FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT April 29, 2016
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
SHERMAN L. GALLOWAY,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 16-3017
(D.C. No. 5:14-CV-03165-SAC-DJW)
RAY ROBERTS, Secretary of (D. Kan.)
Corrections; STATE OF KANSAS,
Respondents - Appellees.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
Before HOLMES, MATHESON, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
Sherman L. Galloway, a pro se1 Kansas prisoner, seeks a certificate of
appealability (COA) to challenge the district court’s judgment dismissing his petition
for a writ of habeas corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.2 See 28 U.S.C.
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the
case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
1
We liberally construe Mr. Galloway’s pro se materials but do not act as his
advocate. See United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 2009).
2
Mr. Galloway’s notice of appeal referenced the denial of his motion to alter or
amend filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), but his COA materials do not mention or
otherwise challenge that ruling. We accordingly restrict our analysis to the district
court’s underlying judgment. See Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Pruitt, 669 F.3d 1159,
(continued)
§ 2253(c)(1)(A) (requiring a COA to appeal the dismissal of a § 2254 proceeding).
For the following reasons, we deny a COA and dismiss this matter.
I
Mr. Galloway is presently serving a prison term of 60 years to life for sexual
assaults and other crimes he committed against two women. His convictions, which
were obtained in separate trials, were affirmed on direct appeal, and his efforts in
state court for post-conviction relief were unavailing. See Galloway v. Shelton,
No. 94,374, 2005 WL 3098732, at *1 (Kan. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2005) (per curiam)
(unpublished) (describing procedural history). In 1990, Mr. Galloway filed his first
§ 2254 petition, which the district court denied. Galloway v. Roberts, No. 90-CV-
3148-S, 1991 WL 47404 (D. Kan. Mar. 19, 1991) (unpublished). We affirmed the
denial of relief. Galloway v. Roberts, No. 91-3125, 1991 WL 172667, at *2
(10th Cir. Sept. 5, 1991) (unpublished). Thereafter, Mr. Galloway filed two more
unsuccessful second or successive § 2254 petitions, Galloway v. McKune,
No. 94-CV-3123-DES (D. Kan. Oct. 26, 1994); Galloway v. McKune, No. 98-CV-
3347-DES (D. Kan. Aug. 4, 1999), and two unsuccessful civil actions challenging his
convictions, Galloway v. Shelton, No. 03-CV-3362-GTV (D. Kan. Oct. 20, 2003);
Galloway v. McKune, No. 07-CV-3105-SAC (D. Kan. July 13, 2007).
__________________________
1166 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[I]ssues designated for review are lost if they are not actually
argued in the party’s brief.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Most recently, Mr. Galloway filed in the district court a § 2254 petition,
asserting that his convictions were invalid because the prosecution never properly
charged him with the crimes for which he was convicted. He also claimed, based on
the same theory that his convictions were invalid because he was never lawfully
charged, that the Kansas Parole Board lacked authority and jurisdiction to consider
his suitability for parole. A magistrate judge reviewed the petition and directed
Mr. Galloway to show cause why it should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
as an unauthorized second or successive § 2254 petition. After Mr. Galloway filed
his response, the district court concluded the petition was indeed an unauthorized
second or successive § 2254 petition and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction.
Mr. Galloway moved the court to alter or amend its judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(e), but the court denied his request. Mr. Galloway now seeks a COA.
II
A COA is a jurisdictional prerequisite to appeal. See Miller-El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). A COA will issue “only if the applicant has made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
This requires that an applicant show “that jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that
jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its
procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
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Here, no reasonable jurist could debate the propriety of the district court’s
dismissal. A prisoner may not file a second or successive § 2254 petition without
first obtaining an order from the circuit court authorizing the district court to consider
the petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). Absent such authorization, “[a] district
court does not have jurisdiction to address the merits of a second or successive . . .
§ 2254 claim.” In re Cline, 531 F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)
“When a second or successive § 2254 . . . claim is filed in the district court without
the required authorization from this court, the district court may transfer the matter to
this court . . . or it may dismiss the . . . petition for lack of jurisdiction.” Id. at 1252.
Mr. Galloway’s failure to obtain our authorization prior to filing his § 2254
petition, which was clearly second or successive, compelled the district court to
either transfer it to this court in the interest of justice or dismiss it for lack of
jurisdiction. See id. Finding no basis for transfer, the court properly dismissed the
petition for lack of jurisdiction. Mr. Galloway’s arguments do not—and cannot—
demonstrate the court erred in requiring him to obtain our authorization before filing
his second or successive § 2254 petition.
Accordingly, we deny a COA and dismiss this matter.
Entered for the Court
ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk
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