Filed 4/26/16 P. v. Schwartz CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D067817
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD254486)
GREGORY PHILLIP SCHWARTZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Louis R. Hanoian, Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded with
directions.
Steven S. Lubliner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Kelley A.
Johnson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I.
INTRODUCTION
The People charged Gregory Phillip Schwartz with assault with intent to commit
rape (Pen. Code, § 220, subd. (a)(1))1 (count 1); false imprisonment by violence (§§ 236,
237, subd. (a)) (count 2); assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury
(§ 245, subd. (a)(4)) (count 3); and shoplifting (§ 459.5) (count 4). A jury found
Schwartz not guilty on count 1, but guilty of the lesser included offense of assault
(§ 240); guilty of false imprisonment by violence on count 2; not guilty on count 3, but
guilty of the lesser included offense of assault (§ 240); and guilty of shoplifting on
count 4.
The trial court sentenced Schwartz to county jail for 180 days on count 4, which
the court deemed satisfied by time served. On count 2, the court sentenced Schwartz to
the upper term of three years in county jail pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (h), to
be served consecutively to the sentence imposed on count 4. The trial court imposed six-
month sentences on both counts 1 and 3, but stayed execution of the sentences pursuant
to section 654. The court imposed a restitution fine pursuant to former section 1202.42 in
the amount of $2,400, and a supervision revocation fine pursuant to section 1202.45 in
the same amount. In addition, three days after sentencing, the court issued a protective
1 Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2 (Stats. 2012, ch. 762, § 1.) Section 1202.4 is similar in all material respects with
former section 1202.4.
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order pursuant to section 136.2 precluding Schwartz from having contact with the victim
for a period of three years from the date of sentencing.3
On appeal, Schwartz claims that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in
failing to object to the trial court's imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to section
1202.4, on the ground that the fine was improperly calculated. We conclude that
Schwartz failed to establish that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to
object to the amount of the fine because the fine was within the authorized statutory
range and there is nothing in the record demonstrating that the trial court erred in the
manner in which it calculated the fine. Schwartz also claims that the trial court erred in
imposing a $2,400 supervision revocation fine and a postjudgment protective order
pursuant to section 136.2. The People concede that both the supervision revocation fine
and the protective order are unauthorized and should be stricken. We agree and order the
supervision revocation fine and the protective order stricken.
II.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND4
Schwartz shoplifted property from a store and assaulted a woman in a bathroom
stall of the store.
3 The court had issued a nearly identical protective order on the date of sentencing,
but the expiration date on the order was incorrect.
4 We provide an abbreviated summary of the facts related to Schwartz's convictions
because the underlying facts are not relevant to the claims asserted on appeal.
3
III.
DISCUSSION
A. Schwartz cannot establish in this direct appeal that his counsel provided
ineffective assistance in failing to object to the court's imposition of a restitution
fine in the amount of $2,400
Schwartz claims that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to
object to the court's imposition of a restitution fine in the amount of $2,400. Schwartz
argues that the trial court "clearly attempted" to apply the formula for calculating such
fines specified in former section 1202.4, subdivision (b)(2), but that the court improperly
included his misdemeanor convictions in counts 1, 3, and 4 in performing such
calculation. We conclude that because the fine was within the authorized statutory range
and there is nothing in the record demonstrating that the trial court attempted to utilize
the formula specified in former section 1202.4, subdivision (b)(2), Schwartz cannot
establish that his counsel was ineffective in failing to raise an objection to the amount of
the fine.
1. Governing law
a. Former section 1202.4
Former section 1202.4 provides in relevant part:
"(b) In every case where a person is convicted of a crime, the court
shall impose a separate and additional restitution fine, unless it finds
compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so, and states
those reasons on the record.
"(1) The restitution fine shall be set at the discretion of the court and
commensurate with the seriousness of the offense, but shall not be
less . . . three hundred dollars ($300) starting on January 1, 2014,
and not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), if the person is
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convicted of a felony, and shall not be less than . . . one hundred fifty
dollars ($150) starting on January 1, 2014, and not more than one
thousand dollars ($1,000), if the person is convicted of a
misdemeanor.
