IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-0345
Filed April 27, 2016
RANDY DEAN JONES,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Mary Pat Gunderson,
Judge.
Randy Jones appeals the district court’s denial of his application for
postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Andrew C. Abbott of Abbott Law Office, P.C., Waterloo, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Tyler J. Buller, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.
A jury found Randy Jones guilty of first-degree murder. Jones filed a
direct appeal of his judgment and sentence, which was resolved against him.
The appeal became final in 1997. Seventeen years later, Jones filed his fourth
application for postconviction relief. He asserted the trial information and certain
jury instructions were defective. The State moved for summary dismissal of the
application on the ground it was time-barred. The district court granted the
motion, and this appeal followed.
The law is clear. A postconviction-relief application “must be filed within
three years from the date the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an
appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo is issued” unless the application
raises “a ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within the
applicable time period.” See Iowa Code § 822.3 (2013). Jones’ fourth
application, filed in 2014, concededly fell outside the three-year period. The
question on appeal is whether the “ground of law” exception to the time-bar
applied to Jones’ claims.
I. Trial Information
Jones’ appellate attorney contends his challenge to the trial information
falls within the “ground of law” exception because the challenge implicates the
subject matter jurisdiction of the court, an issue that may be raised at any time.
See DeVoss v. State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 62 (Iowa 2002). However, in a pro se
brief, Jones retracts this argument, stating he “no longer relies on ‘subject matter
jurisdiction’ in this appeal.” In light of his waiver of the issue, we question the
need to reach this argument. Bypassing this concern, we are persuaded by a
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litany of opinions holding defects in a trial information do not implicate the subject
matter jurisdiction of the court. See, e.g., Fuhrmann v. State, No. 14-1504, 2015
WL 8310020, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2015) (citing the trial court’s rejection
of an assertion that the trial information was not sufficiently specific to apprise
defendant of the crime); Cannon v. State, No. 13-1661, 2015 WL 5278916, at *1
(Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2015) (rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the trial
information); Frasier v. State, No. 12-1957, 2014 WL 69671, at *2-3 (Iowa Ct.
App. Jan. 9, 2014) (rejecting an assertion that the trial information was so
defective it did not charge an offense). These opinions address the precise
defects Jones raises—the alleged failure of the trial information to include facts
supporting each element of the crime and the alleged failure of the trial
information to charge an offense. We conclude Jones’ challenge to the trial
information does not fall within the “ground of law” exception to the time-bar. See
Gonzalez v. State, No. 11-0684, 2013 WL 263356, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 24,
2013) (concluding Gonzalez knew of defects in the trial information at the time of
the underlying criminal proceeding and could have raised the defects at that
time). The district court did not err in dismissing the claim.
II. Jury Instructions
We next address Jones’ challenge to the jury instructions on felony
murder and joint criminal conduct. He contends the instructions were
inconsistent with subsequent opinions in Schuler v. State, 774 N.W.2d 294, 299
(Iowa 2009) and State v. Smith, 739 N.W.2d 289, 294 (Iowa 2007).
Jones specifically asserts the felony-murder instruction failed to require
proof that his actions caused the victim’s serious injury, as required in Schuler.
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See 774 N.W.2d at 299.1 Jones raised this claim in a prior postconviction action,
and we rejected it. See Jones v. State, No. 12-0706, 2013 WL 4506167, at *2-3
(Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2013). We stated, “An opinion that clarifies the law could
be applied retroactively but, because it is simply a clarification rather than the
announcement of a new rule of law, it could have been anticipated and raised
within the three-year limitations period.” Id. at *3. We continued,
There is no question that Schuler clarified rather than changed the
law. Jones conceded this fact. Accordingly, under Nguyen [v.
State, 829 N.W.2d 185 (Iowa 2013)] and Perez [v. State, 816
N.W.2d 354 (Iowa 2012)], Schuler was a ground of law that could
have been raised within the applicable time period. It was not
raised within three years of procedendo. For that reason, the
statute of limitations barred Jones’s claim. See Iowa Code § 822.3.
Id. Our reasoning still holds true. Because the “ground of law” exception to the
time-bar is inapplicable to Jones’ Schuler argument, the district court did not err
in dismissing the claim.
Jones’ challenge under Smith was not preserved for our review. See
Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). Although he raised the
issue in the postconviction court, he did not obtain a ruling. However, even if he
had preserved error, we would conclude the argument did not fall within the
“ground of law” exception for the same reason as his Schuler argument.
III. Challenge to Legality of Sentence
Jones argues his sentence “is inherently illegal and void due to being in
violation of the ex post facto [clauses] of the United States and Iowa
Constitutions.” Specifically, he contends his sentence for life without parole is
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In his pro se brief, Jones raises a challenge to “Instruction No. 38.” This, too, appears
to be a challenge grounded in Schuler.
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inherently illegal because his conviction for first-degree felony murder “is not
supported by an underlying forcible felony to which his jury found guilt.” This
issue was not raised in the district court. However, challenges to the legality of a
sentence, if they are indeed that, may be raised at any time. See State v.
Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 870 (Iowa 2009).
This is not such a challenge. It is a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the jury’s finding of guilt. See Gonzalez, 2013 WL 263356,
at *3 (noting Gonzalez raised a challenge to the underlying conviction, not a
challenge to the legality of the sentence). Because this claim could have been
raised within the section 822.3 limitations period, it is time-barred.
We conclude the district court did not err in dismissing Jones’ fourth
postconviction-relief application as time-barred.
AFFIRMED.