FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 03 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ADRIAN COOPER, No. 15-15354
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 4:14-cv-02108-JAS-
PSOT
v.
ROBERT McFADDEN, Regional MEMORANDUM*
Director; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
James Alan Soto, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 26, 2016**
Before: McKEOWN, WARDLAW, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
Adrian Cooper appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing his
action brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging malicious prosecution and equal
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
protection claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A). We reverse and remand.
Dismissal of Cooper’s malicious prosecution and equal protection claims at
the screening stage was premature because, taking Cooper’s allegations as true and
drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, Cooper sufficiently alleged that
defendants Peterson, Campbell, and Cranford assaulted Cooper and prosecuted him
with the purpose of denying him equal protection because Cooper was an African
American who pursued grievances. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.”); Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir.
2012) (en banc) (to state a constitutional claim for malicious prosecution, a
plaintiff must allege “that the defendants prosecuted [him] with malice and without
probable cause, and that they did so for the purpose of denying [him] equal
protection or another specific constitutional right” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (“To
state a claim . . . for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause . . . a plaintiff must
show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the
2 15-15354
plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.”).
We do not address the district court’s dismissal of Cooper’s claims against
defendant McFadden as Cooper did not raise these claims in his opening brief. See
Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[A]rguments not raised by
party in its opening brief are deemed waived.”).
REVERSED and REMANDED.
3 15-15354