the appropriate

court, the record before the district court was sufficient to

answer the jurisdictional question. Id. at 739.

Like Blitz, we find that the record before the district

court in this case was sufficient to decide the jurisdictional

question. Not only did the record contain the complete Party

Plan, the district court undertook a thorough and exacting

review of it. See J.A. 363-69.

Moreover, the Committee and the Commonwealth both clearly

represented to the district court that there were no issues of

disputed fact. J.A. 203. The Committee now contends that its

“factual stipulation” was “limited” to the motion for

preliminary injunction. There is no evidence from the

transcript that the Committee’s stipulation was indeed limited

10
in this way and no argument presented for what the legal

significance of such a limitation might be.

The Committee also fails to present a compelling argument

as to what evidence additional discovery would have brought to

light. When asked by the district court whether there was “any

evidence [they could] provide . . . as to why that particular

phrase is in that part of the plan and not in other portions of

the plan,” counsel for the Committee replied: “Not any

evidence, no.” J.A. 223. The Committee’s insistence that

discovery was necessary is particularly puzzling given the fact

that no one sought or mentioned discovery at the hearing or in

the briefs they submitted after the hearing. See J.A. 312.

Finally, the district court’s singular use of the phrase

“more reasonable” to describe the Committee’s construction of

the Plan in its opinion does not in and of itself transform what

is essentially a legal question into a factual one. “The

interpretation of a written contract is a question of law that

turns upon a reading of the document itself, and a district

court is in no better position than an appellate court to decide

such an issue.” Seabulk Offshore, Ltd. v. Am. Home Assur. Co.,

377 F.3d 408, 418 (4th Cir. 2004). Because the proper

construction of the Plan is a question of law and the record

before the district court was sufficient, we conclude that

jurisdictional discovery was not necessary.

11
IV.

Whether the Committee has standing depends on whether its

alleged injury was the result of the Act or a lawful and

voluntary decision on behalf of the Party. The Commonwealth

argues that the Party has limited its authority to determine

unilaterally the method of nomination through its adoption of

Article V Section D(1)(a) of the Party Plan, which reads, “The

Legislative District Committee shall determine whether

candidates for Legislative District public office shall be

nominated by Mass Meeting, Party Canvass, Convention or Primary,

where permitted to do so under Virginia Law.” J.A. 163

(emphasis added). We agree.

We have previously held that where an “alleged injury is

caused by a voluntary choice made by the Virginia Republican

Party and not [the challenged state law],” plaintiffs do not

establish causation. Marshall, 105 F.3d at 906. In Marshall,

two members of the Party challenged Virginia’s open-primary law,

which allows primary voting for all individuals qualified to

vote regardless of party affiliation, alleging that it burdened

their rights to free speech and freedom of association. Id. at

905 (citing Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-530). Then-incumbent U.S.

senator John Warner exercised his power under the Act and

12
selected a primary as the means of nomination for his seat. Id.

Several months later, the Party also adopted a primary. Id.

The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction, and we affirmed, concluding that the

plaintiffs failed to satisfy the causation and redressability

components of the standing inquiry. Id. at 905-07. We found

that it was the Party’s decision to conduct an open primary,

rather than the open primary law itself, that was the cause of

plaintiffs’ alleged injury because (1) it was not

unconstitutional for a political party to choose an “open”

primary and (2) there was “no indication” that the Party “would

have a ‘closed’ primary in the absence of the Open Primary Law

or change to a ‘closed’ primary if we declared the Open Primary

Law unconstitutional.” Id. at 906. “In other words, if a

political party’s choice of an ‘open’ primary is a lawful and

voluntary one, the decision of the party is the cause of the

alleged ‘forced’ association, not the state law requiring the

‘open’ primary.” Id. at 906 (citing Marchioro v. Chaney, 442

U.S. 191, 199 (1979) (“There can be no complaint that the

party’s right to govern itself has been substantially burdened

by statute when the source of the complaint is the party’s own

decision.”)).

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B.

We now turn to the construction of the Plan to determine

whether the Party voluntarily submitted to the Act and

incorporated it by reference into the Plan.