"(2) In setting a felony restitution fine, the court may determine the
amount of the fine as the product of the minimum fine pursuant to
paragraph (1) multiplied by the number of years of imprisonment the
defendant is ordered to serve, multiplied by the number of felony
counts of which the defendant is convicted."
b. Ineffective assistance of counsel
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show
that counsel's performance was deficient in that it "fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness," evaluated "under prevailing professional norms." (Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688 (Strickland); accord, People v. Ledesma (1987) 43
Cal.3d 171, 216 (Ledesma).) "When examining an ineffective assistance claim, a
reviewing court defers to counsel's reasonable tactical decisions, and there is a
presumption counsel acted within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance."
(People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) Thus, "[w]hen the record on direct appeal
sheds no light on why counsel failed to act in the manner challenged, defendant must
show that there was ' " 'no conceivable tactical purpose' " for counsel's act or omission.' "
(People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 675.) In addition, "[c]ounsel is not ineffective
for failing to raise futile objections." (People v. Ramirez (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 992,
1002 (Ramirez).)
If counsel's performance has been shown to be deficient, the defendant is entitled
to relief only if he can also establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness.
5
(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 691-692; accord, Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at
p. 217.)
2. Factual and procedural background
The probation report indicated that Schwartz was convicted of one felony and
three misdemeanors. The report recommended that Schwartz be sentenced to three years
in county jail on count 2, with the final year to be suspended and served in the
community while under mandatory supervision. The report also recommended that the
court require Schwartz to pay a "[r]estitution fine pursuant to [former section] 1202.4[,
subdivision] (b) in the amount of $2,400." The probation report did not indicate how this
figure was calculated nor did it discuss any reason for setting the amount of the fine at
$2,400.
At sentencing, the trial court initially followed the probation report's
recommendation as to the sentence on count 2. The court also imposed a restitution fine
pursuant to former section 1202.4 in the amount of $2,400, stating, "The defendant will
pay a restitution fine to the state victims['] restitution fund in the amount of $2,400."
After a break in the proceedings, defense counsel informed the court that Schwartz
would prefer to serve the entire three-year sentence on count 2 in custody rather than
serving two years in custody and one year on mandatory supervision in the community.
The court granted Schwartz's request and sentenced Schwartz to three years in county jail
on count 2.
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3. Application
Schwartz argues that the amount of the fine ($2,400) suggests that the court
determined the fine by using the formula specified in former section 1202.4, subdivision
(b)(2)—multiplying the minimum fine ($300) by the number of years in custody (2)5
multiplied by the total number of convictions (4), which equals $2,400. Schwartz notes
that calculating the fine in this manner would be improper because former section 1202.4,
subdivision (b) expressly excludes using misdemeanors in applying the formula.
We are not persuaded. As Schwartz acknowledges, the trial court's imposition of a
$2,400 restitution fine was well within the authorized statutory range of $300 to $10,000.
(Former § 1202.4, subd. (a)(1).) Further, neither the probation report nor any other
document in the record referred to the discretionary formula contained in former section
1202.4, subdivision (b)(2) that a trial court "may" use in setting the felony restitution
fine. (Former § 1202.4, subd. (b)(2).) In addition, the trial court did not indicate at
sentencing that it was using the formula specified in former section 1202.4, subdivision
(b)(2).
Thus, this case is unlike People v. Martinez (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1169, 1189-
1190 (Martinez) and People v. Le (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 925, 932-936 (Le) on which
Schwartz relies. In those cases, the Court of Appeal concluded that trial counsel had
been ineffective in failing to object to a trial court's improper application of the formula
5 Schwartz notes that the trial court initially stated that it would impose the sentence
recommended by the probation report, i.e., two years in county jail followed by a year of
mandatory supervision.
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specified in prior versions of section 1202.4, subdivision (b)(2).6 Unlike in Martinez and
Le, there is nothing in the record demonstrating that the trial court improperly applied the
formula in former section 1202.4, subdivision (b)(2). In the absence of such evidence,
we must presume that the trial court applied the proper law in exercising its discretion in
imposing a restitution fine. (See, e.g., People v. Mack (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 1026, 1032
["It is a basic presumption indulged in by reviewing courts that the trial court is presumed
to have known and applied the correct statutory and case law in the exercise of its official
duties"].) Thus, there is nothing in the record demonstrating that the trial court erred in
setting the fine. Schwartz thus cannot demonstrate that counsel was ineffective for
failing to raise an objection to the fine, because counsel may have reasonably determined
that such an objection would have been overruled. (See Ramirez, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1002 [trial counsel is not required to raise futile objections].)
