IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
CITY OF WILMINGTON, )
)
Appellant, )
)
v. ) C.A. No. N15C-11-152 ALR
)
NATIONWIDE INSURANCE )
COMPANY, )
)
Appellee. )
CITY OF WILMINGTON, )
)
Appellant, )
)
v. ) C.A. No. N15C-09-244 EMD
)
VICTORIA INSURANCE )
COMPANY, )
)
Appellee. )
ORDER
Upon Appellant’s Motion to Consolidate
GRANTED
Upon consideration of the motion to consolidate filed by Appellant City of
Wilmington (―City‖) for the limited purpose of deciding the motions to dismiss
filed on behalf of Appellees Nationwide Insurance Company (―Nationwide‖) and
Victoria Insurance Company (―Victoria‖), Victoria’s opposition thereto, and
Nationwide’s opposition thereto;1 the facts, arguments and legal authorities set
forth by all parties; decisional precedent; and the record of this case, the Court
finds as follows:
1. On September 28, 2015, City commenced an action against Victoria
(―Victoria Action‖), demanding a trial de novo from a Department of Insurance
Arbitration Award Panel (―Arbitration Panel‖) award dated August 28, 2015, that
found in favor of Victoria.
2. On November 18, 2015, City commenced an action against
Nationwide (―Nationwide Action‖), demanding a trial de novo from an Arbitration
Panel award dated October 19, 2015, that found in favor of Nationwide.
3. On February 26, 2016, Nationwide filed a motion to dismiss the
Nationwide Action, arguing that the Superior Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the Nationwide Action under Superior Court Civil Rule of
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 21 Del. C. § 2118(g)(3).
4. On March 2, 2016, Victoria filed a motion to dismiss the Victoria
Action, arguing that the Superior Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the
Victoria Action under Superior Court Civil Rule of Procedure 12(b)(1) and 21 Del.
C. § 2118(g)(3).
1
Specifically, on April 14, 2016, Victoria filed a response in opposition to City’s motion to
consolidate. On April 18, 2016, Nationwide filed a notice of adoption of Victoria’s response.
2
5. On March 30, 2016, City filed a motion to consolidate the Nationwide
Action and the Victoria Action for the limited purpose of considering the pending
motions to dismiss filed by Nationwide and Victoria respectively. City argues that
the motions to dismiss should be consolidated because the motions request nearly
identical relief, present an issue of first impression and, therefore, inconsistent
rulings should be avoided, and neither Victoria nor Nationwide would suffer
prejudice as a result of consolidation.
6. On March 14, 2016, Victoria responded to City’s motion to
consolidate in opposition thereto, arguing that the risk of inconsistent judgments
and the mere fact that there is a common question are insufficient to consolidate
the matters. On April 18, 2016, Nationwide filed a notice of adoption of Victoria’s
responsive motion. Nationwide and Victoria argue that each motion to dismiss
should be heard separately by an independent Superior Court judicial officer in the
interest of ―future clarity, economy, and expedition on issues to be determined by
mandatory arbitration pursuant to 21 Del. C. § 2118(g)(3).‖2
7. Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) (―Rule 42‖) provides:
When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending
before the court, in the same county or different counties, the court
may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in
the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make
2
Victoria’s Response to City’s Mot. to Dismiss, April 4, 2016, ¶ 10.
3
such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid
unnecessary costs or delay.3
The purpose of Rule 42 is to ―give the court broad discretion to decide how cases
on its docket are to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched
with expedition and economy while providing justice to the parties.‖ 4 Courts
generally take a favorable view of consolidation.5 However, there mere fact that
there is a common question present—and consolidation is permissible under Rule
42—does not mandate that a judicial officer order consolidation.6 Instead,
―[c]onsolidation is really nothing more than a case management tool.‖7
8. As already discussed, both the Nationwide Action and the Victoria
Action were commenced by City, seeking a trial de novo from an Arbitration
Panel. In both the Nationwide Action and the Victoria Action, Nationwide and
Victoria respectively filed motions to dismiss presenting nearly identical
arguments – that City is not entitled to a trial de novo from the Arbitration Panel
and the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the action under Superior
Court Civil Rule of Procedure 12(b)(1) and 21 Del. C. § 2118(g)(3).
Accordingly, both motions to dismiss involve common questions of law.
3
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 42(a) (emphasis added).
4
Dove v. Demange, 2008 WL 4152744, at *1 (Del. Super. Aug. 29, 2008) (internal citations
omitted).
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id. (internal citations omitted).
4
9. Further, Victoria is a wholly owned subsidiary of Nationwide and
Victoria and Nationwide are represented by the Law Office of Cynthia G. Beam.
10. In the interest of judicial economy and to avoid any unnecessary
costs or delay in these actions,8 the Nationwide Action and the Victoria Action
will be consolidated for the limited purpose of considering the nearly identical
motions to dismiss filed by Nationwide and Victoria.
11. This judicial officer will consider the consolidated motion to
dismiss, now under advisement as of April 20, 2016.
NOW, THEREFORE, this day of 20th day of April, 2016, Appellant
City of Wilmington’s motion to consolidate for the limited purpose of
considering the motions to dismiss filed on behalf of Appellees Nationwide
Insurance Company and Victoria Insurance Company is hereby GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Andrea L. Rocanelli
____________________________________
The Honorable Andrea L. Rocanelli
8
See Super Ct. Civ. R. 42(a) (―. . . and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein
as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.‖).
5