“The constitution and by-laws adopted by a voluntary

association constitutes a contract between the members, which,

if not immoral or contrary to public policy, or the law, will be

enforced by the courts.” Gottlieb v. Econ. Stores, Inc., 102

S.E.2d 345, 351 (Va. 1958) (citation omitted). Therefore, we

interpret the Plan according to general principles of contract

interpretation under Virginia law.

In Virginia, “courts adhere to the ‘plain meaning’ rule in

interpreting and enforcing a contract.” Hitachi Credit Am.

Corp. v. Signet Bank, 166 F.3d 614, 624 (4th Cir. 1999). If the

contract “is complete on its face” and “plain and unambiguous in

its terms,” we do not “search for its meaning beyond the

instrument itself.” Id. Furthermore, we “read the contract as

a single document and give meaning to every clause where

possible . . . giv[ing] effect to the presumption that the

parties have not used words aimlessly.” Id. (citations

omitted.)

Whether the Party voluntarily submitted to the Act turns on

the meaning of the clause “where permitted to do so under

Virginia Law.” This phrase does not appear anywhere else in the

14
Plan, despite the fact that there are similar delegations in

three other parts of the Plan’s text. For example, article III,

section D(1)(b) provides that “[the State Central Committee]

shall determine whether candidates for statewide public office

shall be nominated by Convention, Party Canvass or Primary.”

Similarly, article IV, section D(1)(a) specifies that “The

[Congressional] District Committee shall determine whether

candidates for District public office shall be nominated by

Convention, Party Canvass or Primary.” See also art. III

§ D(1)(a) (“The Unit Committee shall determine whether

candidates for local and constitutional public offices shall be

nominated by Mass Meeting, Party Canvass, Convention, or Primary

and whether Unit Chairman and Committee members shall be elected

by Mass Meeting, Party Canvass, Convention, or Primary.”). When

asked at the hearing if the Committee had “any evidence . . . as

to why that particular phrase is in that part of the plan and

not in any other portions of the plan,” counsel for the

Committee answered, “Not any evidence, no.” J.A. 223. The

Plan’s omission of the relevant language in three near-verbatim

parallel provisions reflects a deliberate choice to provide a

limited delegation of authority to the LDCs. See Smith Barney,

Inc. v. Critical Health Sys., 212 F.3d 858, 861 (4th Cir. 2000)

(relying on the principle of expressio unius est exclusio

alterius to interpret contract clause).

15
Furthermore, the fact that the Plan defines “primary” as

“subject to the Election Laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia,

except to the extent that any provisions of such laws conflict

with this Plan, infringe the right to freedom of association, or

are otherwise invalid” indicates that the Party was well aware

of how to draft language that supported a constitutional

challenge to Virginia law. J.A. 23 (Plan at Art. II, ¶ 24)

(emphasis added). A faithful reading of the contract that

“gives effect to the presumption that the [Party has] not used

words aimlessly” requires us to view these selective omissions

and inclusions as intentional and meaningful. Hitachi, 166 F.3d

at 624. If the Party had intended to preserve its ability to

unilaterally choose the method of nomination for legislative

districts, it could have done so. Similarly, if it had intended

to give the Committee the authority to challenge a provision of

Virginia law, it could have done so. The plain language of the

contract, read as a single document, shows clearly that it did

not.

The Committee contends that the language is more naturally

read as “an acknowledgment of the potential for conflict between

the Act and the Plan . . . and a statement that the outer limits

of an LDC’s authority to select the method of nomination are

defined by the coercive force of Virginia law.” To the extent

this differs from the Commonwealth’s interpretation, it

16
certainly does not conflict with it, unless we read in

nonexistent language. And that is precisely what the Committee

would have us do—read the phrase “Virginia law” as “valid,

constitutional Virginia law” and assume that the Act is

unconstitutional. 2 In interpreting a contract under Virginia

law, however, we “cannot read in[] . . . language which will add

to or take away from the meaning of the words already contained

therein.” Wilson v. Holyfield, 313 S.E.2d 396, 398 (Va. 1984).

The Committee’s tortured reading contravenes the plain language

of the Plan and requires us to assume the outcome of the very

challenge before us.

