NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 19 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WEIKE CHENG, No. 14-70866
Petitioner, Agency No. A088-294-516
v.
MEMORANDUM*
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 13, 2016**
Before: FARRIS, TALLMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Weike Cheng, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an immigration
judge’s decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Our jurisdiction is
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s
factual findings, applying the standards governing adverse credibility
determinations created by the REAL ID Act, Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034,
1039-40 (9th Cir. 2010). We deny the petition for review in part and dismiss in
part.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination
based on inconsistencies in the record as to Cheng’s baptism, when he started
attending a house church in China, and when he decided to leave China. See
Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1048 (adverse credibility determination was reasonable
under the “totality of the circumstances”). Cheng’s explanations do not compel a
contrary result. See Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000). In the
absence of credible testimony, Cheng’s asylum and withholding of removal claims
fail. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).
Cheng fails to raise any substantive challenge to the denial of his CAT
claim. See Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1260 (9th Cir. 1996) (issues
not supported by argument are deemed waived).
We reject Cheng’s contention that the BIA failed to analyze his claim
properly.
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Finally, we lack jurisdiction to review arguments in the opening brief related
to due process or Cheng’s fear of persecution in the future because they are
unexhausted. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 2004).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
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