IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-0113
Filed April 27, 2016
IN THE INTEREST OF K.H.,
Minor Child,
P.H., Father,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jasper County, Steven J.
Holwerda, District Associate Judge.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child.
AFFIRMED.
Larry J. Pettigrew of Pettigrew Law Firm, P.C., Newton, for appellant
father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Meegan M. Langmaid-Keller of Keller Law Office P.C., Altoona, for minor
child.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ.
2
DOYLE, Judge.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. He
concedes the grounds for termination exist but argues that termination is not in
the child’s best interests. Because clear and convincing evidence shows
termination is in the child’s best interests, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The child came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Human
Services (DHS) in December 2014 when both parents tested positive for drug
use at the time of the child’s birth. The child was removed from the parents’ care
and adjudicated a child in need of assistance (CINA) pursuant to Iowa Code
section 232.2(6)(b), (c)(2), and (n) (2013). The mother had three other children
who had already been adjudicated CINA at the time the child at issue was born.
In January 2015, drug testing revealed the father had used both marijuana
and methamphetamine. He completed a substance-abuse evaluation in May
2015, which recommended he undergo extended outpatient treatment. The
father began outpatient treatment but stopped attending in June 2015. He never
completed formal substance-abuse treatment but reported he began receiving
treatment from a church-based support group beginning in April 2015. However,
the group does not offer counseling, provide drug screens, or require attendance.
The father was offered supervised visits with the child but failed to attend
these visits from January until April and from mid-May until mid-July 2015. He
also failed to attend a permanency hearing in June 2015. Thereafter, the
permanency goal was changed from reunification to termination of parental
rights.
3
A petition seeking to terminate parental rights was filed in October 2015,
and the termination hearing was held in December 2015. In its order, the
juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence supported terminating both
the mother’s and the father’s parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code section
232.116(1)(d), (e), (g), (h), and (l). The court further found termination was in the
child’s best interests based on the impact the parents’ substance-abuse
problems have on their ability to care for the child, their refusal to comply with the
requests made by the court and the DHS, and their inability to maintain safe and
stable housing. Finally, the court declined to apply any of the exceptions to
termination set forth in section 232.116(3). Accordingly, it terminated both the
mother’s and the father’s parental rights.1
The father appeals.
II. Scope and Standard of Review.
We review termination-of-parental-rights proceedings de novo. See In re
T.S., 868 N.W.2d 425, 431 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015). We give weight to the juvenile
court’s fact-findings, especially those concerning witness credibility. See In re
A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014). We are not bound by them, however.
See id.
III. Best Interests.
The father does not challenge the evidence supporting the grounds for
termination. He instead argues termination is not in the child’s best interests.
See Iowa Code § 232.116(2). We cannot agree. The father had been using
drugs since 2007. Although the father testified he abstained from drug use for
1
The termination of the mother’s parental rights is not at issue in this appeal.
4
more than nine months leading up to the termination hearing, no reliable
evidence substantiates his claim. Instead, the record shows the father refused to
provide a hair sample for drug testing in October 2015. When asked about his
refusal, the father testified it was his “right” to decline testing, he “didn’t want to,”
and he “felt like it’s been enough” because he had “done hair follicle tests before”
and did not want “another patch of hair taken out of [his] head.” The father
denied he declined the test due to drug use, even though he understood that
failing to take the drug test would impact his ability to have the child returned to
his care. At the termination hearing, the father provided results of a drug test
allegedly performed in November 2015 that showed no signs of recent drug use,
as well as a substance-abuse evaluation he reportedly completed in October
2015. However, neither document was provided to the DHS at any point before
the termination hearing.
There were other concerns identified beyond the father’s substance
abuse. He failed to complete a mental-health evaluation as ordered. The
evidence shows he has difficulty controlling his temper and handling
confrontation, as he demonstrated during interactions at a staffing. It was also
evident in his behavior at the termination hearing, which the juvenile court noted
in the termination order. The record indicates the father has a history of violent
aggression as he had been convicted of simple assault and there were
suspicions the father had perpetrated domestic abuse on the mother.
Furthermore, the father was unable maintain safe and stable housing, lacked
transportation, and was unemployed at the time of the termination hearing. His
visits with the child never progressed beyond supervised visits.
5
The record belies the father’s claims regarding his ability to remain sober
and provide adequate care and shelter for the child. See In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d
489, 495 (Iowa 2000) (“Insight for the determination of the child’s long-range best
interests can be gleaned from ‘evidence of the parent’s past performance for that
performance may be indicative of the quality of the future care that parent is
capable of providing.’” (citation omitted)). The father had a year in which to
demonstrate he was capable of caring for the child and failed to do so. “Time is
a critical element” in termination proceedings. Id. Once the statutory time period
for termination has passed, termination proceedings are viewed with a sense of
urgency. Id. Children are not equipped with pause buttons. See In re T.J.O.,
527 N.W.2d 417, 422 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (“Children simply cannot wait for
responsible parenting. Parenting cannot be turned off and on like a spigot. It
must be constant, responsible, and reliable.”); In re D.A., 506 N.W.2d 478, 479
(Iowa Ct. App. 1993) (“The crucial days of childhood cannot be suspended while
parents experiment with ways to face up to their own problems.”). Considering
the young age of the child, the amount of time the father was given to address
his shortcomings, and the father’s lack of progress to resolve his parenting
deficiencies, termination is in the child’s best interests. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.