2 The dissent relies on DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S.
Ct. 463, 469 (2015), to support the proposition that “the phrase
‘Virginia Law’ in the Plan . . . cannot be construed to include
invalid Virginia statutes.” Dissenting op. at 12. DIRECTV
concerned the interpretation of the phrase “law of your state”
in a customer service agreement arbitration clause. DIRECTV,
136 S. Ct. at 466. The California Court of Appeals had
interpreted “law of your state” to include California law it
conceded was invalidated by the Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). Id. at 467.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the California Court of
Appeal’s interpretation did “not place arbitration contracts ‘on
equal footing with all other contracts,’” did “not give ‘due
regard . . . to the federal policy favoring arbitration,’” and
therefore was “pre-empted by the Federal Arbitration Act.” Id.
at 471. DIRECTV is of no import here because no state or
federal court has held that Virginia’s Incumbent Protection Act
is unconstitutional or preempted by federal law. Thus, even if
we did construe “‘Virginia law’ to encompass only valid Virginia
law,” as the dissent suggests, the Incumbent Protection Act,
unlike California’s pre-Concepcion state law, has never been
invalidated by statute or this, or any other, Court.

17
The Committee’s attempts to distinguish the facts of

Marshall are similarly unavailing. As we explained above,

disagreement over the Plan’s meaning does not transform this

legal dispute over contract interpretation into a factual one.

Moreover, our holding in Marshall was clear: where the alleged

injury is caused by the Party’s voluntary choice, the Party does

not establish causation. 105 F.3d at 906. The injury in both

cases is traceable to the Party’s voluntary choice: in

Marshall, the choice was to hold an open primary. Id. Here,

the choice was to defer to the incumbent’s selected nomination

method by limiting the authority of the LDC. Whatever factual

distinctions may exist do not render inapplicable the analysis

and holding of Marshall.

Finally, the Committee’s suggestion that the district court

erred by failing to secure a definitive interpretation of the

Plan from the Party is untimely and therefore waived, as any

request should have been made to the district court. Helton v.

AT&T, Inc., 709 F.3d 343, 360 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Muth v.

United States, 1 F.3d at 250 (4th Cir. 1993)).

We conclude that the language of the Plan is clear and

unambiguous: the Plan delegates to the Committee the authority

to determine the nomination method unless Virginia law otherwise

limits that authority. Where Virginia law sets forth an

alternative method of nomination, the Plan does not give the

18
Committee the authority to supersede or challenge that

determination. Because the Party has made a voluntary choice to

limit the Committee’s authority in this way, the plaintiffs have

“no complaint that the party’s right to govern itself has been

substantially burdened by” the Act because “the source of the

complaint is the party’s own decision.” Marshall, 105 F.3d at

906 (citing Marchioro, 442 U.S. at 199). Accordingly, we affirm

the district court’s holding that the Committee lacks standing

to bring this suit.

Lastly, we address Moxley’s claim that he has standing

independent of the Party to bring his equal protection claim.

Under Virginia law, there are two entities that have the

right to determine the nomination method: political parties and

incumbents. Moxley is a member of the Party and, as a member,

he is contractually bound by the Plan’s rules and decisions.

See Gottlieb v. Econ. Stores, Inc., 102 S.E.2d 345, 351 (Va.

1958) (“The constitution and by-laws adopted by a voluntary

association constitutes a contract between the members, which,

if not immoral or contrary to public policy, or the law, will be

enforced by the courts.” (citation omitted)). The Plan does not

authorize individual party officials or members to determine the

nomination method for legislative districts. Moxley seems to

19
recognize this, as he acknowledges that if the Committee had

chosen a primary, he would have been “uninjured” because he has

“no legal claim to any other method of nomination.” J.A. 344.

Because neither Virginia law nor the Plan gives Moxley “a

legally protected interest” in determining the nomination method

in the first place, he fails to make out “an invasion of a

legally protected interest,” i.e. actual injury, in this case.

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (emphasis added); see, e.g., Friends for

Ferrell Parkway, LLC v. Stasko, 282 F.3d 315, 321 (4th Cir.

2002) (observing that land transaction which would prevent

development of land previously designated as a roadway did not

impact plaintiffs’ “liberty interest in access to their

community” because “under Virginia law they have no entitlement

to the construction of a roadway”).