Accordingly, we reject Schwartz's claim that his counsel provided ineffective
assistance in failing to object to the court's imposition of a restitution fine in the amount
of $2,400.
B. The trial court's imposition of a supervision revocation fine pursuant to section
1202.45 was unauthorized and the fine must be stricken
Schwartz argues that the trial court erred in imposing a $2,400 supervision
revocation fine (§ 1202.45) and contends that the fine must be stricken. The People
6 Schwartz acknowledges in his brief that "the records in Martinez and Le contained
explicit statements that the statutory formula was being used."
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concede that the trial court erred in imposing the fine and contend that the fine should be
stricken. We order the fine stricken.
Section 1202.45 provides in relevant part:
"(a) In every case where a person is convicted of a crime and his or
her sentence includes a period of parole, the court shall, at the time
of imposing the restitution fine pursuant to subdivision (b) of
Section 1202.4, assess an additional parole revocation restitution
fine in the same amount as that imposed pursuant to subdivision (b)
of Section 1202.4.
"(b) In every case where a person is convicted of a crime and is
subject to either postrelease community supervision under Section
3451 or mandatory supervision under subparagraph (B) of
paragraph (5) of subdivision (h) of Section 1170, the court shall, at
the time of imposing the restitution fine pursuant to subdivision (b)
of Section 1202.4, assess an additional postrelease community
supervision revocation restitution fine or mandatory supervision
revocation restitution fine in the same amount as that imposed
pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 1202.4, that may be collected
by the agency designated pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section
2085.5 by the board of supervisors of the county in which the
prisoner is incarcerated." (Italics added.)
In this case, the trial court sentenced Schwartz to three years in county jail
pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (h). The court did not impose a sentence that
included a period of parole, postrelease community supervision, or mandatory
supervision. Thus, the trial court's imposition of a supervision revocation fine pursuant to
section 1202.45 was unauthorized and must be stricken. (See People v. Cruz (2012) 207
Cal.App.4th 664, 672, fn. 6 [stating that a defendant sentenced to county jail pursuant to
section 1170, subdivision (h) "is not subject to a parole revocation restitution fine"
pursuant to section 1202.45].)
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C. The trial court's imposition of a postjudgment protective order pursuant to section
136.2 was unauthorized and must be stricken
Schwartz argues that the trial court's imposition of a postjudgment protective order
pursuant to section 136.2 was unauthorized and must be stricken. The People concede
that the protective order is unauthorized and agree that it should be stricken. We order
the protective order stricken.
Section 136.2, subdivision (a) "authorizes issuance of a protective order during the
duration of criminal proceedings." (People v. Robertson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 965,
996, italics added (Robertson).) Section 136.2, subdivision (i) authorizes the imposition
of a postjudgment protective order in cases in which the defendant has been convicted of
certain domestic violence crimes or crimes requiring sex offender registration.7 No other
subdivision of section 136.2 authorizes the imposition of a postjudgment protective order.
A defendant may raise a challenge to the imposition of an unauthorized protective order
on appeal, notwithstanding the failure to object in the trial court. (Robertson, supra, at
p. 995.) Where a trial court imposes such an unauthorized protective order, the appellate
court must strike the unauthorized order. (Id. at p. 996.)
In this case, the trial court imposed a postjudgment protective order pursuant to
section 136.2, despite the fact that Schwartz was not convicted of a qualifying offense
7 Section 136.2, subdivision (i) provides in relevant part: "(1) In all cases in which
a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime involving domestic violence as
defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, a violation of Section
261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to
subdivision (c) of Section 290, the court, at the time of sentencing, shall consider issuing
an order restraining the defendant from any contact with the victim."
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under section 136.2, subdivision (i). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court's
imposition of a postjudgment protective order pursuant to section 136.2 was unauthorized
and must be stricken.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The supervision revocation fine imposed pursuant to section 1202.45 and the
protective order imposed pursuant to section 136.2 are stricken. In all other respects, the
judgment is affirmed. The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to prepare
a corrected abstract of judgment and forward the corrected abstract to the San Diego
County Sheriff's Department.
AARON, J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, Acting P. J.
HUFFMAN, J.
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