FIRST DIVISION
DOYLE, C. J.,
ANDREWS, P. J., and RAY, J.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
http://www.gaappeals.us/rules
April 22, 2016
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A16A1237. THE STATE v. REID.
ANDREWS, Presiding Judge.
The State appeals the grant of a motion to suppress results of a blood test taken
pursuant to the Georgia implied consent law. We reverse.
The evening of February 8, 2015, a Georgia state trooper pulled Jessica Reid
over for speeding. In the course of that traffic stop, the trooper suspected Reid had
been driving under the influence of alcohol and he arrested her after conducting some
field sobriety tests. After reading her the Georgia implied consent notice, the trooper
transported Reid to a county fire department EMS to have a blood test. Before the
blood draw, Reid signed an EMS form stating: “I hereby consent to allow
SSFD/EMS, acting at the request of the Officer identified below and as an agent of
a licensed law enforcement agency, to draw a blood sample for the purpose of
determining the presence of alcohol or any other drug.” The state trooper also
executed the EMS form below Reid’s signature, stating that his request for a blood
draw was made pursuant to the Georgia implied consent law.
Reid subsequently moved to suppress the blood test results on the ground she
had not given actual consent to the blood draw as required by Williams v. State, 296
Ga. 817 (771 SE2d 373) (2015). Considering the totality of the circumstances, the
trial court found the State only showed that Reid acquiesced to the blood draw in the
context of the implied consent law, i.e., out of concern she would lose her license if
she refused the test. As such, the trial court suppressed Reid’s blood test results on
the ground Reid’s consent to the blood test was not free and voluntary.
Williams rejected [a] per se rule automatically equating an affirmative
response to the implied consent notice with actual consent to a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Instead, courts must now
conduct a case-by-case analysis, considering the totality of the
circumstances. . . . A consent to search will normally be held voluntary
if the totality of the circumstances fails to show that the officers used
fear, intimidation, threat of physical punishment, or lengthy detention to
obtain the consent.
Kendrick v. State, 335 Ga. App. 766, 769 ( SE2d ) (Feb. 23, 2016).
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In the instant case, Reid verbally agreed to submit to the requested blood test,
and she also executed a written consent that specifically indicated it was for the
purpose of determining the presence of alcohol in her blood. The state trooper’s video
of the stop and administration of the field sobriety tests shows Reid clearly
understood the situation and articulately pleaded with the officer not to arrest her. The
video also fails to show any coercive circumstances that would undercut the
voluntariness of Reid’s consent.
“[W]e do not read Williams’ rejection of a per se rule of consent under the
implied consent statute as authorizing us to replace it with its opposite—that is, a per
se rule that the State must always show more than consent under the implied consent
statute. . . . An affirmative response to the question posed by the implied consent
language may be sufficient . . . to find actual consent, absent reason to believe the
response was involuntary.” Kendrick v. State, supra at 771-772.
As there is no evidence that Reid’s consent was anything but free and
voluntary, the trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress.
Judgment reversed. Doyle, C. J., and Ray, J., concur.
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