The dissent relies on out of circuit authority to support

its view that Moxley’s alleged interest in depriving his

opponent the ability to choose “the nominating method that would

best ensure his re-nomination” is sufficient to establish his

own independent standing. Dissenting op. at 4 (citing Texas

Democratic Party v. Benkiser, 459 F.3d 582, 585-87 & n.4 (5th

Cir. 2006); Schulz v. Williams, 44 F.3d 48, 53 (2d Cir. 1994);

Owen v. Mulligan, 640 F.2d 1130, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1981)). But

even if we assume Moxley has a legally protected interest, he

still fails to demonstrate how that injury is redressable by a

20
decision of this Court. In Benkiser, for example, the Fifth

Circuit found that plaintiff political party’s “threatened loss

of political power . . . likely would be redressed by a

favorable decision, which would preclude a Republican party

candidate.” Benkiser, 459 F.3d at 587 (emphasis added). Here,

however, the plain language of the Plan indicates that only the

LDC shall determine the method of nomination and only where the

application of Virginia law does not limit that authority. Even

in the absence of the Act, Moxley is bound by the LDC’s choice

of nomination method. Accordingly, even if the Act were held

unconstitutional, the Party is not precluded from “voluntarily

elect[ing]” to defer to the incumbent’s choice, “which it is

legally entitled to do.” Marshall, 105 F.3d at 907. And “there

is nothing [we] can do to prevent” the Party from deferring to

the incumbent’s choice. Id.

VI.

We must apply the plain language of the contract. For the

foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

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TRAXLER, Chief Judge, dissenting:

The majority affirms the dismissal of this case for lack of

standing because it believes the contractual term “Virginia Law”

includes Virginia statutes that are void for

unconstitutionality. Because I believe that the phrase plainly

does not encompass Virginia statutes that are invalid, and

because the Supreme Court has construed nearly identical

language to mean valid state law, I respectfully dissent.

Virginia Code § 24.2–509(A) provides that “[t]he duly

constituted authorities of the political party for the district,

county, city, or town in which any other office is to be filled

shall have the right to determine the method by which a party

nomination for that office shall be made.” 1 This lawsuit

involves constitutional challenges to a statutory exception to

that rule that can deprive the political parties of the right to

choose the nomination method for candidates for the Virginia

General Assembly. That exception, commonly referred to as the

Incumbent Protection Act (“the Act”), states in pertinent part,

“Notwithstanding Section A, . . . [a] party shall nominate its

candidate for election for a General Assembly district where

1Section 24.2-509(A) also includes similar language
concerning the nomination of candidates for the United States
Senate or for any statewide office.

22
there is only one incumbent of that party for the district by

the method designated by that incumbent, or absent any

designation by him by the method of nomination determined by the

party.” Va. Code § 24.2–509(B).

Central to this appeal is the Plan of Organization (the

“Plan”) of the Republican Party of Virginia (the “Party”), which

is a contract governing the Party’s members and operation. The

24th Senatorial District Republican Committee and its chairman

(collectively, the “Committee”) brought this action in federal

district court against the Virginia Department of Elections and

various officials with the Virginia State Board of Elections

(collectively, “the Defendants”), claiming that the Act violated

its First Amendment right to free association by denying the

Committee its right under the terms of the Plan to decide the

nomination method for candidates seeking the Republican

nomination for the Virginia General Assembly in its district.

(The Committee attached the Plan as an exhibit to its

complaint.) Senator Emmett Hanger, the incumbent, and Daniel

Moxley, a Republican challenger, later intervened in the suit.

Moxley asserted a claim alleging that the Act violated his

Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection under the law by

23
allowing the incumbent Hanger to choose the nomination method. 2

The district court eventually dismissed the entire case for lack

of standing. See Adams v. Alcorn, No. 5:15cv00012, 2015 WL

1524481 (W.D. Va. Apr. 2, 2015). The Committee and Moxley have

appealed.

We review de novo a district court order dismissing for

lack of standing. See Cooksey v. Futrell, 721 F.3d 226, 234

(4th Cir. 2013). On review of a dismissal of a complaint, we

“assume all well-pled facts to be true” and “draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Nemet Chevrolet Ltd. v.

Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009)

(alteration & internal quotation marks omitted). We also

“consider exhibits attached to the complaint.” Cooksey, 721

F.3d at 234 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiffs have “the burden of establishing standing” in

order to show that a district court possesses subject-matter

jurisdiction over a case. Miller v. Brown, 462 F.3d 312, 316

(4th Cir. 2006). The doctrine of constitutional standing

includes three components: “(1) the plaintiff must allege that

he or she suffered an actual or threatened injury that is not

conjectural or hypothetical[;] (2) the injury must be fairly

2
Senator Hanger chose a primary, whereas the Committee
favored a convention.

24
traceable to the challenged conduct; and (3) a favorable

decision must be likely to redress the injury.” Id.

The injury the Committee alleges here is the deprivation of

the right to choose the nomination method for the General

Assembly position at issue. And the injury Intervenor Moxley

alleges is that his opponent was given the unfair advantage of

being allowed to choose the nominating method that would best

ensure his re-nomination. 3 Among other relief, the parties’

3Moxley’s alleged interest in depriving his opponent of
that advantage, and thereby increasing his own prospects for
winning the nomination, is sufficient to establish his standing.
See Texas Democratic Party v. Benkiser, 459 F.3d 582, 586-87 &
n.4 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that plaintiff political party had
standing to sue to prevent opposing party from removing a
candidate from the ballot and replacing him with a new candidate
in part because obtaining that relief would improve the chance
of winning for the party’s candidate); Schulz v. Williams, 44
F.3d 48, 53 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding, based on “[t]he well-
established concept of competitors’ standing,” that political
party chairman had standing to challenge placement of another
party’s gubernatorial candidate on the ballot because that
placement could reduce the chances that the plaintiff’s party
would receive the number of votes it needed to retain its place
on the ballot); Owen v. Mulligan, 640 F.2d 1130, 1132-33 (9th
Cir. 1981) (holding that candidate had standing to sue to compel
Postal Service to cancel a bulk-mail permit being used by a
political opponent to mail political literature insofar as the
reduced-cost mailings put the plaintiff candidate at a
competitive disadvantage). Cf. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d
352, 371 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[W]hen the government erects a
barrier that makes it more difficult for members of one group to
obtain a benefit than it is for members of another group, the
injury in fact is the denial of equal treatment resulting from
the imposition of the barrier.” (alterations & internal
quotation marks omitted)).

25
complaints each request a declaration that the Act violates the

United States Constitution. The district court concluded that

the constitutionality of the Act was irrelevant because the

district court believed the Act was not the cause of these

alleged injuries and the requested declaratory relief would do

nothing to redress the alleged injuries in any event. See

Adams, 2015 WL 1524481, at *7; see also id. at *4. That is so,

the district court reasoned, because the Party chose to

incorporate the Act’s terms into its Plan, whether the Act was

constitutional or not; thus, it was the Plan, and not the Act,

that was the cause in fact of the alleged injuries. See id.;

Marshall v. Meadows, 105 F.3d 904, 906 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Because

the alleged injury is caused by a voluntary choice made by the

Virginia Republican Party and not the Open Primary Law, the

plaintiffs have not established causation.”). It is the

correctness of this reading of the Plan that is at the heart of

the case before us.

The parties agree that the Plan should be interpreted as a

contract among the members of the Republican Party of Virginia

(“the Party”) and construed according to ordinary contract

principles. See Gottlieb v. Economy Stores, Inc., 102 S.E.2d

345, 351 (Va. 1958). Because the interpretation of a written

contract presents a question of law, we review the district

26
court’s interpretation de novo. See Seabulk Offshore, Ltd. v.

American Home Assur. Co., 377 F.3d 408, 418 (4th Cir. 2004).

Under Virginia law, “[i]t is well established that, when

the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, a court must

give them their plain meaning.” Pocahontas Mining Ltd. Liab.

Co. v. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp., 556 S.E.2d 769, 771 (Va. 2002).

A court determines a contract’s plain meaning by giving its

words “their usual, ordinary, and popular meaning.” Id. at 772.

We therefore need to look at the Plan terms.

For most offices, the Plan unqualifiedly provides that

particular Party committees will choose the nomination method.

See Plan at Art. III, § D(1)(b) (providing that the [“State

Central Committee”] will decide the nomination method for

candidates for statewide public office); Plan at Art. IV, §

D(1)(a) (providing that the “District Committee” will decide the

nomination method for candidates for the United States House of

Representatives; Plan at Art. VI, § D(1)(a) (providing that the

“Unit Committee” will decide the nomination method for

candidates for local and constitutional public offices). This

choice reflects the fact that Virginia law gives political

parties the unqualified right to make those decisions with

regard to their candidates for those offices. See Va. Code §

24.2–509(A). The Plan provision concerning the General

Assembly, however, has a special proviso that reflects the Act’s

27
potential to deny the Party the right to choose the nomination

method. Accordingly, it states:

The Legislative District Committee shall determine
whether candidates for Legislative District public
office shall be nominated by Mass Meeting, Party
Canvass, Convention or Primary, where permitted to do
so under Virginia Law.

Plan at Art. V, § D(1)(a) (emphasis added).

Central to these appeals is the question of how the

emphasized language (the “qualifying language”) applies if the

Act, which gives the nomination-method decision to an incumbent,

is unconstitutional. The Committee argues the Act is

unconstitutional and cannot be applied, thus giving the election

decision to the Committee. The Defendants contend that

“Virginia Law” includes the Act, even if it is unconstitutional.

In my view, the plain meaning of the Plan is the one that

the Committee urges. Both the United States Supreme Court and

the Supreme Court of Virginia have held that the law of a

particular state includes the United States Constitution, such

that an unconstitutional Virginia statute is no law at all. See

Howlett ex rel. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367 (1990)

(“[T]he Constitution and laws passed pursuant to it are as much

laws in the States as laws passed by the state legislature.”);

Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376 (1879) (“An unconstitutional

law is void, and is as no law.”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.

137, 180 (1803) (“[A] law repugnant to the constitution is

28
void.”); Spiak v. Seay, 40 S.E.2d 250, 251 (Va. 1946) (“The

provision of the Constitution of the United States on interstate

extradition, together with the Acts of Congress on the subject,

are a part of the supreme law of the land and therefore a part

of the law of each State.”). For that reason, the ordinary and

natural meaning of “Virginia Law” does not include Virginia

statutes that are void because they violate the U.S.

Constitution.

Indeed, only days after we heard oral argument in the

present case, the Supreme Court held that language nearly

identical to that now before us unambiguously conveyed that very

meaning. See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 469

(2015). In that case, DIRECTV entered into a service contract

with its customers that included an arbitration provision that

stated that it would be unenforceable if the “law of your state”

made waivers of class arbitration unenforceable. Id. at 466

(internal quotation marks omitted). Another section of the

contract provided that the arbitration provision “shall be

governed by the Federal Arbitration Act.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). Two of DIRECTV’s customers brought

suit in 2008 against DIRECTV in a California state court seeking

damages for early termination fees that the customers alleged

violated California state law. See id. Invoking the

29
arbitration provision, DIRECTV requested arbitration. See id.

The state trial court denied the request. See id.

DIRECTV appealed to the California Court of Appeal, which

affirmed. See id. at 466-67. Under that court’s analysis, the

enforceability of the arbitration provision turned on the effect

of a rule of California state law that resulted from a 2005

California Supreme Court decision, Discover Bank v. Superior

Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005), and which was embodied

in California statutory law as well (the “Discover Bank rule”). 4

See DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 466-67. Under the Discover Bank

rule, the arbitration provision would have been unenforceable as

a matter of California state law. See id. However, in 2011,

the United States Supreme Court held that the Discover Bank rule

was preempted and invalidated by the Federal Arbitration Act

(“FAA”) because the rule “st[ood] as an obstacle to the

accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives

4 Discover Bank held “that a waiver of class arbitration in
a consumer contract of adhesion that predictably involves small
amounts of damages and meets certain other criteria” that were
not contested in DIRECTV was “unconscionable under California
law and should not be enforced.” DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136
S. Ct. 463, 466 (2015) (alteration & internal quotation marks
omitted). The applicable California statutes referenced above
were sections 1751 and 1781(a) of California’s Consumers Legal
Remedies Act. See id. at 466-67.

30
of Congress” that the FAA embodied. AT&T Mobility LLC v.

Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011).

Although it recognized that Concepcion had invalidated the

Discover Bank rule, see DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 467, the

California Court of Appeal nonetheless believed that DIRECTV’s

entitlement to arbitration depended on the meaning of the

contractual phrase “law of your state,” see id. at 466.

Concluding that the parties intended that phrase to mean “the

law of California including the Discover Bank rule and

irrespective of that rule’s invalidation in Concepcion,” id. at

468, the court affirmed the lower court’s denial of DIRECTV’s

request to enforce the arbitration agreement, see id. at 467.

And the California Supreme Court denied discretionary review.

See id.

The United States Supreme Court then granted DIRECTV’s

petition for certiorari and reversed. The Court assumed that

the California Court of Appeal’s decision was correct as a

matter of state contract law, but nonetheless considered whether

that state law was consistent with the FAA. See id. at 468.

The Supreme Court concluded that in ruling that “law of your

state” included state laws that were invalidated by federal law,

the California court did not “place[] arbitration contracts on

equal footing with all other contracts.” DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at

468-69 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court

31
offered many reasons for its conclusion, most of which related

to the fact that the California court’s interpretation could not

be justified in light of generally applicable law. 5 See id. at

468-71.

The Court began by considering the ordinary meaning of the

phrase “law of your state.” The Court concluded that the

natural meaning is “valid state law.” Id. at 469. In fact, the

Court determined that it would not even be reasonable to read

“law of your state” to include state law that was invalid under

the Supremacy Clause. See id. And the Court noted that it had

not found any contract case from any state “that interprets

similar language to refer to state laws authoritatively held to

be invalid.” Id.; see id. at 470 (“[W]e can find no similar

case interpreting the words ‘law of your state’ to include

invalid state laws.”).

The Court also noted that construing “law of your state” to

exclude law that was invalidated after the formation of the

contract would be consistent with applicable principles of

contract interpretation. See id. at 469. The Court

5
The Court also noted that particular language the Court of
Appeal used suggested that the court might have intended its
holding to be limited to the arbitration context. See id. at
470.

32
particularly cited California caselaw holding that plea

agreements, which are construed according to normal contract

principles, are “‘deemed to incorporate and contemplate not only

the existing law but the reserve power of the state to amend the

law or enact additional laws.’” Id. (quoting Doe v. Harris, 302

P.3d 598, 601-02 (Cal. 2013)). And the Court referred to the

fact that “judicial construction of a statute ordinarily applies

retroactively.” Id. (citing Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc.,

511 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1994)).

In my view, the reasons cited by the Supreme Court in

DIRECTV also demonstrate that the phrase “Virginia Law” in the

Plan before us here cannot be construed to include invalid

Virginia statutes. Under the Supreme Court’s reasoning, the

ordinary meaning of the phrase “Virginia Law” is “valid

[Virginia] law,” and a reading that included invalid Virginia

statutes would not even be reasonable. Id. (emphasis in

original). Additionally, the contract and statutory principles

that the DIRECTV Court relied on provide further support this

interpretation, just as they supported the DIRECTV Court’s

similar interpretation. 6 See id.

6
Similar to the California caselaw cited by the Supreme
Court in DIRECTV, see id. at 469, the Supreme Court of Virginia
has held, in the context of interpreting a plea agreement, that
“contracts are deemed to implicitly incorporate the existing law
and the reserved power of the state to amend the law or enact
(Continued)
33
Because I would construe “Virginia Law” to encompass only

valid Virginia law, I would read “Virginia Law” – and Virginia

Code § 24.2-509(A) in particular – to “permit[]” the Committee

to choose the nomination method in the event that § 24.2-509(B)

is unconstitutional. See Va. Code § 24.2-509(A) (“The duly

constituted authorities of the political party for the district,

county, city, or town in which any other office is to be filled

shall have the right to determine the method by which a party

nomination for that office shall be made.”). And because I

would read the Plan as authorizing the Committee to choose the

nominating method in the event that § 24.2-509(B) is

unconstitutional, I do not agree with the district court’s

conclusion that it is the Plan itself that is the cause of the

parties’ alleged injuries and an obstacle preventing

redressability. 7 Accordingly, I would hold that the district

additional laws for the public welfare.” Smith v. Commonwealth,
743 S.E.2d 146, 150 (Va. 2013).
7The fact that no court has determined prior to the
initiation of this case that § 24.2-509(B) is unconstitutional
has no bearing on standing. Under DIRECTV’s reasoning,
“Virginia Law” excludes invalid Virginia statutes, including
unconstitutional statutes whose unconstitutionality had not yet
been recognized by any court at the time the Plan was adopted.
See DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 466-71 (holding that the “law of your
state” excluded state laws that, after the formation of the
contract at issue – and after the initiation of the lawsuit at
issue – were held by the Supreme Court to be preempted by the
FAA). Consequently, if the Committee and Moxley are correct on
(Continued)
34
court erred in concluding that the Committee and Moxley failed

to establish standing under our Marshall decision.

Defendants contend that, even if the Committee and Moxley

would otherwise have established standing, they failed to do so

because Virginia could have enacted legislation requiring a

particular nomination method without running afoul of the

Constitution. See Appellees’ brief at 29-32 (citing Miller v.

Brown, 503 F.3d 360, 368 (4th Cir. 2007)). However, even if

Defendants are correct that Virginia could have constitutionally

enacted such legislation, this argument at most goes to the

merits of the claims asserted in this case; it does not relate

to standing. See Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Indep.

Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2663-65 (2015) (Arizona

legislature challenged statute on basis that it deprived

legislature of its constitutional authority to initiate

redistricting; although Court concluded that legislature did not

have the authority it asserted, that point related only to the

the merits of their claims that § 24.2-509(B) is
unconstitutional, then they are also correct, under the
reasoning of DIRECTV, that “Virginia Law” does not include
§ 24.2-509(B) and that the Plan authorizes the Committee to
choose the nomination method.

35
merits of the legislature’s claim, not to its standing to assert

the claim).

The Committee alleged injuries from operation of the Act in

that it prevents it from selecting the nomination method for the

General Assembly position at issue here. Moxley alleged

injuries from the Act in that it was allowing his opponent to

choose the nominating mechanism that he believed would best

ensure his reelection. Both sought to have the Act declared

void so that the Committee’s designation of a convention would

be upheld and their injuries could be avoided. These

allegations were sufficient to establish that the dispute would

“be resolved . . . in a concrete factual context conducive to a

realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action,”

as the standing doctrine requires. Valley Forge Christian

College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,

Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). I therefore believe the

district court erred in dismissing this case for lack of

standing. 8

8The fact that Senator Hanger defeated Moxley in the
primary long ago does not moot this appeal because the issues
presented fit into the “capable of repetition, yet evading
review” exception to the mootness doctrine. See FEC v. Wisc.
Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007). Although this
exception applies only if the issue is capable of repetition in
regard to the same plaintiff, see Stop Reckless Econ.
Instability Caused by Democrats v. FEC, 814 F.3d 221, 229-32
(4th Cir. 2016), there is a reasonable expectation that each of
(Continued)
36
II.

In sum, I would reverse the district court’s judgment

dismissing the complaints for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s

contrary decision.

the plaintiffs and intervenor Moxley will be subject to the same
action again in future elections, see North Carolina Right to
Life Comm. Fund for Indep. Political Expenditures v. Leake, 524
F.3d 427, 435 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that constitutional
challenges to system of public financing for judicial elections,
brought by two political committees and a candidate, were not
mooted by the election even though neither the political
committees nor the candidate had specifically alleged an intent
to participate in future election cycles; concluding that “there
is a reasonable expectation that the challenged provisions will
be applied against the plaintiffs again during future election
cycles”; rejecting “the argument that an ex-candidate’s claims
may be ‘capable of repetition yet evading review’ only if the
ex-candidate specifically alleges an intent to run again in a
future election”).